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ABSTRACT
Firms such as Toyota in Japan and Dell in the USA have been pioneers in introducing

organizational innovations (OIs) such as the lean production system (LPS) or its equivalent jus
time cum quality control (JJT/QC) system. Through these OIs, they have become leaders in their

respective industries, and in turn the latter became leaders in their national economies. In add
Dell successfully copied the JIT/QC system from Japan. Furthermore, these companies did not

introduce any significant technical innovations (TIs), thus reinforcing the importance of OIs. T
growth of firms and industrial sectors positively depends on OIs as well as other factors such

TIs. There is a strong need to include OIs in the analysis of sectoral industrial development s

eventually the process of economic growth is better understood. Though OIs have been one of the
research topics in management disciplines at a firm level, they have generally been ignored by
economists at a firm, sectoral, and macro growth level in favor of TIs.

This study attempts partially to fill this gap in the literature. The qualification 'partially'

the focus on the firm and sectoral analysis, both theoretical and empirical, thus excluding the

macro economy. Briefly, the aims of this thesis are threefold: First, theoretically, to justify

separate inclusion of OIs in explaining industrial and hence economic growth by using some well
known economic theories of the firm and their extension presented in this study. Second,

empirically, to provide some basic evidence that sectoral industrial growth differences are als

attributed to the presence and evolution of OIs, such as the LPS. Third, to test the hypothesis

it is possible to successfully transfer a major OI such as the JIT/QC from one country to anoth

To attain these threefold aims, the various OIs have been historically identified in the two la

economies -the USA and Japan- from the late part of the 19th century until the present. Then, th

OIs are linked with economic theories in order to justify their relevance. Finally, the empiric
analysis brings some evidence to this thesis.

Within the apparently wide range of OIs, the focus is put on the 'scientific management cum
Fordism' versus 'scientific management cum JIT/QC axis, though other OIs such as vertical

integration, multidivisional form of firms, are also recognized. All OIs are interrelated and fo
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three interlinked axes of OIs: mass production versus lean production, vertical integration ver

vertical disintegration, and networks. The empirical exploration focuses on the most recent pos

World War II period for which there is more precise data. The theoretical part of the thesis is

equally distributed between the USA and Japan, however the empirical part is more related to th

USA for two reasons. First, data availability; and second, American firms and industrial sectors
successfully copied the LPS resulting in their sustained growth and hence overall economic
development over the last 20 years.

The theoretical justification for the inclusion of OIs in explaining economic growth is gradual

built on the core of such growth, namely the firm. It is shown that the various OIs are distinc
forces, not only reducing transaction costs, increasing capabilities and competences, but also
decreasing the 'kinetic costs' of firms. These latter costs are related to the five fundamental
processes of firm operations as identified in this thesis. The main preoccupation is the link

between OIs and economic growth, mainly by scrutinizing the axis of mass production versus lean
production within firms and not so much between firms; hence the emphasis is on the internal
structure of firms. The end result of the reduction in kinetic costs and other costs is a

corresponding increase in productivity, which in turn leads to economic growth. Furthermore, th

importance of leading firms and leading industries is carefully demonstrated either theoretical
quantitatively by linking them to OIs.

The empirical parts of this study show that effectively, at different points of time, there hav
some key firms and industrial sectors that pulled the rest of the economy ahead because of the
presence of OIs. In addition, the quantitative part of this study cannot be properly evaluated
we understand well the theoretical foundations.

The consequences of the findings in this study are substantial for economic policy at all level
(government, industrial firm, or any other firm). We should encourage the implementation of

policies that promote the appearance or transfer of OIs because the later are a necessary condi
for sustained economic growth.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
The objective of this research is to answer the following questions: Have organizational
innovations (OIs) significantly and positively impacted on industrial growth, and can this be

shown both quantitatively and qualitatively? As adjuncts to this main question, some other iss

need to be answered. First, can OIs be successfully transferred from one country to another? I

particular, is it possible to provide quantitative evidence that the so-called lean production
of Japan, with its corollary of Just-In-Time/ Quality Control (JIT/QC), has been successfully
operating in the USA with a significant effect on this country's sub-sectoral and hence macro
growth? Second, what are the links between OIs and industrial growth from a theoretical point
view?

Table 1.1 summarizes the major OIs that have taken place over the last 150 years. This non-

exhaustive list is based upon the major findings presented in Chapter two. This study is devot

analyzing and exploring these OIs in relation to industrial growth, with emphasis on the inter
OIs of firms. Economic activities have been variously organized since ancient times. Farms,
estates, mines, shops, craft production, and governments are organizational entities that have

existed in many areas of the world for at least three thousand years. A large estate was the o
of the first known economic or management manual ever written, that of Xenophon (circa 370
BC). Closer to our era, the Industrial Revolution that began in Britain about 200 years ago
generated new forms of economic organization, such as the factories and the appearance of
managers. Later, in other parts of Europe, in the USA and in Japan, new forms of industrial
organization were developed, for example, the big integrated business, the M-form of firms,

'scientific management', and lean production. Many of these new organizational innovations (OI
took place in the USA from the 1870s to the 1920s, and many of them in Japan during the same
period, in the interwar period, and mainly from the 1950s to the 1970s.

2

These examples raise the following questions: what is the definition of an organizational entity
(OE) and when does this OE become an organizational innovation (OI)? An OE can be a

production form, or an industry structure, or a firm structure, or a production process, or a n
of OEs, or an institution in general1. This list of OEs depends on the object of analysis; for
instance, if we consider the production form as an OE, then the object of analysis could be the
craft production mode or the mass production mode and so on (see Table 1.1). If a factory

producing furniture is taken as a concrete example of a firm structure, it is an organizationa
(OE), which involves the following concepts: ownership, people working in it to produce output,
tools and machinery used by these people, some targets to be achieved by everybody; relations
between various employees, between employees and employers, between employees and tools and

machinery; relations between this factory and other factories or other OEs, and a learning proce
for everybody involved in this factory.

All these concepts encompass dynamic organizational interactions for the OE to survive. However,
any one of these interactions continually change and, eventually, new OEs appear. These new OEs
become OIs when they are very different from previous OEs. For example, the putting-out OE was
eventually transformed to the factory OE, hence the latter became an OI; the mass production OE

became a lean production OE and so on. In these cases, the factory OE and the lean production OE
became OIs in relation to their previous states.

In this preface, Table 1.1 summarizes the OIs that will be the object of further exploration in
thesis2. A more detailed and economics oriented analysis of these OIs will be undertaken in
subsequent chapters, thus seeking to justify their existence and value. Note that all these OEs

interrelated, either through their object or their type. For example, a lean production OE inclu

focal factories, the JJT/QC philosophy and so on. Also, all the OEs are a consequence of the typ

of underlying ownership, core competences, strategies and other features that will be analyzed i
1

Ven de Ven and Poole (1995, p. 512) provide the following similar definition: "...The entity
individual's job, a work group, an organizational strategy, a program, a product, or the overall
organization..."
2
According to this research, there are no discernible or emerging new OIs in the 1980s and 1990s, except
perhaps an Internet system that started shaping in the second half of the 1990s.

subsequent chapters. Furthermore, since O E s and OIs are virtually the same concept, with the

difference that OIs mean new and very important OEs, reference will only be made to OIs f
remainder of this study.
Table 1.1 Organizational entities (OEs) and innovations (OIs) historically

Object of O E

Type of O I

Approximate date of introduction and
country offirstappearance

Production or

Craft production

F r o m ancient times

Distribution

Putting-out production

18th century (Britain), 19th century ( U S A )

Factory production

End of 18th century (Britain)

Mass production

End of 19th century (USA)

Mass distribution

End of 19th century (USA)

Integration of mass production

End of 19th century (USA) and beginning of 20 th

and distribution

century

Lean production

1960s and 1970s in Japan

Industry

S M E s and L E s

End of 19th century (USA)

Structure

Oligopolies, Monopolies etc

End of 19th century (USA)

Clusters and Industrial districts

1950s, 1960s, 1970s in the U S A , Japan,
Germany, Italy

Zaibatsus

End of 19th century (Japan)

Keiretsus (with sub-contractors)

Since 1950s (Japan)

Diversified

1920s ( U S A )

Focal

1930s (Japan)

Vertically integrated

End of 19th century ( U S A )

Conglomerate

End of 19th century (Japan)

Functionally managed

1870s and 1880s ( U S A )

Divisionally managed

1920s (USA, Japan)

T e a m work based

1950s and 1960s (Japan)

Production

U-shaped machine layout

1960s (Japan)

Process

Scientifically managed

1910s ( U S A )

Quality controlled

1950s (Japan)

Just-In-Time oriented

1960s (Japan)

Government agencies

After W W I I (Japan)

Anti-Trust Laws

1890s ( U S A )

Stock Exchanges

End of 19th century ( U S A )

Networks

Firm Structure

Institutions

presented in Chapter two.
Source: Based on the Indings
:
All these major OIs, as recognized by numerous researchers, took place in the two largest
economies of the world today, the USA and Japan. These two countries' GDPs together

constituted approximately 30% of the world's total GDP (PPP) in 1999, or 43% of the world
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total GDP (non PPP) in 1999 (World Bank, 2001). Also, these two countries exper
different times in their economic history, a very high industrial growth, as
and 1.2. For example, Figure 1.1 shows that the highest industrial growth in

during the periods from the 1870s to the 1880s as well as from the 1900s to t

which several OIs also took place (the world wars are excluded for being unus

periods). Figure 1.2 shows that the highest industrial growth in Japan took pl
of the 1950s to the 1970s, during which several OIs were generated.

Source: Based on Mitchell (1998), and World Bank Group (2001)
Figure 1.1 Rates of growth of industrial production in the USA, from 1861 to
1997 (in % )

Source: Based on Mitchell (1998), and World Bank Group (2001)

Figure 1.2 Rates of growth of industrial production in Japan, from 1875 to 199
(in%)

5

To complement the comments just made on Figures 1.1 and 1.2, Table 1.2 summarizes the growt

rates in the two countries for some key periods (the period 1925 to 1950 was excluded, as i

exceptional in terms of the great depression, and the preparation or outbreak of wars. Howe
this period is included in this study of OIs).

Table 1.2. Average annual real growth rates of industrial production for some
key periods in the U S A a n d Japan, 1866-1996
Period

USA

Japan

1866-1891 (for Japan: 1876-1901)

6

4.4

1895-1920 (for Japan: 1900-1925)

5.6

5.1

1951-1976

4.3

12.6

1971-1996

3.3

3.2

Source: Based on Mitchell (1998), and World Bank Group (2001)

Before w e proceed, another question must be addressed. W h a t is the relationship between OIs and

technological innovations or technology, at least from a definitional point of view? The d

of technology provided by an international institution, the United Nations Centre on Trans
Corporations (UNCTC), in 1985 is revealing:

"...Technology may be embodied in the form of capital goods, such as machinery, equipment a
physical structures; or it may be disembodied in such forms as industrial property r
unpatented know-how, management and organization (my emphasis), and design and operati
instructions for production systems..." (UNCTC, 1985, p. 119) .

A key objective in this study is to separate embodied from disembodied in the definition of
technology. Hence, what are referrd to as OIs forms part of the disembodied technology

(according to the above definition of the UNCTC). The term technical innovations (TIs) is a
to refer to embodied technology. As argued in Chapter three, the latter has been the main

the immense literature on economic growth. The aim of this thesis is to introduce a systema
awareness that OIs may play a distinct and indeed preponderant role in the process of such
(as distinct from the role of TIs or technology as a whole).

3

Also quoted in Dicken (1998, p. 248).
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The following example is used to illustrate the importance of OIs. The semi-conductor industry
(which will be fully analyzed in Chapter six) has been very important for both the Japanese and the
American economies. A recent detailed account of this industry by Langlois and Steinmueller
(1999) reached s o m e notable conclusions.

" ...One of the factors driving the success of Japanese firms in memory products in the early 1980

was the higher quality of the chips they produced. For Japanese chips, defect rates- the fracti

chips that prove to be defective - were probably half to one-tenth the rates for American product
By the second half of that decade, however, American firms had dramatically increased

expenditures for quality control, imitating Japanese practices such as total quality managem
(TQM),

greater attention to preventive maintenance, and automated process control and

monitoring. By the early 1990s, American manufacturers had probably begun to match the defec
levels of their Japanese counterparts. Intel reportedly reduced its defect rate by a factor

There is also evidence that American firms have improved manufacturing yield rates and direct
labor productivity since the early 1990s... " (p. 49).

A brief comparison between TIs and OIs is necessary at this point. Overall, TI or technology in th
ordinary sense (e.g. n e w machines, n e w products and so on), is responsible for changes in
industrial economic growth. Certainly TIs have played a primary role in promoting growth.
Effectively, the theorists of economic growth have been concentrating their research on the impact
of four main categories of factors affecting such growth: capital, labor, technology (in the sense of
TIs), and h u m a n capital. However, despite the writings of such eminent economists like Marshall
(1890) and Schumpeter (1934, 1942) that OIs significantly generate economic growth, and despite
the writings of management scholars that OIs do actually matter significantly in the growth of
firms, the vast majority of modern economists have consistently ignored OIs in their analysis of
economic growth models. This is true for both exogenous and endogenous types of models, and
yet, on a priori grounds, OIs are no less important than factors such as TIs.

What are the implications of not explicitly including OIs into the theories and empirics of
economic industrial growth? The famous residual of Solow's analysis (1957), the so-called total
factor productivity (TFP) was found to be substantial in m a n y studies. This residual has usually
been explained by technological factors (or TIs in m y terminology). However, h o w do w e k n o w
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that OIs have not contributed equally to TFP, or even more? Unless we carefully explore the
contribution of OIs we will not be able to properly refute or accept their importance.

Consequently, the issue is there to be explored. This is exactly what this thesis is about: do
major OIs significantly affect industrial growth and how do they do this? As well, is it also
possible to provide quantitative evidence to answer this question?

A further issue must be identified before we proceed to address the core aims of the thesis, a
stated earlier. That is, are OIs related to entrepreneurship? The immediate answer is yes, as
entrepreneurs and managers (in a broad sense) who instigate, introduce, and implement OIs.

However, in this study, the specific contribution of these people is not explored, except on a
hoc basis, as this would involve much more space than is available. Future research, though,

should attempt to investigate such contributions in a more systematic way. After all we do not
priori know whether or not OIs are exogenously, or endogenously, determined by entrepreneurs

and managers, and whether, in general, OIs, entrepreneurship, and management are part of a larg
and more complicated mechanism of determination involving other parameters as well such as
law, institutions, culture and so on.

1.2. JUSTIFICATION AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE THES
1.2.1 Evidence on the impact of OIs on industrial growth
There is a need to explore the significance of OIs in promoting industrial growth on a firm,
sectoral and macro basis. Furthermore, this significance ought to be both qualitative and
quantitative in kind. Management research has already provided ample evidence to suggest that
some OIs matter considerably for the firms' expansion (e.g. Thomson and Strickland, 2001;
Davidson and Griffin, 2000). This study, effectively, extends the theoretical literature by

introducing new concepts integrated into existing ones in order to show that OIs, or disembodi

technology, have a significant positive impact on economic growth. This study also provides so

empirical evidence on the significance of OIs in promoting industrial growth in the context of
manufacturing sectoral growth.
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1.2.2

Exploration of O I s ignored b y other scholars

Chandler (1977, 1990) and to a lesser extent Lazonick (1990) amongst others have provided
considerable evidence (mainly qualitative) that 'organizational capabilities', as these authors call
them, played a key role in shaping the growth offirms(mainly big business) and industrial sectors
in an evolutionary manner. These capabilities were linked with some of the OIs listed in Table 1.1,
but have not included some others, such as the production process of JTT/QC. Consequently there
is a need to explore the ignored OIs and in particular JIT/QC as well more systematically.

1.2.3 A comparison between the USA and Japan regarding the impact of OIs.
A n extensive comparison between the two countries, in terms of industrial growth and OIs, is
needed in order to further support the overall evidence. B y comparing the two largest economies in
this study, a gap in the literature isfilled.Chandler has briefly compared the two countries
although he concentrated primarily on the U S A . Lazonick has made a more conscious effort to
bridge the gap, but he too concentrates mainly on the U S A . However, Fruin (1992), a Chandlerian
scholar, has concentrated his work on exploring Japan. Best (1990), has made a good qualitative
comparison between the two economies in terms of some OIs, but again without quantitatively
linking them to their respective economic growth.

1.2.4 Essence of the thesis's contributions
The contributions of this study are linked to providing quantitative and theoretical evidence as to
the relationship between industrial growth and OIs. Thus, an'atomic/systemic' theoretical
economic growth model, which incorporates the OIs and is based on microeconomic foundations,
is suggested (see Figures 5.10 and 5.11 in Chapterfive,for a brief description). T o construct that
model, it is necessary to identify OIs through history, to provide evidence of their link with
industrial growth and to group OIs into three main axes. It also becomes indispensable that OIs are
further scrutinized in order to explore them in terms of fundamental firm operations (such as the
'process of movements') that pinpoint at the exact substance of OIs and their relationship with
economic growth.

In this way, the links between OIs and economic theory are thoroughly

established. T h e atomic/systemic model also incorporates 'systems of innovations', 'sectoral
systems' and 'evolutionary learning capabilities'.

This theoretical model is also used to determine proxies for measuring OIs. One of these proxie
in rum used to econometrically measure the impact of the main axis of OIs, namely the JJT/QC

system, on American manufacturing sectors during the last 40 years. At the same time, it is sho
that it is possible to successfully transfer the main axis of OIs from Japan to the USA.
Furthermore, an explanation of the recent American continuous economic growth, and of the
recent continuous Japanese recession through a set of propositions related to OIs and leading
sectors is provided, according to the overall findings of this study.

In summary, the main innovations introduced in this thesis are:
• A synthetic approach of the identification of OIs and their contribution to economic
growth. This approach includes the 'three axes of OIs' and is comparative in terms of the
two countries, the USA and Japan.
• An extension to the theory of the firm with the introduction of the five fundamental firm
operations that include the process of movements, the process of contracts, etc.
• The proposition of an atomic/systemic model of economic growth that incorporates OIs
through the five fundamental firm operations, leading firms and leading sectors within a
more general framework of sectoral systems, systems of innovations, and evolutionary
learning process. The concept of an evolutionary negentropic open system is crucial to this
analysis, for instance, in order to appreciate the role of 'waste' in firm growth.
• A thorough quantitative analysis that provides evidence for the role of OIs in promoting
economic growth. This analysis is primarily sectoral and applies to both countries, the
USA and Japan. However, for the USA, the econometric analysis is carried out only for
the American manufacturing sectors, which successfully transferred the JTT/QC system (a
major OI) from Japan to the USA.
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1.3 IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
1.3.1 Major OIs: an historical review

This identification necessitates a review of the research conducted by economic historians in

relevant areas. Chandler (1977, 1990) and Fruin (1992) will primarily be consulted. The task w
be to summarize and emphasize the main points and trace back some common background

elements in their analysis, which will facilitate this research. Thus, OIs are not only the ma

form of firms, or industrial organization, but other entities as well. Moreover, the dates and

chronology for the introduction of the major OIs will have to be detected in order to facilit
quantitative analysis.

1.3.2 Links between OIs and theories of economic growth.
It is necessary to identify these links in a rigorous way. First, the need to include OIs in

growth theory will have to be established. Second, it will be necessary to closely relate OIs

some important economic concepts and issues such as transaction and managerial costs in order
understand their role. Third, it will be crucial to extend the existing theories of the firm

understand the process of economic growth that emanates from OIs (thus, for example, the 'kine

costs' will be introduced). Finally, the latter will have to be scrutinized in such a manner t

common traits can be detected, thus making an overall synthesis significant, and which can al

used to construct the appropriate proxies for OIs to be used in the quantitative component of
thesis.

1.3.3 Proxy variables for OIs.

The identification of these variables/proxies is necessary for their proper use in the econom

modeling. The identification of the major OIs, their main traits, and their links with the pr
economic growth will greatly facilitate the establishment of such proxies. The latter are, in
very difficult to establish due to the generally difficult measurement of OIs. However, some

propositions and attempts must be made to resolve the relevant issues. Thus, these proxies are
consequence of thorough theoretical developments in this study.
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1.3.4

Appropriate quantitative m e t h o d s a n d techniques linking O I s with industrial
growth

Finally, how will these links be estimated? Will this be through correlation or regression anal
At times, clear graphs will be able to show the major propositions. At other times, regression
analysis and other similar tools (such as the vector error correction model) for sub-sectoral data
will be necessary.

1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
In short, the main objectives identified in thefirstpage of this chapter contain two major points:
first, to establish a framework for a theoretical analysis of the impact of OIs on economic growth
in general and on industrial growth in particular; and second, to establish an empirical basis to test
the hypothesis that OIs (in particular, the just-in-time c u m quality control OI) actually and
significantly affect industrial growth in a positive manner. Ancillary to these objectives are the
following aims:
•

Establish an evolutionary account of the major OIs.

•

Establish the links between OIs and economic or industrial growth.

•

Extend the existing relevant theoretical frameworks.

•

Establish variables, which can adequately approximate OIs.

•

Compile and analyze as m u c h data as possible in order to provide quantitative evidence on
the nature and significance of relationships postulated in this thesis.

•

Introduce a sound methodology to quantify the impact of OIs on industrial growth.

•

Separate the impact of OIs from technical innovations (TIs) on industrial growth, and link
them w h e n necessary.

•

Propose a theoretical model of economic growth that incorporates OIs.
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1.5. METHODOLOGY
For the theoretical part of this study, which occupies most of the thesis, the unit of analysis
deliberately be the firm (in the historical context of the USA and Japan), and its extensions
thereafter into industries. Emphasis is therefore placed upon the micro economic element rather
than the macro, as the firm is the core or atom of all economic changes. This firm-oriented
exploration must be detailed and supported by existing or new theories.

The design of a sound methodology to bring as much quantitative evidence as possible to the

identification of the significance of a relationship between economic growth and OIs is a diffi
task, since it is a relatively new area of research. First, the following broad methods will be
exploited: in terms of aggregation, the quantitative analysis is overwhelmingly based on
manufacturing sub-sectors both in the USA and Japan. The agriculture, mining, construction, and

services sectors will not be part of this study, unless on an ad hoc basis. Overall, time-series
section or pooled time-series are used.

Second, the following techniques will be used to carry out the main methods just mentioned: tot

factor productivity (TFP), labor productivity, and growth rates of production on a manufacturing

sectoral basis will be linked with proxies of OIs, carefully worked out during the analysis. For
instance, the ratio of inventories to shipments will be used to represent the Just-in-time cum

Quality Control system. The choice of this proxy will be fully justified. Most of the time, simp
econometric techniques such as the ordinary least squares will be used to measure the proposed
relationships. However, at times, more sophisticated techniques will be used, such as unit root
and error correction models.

Together with the examination of OIs, linkages are made between OIs, technical innovations (TIs)

leading firms and sectors, and some other elements of industrial growth. In particular some lead
manufacturing sectors are further analyzed to confirm the other results.
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1.6. LITERATURE REVIEW

The historical identification of the major OIs contained in the second chapter will mai

through the works of Chandler (1977, 1990) and Lazonick (1990, 1991) for the USA and Fru

(1992) for Japan for the period before WWII. The works of many more authors are consulte

the period after WWH for the USA, for example Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Chandler (1990,
1994), Dicken (1986), Ernste and Jaeger (1989), and others. For the period after WWTI for

Best (1990) is one of the main sources supplemented by Abegglen and Stalk (1985), K. Ima
(1994), M. Imai (1991), and others.

In Chapter three, where the general theoretical foundations of the inclusion of OIs in t

economic growth is treated, reference is made to many eminent economists in order to sh

some scholars have been concerned about the impact of OIs on growth: Schumpeter (1934, 19
Marshall (1890), Abramovitz (1993), Nelson (1996), Porter (1990), Chandler, Lazonick, and

others. These references are then supplemented by reviewing the writings of some other e

scholars such as Coase (1992), North (1992), Rostow (1960, 1990), Hirschman (1958), Penros

(1959), Smith (1776), Langlois and Robertson (1995), and others. To show how scholars view

link between TIs and OIs, reference is made to the writings of Freeman (1984), Mowery an

Rosenberg (1998), Nelson (1996), Lazonick (1991, 1992), Breschi and Malerba (1997), Chandl

(1990), Williamson (1985), and others. In regard to the inclusion of OIs into the producti

function, reference is made to Simon (1997), Mefford (1986), Leibenstein (1966), Menard (1
Edquist, Hommen, and McKelvey (2001), Coase (1937), and others. Finally, the impact of

institutions is analyzed through the writings of North (1990), and Best (1990) amongst o

In Chapter four, the list of authors quoted and analyzed is too large to be cited in thi

A wide variety of writers were necessary to be consulted in this chapter in order to pr

sufficient evidence for the close theoretical link between various OIs and industrial gr
example Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Antonelli (1998), Borland and Young (1992), Chandler
(1992), Chung (1998), Coase (1937), Dietrich (1994), George (1972), Hagstrom and Hedlund

(1998), Hall (1994), Hodgson (1998), Imai (1997), Langlois (1999), Lazonick (1992), Leibens
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(1966), Marris (1966), Menard (1996), Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Mowery and Rosenberg

(1998), North (1991), Nyland (1989), Perry (1999), Piore and Sabel (1984), Plato, Prahala

Hamel (1990), Rosenberg (1972), Rostow (1990), Schonberger (1982), Schumpeter (1942), Sim
(1997), Smith (1776), Tisdell (1996), Williamson (1985), and many others are cited.

In Chapter five, for the leading firms and sectors, reference is made to Perroux (1955)

Thomas, 1972), Chandler (1990), Rostow (1960), Schumpeter (1942), and others. The analysis

the existing theory of the firm is examined through the works of Coase (1937), Langlois

Langlois and Robertson (1995), Fujimoto (1999), Coriat and Dosi (1998), Dosi and Malerba

(1996), Malerba (2002), Williamson (1996), and others. Finally, the suggested atomic/syst

model of economic growth is supported by the writings of Fujimoto (1999), Edquist (1997)

Buckley (1967), Eliasson (1994), and others. The remaining, and largest part of this cha
contains the author's own contribution and suggestions to the overall analysis.

In Chapter six, reference is made to Jorgenson (1990), Jorgenson et al (1995), and other

analysis of sectoral TFP data. For the detailed analysis of some industries, the refer
those of Langlois and Steinmueller (1999), Mowery and Rosenberg (1998), and others. The

analysis of the recent economic recession in Japan includes Porter et al (2000). In Cha
numerous references are made regarding the implementation of the JIT/QC system in the

countries. Also, for the econometric part, reference is made to Maddala and In-Moo Kim (
Green (1993), and others.

1.7. DATA AND TIME PERIOD COVERED
1.7.1 The time frame of OIs

Generally, OIs, like TIs, take a long period of time to be introduced and implemented.

15 to 20 years are perhaps a minimum for such a period. The spread of an OI over the w
economy takes much longer, even 100 years.
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1.7.2 Periods of time to be examined

For the identification of OIs, the last 150 years are considered. For the quantitative li

growth and OIs, various periods are considered, such as 1880 to 1948, or from 1958 to 199
soon.
1.7.3 Availability and reliability of relevant data

Overall, data is more easily available and more reliable for the USA than for Japan. For t

sectoral manufacturing series, the NBER (2000) base is the main source for the American da

UNIDO (2000) data was also used for both countries. The latter is available on a 3 or 4 di
For Japan, only 2-digit data is available for most cases. The main time-series needed are

manufacturing production, capital, employment, inventories, and other related data on a su

sectoral level. The actual description of data and their sources is the object of relevant
Appendices.

1.7.4 Compatibility between the USA's and Japan's data

There is no great need to have strictly compatible data between these two countries, for r

that will become apparent in subsequent chapters. The existing degree of compatibility see
good enough for the purpose of this study.

1.8. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

In Chapter two, entitled "Organizational Innovations (OIs) from the 1860s in the USA and J

the major OIs are identified historically in the USA and Japan from about the 1860s to th

by mainly referring to some major works of eminent economic historians. This chapter pinpo

the main forces that shaped the appearance of OIs, their chronology and their evolution, t

with examples of leading firms, leading sectors and sometimes links between OIs and TIs. T

importance of this chapter for subsequent chapters is paramount. Directly or indirectly, e
this chapter are used in various ways in the whole study to bring evidence to the thesis.

16

The next three chapters lay the theoretical foundations of why OIs should be included separ
explaining industrial growth. In particular, in Chapter three, entitled "The role of OIs in

of economic growth", a general theoretical background to economic growth is proposed in ord
take into account the impact of OIs. This background first reviews the relevant literature

introduces some important concepts and theories of the significance of OIs in explaining gr

Then, it suggests that OIs are not necessarily a 'handmaiden' of TIs, but rather they should

separately examined. It also proposes (in a non-mathematical way) a general form of a produ

function that has explicitly taken into consideration various types of organizational inputs

latter are linked with some fundamental concepts such as division of labor, transaction cost

institutions, and others. However, a more thorough and comprehensive explanation as to why O

should be included in theories of industrial growth will take place in Chapters four and fiv
addition, some external factors, such as resources, demand, and institutions impacting on
economic growth and on OIs, are briefly explored.

Chapter 4, entitled "Contribution of specific OIs to economic growth and the three axes of
a continuation of the themes of Chapter three. However, in Chapter four the links between

industrial growth and the OIs are established in a concrete manner. Thus, a theoretical expl

is offered regarding the replacement of the putting-out system by the factory one; the role
scientific management and its 'successors'; the appearance and evolution of mass production
USA; the appearance and evolution of lean production in Japan, and so on. The links between
these OIs and industrial growth are made according to various economic concepts and

propositions, like those mentioned in the previous chapter, but in a more concrete and analy
manner.

In Chapter five, entitled "The process of firm operations: core of the atomic/systemic model
economic growth", the proposition is made that in order to properly explain the close link

OIs and industrial growth, one must explore the heart of this growth which is the firm. Thus
taxonomy of operations of running a firm (hence costs and benefits) is proposed, according

which OIs, as analyzed up to Chapter four, are a mixture of most of these operations. It bec
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apparent in this chapter, however, that OIs (in particular, the internal OIs) are part of wh

here the 'process of movements', as opposed to the 'process of contracts' which is related t

transaction costs theory, and so on. This chapter also analyzes the role of leading firms, l
sectors and networks in the context of OIs and economic growth, so that finally a basis for

atomic/systemic model of industrial growth incorporating the role of OIs and firms is sugges

This model also incorporates systems of innovation, sectoral systems, and evolutionary learn
process.

In Chapter six, entitled "OIs and manufacturing sector growth in the USA and Japan", a

quantitative sub-sectoral analysis is carried out for the USA and Japan, first from the 1880
WWII in a brief manner (due to lack of data) and with emphasis on the American economy; and
second from 1960 to 1997 in a more detailed manner. Some general trends and tendencies are

discerned concerning the leading sectors in terms of OIs. Real output and TFP per industria

are scrutinized for different sub-periods so that more appropriate conclusions can be drawn

for the USA and Japan. The statistical methods used in this chapter are relatively simple, f

graphs and tables to cointegration analysis. One of the sub-sections explores some of the ma
reasons for the recent prolonged recession in Japan. In order to support the findings as to

of OIs, some of the TIs are also briefly described for both countries for the latest period.

preliminary quantitative evidence presented in this chapter is confirmed by a more detailed
exploration of three leading industries in the USA (and with reference to Japan). Finally,
Chandler's analysis of the reasons for the ^American industrial slowdown during the period

the 1960s to 1980s is supplemented and criticized in view of the findings of this study and
especially Chapters six and seven.

In Chapter seven, entitled "Empirical evidence on the links between industrial sectoral grow

the lean production system (JIT/QC) in the USA", the focus is on the American manufacturing

sub-sectors for the period between 1958 and 1996, and in terms of OIs the JIT/QC system bec

the object of analysis. First, the chronology of implementation of the lean production syste

is established in the USA in relation to Japan, both in terms of the JIT and the QC processe
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a thorough econometric analysis is conducted by exploring models with various lengths of cro

sectional or pooled time-series data. These models are either simple regression models or m

complex ones such as the vector error correction models (VECM), and incorporate or include t

TFP or labor productivity variables as the main variables to be quantitatively explained. T

purpose of this chapter is to show empirically that the LPS or its equivalent JIT/QC has be
successfully transplanted in the USA from Japan, and that this imitation has been the main
for the recent American industrial revival.

Lastly, Chapter eight draws out the conclusions, limitations, and implications of this resea

In short, Chapter two reveals the nature and evolution of OIs, Chapters three, four, and fiv

establish the necessary theoretical background for the inclusion and impact of OIs in expla

industrial growth, whereas Chapter six discusses the importance of sectoral growth in the t

countries regarding OIs, and Chapter seven presents empirical evidence for the impact of OI

using various statistical techniques. Figure 1.3 summarizes the main points that each chapt
contains in a circular flow of interdependent nodes.
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2. ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATIONS (OIs) FROM THE
1860s IN THE USA AND JAPAN
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The primary aim of this chapter is to pinpoint the most significant and essential OIs in the
Japan. The period examined is approximately from the 1860s to the present. However, two sub-

periods will be more closely scrutinized, the 1880s to 1920s and the 1950s to 1990s, of appro

40 years each. During these two sub-periods the so-called Second Industrial and Third Industr

Revolutions took place. The first two sections will examine the historical evolution of OIs u

WWII (the first section for the USA and the second for Japan). The next two sections will exam

the historical evolution of OIs from WWH onwards (the third section for the USA and the fourt

Japan). Finally, in the fifth section, a brief comparison between the two countries in terms o

be undertaken. In this historical survey the analysis will concentrate on the detection of th

and their evolution, thus avoiding as much as possible any links with economic theories. Thes

will be made in the following three chapters. Finally, note that this chapter does not provid

comprehensive history of all OIs in the two countries; rather, its aim is to selectively pinp
aspects and nature of the major OIs that will be useful in this thesis's exploration.

2.2 OIs IN THE USA UP TO WORLD WAR TWO (WWII)

This section is primarily based on Chandler's pioneering work on the evolution of big busines

However, it is important to note that exploration of big business is not the only type of bus

has shaped the American economy. Scranton (1997) emphasizes that' specialty production' paral

complemented, and sometimes conflicted with the mass production corporations; this other side

second industrial revolution certainly played an important role in shaping the American econo

major OIs that took place during the period examined were more related to mass production and

features (which will be explored in the following pages). Thus, Boyce and Ville (2002, p. 150)
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remarked: "...Specialist manufacturers relied extensively on skilled labor, while mass produ

skilled workers. The methods employed by the former relied on 'smart workers', while the lat
depended on 'smart (production) systems'..."

2.2.1 The appearance of big business, full integration, hierarchies and oligopolies1

The US westward movement of population was the moving force for the rapid development of the
railway system in the 1840s and 1850s, which eventually created a national market. However,
growth and restructuring was not complete until after the recession years of the 1870s. The

development of the railway system coincided with the USA' s economic industrial take-off per
in the mid 19th century, which later led to the second industrial revolution. Many famous

entrepreneurs, who played a marked innovation role in their own business, were originally tr
in railway firms. Another precondition for the second industrial revolution was the

superabundance of land, combined with a favorable inclination for entrepreneurship (American

were always fascinated by the success of their business people) and a shortage of labor (McG
1997; Habakkuk, 1962).

Major and minor technological breakthroughs (TIs according to the terminology followed in th
thesis), although continuous in trend, were particularly noticeable in the 1870s and 1880s.

time big business, through mass production, began to gather steam in the 1870s and 1880s. Ou

Fortune 500 largest American firms in the mid 1990s, 53 were founded in the 1880s (e.g. Koda

Johnson & Johnson, Coca-Cola, Westinghouse Electric), 39 in the 1890s (e.g. General Electric

Pepsico, Goodyear ), and 52 during the 1900s (e.g. Ford Motor, Gillette, General Motors) (So

Harris Corporation, 1996). The first industries to grow very large were consumer goods indus

such as fresh meat, harvesters, sewing machines, sugar, salt, and leather, which all built l

marketing departments and expanded horizontally. The same story was repeated in other indust

processing agricultural products, for which a number of machines were invented in the late 1

Most of this sub-section draws from Chandler (1977).
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1880s to permit large-batch and continuous process production (cigarettes, matches, flour, brea
cereals, canned foods and soap).

In the 1880s and early 1890s, many small manufacturers in the sugar, leather, salt, distilling,

and cotton oil, biscuit, petroleum, fertilizer and rubber boot and glove industries, jointly f

horizontal combinations. The latter resulted mainly as a response to overproduction by numerou
small firms in an expanding national market during the 1860s and 1870s that threatened prices

below production costs (Chandler, 1959, p. 10). In most of these industries, consolidation and

integration followed horizontal combinations. Examples in this category are the whisky enterpr

and the rubber boot, shoe and glove industries. In both the petroleum and fertilizer industries

over raw materials came after the combination and consolidation of groups of small manufactuir

firms. For instance, the Standard Oil Trust, formed in 1882, consolidated its production activi

created a domestic marketing system first and only in the late 1880s did it start to adventure

production of crude oil. The producer goods industries developed later. Until the depression o

1890s, most of the combinations and consolidations had been in the consumer goods industries. B

the first decade of the 20th century the leading firms in many consumer goods sectors had beco

departmentalized and centralized as a consequence of vertical integration, thus creating oligo

and sometimes monopolies for their markets. For instance, by 1898 the Rubber Company controlled
75% of the nation's rubber boot, shoe and glove output.

Like the companies making consumer goods, those making producer goods also set up nation-wide

and world-wide marketing and distribution organizations, consolidated production into a few la

plants and established purchasing departments. Also, except in steel, integration usually follo

combination in the producer goods industries. The growth of such large enterprises often led t

diversification of the types of products these manufacturing companies made and sold. The 'full
strategy, pioneered by General Electric and Westinghouse, was soon adopted by many other

consolidated concerns. Continuing diversification came largely in industries where science cou
most easily applied. Thus,
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"...The chemical, automotive, power machinery, rubber and petroleum industries led the way to

development of new processes and products, new ways of internal organization and new techniques

external competition as the new century unfolded. The metals industries and those process
agricultural goods have, on the other hand, changed little since the beginning of the century...

the greatest period of change came in the last decade of the 19th century... The middle of the f
decade of the new century might be said to mark the end ofan era." (Chandler, 1959, p. 26,).

These large industrial firms became by the turn of this century vertically integrated, forward into
distribution and backward into supplies of inputs, as well as centralized and functionally
departmentalized organizations. T h e y became increasingly bureaucratic internally and oligopolistic
externally, despite some tendencies for monopolies. Integration and combination by one manufacturer
forced others to follow. T h e oligopolistic structure of most of the leading industries meant that, by and
after 1900, costs rather than mterfirm competition determined prices, and that strategies such as price
leadership and price umbrellas became c o m m o n practices. Therefore the top management of these
industries paid more attention to issues such as advertising, product differentiation, brand names,
improvements in further integrating manufacturing, marketing and buying processes, and developing
more diversified lines of products.

In short, the American economy was consolidated and strengthened during the approximate period
1880 to 1920 2 . This consolidation took place through the process of appearance of big national and
international corporations, which usually were backward and forward vertical integrated (full
integration of mass production and mass marketing for both the consumer goods and producer goods
industries). In addition, these corporations were multi-functional hierarchical business organizations
(to some extent similar to that of the railways firms), they were markedly changed in the organization
of the shop floor, especially through various applications of scientific management (see next subsection). Their salaried managers took over in the running of busines from the founding entrepreneurs
in an increasing way; in particular, middle management and especially top management for the first
time replaced market forces in an oligopolistic environment (the learned skills and knowledge within
each oligopolistic market were company-specific and industry-specific).

2

Sklar (1988, p. 1) says: "...The period 1890-1916 in United States history, encompassing what is
called the Progressive Era, was both an age of reform and the age of the corporate reconstruction of American
capitalism..."
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2.2.2 The rise of scientific management and Fordism

The coordination and control of the flow of materials at a high volume and speed through ma

departments in which many workers were employed in each of the production processes created
challenging administrative and managerial problems in the second half of the 19th century.

instance, Litterer (1963) said that the growth of internal disorder fell into two major cate

breakdown of co-ordination among subordinates, and second, a breakdown in relationships betw
top and lower levels of management. These problems became acute in the late 1870s and 1880s

their solutions only started to take place in the 1890s and 1900s. The movement of 'Systemat

Management' attempted to suggest such solutions from the 1870s (cf. Litterer, 1961, and 1963)

Nelson (1974, p.479) said in this regard: "...The Taylor system was a comprehensive answer t
problems of factory coordination, a refinement and extension of the earlier ideas known as
management..."

During the expansion years of the 1870s and 1880s, industrialists relied on skilled foremen

train and manage the workers. That was the 'inside contracting' system of labor organization
according to which these departmental foremen were contracted with the owners to produce a

specified number of parts or mechanisms in a specified time (usually a year) for a specified

this way, the owners were able to pass on to the contractors all management related problems

this system, the owners lost control over costs and the coordination of the flow of goods t

many departments. The contractors had obvious reasons to conceal valuable information from t

factory owners, and did not have the need to coordinate shop floor operations in an efficien

H. C. Metcalfe, in 1885, prescribed a solution to the 'inside contracting' system in his boo

Cost of Manufactures and the Administration of Workshops, Public and Private' (the first boo

ever published in the United States on factory management). His solution was an adaptation o
voucher system of accounts developed in railroad repair shops to meet the needs of
interchangeable-parts manufacturing (Chandler, 1977). However, Metcalfe's solution had major

disadvantages: first, it required an excessive amount of paperwork from the foremen and seco
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the latter were still not willing to provide all necessary information. H. A. Towne of Yale a
Towne, F. A. Halsey of the Rand Drill Co. and other metalworking manufacturers, subsequently
developed the 'gain-sharing' system, according to which any reduction in unit costs achieved
improved machinery and plant design, better scheduling, or more productive labor would be

equally shared by the company, the workers and the foremen (the latter would get 60% to 80% o
the non-company share) (Ibid). A further suggestion came from F. W. Taylor, who, in 1895,
pronounced his 'scientific management', according to which the standards of premiums and

bonuses paid should be determined 'scientifically' and not historically. He also urged that a

of 'functional foremen' and a 'planning room' should replace the contracting foremen. However,
American manufacturers rarely adopted Taylor's full system, which was developed during the
period 1895 to 1915 (Taylor's detailed principles will be elaborated in subsequent chapters).

There is another way of looking into the relation between workers on the shop floor and manag

of the production processes. Skilled workers who played a central role in shop floor operatio

transformed into lower managers, thus a valuable cooperation was gained from these transformed
salaried employees. As Lazonick said: "...making skilled workers members of the firm helped
management to divide and conquer the labor force." (Lazonick, 1990, p. 229). Lazonick regards

shift in control over shop-floor organization from craftsmen and inside-contracting on the sh

to line and staff managers as a key feature of managerial capitalism in the USA during the pe
thel880s to the 1920s. The main reason for this shift, deliberate and deterministic in nature
Lazonick describes it (1990, Chapter seven), was the fact that the shop was really run by the

craftsmen or inside contractors and hence the upper management was obstructed from introducin
new technologies and methods of production.

By now, it is perhaps becoming apparent that the gradual disappearance of the inside-contacti

system coincided with the parallel advent of various methods of scientific management. As Laz

(1990, p. 223) said: "...Inside contracting, and with it craft control, was particularly preva

metalworking industries of the northeastern United States. It was also these machine shops tha

birth to the scientific management movement..." One of the consequences of this transformation
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towards a management controlled mass production system was a sharp increase in managerial,
engineering, scientific, and generally professional personnel during the period 1890 to the 1920s. For
example, ".. .the total number of salaried employees in manufacturing in the United States rose from
348,000 -1 for every 12.9 wage earners in manufacturing- in 1899 to 1,496,000 -1 for every 5.6 wage
earners- in 1929..." (Lazonick, 1990, p. 229). During the same period, the higher education system
developed in a similarly spectacular w a y (Ibid). All this important organizational transformation,
which accelerated at the end of the 19th century and became a c o m m o n policy at the beginning of the
n e w century, w a s observed by other researchers as well. For instance, Montgomery (1987, p. 215) has
argued that "...proliferation of white shirts and conversion of craftsmen into supervisors were
universal and continuing phenomena..." in thefirstdecades of the 20 th century.

Furthermore, this organizational transformation was also linked to new technologies. For instan
period 1880 to 1920 saw an immense increase in the development of machine tools for highly
specialized purposes. This development started earlier with the production offirearms,continued with
the production of sewing machines from the 1850s to the 1870s, then culminated in the 1890s through
to the 1910s with the emergence of the bicycle and automobile industries (Rosenberg, 1976, pp. 1831).

An application of scientific management was Fordism. Effectively, Fordism was a not so fortuito
continuation of the Taylorist principles. A s Littler (1982, p.56) said:

"...By the time that Henry Ford came into business Taylorism had begun to affect the US enginee
industries. Consequently, Ford took over some of the essential aspects of Taylorism (the

planning and doing, the fragmentation of jobs, each task allotted a specifictime,etc), but he

further by introducing two further principles. These were theflow-lineprinciple and a new met

labor control. The new method of labor control used by Ford revolved around the Five Doll
Day'..."

The contributions of Taylor and Ford to OIs will be more extensively explored in sub-section 2.
and subsequent chapters.
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2.3 OIs IN JAPAN UP TO WWII

Though this section draws extensively from Fruin (1992), several other sources were consulted
confirm some of Fruin's pioneering work; these sources include: Yui and Nakagawa, (1989),
Lockwood (1968), Morikawa (1992), and Hirschmeier and Yui (1981).

2.3.1 Conglomerates (Zaibatsus)

Fruin (1992) distinguishes three types of enterprises, which made an impact during the initi
period of industrialization (from around 1870, beginning of the Meiji era till WWII), namely
zaibatsu, the independent urban firms, and the independent rural firms. Most studies have

concentrated on the first type, which, admittedly, was the most prominent in shaping Japanese
industries. These groups were, from that starting point, a collection of mostly unrelated

commercial, industrial, and service enterprises and were family-owned and for a while family-

managed. To use a modern term, they became conglomerates and they had to find a way to creat
inter-dependence between enterprises of the same zaibatsu conglomerate.

For this type of enterprise, from this early period, there was a situation of joint producti

distribution generating economies of scope, thus firms were becoming interdependent. As Fruin

(1992, p. 90) remarked "...In Japan, zaibatsu grew for the most part by unrelated diversifica

which is to say that economies of scale in production and distribution were not the forces b

the development of national or zaibatsu business groupings..." Unrelated diversification was

salient feature of these groupings before the 1930s. The initial clusters were transportation
in shipping, energy production, and finance. Manufacturing was crafted on to these initial
activities. These early Japanese zaibatsu gradually became more efficient and lowered their
by economizing in scope much more than in scale.

Furthermore economies of scale did not take place until the boom associated with WWI, and in
more extensive way in the late 1950s: "...In Japan before WWH, indeed before the late 1950s,

domestic and proximate East Asian markets for volume goods were not large, and it was extrem
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risky to compete on the basis of economies of scale in most instances..." (Fruin, 1992, p. 11
Some sustainable scale economies were present before WWI only in some industries, such as
textiles, paper, some metals production, food (sugar, beer, milled grains), beverages, some
chemicals, and cement. However, only textiles were exported in bulk, thus realizing more

economies of scale. A significant corollary of the importance of economies of scope present i

early Japanese industrial development, is the "...nearly universal separation of production a
distribution..." (Fruin, 1992,p. 109).

The parallel existence of these two phenomena, namely, first, the divorce between distributio
production and second, the economies of scope had another consequence, namely the non-

existence of organizational centralization; hence Japanese firms of this period had a non-com

U-form organizational chart. The Japanese holding companies concentrated managerial resources

in factories and at the lower level of the firm, and consequently they did not act as a capit

to allocate funds to subsidiary enterprises. Even the most managerially advanced companies (a
explained below), the textile ones, kept a relatively simple form. Nonetheless, and despite a

proportion of middle managers, textile firms were the first ones to introduce managerial hier

coordination of production and distribution, a careful monitoring of the steps of production,
better trained and motivated workforce, and a more highly capitalized and better managed

enterprise (Fruin, 1992, p. 117). Despite these elements of a more modern firm, textile compa

integrated and coordinated activities in a decentralized way. For instance, in 1914, one of t

largest industrial enterprises in Japan, Toyobo textiles, had a total personnel of 36,694, out

which only 479 (or 1.3%) were located in the head office to carry out administrative, account

and personnel functions. ".. .Toyobo's example of not centralizing operations was widely imit

following a wave of mergers in the textile industry during the recession years of 1907-14..."
(Fruin, 1992, p. 118).

Although zaibatsu firms played a central role in Japanese economic development, the independe

enterprises were more numerous, widespread, and diversified in terms of their activities. "..
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were also more important given their estimated two-thirds to three-quarters contribution to t
nation's domestic manufactured product..." (Fruin, 1992, p. 119).

2.3.2 Small focal firms and interfirm networks

Both the Japanese economy and Japanese firms grew stronger and stronger, especially after the

auspicious conditions of WWI (increased demand of Japanese products by combating countries). T

products of the Second Industrial Revolution started penetrating the Japanese markets in an a

way. The demand for new products, coupled with new producers and new technologies, accelerated

substantially at the time of the Great War, primarily because the country was not part of the

conflict and, as a result, Japanese firms filled prodigious orders for virtually all combatan

types of goods). Thus, without the natural resources of many Western nations, through the impet
provided by WWI, Japan was going to further reinforce its existing strategy of creating this
organizational system of its own. One of the main messages from Fruin's detailed study (1992,

especially Chapter five) is that Japanese firms did not grow very large compared with Western

companies, they specialized their production in mainly one or two products at the most, and th

concentrated their activities within the factories, thus avoiding centralization and accentuat
inter-firm networks.

Further evidence of the product focused inter-firm networks is the degree of out-sourcing as
percentage of manufacturing value added. A government publication of 1936 based on 1932 data

(Fruin, 1992, p. 134) showed that this proportion varied between 5% and 65%. In the automobile
textile weaving, and electrical equipment industries, at least 20% of the manufacturing value

products came from suppliers. These figures strongly indicate that vertical integration was l

that a large network of product-based firms was already in place in Japan during the inter-wa

This network was more obvious in the case of zaibatsu. For example, Mitsui & Co., the main tra

firm for the Mitsui group, held a direct controlling interest in several manufacturing venture
1940, Mitsui & Co. held equity shares in 253 companies covering 14 industries for a total of

million yen (Ibid, p. 140). Horizontal integration, through mergers and acquisitions, especial
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textiles, paper, agricultural chemicals, and machinery led to a concentration of resources at
sites and decentralization.

Decentralization of management decisions amounted to the development to what Fruin calls the
focal factories (Fruin's work on focal firms in Japan is referred to by other researchers, for
instance Boyce and Ville (2002, p. 159):

"... Within focal factories, a panoply of corporate functions could be found: quality-assurance

offices, marketing and sales staff, research facilities, and even personnel departments.

managers, like company presidents, were enveloped by a hive of clerical and technic
specialists...Focal factories were charged not only with labor management

but also w

technology transfer, product and process innovation, engineering, manufacturing, cost acco
new personnel policies, regional distribution, and sales coordination... " (Fruin, 1992, p.

Thus, a focal firm is a factory, relatively small in size (in comparison with American firms),
focused in activities (e.g. not diversified), organizationally interdependent within the network it
belongs to, and with all distinct functions, such as technology research, localized at the factory
level. Table 4.5 in Chapter four contains the main characteristics of focal firms according to
Fruin's work 3 .

Why has this focal factories system evolved so strongly in Japan? Several reasons can be detect
from Fruin's analysis. First, the end of the 19th century witnessed a process of trial-and-error
adaptation of Western knowledge and technology, which found a fecund area for development in
small-decentralized local and autonomous firms. T h e time and economic uncertainty constraints
made this process even more necessary in such firms. Second, the economic downturn following
W W I and defence cuts caused widespread lay-offs in military arsenals and civilian shipbuilders.
This large pool of skilled and semi-skilled underemployed or unemployed workers became the
pool of m a n y small subcontractors w h o became suppliers to large firms between the mid 1920s
and the beginning of the 1930s. A survey of Tokyo factories published in 1932 reported that twothirds of the 322 small metalworking shops in that city were founded between 1922 and 1930.

3

It is worth noting that a similar system of industrial organization to the Japanese focal fa
territorial administrative systems, can be found in Italy, France and Germany, where industrial local dis
are highly viable (see for instance, Best (1990) for the Italian case, Piore and Sabel (1984) for the French
and Italian cases).
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Third, and as a corollary of the second reason, larger firms used the smaller subcontractors b
of their lower wages.

Fourth, factories were not producing for the national market but for regional or international
markets. Fifth, cost accounting methods were not well developed. Sixth, the well-established

regional traders and middlemen prevented companies from centralizing and coordinating relevant

functions. This was especially true in the textile, cement, food, and beverages industries, whi

considered together, accounted for 53% of the 200 largest industrial firms in 1930. Seventh, t

was no anti-trust legislation to prohibit interlocking business alliances and hence small loca

could exist independently and yet be at the same time part of a bigger group such as the zaiba

Eighth, alliances in manufacturing and distribution of small focal firms minimized risks while

taking advantage of the production and distribution resources that other firms commanded, "...
strategy of maximizing inter-firm economies of scope through group-driven cooperative

transactions made better sense than the pursuit of internal production and allocative efficien

through vertical integration and product diversification..." (Fruin, 1992, p. 157). Ninth, as t

performance of focal factories was strongly correlated with the existence and intensity of int

firm networks, there were substantial savings in transaction costs and diseconomies of manager
control.

What are some of the other consequences of this dual system of focal factories cum inter-firm

networks? First, the narrow specialization in products of Japanese firms made these firms- even
the larger ones- small by Western standards (for instance in terms of employment or output) .
Second, the difference in relative size of Japanese firms created a dual regime of wages and

security, where these were higher for larger firms, especially those that were part of a zaibat
lower for smaller firms, and especially those that were subcontractors. Third, the upper
management, and, to some extent, the middle management was relatively unimportant. Finally,

Japanese firms aimed not to just increase the number of different products manufactured in-hou
but also to increase their value added contribution to the manufacturing process.
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2.4 OIs IN THE USA AFTER WWII
2.4.1 Diversification, multidivisionalism, and conglomerates

The American economy was already dominating the world economy before World War JJ. When
the latter ended, the American economy w a s even stronger and totally in control of the noncommunist globe. It w a s not until the late 1960s, and especially the 1970s, that the European and
Japanese nations started threatening this American supremacy. It is again worth referring to
Chandler in one of his most recent studies in order to assess the situation:

"...The successors of the 1950s managers -the third generation- were those who had to meet the

challenges of intense inter-industry and international competition that began in the 1960s

serious competitive challenge yet faced by US managers... But in the 1960s,firmsfromabroa

from related industries began to crowd their markets. Excess capacity increased. Prices fe
rose, ROIdropped... "(Chandler, 1994, p. 16).

How did these managers respond to the fierce competition developing during the 1960s and
1970s? Chandler (1990, 1994), and other researchers have suggested that the American firms
decided to expand through the process of diversification either to a minor extent into related
industries, or, to a major extent, for the first time, into unrelated ones. O n e of the reasons, although
not the most important, for this n e w w a y of expanding business, was the continuous passing of
anti-trust laws by the American government. Thus, the Celler Kefauver Act in 1950 further
tightened restrictions on firm growth through horizontal and vertical integration. However, there
are other reasons4. For instance Penrose (1959) said that diversification is a solution either to
specific problems such as cyclical fluctuations, or a solution to more growth and expansion.

It seems that the latter solution was the dominant one in the 1960s in the USA. The emergence
many conglomerates w a s an innovation of the 1960s (Chandler & Tedlow, 1985, p. 739) for the
U S A . These authors (1985, p.737) say that: "...In the 1960s, a n e w kind of business enterprise
played a key role in mergers and acquisitions. This was the conglomerate type. Eleven of the top
25 acquiring companies in the 1960s were classified as conglomerates. These 11 firms acquired
4

A brief discussion as to why firms diversify is found in Didrichsen (1972, p.205).
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over 500 companies between 1961 and 1968. And these acquired companies represented over 92

% of the acquired firms' assets by the latter years..." Classic conglomerates such as ITT, L

and Textron developed a new administrative structure: in brief, central offices were small a

included mainly finance, acquisitions and control. Hence, the purchasing, production, R&D, a
marketing were left to the separate divisions, namely the former firms. Consequently, in
conglomerates the role and importance of the divisions was enhanced.

During the third most important merger movement in American economic history (in the 1960s)

the number of mergers and acquisitions rose from about 2000 in 1965 to more than 6000 in 19
falling back to 2861 in 1974 (Chandler, 1990, p. 622). Overall, American managers, via this

merger movement in the 1960s, chose an easy way of making extra profits, or at least conserv
existing ones, but they did so not by lowering unit costs of various products via economies

as they had done, so successfully, during the Second Industrial Revolution. However, as Shle
and Vishny (1994) conclude, in the 1980s there was a tendency back to consolidation and

specialisation, and away from unrelated diversification. The same authors debated as to whet
both periods examined (the 1960s and 1980s) were based on the principle of efficient

diversification or not and their conclusion was that the 1980s move by the managers was a m
correct the inefficiencies created in the 1960s.

Another aspect, which ought to be emphasised in this brief discussion, is that diversificati

multidivisionalisation (M-form of firms) go hand in hand. The continuous process of vertical
horizontal integration as well as product extension into additional industries during more
100 years of American economic development has ended up in more and more

multidivisionalisation. A measure of the extent of diversification can be obtained by examin

number of different SIC categories in which the largest firms operated. Thus, in 1948 relati

few of those firms operated in as many as 5 3-digit industries (see for example UNTDO, 2000,
Appendix 6.A3), but by 1973 a sizeable number were operating in 10 or more such industries
(Chandler, 1990, p. 619).
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From the so called U-form structure of the American firm of the 1900s (which started in the

and continued into the 1910s) which was centralized, and functionally departmentalized, a n
structure, the M-Form, started emerging from the 1920s which was multidivisional in nature.

Chandler emphasized in his numerous studies (for example in his "Strategy and Structure", 19
not all industries were keen to adopt the M-Form. Basically, the latter was adopted by the

technologically and capital-intensive industries, such as Du Pont and General Electric. Rume

(cited in Scott, 1973, p.139) notes that the proportion of multidivisional firms within the
"500" grew from about 15% in 1950 to over 75% in 1969. At the same time, in 1969, numerous

companies were operating 40 to 70 divisions, whereas before WWII the corporate office of ma
large firms rarely managed more than 10 divisions (Chandler 1994).

Some general remarks will close this sub-section. First, as Chandler suggested (1990, 1994),

following the continuous diversification into related and unrelated industries, there has b

separation between top managers at the corporate office and the middle managers of the divi
This separation created a problem regarding the statistical and cost accounting tools used

managers to evaluate projects and division performance. Second, after the Second World War,
parallel with decentralized profit-planning, the system of capital budgeting was developed

to organize data and make relevant decisions. As Baldwin and Clark (1994, p. 80) indicate, t

resulting cash inflow-outflow view of investment "...remains the theoretical core of most c

budgeting systems in the early 1990s...". However, as these authors testify, such systems, t
useful in some aspects of efficiency evaluation, led companies to invest vigorously but in
wrong projects.

2.4.2 Fordism, neo-Fordism, and flexible specialization

Since the introduction in various ways of the Tayloristic subdivision of labor at the begin
the 20th century and the mass production of cars achieved by Ford which was also based on
applications of scientific management, a growing part of American manufacturing became

gradually "Fordist". Fordism can be extended beyond its relevance to the production process
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become ".. .a social system combining a Tayloristic organization of work with a Keynesian role

the state and with mass consumption of standardized industrial products..." (Jaeger and Ernste
1989, p. 163). Ford had actually initiated this parallel mass consumption by substantially
increasing wages and promoting his cars.

The new information technology introduced in the 1950s (with the development of the electronic

industry), expanded in the 1960s, and really took off in the 1970s. It allowed the appearance o
flexible and programmable machines, which can be used not just for one task but for a whole

series of tasks. These machines can extend Tayloristic organization of labor from mass product

to the production of small lots and even single products. Consequently, ".. .Corporations woul

run as networks of establishments often considerably smaller than the classical Fordist factor

Also, many forms of subcontracting, franchising and the like are used to a considerable extent

create formally independent units well integrated in such networks.. ."(Ernste and Jaeger, 198
173). In this respect, Chandler (1990, p. 607) says "...In the 1960s and 1970s a wide variety

industries shifted from electromechanical to electronically controlled processes of production

began to transform the work place and alter the materials used in production. They realigned t
economies of scale and scope, often reducing minimum efficient scale and at the same time
expanding the opportunities for exploiting the economies of scope..."

Neo-Fordism is the continuation of Fordism in the USA, thus still including the trend of

Taylorisation and deskilling, but also including the new information technology. As such, Neo-

Fordism is opposed to Post-Fordism, which is more related to the system of flexible specializa
The latter can be defined in broad terms as a vertical disintegration of some core industries
"...the establishment of a much more independent network of small plants based on a work
organization which as a complement to flexibility and specialization explicitly emphasizes
professionalisation..." (Ernste and Jaeger, 1989, p. 176).

Overall, Neo-Fordism has not introduced new OIs, as Ernste and Jaeger (1989) or McLoughlin and

Clark (1994) testify. Post-Fordism on the contrary has, but not in the USA, at least up to the
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1980s. Post-Fordism is more linked to the OIs introduced in Japan after the 1950s (McLoughl
and Clark, 1994); this will be explored in the next section and chapters, though the concept of
Post-Fordism per se will not be analyzed (except on an ad hoc basis, for example, in Chapter four).
However, in the U S A , during the last 20 years firms in all sectors have been in the process of
imitating (.American firms were becoming less internationally competitive contrary to Japanese
firms) a strong element of Post-Fordism, namely the JIT/QC process, which initially had been
developed in Japan. This topic regarding the American imitation of the JIT/QC philosophy will be
the object of Chapter seven.

2.5 JAPANESE OIs AFTER (WWII)
2.5.1 The Just-in-time (JIT) system

Though the JJT cum quality control (QC) system will be the object of exploration in several
sections of this thesis, the present sub-section is a necessary introduction to this system, mainly
seen through the analysis of Best (1990) (numerous other references will be used in subsequent
sections). This author states (p. 143):

"...It was not until the 1970s that Japanese firms developed the plant flexibility to prod

of products on the same production lines without driving up indirect costs. The new plant fl

emerged out of the focused system and the refinement of associated production activities

together established the organizational preconditions for the just-in-time' (JIT) product
JIT is not simply an inventory management system... "

Best (1990) suggested that the 'New Competition' (as it is elaborated below) emerging from
Japanese firms is not sufficiently explained by strategy and culture alone, but also by n e w
production innovations such as the JIT system. The latter is closely linked to the concept of
process efficiency, which includes the productive time (per worker or per machine) as the basis for
operational efficiency, as well as the unproductive time, which eventually generates process
efficiency. The unproductive time is the time materials spend in inventory, handling, moving,
inspecting, recording, batching, reworking, chasing, counting and repacking. Emphasis on process
efficiency, and hence unproductive time, is justified w h e n one observes that the amount of time
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workers are actually transforming material is a small percentage of total producti
(estimated as being as low as 1% to as high as 20%) (Best, 1990, p. 148).

Another way to measure process efficiency is the 'work-in-process' (WTP) turn, whic

of annual sales to WIP (the value of inventories excluding inventories of produced
to be shipped). Abegglen and Stalk (1985, p. 113-4) provide the following relevant

the late 1970s most Western vehicle companies had WTP turns of around 10, but Toyo

leader in that respect) WIP turn was greater than 300 per year and Mazda's WIP tur
12 times in 1976 to over 50 times in 1981. The same authors calculated that every

WIP turn increases labor productivity by 38%. Figure 2.1, according to these writer

relationship between WTP turns and labor productivity (a similar relationship will
Chapter seven for econometric purposes).

Production
per head
(units/
person/
year)

38%
36%
Nissan
,*-*• Toyota

5038%
Mazda

1981 .. 3 5 %
•» "* Western Auto Company
1980
1978,,-

1979
i

10

50

100

200

300

Work-in-process turns
Source: Abegglen and Stalk (1985, p. 114)
Figure 2.1

Productivity

and

work-in-process

( W I P ) improvements

of

selected automobile producers

Process efficiency is not only related to the inventories side of the production process but also to

the production itself. Thus, it is inherently linked with short production runs (f

reducing the cycle from start to finish; for example the time to start a new car m
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production is considerably diminished under the regime of short runs), which reduce the time

materials are stored and level out production runs in supplier firms (see Atkinson, 1990 fo

description of the close links between short runs, JTT, work cells, customer responsiveness,

order to find alternatives to long production runs, the solution was to drive down changeove

so that small batches could be run with minimal interference with flows. This necessitated t

invention and innovation of 'single-minute exchange of dyes' that are necessary in the produ
of cars, or other products (Best, 1990, p. 152).

The organization of production in Japan was revolutionized in at least three other related w
(Best, 1990). First, machines were laid out in U-shapes with a single worker overseeing a group of
machines around her/him, in lieu of the usual straight-line layout. This organizational innovation
also increased productivity. Second, workers became problem solvers as opposed to merely
minders, since their tasks were transformed into detecting the problem of the self-stopped
machines and developing a solution. Third, a degree of automation became necessary, though as
Abbeglen and Stalk (1985, p.l 16) remarked:

"...Many Japanese companies view the adoption of JIT as the prelude to full factory automati

further reduce costs. As one recent executive of a robot manufacturer said, 'If you want

what is wrong with your process, try putting a robot in it'. Factories must be running e
before they can be automated... "

Another aspect closely related to the implementation of the JTT system is the sub-contractin
process. Parent or generally larger companies have established with suppliers, or generally smaller

firms, two types of sub-contracting, an informal one or kyoryokukai according to which writt

contracts are non-existent, and a formal one. A set of 'shared network norms' is established
time in the former one with the objective of achieving a trusting relationship. Within the sub-

contracting system special emphasis must be given to component design, which, depending on t

relative independence of the smaller firms, enables technological innovations to be maximize

Finally, three more aspects related to the JIT system will be briefly mentioned here. First,
researchers on the miracle of the modern Japanese economy, from 1950 to 1990, repeatedly
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observed that there is cooperation at all levels of Japan's society. For instance between
and managers, between government agencies and firms etc. "...Japan's physical and geographical
characteristics give social reinforcement to its social history of groupism, interdependence, and
sense of O N and G H U - debt and obligation..." (McMillan, 1984, p. 23). A s Caves and Uekusa
(1976, p. 59) have written:

"...Japan is a group-oriented society, and its economy exhibits a startling variety of gr

firms that extend beyond well-defined commodity markets. These groups in turn are cemen

variety of commercial linkages: between buyer and seller of goods, lender and borro
shareholder and issuer of equity... "

This spirit of cooperation can be especially detected in firm networks. Imai (1994) identi

different types of enterprise groups (zaibatsu, independent, fission, and network types5), which can
be combined into m a n y other hybrid types in the real world in Japan. Even in the apparently least
connected groupings, thefissiontype, the sense of cooperation is paramount. A s cited in Imai
(1994, p. 136), the President of thefissiontype group M a e k a w a said: "...Each company strives to
have its o w n character, but the more clearly defined that character becomes, the clearer it becomes
that it is part of the whole, and that it must collaborate with other group members which have other
characters..."

Second, regarding cost systems, "...The Japanese do not let the accounting procedures dete
h o w they measure and control their organizational activities. There are relatively fewer accounting
andfinancepersonnel in Japanese firms compared to similar U S companies..." (Giffi et al, 1990,
p. 155). Also, direct labor cost is not used to allocate overhead expenses. The Japanese treat direct
labor cost as a fixed asset (Ibid). Third, though the tendency for diversification and
multidivisionalism has followed an upward trend since World W a r II, ".. .M-form organization has
developed less extensively in Japan than in America, Britain and West Germany, yet still
accounted for over 4 0 % of the country's leading companies in the early 1970s..." (Cable and
Yasuki, 1985,417).

5

Examples: Honda Motor for the independent type, Maekawa for the fission type, and pharma
firms for the network type.
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2.5.2

Quality products, quality control, a n d Kaizen

The story about the quality issue in Japan is a fascinating one and lies at the heart of
economic miracle. Before World War II, Japanese products were low in quality (Best, 1990,

p. 137). After that War things changed rapidly, mainly because of some suggestions made by

American scholars such as Deming (1986) who, in turn, was influenced by his mentor Shewhar

who wrote, in 1931, a book entitled 'The Economic Control of Quality of Manufactured Produ

In 1950, the JUSE (Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers) asked Deming to give a seri

lectures on statistical quality control, because they (JUSE) "...saw potential in such me

addressing the Japanese problem of low quality products..." (Best, 1990, p. 159). This se

place successfully. At the same time Deming met many Japanese managers. "...The rest is hi

as the methods (Deming's) came to be adopted by virtually all of Japanese industry..." (Ib

Following Deming, Duran and Feigenbaum also carried the same message to Japan where any ty
of quality control soon became an obsession at all levels of production, from the hourly
market researchers, to product designers, to materials acquisitions employees and others.

control, especially based on statistical methods, became priority number one in all busine

activities. Overall, Japanese managers and industrialists systematically followed Deming'
ideas, which are summarized in his 14 famous points (Deming, 1986, or, Evans and Lindsay,
p. 92). For example: refuse to accept defects; cease dependence on mass inspection; find
and continually and forever make improvements; provide vigorous and ongoing education and
retraining; clearly demonstrate management commitment to all the 14 points every day.

Deming's ideas can also be summarized in the following way: when a worker is deprived of

his/her right to do good work and to be proud of himself or herself, this may be the singl
important contribution of management to poor quality (Deming, 1986). This is exactly what

Japanese worker was not deprived of, as after WWH the quality movement in Japan has genera
a work environment such that the Japanese worker became dedicated to and proud of his/her

41
for example via the creation of numerous quality control ( Q C ) circles (more on these circles see

Chapter four). It is relevant to see what Best (1990) has to say in this respect: ".. .The po
Japanese companies have not been successful because of cultural characteristics peculiar to

Japanese but because of the organizational characteristics that have tapped human energies
presumed, at least by scientific management, not to exist in working people..." (1990, p.

Initially, QC was applied in heavy industries such as steel, because they especially requi
instrumentation control. At a later stage, other industries started to introduce QC for such

consumer durables and home appliances (Imai, 1991, p. 12). Overall quality control in Japan h

growing at an exponential rate since 1950, as Figure 2.2 shows. This exponential evolution ca
compared with the historical expansion of quality control in Japan as Table 2.1 shows.
Table 2.1 Initial steps of quality control in Japan
Date

Event

March 1950

The J U S E started publishing its magazine Statistical Quality Control.

July 1950

Deming'sfirstvisit to Japan invited by the JUSE.

1950s

Several visits by Deming.

July 1954

J. M . Juran invited to Japan to conduct a J U S E seminar on quality control

1956

Japan Shortwave Radio included a course on quality control.

November 1960

Thefirstnational quality month was inaugurated.

1960

Q-marks and Q-flags were formally adopted.

April 1962

The magazine Quality Control for the Foreman was launched.

Source: Imai, 1991, pp. 10-12.
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All these points clearly show at least one issue: a continuous dynamic search for and

implementation of improvement. This is inherently related to Kaizen, which means continuou

improvement in all aspects of life. According to Imai (1991) Kaizen is one of the most comm
used words in Japan.

Kaizen is more of a philosophy, or a strategy, than an actual technique or innovation, and

embraces everything else analyzed so far. Imai (1991, p. 4) puts under the 'umbrella oi Kai
following concepts: TQC, robotics, QC circles, suggestion systems, customer orientation,
automation, discipline in the workplace, total productive maintenance, Kanban, quality

improvement, JJT, zero defects, small-group activities, cooperative labor-management relati

productivity improvement, and new product development. Kaizen is especially linked with TQ

it is already obvious from the fact that continuous improvement is inherently related to q
control. As Imai (1991, p. 13) has stressed "...Japan has developed an elaborate system of
strategies as management tools within the TQC movement..."

2.6 JAPANESE AND AMERICAN EVOLUTIONS OF FIRMS
OIs: A BRIEF COMPARISON

From this very brief historical overview of firms and OI developments in Japan and the USA
conclusions can now be readily made. In Japan, in parallel with only a handful of large

conglomerates, smaller and more numerous firms has been the trend from the beginning of th

country's industrialization process. This was due to the early development of the focal typ
company because of limited resources and technology. Hence the search for cooperation and
consequently economies of scope was to the detriment of economies of scale. In the USA a

contrary evolution took place, in which, from the beginning of the country's industrializat

there was a tendency for the creation of big business, diversification of products, and eve
multi-divisional organization. This was due to a natural abundance of resources, human and

human, plus a series of major and minor technological and organizational breakthroughs (se

subsequent chapters for an exploration of this statement). This divergent historical evolut

firm in the two countries demonstrates that there is not a unique way to evaluate competit
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the role of firms, but this evaluation depends on the historical context of factors such as

availability of resources, technology, and organization. In other words, what is good for the U
might not be good for Japan or what is good for Japan might not be good for Canada, and so on.

addition, this historical and spatial dependency is part of the contingency approach in manag
and related sciences.

Also, in Japan, many organizational innovations such as flexible production, JIT, quality contr
and Japanese style sub-contracting enhanced and sustained the development of small and medium

enterprises (SMEs). On the contrary only very recently in the USA, from the late 1980s, has the

been a reversal in the continuous expansion of big business; thus in the last 15-20 years in th
USA big firms have been shrinking and SMEs expanding in number (for example, cf. Stewart,
1993, or Brown, 2000), though the overall importance of big business remains. This is to a

significant extent explained by the reorganization of the American firms in terms of the JIT/QC
system as it will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters and especially in Chapter seven.
Otherwise, no major organizational innovation took place in this country after WWII except for
intensification of product diversification and multi-divisionalism.

In Japan, the conglomerate type of business existed from the start of the country's industrial

process and has continued its development up to the present. On the contrary, in the USA it onl

appeared in the mid 1960s, but its development was reversed in the 1980s. Again, this antithesi

between Japanese and American firm evolutions can be -at least partly- explained by differences
in OIs and TIs, resource endowments, as well as historical circumstances and culture. In

subsequent chapters, and especially in Chapter four, a more detailed comparison of developments
in each of these countries will be carried out.

2.7

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter an historical overview of the U S A and Japan uncovered the major OIs as described

by eminent scholars and in particular by economic historians. A summary of these OIs and thei
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chronology is provided in Table 1.1 of Chapter one (although the list is not exhaustive). In

USA most of the major OIs appeared during the Second Industrial Revolution, between 1880 and

1920: mass production and mass distribution and their integration, mergers, diversification,

scientific management, Fordism, and so on. In the same country, no major OI was discovered a

WWH, except for the adoption of the JIT/QC system during the last 20 years via the introduct

of flexible specialization and Post-Fordism. On the contrary, in Japan some major OIs appear

after the 1930s and especially after the 1950s: focal firms, JIT/QC, quality control, kaizen,
on.

These OIs, as related to industrial and economic growth, will be extensively scrutinized in
remainder of this study, first from a theoretical point of view, and then from an empirical

viewpoint. For example, in Chapter four, from the various and numerous OIs identified in sev
historical periods some patterns and common ground will emerge.
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In Chapter two, a historical review of the economies of the U S A and Japan revealed the nature and
the importance of various OIs. The first question to answer subsequent to this review is how OIs

fit into the preoccupations of economists and other scholars, and consequently how OIs fit into t

process of economic growth. In this thesis, the latter is defined as changes in the rate of eith
output, or productivity (total factor or labor productivity1). When necessary, reference will be

made to the growth in employment or other related variables, though it is not a primary concern i
this study how these variables (including employment) are related to economic growth2.

In this chapter the foundations for the inclusion of the impact of OIs on the process of industri

growth is laid. Though industrial growth is not the same as economic growth in general (the latte

includes growth of the services, agriculture, and mining sectors), most of the analysis carried o
in this chapter is related to economic growth (whereas industrial growth will be more explicitly
dealt with in Chapter four). In this chapter, some 'hidden' mechanisms of economic growth and
development are explored. In brief, there are some scholars who, for example, have expressed the
need to consider or emphasize the impact of OIs per se; this is reviewed in the second section
together with some other relevant economic concepts. The third section examines the relationship
between OIs and TIs in terms of whether technology is embodied or not, or in terms of the
simultaneity of impact of OIs and TIs, and so on. It emphasizes the need to examine OIs
separately. The fourth section shows why and how OIs can be incorporated more rigorously in a

production function. The fifth section introduces some other major 'external' factors in explain
industrial growth.

1

In Chapter seven all the types of productivity are linked and explained.
Edquist et al (2001) discuss in detail this relationship. For instance they talk about the phenomenon of
'jobless growth' in relation to TIs and OIs. See also, h o w in this thesis this discussion is briefly extended in
subsequent Chapters and especially in Chapter seven.
2
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ABOUT OIs
The literature review in this chapter is focused on h o w the impact of OIs on economic growth
(called OIsImEG) has been treated by scholars, from a theoretical point of view; Chapters four and
five will complete this review. The quantitative relationship of OIsImEG will be reviewed in
Chapters six and seven. Sub-section 3.2.1 will deal with the general scholarly concern regarding
the OIsImEG and sub-section 3.2.2 will focus on h o w some economic concepts and theories could
be potentially used to understand the OIsImEG.

3.2.1 The focus of scholarly concern
It is seldom the preoccupation of economists to analyze the OIsImEG. This sub-section attempts to
collect the writings of scholars w h o expressed some concern about it.

Marshall was amongst the first economists to have included OIs in his remarkable analysis
than 100 years ago. The 4th book of his "Principles of Economics" (1890, 8th edition reprinted in
1949) is entitled "The agents of production, land, labor, capital, and organization", and contains 13
chapters. Thus, he recognizes that "...it seems best sometimes to reckon Organization apart as a
distinct agent of production..." (p. 115). M o r e precisely, Marshall suggested (p. 221) that:

"... We may divide the economies arising from an increase in ihe scale of production of a

goods, into two classes-firstly,those dependent on the general development of the indus

secondly, those dependent on the resources of the individual houses of business engage

their organization and the efficiency of their management. We may call the former e
economies, and the latter internal economies... "

In relation to the 'internal economies', he explored the relations between machines and l
the division of labor in general. In relation to 'external economies' he included the particular
localities of specialized industries, and a comparison between large and small firms. H e also
explored the role of managers, entrepreneurship, leadership and the various legal types of firms,
such as the primitive handicraftsmen, cottage factories, professionals, joint-stock companies and
so on. Finally, he related improved organization with increasing returns of profitability (Ibid, p.
265).
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More recently, Maddison (1982) enumerated several factors that have an impact on economic
development. These factors are to some extent based on Schumpeter's work, as his comments
show:

"...Schumpeter described the nature of economic development as the 'carrying out of new

combinations', which he defined rather widely as follows (in fact, only thefirsttwo of thes
represents what is conventionally included in the notion of technical progress):
a. Introduction of new goods;
b. Introduction of new methods of production;
c. Opening a new market;
d. Conquest of a new supply of raw materials;
e. New orzanization of an industry (my emphasis) ..." (Maddison, 1982, p. 20)
Schumpeter (1934) said that OIs are important in determining economic growth, although he was
more preoccupied with the role of innovative entrepreneurs and their leadership in combining the
five factors mentioned by Maddison (see above quote) than any one of these factors in particular,
for example the "...new organization of an industry, like the creation of a monopoly position (for
example through trustification) or the breaking up of a monopoly position..." (Schumpeter, 1934,
p. 66).

The definition of 'technical progress' in the above quote by Maddison very often assumes that
organizational or managerial elements are not included, and if s o m e h o w the latter are at least
recognized as being a separate conceptual and practical entity they are very quickly eliminated
from further analysis. T w o examples illustrate this point. First, Jackson (1998, p. 15), has split
process innovation into two parts: 'technological change' encompassing change in materials, plant,
equipment etc, and 'change in technique' encompassing change in work group organization (e.g.
assembly line) and change in individual work (e.g. parts of scientific management). However, on
the next page, Jackson says: "...Change in technique is a large but somewhat specialized subject
and will not be further discussed..." Second, although Hall (1994) includes 'the organization of
production' in the definition of 'technological change' he rarely refers to this organization in his
entire book on innovation, economics and evolution.
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Also, Abramovitz (1993, p. 237), in his search for the areas of ignorance about the sources of
growth, said:

"...There is still far too much that is poorly understood about the influence of relative fact

about the evolution of science and technology, and about the political and economic institu

and modes of organization (my emphasis) on which the discovery or acquisition of new knowledg
depend... "
This n e w knowledge is, for Abramovitz, one of the interdependent sources of economic growth.

Along similar lines to those of Abramovitz, Nelson (1996, p. 119) suggested in a much more
concrete way: "...From the perspective of evolutionary theory, firm diversity is an essential aspect
of the processes that create economic progress...". This author, though m u c h more preoccupied
with technological innovations as the key to economic growth, regards the organizational
differences between firms as the key to the appropriate exploitation of technology. In an earlier
article Nelson (1994, p.237) remarked: "...There has been far more study of the n e w technology
advances than there has been of the w a y firm organization has evolved..." Nelson, in a more
recent article (1997), besides his main point that Abramovitz in 1952 had already elaborated on
many more contemporaneous issues of exogenous and endogenous growth models, repeatedly
emphasized that organization of firms and institutions should be more on the agenda for academic
research, instead of just technology.

In his work Nelson (1996) made it clear that OIs are paramount in determining productivity
changes at the firm level. Thus, he explicitly states:

"...This calls attention to complications repressed in the neoclassical theory of production. O

the need for mechanism to coordinate action. Given division of labor, jobs must be compatib

designed and appropriately meshed. A network of information flow is needed so that the whole j

gets done smoothly. This problem of organization would exist even if all individuals share
goals of top management... " (Nelson, 1996, p. 20)

Following this statement, and basing his suggestions partly on the work of other scholars, he
distinguishes between 'classical' and contemporary views of organizational theory of the firm; in
the former he includes Taylor's scientific management (see below), or a machine with h u m a n
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elements; and in the latter he includes the Hawthorne works experiment or social system norms
(Nelson, 1996, pp. 20-24). More precisely, Nelson said: "...Management cannot effectively

'choose' what is to be done in any detailed way, and has only broad control over what is done,

how well. Only a small portion of what people actually do on a job can be monitored in detail.
(Ibid, p. 21) This 'dichotomy' between the machine model and the social system model of firm

organization will be one of the main themes of analysis in this thesis in later chapters when
Fordism cum scientific management axis versus the lean production system will be extensively
explored.

Despite Nelson's (and other evolutionary economists') recognition of the role of OIs in posit
impacting on the growth of firms, Nelson was predominantly preoccupied with TIs and their
impact on economic growth. Thus, he explicitly admitted, "...These and the other recent

evolutionary models do not address the complexities of internal firm organization or of indiv

or social psychology..." (Ibid, p. 51) Nevertheless, it remains true that eminent scholars su
Nelson have been actively exploring the intricacies of OIs in economic theories3.

Hunt (1997) in linking evolutionary economics, endogenous growth models, and his resource-

advantage (R-A) theory said: ".. .R-A theory is an evolutionary, disequilibrium-provoking, pr
theory of competition, in which innovation and organizational learning are endogenous and in
which entrepreneurship and institutions affect economic performance..." (p. 437). The same
author quoted another writer, namely McNulty, who in 1968 "...pointed out three decades ago,

'the essence of industrialization and economic growth is a changing production function and t

development of new products, techniques, and forms of business organizations'..." (p. 429). Al
Tisdell (1996, p. 107) remarked: "...A part of productivity progress may be due to...

improvements in organization of the business firm as it learns how to best adjust to innovati

change in its production processes..." Another well-known scholar, Porter (1990) stressed the

importance of strategies, skills, and organizational arrangements in determining the 'competit

3

Nelson's views on the relation between OIs and TIs is discussed further in section three of
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advantage of nations'. Sayer and Walker (1992) extensively analyzed the importance o
often used the same terms, namely 'OIs'.

Rosenberg (1976) has been one of the main proponents of the theory that technologica
major force in shaping economies and histories. However, overwhelmingly, he analyzed TIs and
ignored OIs, although he acknowledged the importance of the latter as well. Thus, he said:

"...The economy's output may be raised not only by increasing the supply of inputs (

along an existing production function) or by technological change (shifts in th

function) but also by numerous kinds of alterations in the qualities of the inputs

typically escape the scrutiny of the economic theorist. It is apparent that econom

associated with important qualitative changes in the human agent as a factor ofpro

improvements take such forms as changes in knowledge, technical skills, organi

managerial abilities, levels of economic aspiration, responsiveness to econo
capacity to undertake and to adapt to innovation, etc... " (Rosenberg, 1976, p. 86)

Two more recent relevant survey articles have 'discovered' the need to consider more
organizational issues. Thefirst,compiled by Fuhrer and Little (1996), was based on an economic
conference organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, where several well-known
economists participated, such as Solow, Jorgenson, Grossman, Rosenberg, A. Greenspan and
others.

"...Most participants were sympathetic with the need to decompose technology into it

parts -innovation, development, and diffusion- and, to include intangibles lik

structure, management skills, and culture in the package labeled technology... " (

The second survey by Ruttan (1998) reached a similar conclusion.

The review of the literature has so far, not been exhaustive, and more references on
be referred to later in this study. Some other references could also be made, including those, which
are related to institutional issues, such as Dosi et al (1992). A supplementary review of the
literature and relevant analysis will take place in Chapter four for a more concrete elaboration of
the issues at hand. Overall, despite these sporadic concerns about the impact of OIs on economic
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growth, not many scholars have consistently demonstrated this impact, at least qualitatively or
even to any extent quantitatively. Perhaps, the most outstanding out of these exceptions are
Chandler and Lazonick.

Chandler's work is one of the strongest or closest points of reference one can get regarding the
impact of OIs on industrial growth. His historical analysis of the American industrial evolution
was systematically cited in the previous chapter (based on his books of 1962, 1977, 1990). Three
remarks will be m a d e here. First, Chandler's work is a continuous interplay between OIs and TIs,
sometimes the former preceding the latter, and sometimes vice-versa. Second, he analyzed the
organization of business mainly in terms of management functions and strategies. Third, he very
often referred to the changes that took place in the organization of the shop floor and design of
factory works. The organizational features of big business are at the heart of Chandler's work:
"...Such institutional linkages m a y help to explain w h y Britain and France missed out on what has
been called the Second Industrial Revolution.. .In Britain and France technically trained salesmen,
production engineers, laboratory technicians, and university scientists were not coordinated
through the instrument of the large business enterprise..." (1981, p. 169). O n the contrary, in the
U S A the latter were the moving force of the American 'managerial capitalism'; they replaced to
some extent market mechanisms to establish a 'visible hand' on economic performance. Finally, to
summarize Chandler's position, the following quote from his 1994 article is useful:

"...The actual economies of scale and scope, as measured by throughput, are organizational. Such
economies depend on knowledge, skill, experience, and teamwork- on the organized human
capabilities essential to exploit the potential of technological progress... " (p. 81)

Lazonick's work is again one of the strongest or closest points of reference someone can get
regarding the impact of OIs on industrial growth. Effectively, Chandler and Lazonick complement
each other in several ways. In his 1991 book, Lazonick thoroughly examined both the American
and the Japanese economies, thus extending Chandler's analysis even further. His main points can
be summarized in four propositions. First, he used m a n y economic concepts of various scholars,
such as Marshall and Williamson, to emphasize that Chandler's 'managerial capitalism' promoted
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economic growth (e.g. cf. 1990, p. 291). Second, "...The Japanese have not rejected managerial
capitalism, but have elaborated it into a set of institutional relationships that I call collective
capitalism..." which enabled private-sector enterprises to generate high-quality products at low
costs (p. 15, and pp. 36-45). Third, he presented a dynamic theory of the business organization as
an engine of economic growth (Ibid, Chapter three), based on both TIs and OIs, and by using the
concept of the 'high-fixed-cost strategy'. Finally, he combined the 'innovative business
organization' with transaction cost theory in a different manner from Williamson.

"...By adopting an 'organizational success'perspective rather than a 'marketfailure'perspective

on the economic institutions of capitalism, one can argue that, when innovation is the iss

market cannot mimic the high-powered incentives of collective organizations... " (Ibid, p. 227

In his 1990 book, he extensively analyzed the organizational transformations that took place on
shop floor during the second industrial revolution in the U S A . Thus, he recognizes the immense
impact of internal labor structure as a means to advance economic development.

In closing this brief review reference is made to an article written in an organization-oriented
journal. Lillrark (1995) emphasized that OIs such as JIT and T Q M become a productive factor in
their o w n right besides capital and labor, and "...the very factor that differentiates successful
economies from lesser ones..." (p. 971). Such assertions are quite rare to find in economicsoriented journals.

Finally, it is worth adding some comments about the relationship between OIs and
entrepreneurship. There is a wide variety of relevant works in the literature, mainly smce
Schumpeter's work. S o m e economists have taken a proactive stand as to the important role that
entrepreneurs play in shaping economic development (for instance, Lydall, 1998 more recently).
This indirectly supports the importance of OIs as well, because the latter needs the ideas and
actions of entrepreneurs for the implementation of OIs. Baldwin (1972), for example, argues along
the same lines, although instead of OIs he refers to TIs. Kircbhoff (1994) suggests that
entrepreneurship is the key to dynamic capitalism through the process of business firm formation
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and growth. Although entrepreneurship is usually related to innovative individuals (mostly
creators and owners of new firms), as Schumpeter (1934), Baumol (1995) and others have
proposed, entrepreneurship can also exist within large organized companies as McGee (1995)
counter-proposed. This enlarged concept of the process of entrepreneurship can then be better
related to the process of TIs and OIs.

3.2.2 Link between OIs and economic concepts

Although scholarly concern has not very often been focused on the relationship between OIs and
economic growth as the previous sub-section has demonstrated, some economists have developed

concepts that can potentially be used to describe this relationship. As a first approximation of
model proposed in this study, Figure 3.1 shows the main elements discussed in this sub-section
based on economic concepts and theories suggested by various scholars. This model is only an

attempt to put together these various, apparently unrelated, elements4. Each one of these element
will now be briefly analyzed .

Coase (1992), in his Nobel Prize speech, outlined some of the main issues related to his
contribution to the economic theory of transaction costs (TCs)6, and the existence of firms and

institutions (mainly through his 1937 and 1960 publications). It is appropriate to quote some of
writings in that speech in order to capture the essence of his ideas.

"... What happens in between the purchase of the factors ofproduction and the sale of the good

that are produced by these factors is largely ignored... The firm in mainstream economi

often been described as a 'black box'. And so it is. This is very extraordinary given th

4

Note that not all interactions between the different factors and hence not all relevant arrows are shown on
this Figure. The inclusion of all the relevant arrows would have shown the links of all aspects in reciprocal
ways in order to indicate the endogenous character of these factors of economic growth. Here, the
mathematical models developed by Solow (1956) and Romer (1994) are pertinent for showing the axis of
exogeneity versus endogeneity of economic growth.
5
In chapters four and five, a more comprehensive study of all these elements plus necessary extensions will
be undertaken. Especially in chapterfive,a model will be proposed that takes into account new issues about
OIs.
6

Cheung (1998, p. 515) defined TCs "to be all the costs which do not exist in a Robinson Crusoe
they cover both costs associated with 'exchanges' and those associated with 'commands from higher
authority'. TCs will be more extensively analyzed in the next two chapters.
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resources in a modern economic system are employed withinfirms...I argued in 'The Nature of the
Firm' that the existence of transaction costs leads to the emergence of the firm... Not to
transaction costs in the theory leaves many aspects of the working of the economic system
unexplained...To have an efficient economic system it is necessary not only to have markets
also areas of planning within organizations of the appropriate size... "

This
study

Marshall
Taylor
Ohno

Chandler

Rostow
Hirschman

Evolutionary Process of Economic Growth
Boulding
Nelson
Winter
Notes: KCs: kinetic costs (see Chapterfive),TCs: transaction costs; K: capital; L: labor.

Figure 3.1 OIs and economic growth
From Coase's seminal papers many other scholars have substantially analyzed the impact of
transaction costs on economic theories. Williamson, Demsetz, and Cheung are three researchers,
among others as Coase (1992) himself recognized, who have made the notion and idea of
'transactions costs' a new area of fundamental foundation in economic thought. These costs have
gradually become a generic name for many other similar or complementary notions, such as
governance, opportunism, and so on. Many applications of the existence of transactions costs have

confirmed its validity. For example, the decision as to whether a firm should outsource some of its
inputs or vertically integrate depends on the magnitude of transaction costs involved in these two
alternatives.
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Although institutions in a broad sense (for example democratic constitutions and culture) are
explored in the last section of this chapter, here they are analyzed in the context of TCs. A s North
(1992) m a d e it clear, w h e n transaction costs are positive, institutions7 matter. Cheung (1998)
suggested that T C s should actually be called institution costs. North (1992) has combined the
theory of transaction costs with the evolution of institutions and organizations. H e summarized
most of his theoretical suggestions as follows.

"...In fact, we have incomplete information and limited mental capacity by which to process
information. Human

beings, in consequence, impose constraints on human interaction in orde

structure exchange. There is no implication that the consequent institutions are efficient.

world ideas and ideologies play a major role in choices and transaction costs result in impe

markets... Institutions and the way they evolve shape performance of economies over time..

Institutions are the rules of the game of a society... Organizations are the players... The con

interaction between institutions and organizations in the economic setting of scarcity and h

competition is the key to institutional change... The economies of scope, complementarities

network externalities of an institutional change are overwhelmingly incremental and pat
dependent..."

Wallis and North (1986) found that 45% of American national income in 1970 was devoted to
transacting. This confirms the existence of transaction costs and hence the existence of the role of
institutions and organizations in the economy. However, North's remark in 1992 that "...We still
k n o w all too little about the dynamics of institutional change and particularly the interplay
between economic and political markets..." (p. 6) adequately describes the state of knowledge in
this respect.

In addition, a recent article by Bouttes and Hamamdjian (1997) has shed some extra light on the
T C s inside organizations: "...Although coordinating economic activities within firms is very
c o m m o n , it remains a mystery from a theoretical point of view...Our objective is to describe the
mechanisms by which operators and activities are coordinated within large corporations..." (p.
59). First, these two authors elaborated on Williamson's (1985, Chapter 10) typology of industrial
relations itself based on four alternatives of combinations of asset specificity and technological

7

Cheung (1998, p. 515) defined institution as "any arrangement used to conduct economic activities
involve two or more individuals".
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non-separability. Thus, they, for example, formalized the concept of 'residual rights' and their
allocation or implementation. Second, they highlighted the need to resolve the coordination issue
inside firms due to the problems of communication and bounded rationality, and to satisfy this
need they explored the three types of contracts: complete, project and residual rights related, which
are described in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 The three elementary contracts and coordination of the firm
Criteria and traits
Complete contract Residual Rights
Project Contract
allocation contract
Specific investment related to the
Qualifications,
Experience of
Knowledge of the
definition of contracts
professional
different functions
firm and its
experience
within the firm
environment
Examples of employees related to
A simple operator
A foreman modifies
The executive
each type of contract
in relation to his
the organization of
committee
supervisor
his team to improve
its productivity;
executives; experts
Role in the coordination process
Weak
Very important
Important
Discretionary power
Weak
Important
Very important
Veto right
N o , in general
Essential
No
Role of the management dialogue
Allows the
Very important, ex
Important for the
evolution of the
ante, interim, ex post cohesion of the
contract terms
project team
to appreciate
performances
Routines
Essential
Some
None
Implementation means
Acting in a collective
Stabilizing the
Adapting to the
hierarchy
way
environment
Collective decision
Instrumental
Essential
Instrumental
Very important
Incentive schemes
Very important
Very important
Important
Information links
Weak
Very important
Strategy, the long
Level of management and action
Control,
the
medium
Operation, the
term,
economic
term, technoshort term,
language
economic language
technical language
Coordination failure:
Modification
Intermediate product or service not
or poorly supplied, because of
antagonistic interests
Redefinition of the
Coordination failure:
residualrightsof
Domination of one team, because
each team, help in the
of attempts of one group to
exercise of residual
increase its influence over the
other
rights
Coordination failure:
Poor understanding of what the
other does or requires, because of
absence of shared vision, or
absence of c o m m o n logic
Source: Based on Bouttes and Hamamdjian (1997), in particular Table 3.1, p. 72.

Implementation of a
small project contract
under the principal's
control

Thus, w e can see in this Table that coordination of operations within firms is inherently linked
with numerous aspects of the three types of contracts. Failure of such coordination leads to
decreases in firm productivity. Furthermore, the basic elements of the theory of TCs are -as
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'criteria and traits' in the Table- interrelated with the three types of contracts, and the proc

intrafirm coordination. For example, routines are essential in 'complete contracts' that depend o
qualifications and professional experience, but they do not exist in 'project contracts'; or,
'discretionary power' and 'information links' are weak in complete contracts but more important
in the other two types of contracts. Also, if coordination of the firm's operations fails due to
domination of one team, the residual rights of each team are eventually redefined and hence new
contracts are made. Bouttes and Hamamdjian's article (1997) considerably enhances the
importance of TCs, since it extends TCs to an important sphere of OIs, namely those that take
place inside firms8.

TCs in general and the evolution of institutions and organizations are not sufficient to explain
economic growth by themselves. We also need the ample and extensive evidence provided by
Chandler, Lazonick, and Fruin9 whose historical studies of firm evolutions in several countries
support and complement North's and Coase's writings. The complementarity comes from

elements such as strategy, sectoral and particular firms' leading role in economic development. I
also comes from other elements as Simon (1997) has highlighted:
"...The attempts of the new institutional economics to explain organizational behavior solely in
terms of agency, asymmetric information, transaction costs, opportunism, and other concepts
drawn from neoclassical economics ignore the key organizational mechanisms like authority,
identification, and coordination, and hence are seriously incomplete... " (1997, p. 237).

We also need Schumpeter's creative destruction and the role of entrepreneurs in shaping booms
and recessions, and historical economic development. Entrepreneurs introduce OIs and TIs in a
dynamic environment characterized by continuous disequilibria. Nelson (1996, p. 109) nicely
summarizes the strong link between Schumpeter's creative destruction and evolutionary
However, TCs are not sufficient to explain the complex process of economic growth. For instance,
topic of 'kinetic costs' (KCs) (and their relationship with the TCs) will be extensively explored in chapter
five. The insufficiency of TCs is pinpointed by many scholars such as Perrow (1986), and Stiles and Mick
(1997). The last two authors say for example "...As Perrow (1986) has pointed out, proponents of
transaction cost economics often forget that intra-organizational decision making, control, and enforcement
are themselves complex and costly enterprises..." (p. 211). In addition, in the above analysis by Bouttes and
Hamamdjian (1997), as summarized in Table 3.2 it becomes apparent that contracts depend on h o w the firm
is organized, and hence this dependence must be further explored in chapter five.
9

These three authors' work has already been referred to in previous sections, and it will be fu
in subsequent sections and chapters.
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economics: "...In our book, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982), Winter and I

spent quite a bit of space presenting a 'theory of the firm' which is consistent with, and mot
a Schumpeterian or evolutionary theoretic view of economic process and economic change...".

Thus, within the boundaries of this view, diversity of firms is an expected phenomenon (Nelson
1996, p. 113).

To further understand the impact of TCs and institutions, and of historical creative destructi
the evolutionary process of economic growth we also need to emphasize the bounded rationality

economic activities. Simon (1997) criticized the concept of rational economic man from as earl
the 1950s. He emphasized that individuals have limited knowledge; they generate choice
alternatives by satisficing and not maximizing their utility. Overall their rationality being

as a rule, due to ".. .the limits of human cognitive capacity for discovering alternatives, co

their consequences under certainty or uncertainty, and making comparisons among them..." (1997

p. 291). This bounded rationality impinges upon many economic activities such as organizationa

identification (1997, p. 203). How are these concepts related to economic growth? It seems tha

existence of such rationality always creates room for improvements in organizational issues; s

improvements in turn increase productivities that eventually speed up economic growth. In othe

words, the existence of bounded rationality and satisficing behavior in decisions of productio

entails that firms, and hence the economy as a whole, are always situated inside their product
possibility frontiers (this point will be further analyzed later)10.

The evolution of historical creative destruction and institutions are also related to the theo
specialization and division of labor (Smith, 1776, and Young, 1928), which constitute strong
moving forces for economic growth, especially via the mechanism of comparative advantage. As

Cheung (1998, p.517) remarked "...Transaction costs as a proportion of gains from specializati

provides a critical measure which, in my view, very largely explains observed differences m th
wealth of nations..."

10

Similar holistic analyses such as that by Arrow (1974) are required to complement our overa
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Furthermore, division of labor influences capabilities and competences of the firm (and viceversa). Penrose (1959) started a n e w w a v e of awareness about the role of firm resources, which in
turn became the basis of the impact of capabilities and competences on the growth of firms. W e
need to k n o w what slows d o w n that growth so that w e better understand the overall mechanism of
sub-sectoral and macro levels of growth. Penrose remarked that limitations to the growth of firms
depend on managerial ability (related to conditions within the firm), product or factor markets, and
uncertainty and risk. Consequently, internal resources, and managerial ability should be included
in our models of economic growth.

Penrose generated a new stream of thought regarding firm competences. Langlois (1992), for
example summarized the importance of these competences:

"Although one can find versions of the idea in Smith, Marshall, and elsewhere, the modern

discussion of the capabilities of organizations probably begins with Edith Penrose (1959), w
suggested viewing thefirmas a 'pool ofresources''.. ."(p. 286). "...In a metaphoric sense, at

the capabilities of the organization are more than the sum (whatever the means) of the skills o

individuals in the organization. In addition to the 'skill' of thefirm'sphysical capital, ther
the matter of organization. How the firm is organized -how the routines of the humans and
machines are linked together - is also part of afirm'scapabilities... " (p. 287)
In addition, as Langlois (1992) again suggests, capabilities, governance, and transactions costs are
all intrinsically interrelated. This theme of the link between firm competences and transaction
costs will be further analyzed in the next two chapters, although it is impossible in this study to
include most of the substantial research conducted on the firms' capabilities mainly by
management scholars. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning here the substantial contribution of
Langlois and Robertson (1995) in this area of research, because it is a significant m o v e to bridge
many issues related to both economics and management (see Chapter five).
Economic growth is also affected by OIs as the following short account shows. The pioneering
innovative entrepreneurs Ford, Toyoda, and O h n o (discussed in more detail in later chapters)
introduced and implemented n e w m o d e s of production, thus having destroyed the old ones. These
three revolutionaries and their organizational systems of production -Fordism and JJT-are a strong
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point of evidence for Schumpeter's thesis. Taylor's introduction to scientific management prov
another piece of fundamental evidence that there can be a positive interplay between institutions
and organizations through a reduction in relevant transaction costs (via its extended meaning).
Taylor's concepts became the basis for Fordism and later for JTT, as scientific management was
the starting point of an era of rationalization of all intrafirm and interfirm activities. Connected
with the JIT system is quality control. D e m i n g (1986) and Juran (1995) theoretically developed the
connection between quality control ( Q C ) and productivity increases. The continuous improvement
in the quality of produced goods is directly linked to a reduction in both production costs and
transaction costs (e.g. via customers' satisfaction). In turn, Q C is inherently linked with JIT, and
hence it becomes a continuation of scientific management.

As it is shown in Figure 3.1, leading sectors are also important in explaining economic growth.
Effectively, Rostow (1960, 1990) has elaborated on the role of leading sectors in the economy and
its stages of growth by 1960 (though his ideas on these leading sectors were expressed in earlier
publications) and expanded on it in 1990. Again let the author explain some of his main points.

"...It is possible to isolate empirically certain leading sectors, at early stages of their ev
whose rapid rate of expansion plays an essential direct and indirect role in maintaining the

momentum of the economy...The overall rate of growth of an economy must be regarded in the fir

instance as the consequence of differing growth rates in particular sectors of the economy

behavior of sectors during the take-off is merely a special version of the growth process in ge

or, put another way, growth proceeds by repeating endlessly, in different patterns, with d

leading sectors, the experience of take-off...(I960) ...Initially. Of course, the growth-r

the leading sector greatly exceeded that of the industrial index. After a time the rate of gro

the leading sector settled down (or fell below) the rate ofgrowth of the overall index.... "(1

Hirschman's (1958) theory of leading sectors complements Rostow's contributions, in the sense
that the micro and macro levels of the economy are linked together through backward and forward
linkages. In addition, this author has emphasized the importance of the administration and
management of firms as being a crucial element to these linkages (Chapter eight of his 1958
work). The leading sectors in m a n y countries (e.g. Great Britain, the U S A , Japan), at the beginning
of their development, or take-off, were the textiles and clothing and railway industries. The
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duration of their positive effect on the overall economy was about 50 years (Rostow, 1990). Mor
recently, the leading sectors were the vehicles and electronics industries for Japan, and the

chemicals and electronics industries for the USA. However, leading sectors must be linked to t

concept of leading firms. As it will be further analyzed in the next two chapters, leading firm

always play a leading role in shaping leading sectors, for example IBM in computers, Ford in ca
and so on.

Table 3.2

Concepts related to the impact of OIs on economic growth

SCHOL.4RS

CONCEPTS

CHANDLER

History, big business, strategies, and managerial organizations

COASE

The black box and transactions costs

DEMING

Quality control

FORD

Mass production system

FRUIN

Focalfirms,inter-firm economies of scope

HIRSCHMAN

Unbalanced growth and leading sectors

JURAN

Quality control

LAZONICK

History, big business, shop floor changes

MARSHALL

Organization as a distinct input of production

NELSON, WINTER, Evolutionary economics, emphasis on disequilibrium economics
BOULDING
History in economics, institutions, and organizations
NORTH
OHNO

JIT process

PENROSE

Firm's resources and capabilities

ROSTOW

Leading sectors, stages of economic development

SCHUMPETER

Creative destruction and innovative entrepreneurship (disequilibrium economics)

SIMON

Bounded rationality and satisficing

SMITH

Economies from specialization, division of labor

TAYLOR

Scientific management

TOYODA

Lean production

WILLIAMSON

Transaction costs

YOUNG

Economies from specialization, division of labor

Note: O n dates of publications, see text and references.

In summary, the pioneers and the economic foundations of the relationship between OIs and

economic growth as they have briefly been described in this section can be summarized in Tabl
3.2. These foundations will be further explored and used in the remaining of this study in a
specific way whenever necessary.
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3.3

OIs A N D TIs

In this section a necessary preliminary discussion takes place to clarify the important issue of

technology, which has almost always been regarded as substantially contributing to the proces

economic growth. Technology is not only TIs, or embodied technology, (as emphasized in Chapte

one) but also OIs, or disembodied technology. In this chapter, and the following two, the rol

OIs in this process is thoroughly explored, as the focus of this study is disembodied technol
OIs, in order to emphasize the organizational character of this type of technology. However,

distinction embodied/ disembodied has not always been very clear, as the following paragraphs

will briefly demonstrate amongst other issues. Thus, when writers refer to 'technology', they

usually implicitly mean the embodied type, or they sometimes mean both TIs and OIs, unless th

specify it. Consequently, care is required to differentiate the two types of technology as mu
possible, since the object of this research is primarily related to OIs.

3.3.1 Distinction between embodied/disembodied technological innovations

Several scholars have made the distinction between embodied and disembodied technology. For

example, Nelson (1996, p. 29) provides a similar distinction though using different terms: ".

the extent that firm structures and decision-making style are important variables influencing

productivity, this fact in itself cautions against thinking of the determinants of labor prod
simply in terms of the quantity of complementary inputs, and technology.

One of the original sources relating to embodied/ disembodied technology is Solow (1957, 1960

who made this distinction in the late 1950s. In his 1957 article, he says: "...It will be see

am using the phrase 'technical change' as a shorthand expression for any kind of shift (origi

emphasis) in the production function. Thus slowdowns, speedups, improvements in the education

of the labor force, and all sorts of things will appear as 'technical change'" (p. 312). Furt

same article, Solow says: ".. .Obviously, much, perhaps nearly all, innovation must be embodi

new plant and equipment to be realized at all..." (p. 316). The same author in his 1960 artic
more specific, though still lacking in clarity.
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"...It is as if (my emphasis) all technical progress were something like time-and-motion study

way of improving the organization and operation of inputs without reference to the nature of th

inputs themselves. The striking assumption is that old and new capital equipment participat
equally in technical change. This conflicts with the casual observation that many if not most
innovations need to be embodied in new kinds of durable equipment before they can be made
effective..." (pp. 90-1).

As expected, Solow did not talk about the 'time-and-motion' (cited in the above passage), or 'a
w a y to improve organization' any m o r e in the remainder of his article, as his preoccupation was to
distinguish capital equipment of different dates of construction or vintages. B r o w n (1968)
analyzed m o r e extensively the embodied/disembodied distinction, mainly based on Solow's work.
H e recognizes its usefulness in theory and policy, and amongst other points he reminds us: "...It
has been s h o w n that in the long run the embodied and disembodied models yield the same rate of
growth w h e n the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is unity..." (p. 78).

The distinction between embodied/ disembodied technology and its relationship with OIs can be
further explored b y referring to Peters (1980,firstchapter). According to this author's discussion,
disembodied technology can also be hardware capital that becomes 'embodied' at thefirstyear of
operation but becomes 'disembodied' in subsequent years w h e n it has an additional impact on
productivity (hence, this definition is m o r e akin to Solow's one and his calculations of vintages, as
it was mentioned in the previous paragraph). However, disembodied technology is also due to
non-hardware factors such as organizational techniques, thus this definition being similar to the
one given b y U N C T C

(as quoted in Chapter one). In this respect, Peters refers to three

distinguished authors to support his arguments (and hence this thesis).

" ...Technological change is the advance of technology, such advance often taking the form of...,
and new techniques of organization, marketing, and management... " (Mansfield, 1968, p. 11)

"...The advance ofproductivity is sometimes discussed as if it were very largely the result of
technological knowledge. But surely this is wrong. Dramatic advances in management and

organizational techniques and in architectural layout are visible to the naked eye..." (Dems
1962, p. 232)

"...Denison's emphasis on the importance of 'software' is an important corrective to a widespr

tendency to think of technological change in purely 'hardware' terms... " (Rosenberg, 1972, p. 7n)
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Then Peters (1980, p. 17) says: "...'Scientific management' is a clear example of disembodied

change..." This is exactly the argument of this thesis; OIs such as scientific management are

disembodied technology that enhances productivity. Therefore, OIs (or 'software' innovations)

must be explored separately from TIs (or 'hardware' innovations). From the cognitive point of

view, a priori, there is no reason to assert that both OIs and TIs grow together or in parall

even with lags, or that they are complementary. On the contrary, there is no deterministic p
between the two types of innovations. The main reason for this view is that it does not have

the same people who introduce both types, or if it is the same persons then there could be de
lags between the implementation of the two types of innovations.

3.3.2 Non-contemporaneous impact of OIs and TIs

The non-parallel way of development in OIs and TIs is one of the main reasons why both impact

-that of the OIs and that of the TIs- on economic growth should be analyzed. None of these tw

types of innovations is sufficient for a sustained long-term growth. We have a good historica
example, that of the former USSR, which shows that only TIs were not sufficient for their

continuous economic development. The former USSR's rigidity of institutional and organizatio

structures over a period of 70 years finally had a negative impact on this country despite it

brilliant record of technological achievements (TIs) (e.g. cf. Nafziger, 1995, or Thurow, 199

Other examples of the non-parallel development in OIs and TIs are those that occurred in the
during the period 1900-1930 and in Japan during 1950-1970. In the first case a substantial
improvement in OIs occurred without such a parallel progress in TIs. These OIs included the

integration of mass production and mass distribution, vertical integration, scientific manag

and Fordism. Evidence of this case is also provided by Freeman (1984, p. 66) in a graph depic

significant inventions, and reproduced here in Figure 3.2, in which we can see that overall,
was a trough in inventions during the period 1900-1920 in the USA.
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Figure 3.2

Inventions in the U S A

This finding is also confirmed by the historical exposition of OIs in Chapter two. In additio
if w e consider the impact that electricity (as an important TI) had on the American economy at the
beginning of the 20 th century, these conclusions remain the same. According tofiguresand other
aspects provided by various researchers and discussed by M o w e r y and Rosenberg (1998),
residential use of electricity increased more than three-fold from 1920 to 1930 (perhaps as a
response to a 1 9 % decrease in price) and this happened mainly in urban areas. It is also in the
1920s that the electrical appliances of radio, refrigerator, and electric water heater were
introduced. T h e use of electricity in business rose from about 5 % in 1899 (electric motors as a
percentage of total horsepower) to 3 9 % in 1914 and 5 5 % by 1919 but jumped to about 8 2 % by
1929. However, as M o w e r y and Rosenberg (1998) remark:

"...The effects of industrial applications of electric power on measured productivity gro

difficult to detect until the 1920s...The restructuring offactories, including the reorga
the flow of work on the factoryfloor,new work arrangements, and the development of the

necessary new patterns ofspecialization on the part of both workers and management took deca
of experimentation and learning... " (p. 116)

This comment by M o w e r y and Rosenberg (1998) provides extra evidence that the introduction of
an important technology (TI) is not sufficient to guarantee economic growth but it must be
accompanied by OIs. The latter can vary from firm to firm and from sector to sector given a n e w
technology (TI). It is these variations, which create differences in growth forfirms,for sectors and
for economies, given the same technology (TI).
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In addition, Table 3.3 summarizes the main technical innovations according to some important

periods from the 19th century up to the 1990s. Although the exact dates of innovations (in con

with the dates of invention) are often approximate, this Table is a rough but pertinent indic

to when most innovations took place. They did appear mainly during the period 1921 to 1950, a
especially in the 1930s and 1940s, and to a lesser extent during the period 1951 to 1975.

Admittedly, it is also difficult to judge the impact of TIs by examining their mere number; i
possible that fewer TIs during a given period might be more important than more TIs during

another period. Nonetheless, it is also possible that each period has some major TIs to offer

as, for example, the telephone and telegraph as well as steel processes during 1866-1895, and
impact of electricity and cars during the 1920s.

Table 3.3

Technical innovaitions

U p to 1865

1866 to 1895

1896 to 1920

1921 to 1950

1951 to 1975

9

27

25

62

41

Source: Freeman(1984); thefigureswere compiled from Taales 3.4 and 5.1.

In the case of Japan during 1950-1970 some leading sectors, such as vehicles, electronics and
machines, grew in a substantial manner not because of any significant TIs (these were mostly

imitated from the West), but because of some major institutional and organizational innovatio

such as cooperative business networks, quality control, JTT, and governmental planning assis
(these OIs will be further explored in subsequent chapters).

Sustained productivity growth without technical change has been k n o w n since the early 1960s as
the 'Horndal effect', introduced in 1961 by the Swedish economist Lundberg (Lazonick, 1992).

Lazonick (1992) briefly discusses this effect in his introductory chapter and then refers to

his earlier articles reproduced in 1992 in order to provide evidence that this effect is due
factors such as the impact of management-worker relations on work intensity, and not due to

Arrow's 'learning by doing' effect (as Arrow himself has suggested in order to explain the ca

analyzed by Lazonick). This thesis, 'learning by doing' is part of the three organizational r
already suggested above, in the same way as 'management-worker relations' are.
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Overall, the suggested theme of this section of a not necessarily parallel development of OIs and
TIs is not n e w in the relevant literature. For example, W o o d (1989, p. 457) said:

"...This article reinforces the point made by Nelson (1975), Lazonick (1983), and Coombs (1985) th

we need to clearly separate innovations in management from technological advances. We must als
avoid the danger of assuming that particular changes in technology require changes in management
methods, or that changes in work organization must follow technological innovations... "

Consequently, once the need to separately examine the OIs is recognized, then in a second stage,
more evidence is also needed to examine the evolutionary paths of OIs and TIs.

3.3.3 Links between OIs and TIs: discussion

Nelson (1996, p. 118)n was very precise as to how he saw the relation between OIs and TIs:

"...From one point of view it is technological advance that has been the key force that has driven
economic growth over the past two centuries, with organizational change a handmaiden. But from

another perspective, we would not have got that technological advance without development of new
ways of organization that can guide and support R&D

and enable firms to profitfromthese

investments..."

Whether OIs are just a 'handmaiden' or something more cannot be verified in this study; however,
there is some evidence that TIs b y themselves are not a sufficient condition for improving
productivity. For example, Boer (1994, p. 101) argues that TIs related to the flexible
manufacturing system ( F M S ) can lead to market success providing that there is ".. .company-wide
involvement in the design and management of organizational innovation..." Substantial evidence
that OIs are determinedfirstand then TIs is provided by W o m a c k and Jones (1996) w h o explored
many firms in revealing detail. Mintzberg and Quinn (1991) in their examination of the Taurus
project for Ford cars also provided evidence that OIs were determinedfirstand TIs followed; in
addition "...Petersen attributed 85% of Taurus' gains to 'managing smarter' and only 15% to the

" A similar comment by Nelson and Wright (1992, p.1940) shows perhaps how strong is the belief th
are the primary moving force in this discussion: "...Here again, w e should not think of organizational
strength as an alternative but as a complement to advanced technology.. "
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new technology..." (Ibid, p. 496). Also, Fujimoto (1999, p. 117) mentions that "...Kim Clark a
I, for example, pointed out that the main source of interfirm difference in the frequency of

product introductions was not the difference in R&D resource inputs but how efficiently given

R&D inputs were used...", thus inferring that OIs are necessary for the efficient use of R&D.
Overall, the message is that we cannot equate OIs with TIs and examine only TIs without
examining OIs (or vice-versa). This thesis pays more attention to the OIs; nevertheless, more
is needed to explore more closely the links between OIs and TIs.

Two significant examples will be given here in order to indicate that often TIs and OIs are b
present in organizing production in important new ways, but it is difficult to separate their

influence without any additional research. The first example is related to the development of

production as introduced by Ford through the adoption of the moving assembly line. Womack et a
(1990, second chapter) emphasized that designing new tools that could cut hardened metal and

stamp sheet with absolute precision was the key to interchangeable parts, which in turn assist
developing the system successfully. The same authors (Ibid, third chapter) provided another

example; they remarked that the introduction of new dyes that were easy and fast to change wa

cornerstone in developing the lean production system in Toyota. Blackburn et al (1985, Chapter
five) seem to adopt the stance that there is a one-to-one relationship between stages of
mechanization (namely control, transfer, and transformation) and stages of production process

(namely craftwork, Taylorism, Fordism, Neo-Fordism). However, as it will be seen in subsequent

chapters, this one-to-one relationship seems to break down when the passage is made from Neo-

Fordism to Post-Fordism (the latter includes elements of the JIT/QC system). The links between

TIs and OIs will be further explored in some other sections of this study as the need might a

Chandler and Lazonick filled many pages of research on the co-evolution of these two types of
innovations. For Lazonick, it seems that internal management of the firm is necessary to

coordinate a specialized division of labor, which includes all employed people in the firm in

to produce high-volume and high-quality goods; technology will assist in producing these goods
(1991, pp. 100-103). Furthermore,
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"...The innovative organization enhances

its value-creating capabilities organizationally by

unbounding its cognitive competence and by transforming the behavior of its participants, and

technologically by committing itself to the development and utilization of organization specif
assets..." (1991, p. 229)

As for Chandler, let Lazonick summarize his ideas on the matter:

"...Chandler's key contribution to economic analysis is a conceptual framework that can comprehend

how organizational capability transforms an innovative investment strategy into low unit costs an

competitive advantage...By imposing a transaction cost interpretation on Chandler's historical
material, Williamson has failed to comprehend both the causes and consequences of the dynamic
interaction between organization and technology that is central to Chandler's approach... " (1991,
230).

Whether Williamson (e.g. 1985), failed to comprehend the dynamic interaction between
organization and technology or not will not be debated here. H o w e v e r , it is certain that Williamson
thoroughly attempted to link organization and technology through the examination of the concepts
of asset specificity, governance, transaction costs and so on. Perhaps for this scholar, technological
factors taken as being exogenous influenced the organizational features of firms. Nonetheless, the
important point for this analysis is that it is not wise to ignore OIs and just examine TIs. Both
types of innovations are needed for a comprehensive analysis of the process of economic growth,
on a firm, sub-sectoral and m a c r o levels.

Langlois and Robertson (1995) extensively analyzed primarily the TIs and to a lesser extent the
OIs in relation to each other through using the concepts of competences, routines, transaction
costs, and so on. For instance, they attempted to find out which firm networks are more or less
conducive to technologies (both systemic and autonomous); or w h y s o m e firms and industries are
immersed into inertia in terms of TIs: factors such as institutions, routines and capabilities,
learning, strategies of market dominance, and others were scrutinized. In their conclusions section
of their sixth chapter, Langlois and Robertson (1995, p. 118-19) said:
"... The model presented here is intended as only one explanation among many for the co-existence

of a variety of competing technologies and organizational forms even in nations at similar stages of
development...It is nevertheless clear that institutional factors, especially those embodied

70

capabilities and routines, can both improve the ability of a firm to exploit an existing techn
and make it more difficult to innovate by generating an inertia that is hard to overcome... "

In an attempt to be more precise about the links between OIs and TIs reference will now be made
to Breschi and Malerba (1997). One of the main preoccupations of these two authors was to first
link technological regimes (TR) (predominantly TIs oriented) with sectoral innovation systems

(SIS)12, and second, to quantitatively (by using the proxy of patent applications) link five types
SIS with Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II13 models in six countries. A TR can be

broadly defined by the particular combination of four fundamental factors: opportunity conditions

(likelihood of innovations), appropriability conditions (possibilities of protecting innovations

imitation), cumulativeness of technological knowledge (serial correlation among innovations), and
nature of the relevant knowledge base (properties of knowledge upon which firms' innovative

activities are based). These four factors are defined and analyzed in relation to TIs. However, a

attempt will be made by the present author to relate the various elements of these factors to OIs
Table 3.4 shows the results of this attempt.

The aim of this Table is to see whether TR as defined by many authors (e.g. Nelson and Winter,
1982; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; Breschi and Malerba, 1997) can also be used to describe OIs
or to relate OIs and TIs. The conclusion is quite clear (the 'yes' answer to the links with OIs
column shows that): TR can be extended to include OIs14. However, the situation is not so simple
as is expressed by the answer 'yes'. OIs, and especially the major ones such as Fordism cum
scientific management, have their own characteristics: for example for JIT/QC, appropriability,
cumulativeness, and knowledge base are very high, but the JIT/QC system does not need to be
patented in order to generate high profits and penetrate markets. This system generates higher
productivity and economic growth due to its connectivity with all layers and aspects of the firm

12

A sectoral analysis of economic growth was used, for example, by Kuznets (1966, 1971), especial
examining the technological (TIs) impact on various sectors (the impact of OIs, as in his 1966 book, was
much less explored). However such a sectoral analysis is not the same as that achieved by examining SIS
(see also Chapter five).
13
A n SIS is composed of thosefirmsthat are active in the innovative activities of a sector. Schumpeter Mark
n is characterized by a small and rather stable population of innovators, thus creative accumulation is
emphasized, whereas Schumpeter Mark I is characterized by a large and highly turbulent population of
innovators, thus creative destruction is emphasized (Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Malerba, 2002).
14
This extension will not take place in this thesis as it is beyond its scope.
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that adopts it (though adopting it takes a lot of time as will be seen in subsequent Chapters). Thus,
OIs are related, besides the traits appropriability, cumulativeness, and knowledge base, to specific
elements of complex evolutionary systems15 such as information and entropy. As Clark (1988, p.
524) remarks:
"... Thus the greater the amount of information in any given system the smaller will be its entropy,
or the greater will be its 'negentropy', and, equally, the greater the flow of information into any
system the greater the degree of organization such a system will exhibit... "

Technological regimes (TIs oriented): links with OI S

Table 3.4
Opportunity

Links

Appropriability

Links

conditions

with

conditions

OIs
Level

Variety

No
No

Levels

Means

Cumulativeness

Links

Knowledge

with

with

base

OIs

OIs

Yes
Yes

Technological level

Firm level

Yes

Links with OIs

Nature of

Yes for specific

knowledge

knowledge

Yes

Yes for degree
of tacitness

Pervasiveness

Yes

Sectoral level

Yes

Yes for degree
of complexity

Sources

No

Local level

Yes

Yes for degree
of independence
Means

of

Yes

knowledge
transmission
Source: Based on Breschi and Malerba (1997).
Consequently OIs are characterized b y their degree of negentropy. Furthermore, another
characteristic of OIs is their ability to support TIs and other types of innovations, that is, their
supportiveness. Overall, it is useful to adopt the conclusion reached in Edquist et al (2001, p. 17):
"...organizational innovations take place under different circumstances and are governed by
different determinants as compared to technological innovation, even though they are also closely
related to technological innovation in their development..."

Returning to Breschi and Malerba' s (1997) paper, another w a y of applying their quantitative
analysis to the present discussion is to observe that the sectors belonging to the Schumpeter M a r k
H model (Ibid, Table 6.4, p. 153) are predominantly those that have invented and propagated the

These systems will be further explored in Chapter five.
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JIT/QC system (an important OI) not only in Japan but also in the USA (Chapters six and seven
provide evidence for this assertion). Thus, the Schumpeter Mark n model (of TIs) is linked with
OIs in order to generate economic growth. Malerba and Orsenigo (1996, p. 42) m their attempt to
answer the question "...are firm behavior and organization related to the specific technological
environment in which firms are operating?..." have examined technological (TIs-related)

strategies and specialization/diversification in relation to the main characteristics of TRs. Th

these authors explicitly state: ".. .this chapter does not address the detailed features and art

of firm strategies, the specific types of firm organizations, the relationship between capabilit

firm behavior, the changes in behavior and strategies during the evolution of an industry and the
dynamic interaction between firm behavior and technological regimes..." (Ibid, p. 43). In
particular, capabilities or specific competences are not considered by these two authors except

specialization/diversification. On the contrary, in this thesis, competences and related concept
defined by these two authors, are the main object of analysis16:

"...The concept of competence is intrinsically an organizational one, in that it necessarily imp
set of organizational rules (routines) for the communication and implementation of individual
knowledge... " (Ibid, p. 48)

The overall conclusion of this brief discussion is that TIs are only part of the whole impact of
innovations on economic growth. More research is needed to more exactly pinpoint the links
between OIs and TIs (and other types of innovations as suggested in Chapter five of this thesis)
relation to economic growth17.

In recent literature, some scholars started more systematically to 'involve' OIs into their
exploration of TIs and generally innovations. In Van de Ven (1995), the role of entrepreneurship
and institutional arrangements are two of the links between OIs and TIs that are more thoroughly
examined. Ehrnberg and Jakobson (1997) include 'firm specific organizational routines and

competence' as one of the determinants of the outcome of a technological discontinuity and relate
inertia. jAndersen and Lundvall (1997) explicitly take into account the division of labor in

16

The exact relationship between OIs and competences will be indicated in Chapter five.
The important point to stress is how the relationship between OIs and TIs affect economic growth, and not
just how OIs affect TIs or vice-versa.
17
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analyzing national innovation systems18. Davenport (1993) in his study of process innovation (TI
oriented) has recognized the need to introduce complementary organizational changes. Rycroft and
Kash (1999) in their attempt to show the complexity of technological innovations (mainly TI
oriented) examine the relevant organizational complexity and organizational learning. Teece
(1998) examines the following factors affecting the development and direction of TIs: monopoly

power, managerial hierarchy, scope of diversification, vertical integration, organizational cult
and values, governance modes, and external linkages. Fujimoto (1999) in his detailed analysis of
the Toyota manufacturing system often examines OIs and TIs together. For example, this author
says: "...JIT principles, which had prevailed at Toyota by the 1960s, were applied to such

manufacturing activities (dye making, prototyping, and startups) in product development..." (Ibi
p. 195)19. Antonelli (1999, p. 231) concluded in his book "...the laws governing the creation of

new knowledge and the introduction of technological and organizational innovations are central t
understanding the dynamics of economic systems..." Dawson (1997, p. Ill) remarked: "...The
design of new technology and the development of new forms of work organization is an important
and generally under-investigated area which may provide useful insight to our current
understanding of the process by which these new innovations unfold in practice.. ."20

This brief review of recent literature brings up the following issues: how is the process of

innovations (TIs or OIs) triggered off and how is it developed or evolved? Especially, how is th
process of innovations linked with the continuous flow of organizational change taking place
inside firms? What is the dynamic interplay between OIs and TIs (and other types of innovations,

see Chapter five)? This thesis does not answer all these questions. Instead it attempts to answe
question: how do major OIs impact on economic growth? However it is important to emphasize

here the following 'axiom' of one of the relationships between OIs and TIs as expressed by Kogut
(1996, p. 273):

T w o remarks are relevant here: most of these studies refer to either small or overall incremental changes
in firm organization in relation to TIs or to specific firm organization issues related to the promotion of
R & D . The OIs treated in this thesis are major OIs as determined in Chapter two.
19
More details on this is found in Chapter six, for example p. 186, in Fujimoto's (1999) analysis.
20
McLoughlin and Harris (1997) is a collection of papers, such as that by Dawson, that explore the theme of
the relations between TIs and OIs.
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"... This essay has traced the coevolution of technological innovations that spawned a wave of n

firms, and the concomitant organizational innovations that developed to manage their growth...

This 'axiom' implies that though TIs might be a necessary condition for the development of new
products, the subsequent growth of firms that develop these products depend on OIs. Nonetheless,
there are cases where OIs can be the major factor in the growth of a firm (a good example is that of
Dell computers as analyzed in Chapter six), thus without the concomitant significant contribution
of TIs. Again only precise studies can demonstrate the exact relationship between TIs and OIs. For
example, Malerba (1985) in his detailed analysis of the semiconductor sector in the U S A , Japan,
and Europe shows h o w vertical integration (an OI) depends on TIs and vice versa (within a more
general context of demand, supply and public policy issues). Also, Bresnahan and Malerba (1999,
p. 124) in their detailed study of the world computer industry conclude "...in each coevolutionary
process, a different appropriate model of the firm emerged, with its o w n competences,
organization, and strategy..." Thus, for mainframes, a Chandlerian integrated firm became quite
successful due to major and continuous R & D efforts and investments in management, production,
and marketing (Ibid). However, these two authors did not fully explain w h y Dell computers
became increasingly the major firm in P C s in the last 15 years, except that Dell had marketing or
distribution advantages (Ibid, p. 111). This particular point will be taken up in Chapter six, where
it will be indicated that internal organization, based on the JIT/QC system, played a substantial
role for Dell's success. In order to be more precise in the relationship between TIs and OIs,
Chapter five of this thesis explores this relationship from the internal fundamental operations of
the firm point of view.

3.4 INCLUSION OF OIs IN THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION
Simon (1997) in examining differences in productivity between car manufacturers said:

"...The causes for these enormous differences in efficiency have almost nothing to do with the
classical physical production function (my emphasis). They also appear to have little to do

cultural differences at the blue-collar level. They seem to have nothing to do, either, with m

reward structures, which are not significantly different in the various plants. They must
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attributed in large part to differences in management practices (for example, quality contr

practices, and inventory policies), perhaps bolstered by differences in management attitudes
motivations... " (1997, p. 232).

Mefford (1986) has attempted to empirically test the impact of these 'management practices' m
about 30 plants around the world. These practices consisted of three criteria: output goal
attainment, cost (factory budget) over or under fulfillment, and output quality level. The general
production function estimated w a s Q = f (K*, L*, M G M T ) , where K * stands for quality adjusted
capital, L * is quality-adjusted labor, and management ( M G M T ) stands for the management
variables mentioned above. "...Management is shown to be an important input to the production
process in these plants regardless of the particular functional form estimated..." (p. 96). A s
Mefford recognized, several other studies were carried out before his o w n , the general conclusion
out of them being similar to his o w n . T h e same author also refers to the X-inefficiency theory of
Leibenstein for which he says:

" ...His theory ofX-inefficiency makes the case that allocation of resources is usually less imp

than effectiveness of use of these resources in determining the amount of output produced. The

effects that make-up X-inefficiency are the organization of the work process, motivation an
supervision of employees, and the monitoring and controlling of the operation..." (1986, p. 96).
However, management practices as briefly analyzed in the above paragraph are not the only OI
that can be found to be quantitatively significant in explaining economic growth. Kogut (1996, p.
269) provides both qualitative and quantitative evidence that during the early decades of the 20
century:

"...The critical factor was not the organizational capabilities of managerial hierarchies, bu
American national strength in the rationalization of work and the standardization of production... "
Also, Antonelli (1999) has quantitatively linked sectoral growth in several countries and the
concomitant impact of TIs and OIs. In this thesis, more quantitative relevant evidence will be
provided in Chapter six and especially in Chapter seven.

Edquist et al (2001) in their detailed analysis of the relationship between innovation and
employment explicitly take into account organizational process innovations in explaining
employment and indirectly growth in the context of a general approach of systems of innovation
that looks at an economic system as a whole, but without referring to general equilibrium theories
"...since innovation is the e n e m y of equilibrium..." (Ibid, p.8) These authors distinguish four
types of innovations: product innovations in goods, product innovations in services, technological
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process innovations, and organizational process innovations (such as JIT production, TQM, and
lean production). The relationship between product and process innovations (thus between OIs and
TIs) is also discussed (for example, Ibid, section 5.3). Thus, these authors say that consumer
products (TIs-related) and intermediate products (TIs -related) never become process innovations
(OIs are included in this category). Overall, "...the study of organizational innovations is
neglected compared to the study of technological innovations..." (Ibid, p. 12)

Edquist (1997, p.23) mentions as an argument favoring organizational change21 the Japanese auto
assembly plants in the U S A . These plants though using process technologies similar to their U S
counterparts, are more productive than domestic plants because of their organizational innovations
such as the JIT/QC system (this argument is fully explored in Chapter seven). Edquist (1997, p.24)
proposes three important reasons for including OIs in the concept of innovation, and as an
extension in the discussion about the relationship between innovations and employment (and
hence growth):

"...Organizational changes are important sources ofproductivity growth and competitiveness
they might also strongly influence employment.

Organizational and technological changes are closely related and intertwined in the real w
and organizational change is often a requirement for technological process innovation to
successful.

All technologies are created by human beings; they are in this sense 'socially shaped', and
achieved within the framework ofspecific organizational forms... "

Edquist et al (2001) in their detailed discussion of the impact of their four types of innovatio
including OIs, show that effectively, OIs are a part of the production process offirms,sectors and
economies. Thus, in their hypothesisfive,they argue that one category of OIs is similar to TIs, that
is, they are labor saving; another class is capital saving with direct effects on employment levels
(Ibid, p. 35). These propositions are further discussed in the context of the empirical analysis
conducted in Chapter seven of this thesis. Gregersen and Johnson (2000) in their review of various
approaches in economics as to h o w innovations affect economic growth,firstexamine theories

21

Organizational change is the topic of numerous papers and books in the management discipline
(for example see Dawson, 1994). However, this thesis examines OIs in relation to economic growth
expressed in terms of productivity, real output, and so on.
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such as the neo-classical, growth accounting, n e w growth, and catch-up growth theories which all
use a 'simplistic' innovation concept. These authors then recommend that innovation should be at
the center of analysis within an evolutionary process. Consequently, they propose the 'technoeconomic paradigm' according to which it is not only technology, but also a constellation of

technological, organizational and institutional factors that form the growth model of a period. In
particular, the organizational modes of firms become increasingly important in order to enhance
learning capabilities that feed into the processes of innovation. Finally, the 'techno-economic
paradigm' can be extended into the systems of innovation (SI) approach (Chapter five further
examines this issue as it is part of the process of growth suggested in this thesis).

Given this sporadic inclusion of OIs in the process of economic growth by some scholars as a
background, the purpose of the remainder of this sub-section is to append onto the 'classical
physical production function' the variable OIs. In summary, the following equations show the
broad relation between the major OIs that have been described so far and elements of economic
analysis linked to economic growth.
Output Growth (EG) (Macro or Micro) is a function of:
TIs +
Quantity of Capital (abbreviated as K ) + Quality of Capital ( Q K ) +
Quantity ofLabor(L) +Quality of Labor ( Q L ) +
Quantitative relation between K and L (KtgrL) +
Organizational relation between K and L (KogrL)+
Organizational relation between L and L (LogrL) +
Organizational relation between K and K (KogrK)
(3.1)
The inputs used in (3.1) are defined as follows.
1. K: simple quantity of capital (the usual stock of capital)
2. Q K : quality in steel, machines, tools etc (cf. Jorgenson, 1990)
3. L: simple quantity of labor (as hours or number of employees)
4. QL: the so-called human capital (education etc) (e.g. as number of years in schooling)
5. KtgrL: the classical technological or technical relation or quantitative substitutability between K and
L, for example KtgrL could be represented by a Cobb-Douglas function (tgr stands for technical
relation)
6. KogrL: the organizational relation between K and L, which is different from KtgrL, that is, altering
KogrL does not necessarily change KtgrL (ogr stands for organizational relation)
7. LogrL: the organizational relation between L and L, which is different from KtgrL, that is, altering
LogrL does not necessarily change KtgrL (ogr stands for organizational relation)
8. KogrK: the organizational relation between K and K, which is different from KtgrL, that is, altering
KogrK does not necessarily change KtgrK (ogr stands for organizational relation)

The inclusion of the last three inputs (KogrL, LogrL, and K o g r K ) explicitly in the production
process (or function) is the purpose of this section. These three inputs represent OIs, as these
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been described in Chapter two and will be further explored in the next two chapters. Their
inclusion in the production function is very rare. For instance Menard (1996) remarked "...Thus,
the production function should include three related inputs: capital, labor, and organizational
capabilities: Q = Q (K, L, O ) . . . " (p. 291). In addition, Lydall (1998) says, "...The productive
enterprise needs to m a k e use of m a n y technologies besides the physical. These m a y be classified
under the headings of commercial, financial, and organizational technologies..." (p.33). A n
extensive review of the relevant literature w a s provided in thefirstsub-section of this chapter.

Furthermore, the separation between the input 'quantitative relation between K and L' (KtgrL),
usually called technology, and the three organizational relations K o g r L LogrL, and K o g r K , all of
which are called OIs, is necessary as this study suggests. Thus,first,this thesis follows Marshall,
Schumpeter and others w h o stressed the importance of OIs (as reviewed in previous sub-section).
Second, overwhelmingly, research has been concentrated on the quantitative relation between K
and L, often deliberately so (see for instance Hall, 1994), and sometimes it is unclear as to what is
meant by 'technology'.

Third, some scholars have already talked about the influence of organizational matters on the
production process. It is worth quoting Coase (1937) in this respect.

"...If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in

relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so... This fact has not been ignored by economi

Marshall introduces organization as a fourth factor of production; J. B. Clark gives the

coordinating function to the entrepreneur..." (pp. 387-88). And "...Why is not all productio

carried on by one bigfirm?...Secondly,it may be that as the transactions which are organize

increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors ofproduction in the uses where their va
greatest, that is, fails to make the best use of the factors of production... " (p. 394)

Finally, it is the genesis of this thesis22 that organizational relations play a preponderant rol
process of economic growth. Thus, it becomes imperative that these relations are explicitly shown
in the production function as above.

The remainder of this thesis will explain this genesis.
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A general w a y of incorporating the above organizational inputs (OIs) in the production function is
now proposed.
Q=f(M,K,L,0,T) (3.2)

In this production function, all inputs (M: materials, K: capital, L: labor, O: OIs, T: TIs)

in the output Q in an autonomous way. Thus, changes in O entail changes in Q, even if the oth

inputs do not vary. In addition, if we adopt the usual calculus results regarding the margina
products of output with respect to each one of the inputs, we can obtain from Lagrangian

maximization of Q the cost or shadow price of each input. For example, the marginal product o
with respect to L (MPL) will provide us with the optimum cost of labor or wages: P. MPL = w,

where P is the price (as taken by the firm) in the output market and 'w' is wages/salaries (c
Nicholson, 2002). In the same way, the marginal product of Q with respect to O (MPO) will

provide us the optimum cost of organization: P.MPO =o, where 'o' is organizational costs. The

latter costs include transaction costs between the various agents and principals of the firm
they also include other types of costs, such as informational and pure organizational costs.

point will be re-examined at a later stage, in the next two chapters, and especially in Chap
where the 'kinetic costs' (KCs) will be introduced.
Aparticularformof(3.2)is: Q=f (O.M, 02K, 03L, 04T,...) (3.3)

In this production function, the O; input plays the role of a special factor having an impac

other inputs separately and directly. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show this type of representation i
case of three factors (K, L, and O).

Figure 3.3

T h e OIs input as a multiplicative vector to the inputs of K , L a n d M
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In Figure 3.3, the factor 02 of equation (3.3) when multiplied with K' increases K' to K" an

factor 03 when multiplied with L' increases L' to L", so that the initial point A on the is
becomes point B on the isoquant Q", hence generating economic growth. Thus, O increases the

effective K and L, although the actual stock of K and L remain K' and L'. On a three dimensi

figure, the isoquant 2 is above isoquant 1 and hence the productivity effects of OIs (the v

can be easily discerned. A good example of how equation (3.3) can be applied in the real wor

the effect of layout reorganization within the JIT/QC system from a linear layout to a U-sha
layout23.

Isoquant 1

Figure 3.4

T h e O I s input as a distinct factor of production

Finally another way of expressing (3.2) is: Q= fi(0, T) f2 ( M, K, L) (3.4)

In this production function, output is generated by two independent functions; one related

inputs O and T and the other one related to all the other inputs. In this case, we could i

classical Cobb-Douglas function Q = A(t).KaLb, where A(t) is the well known technology fact

used by Solow (1956, 1957, 1960) and others. However, in this study it is explicitly indic

A(t) is not only TIs (T) but also OIs (O). Furthermore, from (3.4) total factor productivi

usually calculated and used in quantitative studies. Chapters six and seven will also util

See Chapters four andfivefor more details on the layout factor.
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procedure in order to provide empirical evidence on the importance of OIs in promoting industrial
growth.

Another issue, which will be briefly mentioned here, but not further developed, is that of form

models of economic growth. Such models have been extensively proliferating in the last 20 years
or so, especially with the appearance of the so-called new growth theory. Regarding the link
between OIs and growth models, it is sufficient to refer to a relatively recent review article
Pack (1994). This author, in summarizing some of the shortcomings of the endogenous growth

type models (for example see Romer, 1994), said that factors such as management practices, labo

relations, innovativeness in devising new systems such as JIT, quality circles, flexible new mo

of consumer products are not taken into account in the endogenous growth theory; in addition, t

much reliance on externalities and R&D and not on organizational factors is another characteri
of such theory.

3.5 'EXTERNAL' FACTORS IMPACTING ON THE GROWTH O
FIRMS AND THE OIs
This section briefly develops some important themes related to promoting industrial and hence
economic growth by comparing the relevant issues between the USA and Japan. This comparison
will enable the establishment of some environmental or 'external' factors that strongly affect

industrial growth and at the same time OIs. However, in the long term there is no such thing as
'external' factors, as everything in the society is endogenized.

3.5.1 The role of resources
Previous sub-sections have hinted at the influence of external factors such as resources in
determining the implementation of JJT/QC and other OIs. Resources, both natural and imported
(including technology) have been one of the main topics in economics that has generated much

discussion, theories and policies. They are for instance the object of analysis of the so-calle
efficient allocation of resources on a micro and macro levels, both in partial and general
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equilibrium setups. In this sub-section, one particular aspect of the scarcity of resources

emphasized, namely how the latter can impact on the decision making process of firms. For th

purpose, the tool of linear programming (LP) can be used to briefly explain the Japanese and
American firm evolutions.

Suppose that we have two firms, one in the USA and one in Japan, facing the usual simple LP

problem of maximizing profits subject to some constraints. Without disclosing as yet which L
problem belongs to which country, the two models are formulated first.

LP1: max Z= ax + by + cz + dw
Subject to: an x + aj2 y +a.3 z +a14 w < M]
a2i x + a22 y +a23 z +a 2 4 w
a3i x + a32 y +a 33 z +a 34 w
a4. x + a42 y +a 43 z +a 44 w
a5i x + a52 y +a 53 z +a 54 w
a61 x + a62 y +a 63 z + a M w

<
<
<
<
<

M2
M3
M4
M5
M6

LP2: max Z= ax + by + cz + dw
Subject to: an x + aJ2 y +aJ3 z +ai4 w < Mi
a2i x + a22 y +a 23 z +a 24 w < M 2

Z is the objective function to be maximised, x, y, z, and w are the 4 products to be produce

c, and d are the profit per unit for each product, a^ are the substitution coefficients, and

are the technical, human, and organisational constraints, such as machines, tools, skilled la

teamwork tasks and so on. Furthermore, the firm in LP1 has the intention to produce four pro
by using six different types of technical, human, and organisational inputs or constraints,

these inputs are readily available. On the other hand, the firm in LP2 also has the intentio

produce the same four products, but its resources are limited to only two types of inputs (n

M, and M2). According to the rules of the LP formulation, the firm in LP1 has two possibilit

either to produce the four products considered x, y, z, and w, or to increase its productio

products, say through vertical integration. On the contrary the firm in LP2 has only one lim

possibility, that is, to produce only two products amongst the four (the precise combination
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suggested by the solution of the LP2 problem)24. By now, it has become apparent that the firm in

LP1 is an American firm with its larger choice of inputs, whereas the firm in LP2 must be m Jap
with their limited resources.

As an important confirming conclusion drawn from this LP exercise, it can readily be said that

Japanese evolution of the firm has been influenced by the limited resources, (technical, human,
and organisational), from the beginning of its industrial development a century ago, and

consequently, it still depends on the myriad of smaller firms for strong economic growth. On th
contrary, the American firm has evolved from the beginning of its industrial take-off from big

business and relies much less on the peripheral smaller firms, because resources have always be

relatively abundant in the USA (in Chapter two this point is more extensively analysed, especia
by referring to Chandler's and Fruin's work).

3.5.2 The role of institutions and culture

The role of institutions and culture in promoting economic development has not perhaps been
emphasized enough in economics. However, it seems that these two factors play an essential

indirect role in advancing economies. In this sub-section, only a few remarks will summarize th
role.

First, it is perhaps often overlooked that better institutions across all layers of society are
prerequisite for a country's economic development. For example, since England adopted the

constitution of Magna Carta in 1215 it soon became a world power. Holland experienced a similar
phenomenon, though it was finally dominated by England (cf. North, 1990, p. 130). The liberal
tendencies in Britain since that date eventually led to the first industrial revolution. North
Thomas (1973) remarked that the property rights system introduced in Britain and North America
at the end of the 18th century fundamentally changed the principles of income distribution, and
generally the functioning of the market economy. The democratization and openness of the Meiji

4

On these issues of LP see Baumol (1977).

84
era in Japan started the modern Japanese miracle. The Civil War in the USA and the democratic
unification of that country provided the foundations for the second industrial revolution. On
contrary, the autocratic tendencies in Russia, either through the absolute Tsar regime or the
Stalinist communist regime, still exert a negative impact on the economic development of that
country.

Second, the importance of commercial laws cannot be ignored. Here we can contrast the early an
trust laws in the USA, which discouraged cooperation between firms, and the free adoption of

alliances and close financial and other relations between numerous firms in Japan leading to t
system of zaibatsus and then keiretsus.

Third, culture, for example one that is based on Confucianism and Shintoism in Japan, has ofte
been the explanation for many differences between American and Japanese economic

performance. Von Tunzelmann (1995, p. 328) mentions the following alleged characteristics of t

lapanese society that come from the institution of culture: discipline, acceptance of authorit
deference to seniors, and subjection to the group. Watanabe (1991, p. 75) explains the role of
workers' communal responsibility in a historical context: "...Under the Tokugawa Shogunate
(1603-1867), every five households in rural and urban areas were organized into a unit for

administrative and tax purposes. Land tax and other duties were borne collectively by the memb
households..." Cultural influences are significant in all countries. Thus, in the USA a strong
'protestant ethic' instilled in the American society from its beginnings has been playing a

considerable role in shaping the business environment. In the same country the institutions of

democracy, property, and the underlying desire for power have played a substantial role as wel
(cf. for instance, Roy, 1997).

What are the underlying economic theories of institutions? North (1990, 1992), or North et al
(1971) have extensively demonstrated the primary role of institutions in shaping economic
development and in particular American development. Thus, societies impose constraints on

interactions and transactions due to uncertainty and bounded rationality. In turn, these const
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create various institutions to facilitate costly transactions, especially as there is more and m
specialization and division of labor. Overall, the interaction between organizations such as firms
and institutions such as formal and informal rules (e.g. c o m m o n law and conventions) lead to
economic changes. In addition, the institutional framework provides the incentives for n e w skills
and knowledge; hence a firm's evolution becomes path-dependent. This last point will n o w be
briefly demonstrated in the case of Japan in the period from the end of W W I I until recently.

Best (1990) provides a detailed account of the role that 'the institutional framework' played in
shaping and guiding industrial policy in Japan in that period. His main contention is that according
to a Schumpeterian type of competition, institutions like the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) (very recently renamed to M E T I ) , the Japanese Development Bank, and the Fair
Trade Commission intervened in the Japanese economic society not in terms of attaining allocative
or productive efficiency but rather in terms of achieving strategic advantages. Effectively, these
institutions supported various firms, products, and mainly sectors at different points in time
according to some indicative type of planning process, which was translated into concrete strategic
movements for an effective competitive environment. Thus, they promoted cartels, imposed quotas
and tariffs, eliminated tariffs in due time, and so on. These institutions were the aftermath of the
intervention of the Supreme C o m m a n d e r for Allied Powers ( S C A P ) just after the end of the
W W H , w h e n Japan was defeated. Although S C A P initially dissolved the zaibatsus system, soon it
encouraged the re-establishment of this system under the n e w organizational features of keiretsus
as already explained in Chapter two. Eventually, as Best (1990, p. 175) remarks:

"...The institutional arrangements bequeathed by SCAP formed the foundations for a novel set

industrial policy institutions that would facilitate the rise of Japanese Big Business to inter
leadership in the space of two decades... "

3.5.3 The role of demand and consumers

Demand can influence supply, industrial growth, and OIs in at least three ways. First, this impac
takes place through some external factors such as wars, major economic crashes, and
governmental extra activities. For example, as mentioned in Chapter two, the Japanese economy
experienced a substantial surge during W W I . T h e 1929 Big Crash created a prolonged
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destabilization not only in the USA but also in other countries; this was followed by large
government spending that boosted the demand back to normal levels.

Second, the demand impact takes place through changes in the preferences, tastes, and whims o

consumers. Thus, in the most recent 25 years or so, consumers have become much more selective

in their choice and purchase of various products, hence leading the customization process, wh

necessitates a larger variety of generally shorter lived products. The just-in-time cum quali
control (JTT/QC) system, which will be extensively analyzed in the next chapters, takes into

account the new ever-changing preferences of consumers in a much more satisfactory manner tha
a non JIT/QC system. In addition, demand changes are not independent of the producers'

marketing policies. Thus, for instance, the introduction of modular products has created a new

of technical and organizational requirements for many firms and industries (cf. for instance,
Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Sanchez, 2000).

Third, the demand has a direct impact on industrial growth through the mechanism of saturatio
levels for the consumption of various goods. In other words, the higher the saturation level

final consumer goods, the lower the demand, ceteris paribus (cf. Engel curves for consumer go
in this respect).

3.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has established some important propositions, which will be useful for the remain

of this study. First, a review of the literature revealed that OIs, though sporadically sugge

explicitly taken into account in the growth process of production by some eminent scholars, o

to have their special place in the agenda of research, especially because the separate role o

this process has not as yet been consistently explored. Several concepts and theories that ar

pertinent to the inclusion of OIs in the growth process were explored in this chapter, for ex

the transaction costs theory and its extensions, the role of leading sectors, the role of com
and capabilities, and so on.
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Second, a comparison between OIs and TIs by various scholars has established that the link

between these two types of innovations is not straightforward and requires further investigation

priori, there is no reason for assuming that OIs and TIs have a parallel existence, or that they
complementary, or that OIs are the handmaiden of the TIs or vice-versa. Hence there is ample

room for a thorough exploration of their mutual relationship. In addition, some concrete example
of OIs and their graphical representation shed more light into the rather autonomous existence
OIs.

Third, the inclusion of OIs in a general framework of economic growth, and indeed in a productio

function was suggested. The inputs of such a production function explicitly include the OIs in a
more detailed and concrete way but not mathematically. In particular, the distinction is made

between the quantitative relation between capital and labor and the organizational relation bet
K and L, or between L and L, or between K and K.

Fourth, the inclusion of OIs into the growth process should be supplemented by some 'external'

factors, such as available resources, the prevailing institutions and culture, and the demand si
an economy.

However, this chapter is only an introduction of the various issues involved. In Chapter four, t

close and important relationship between the various concrete OIs and industrial growth will be

more extensively scrutinized. In subsequent chapters, the principles established in this chapter
be further justified.
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4. CONTRIBUTION OF SPECIFIC OIs TO ECONOM
GROWTH AND THE THREE AXES OF OIs
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter it was established that there is a need to include OIs into the process
economic growth and by extension into the production function. In that chapter OIs were

examined as a group. In this chapter, the analysis becomes more specific. Thus, each major OI is

explored in the USA or Japan in order to show that each OI contributes to industrial growth in t
light of some major economic theories. Emphasis is placed on the factors that increase

productivity, e.g. elimination of economic wastes (such as unnecessary inventories). For instanc
the benefits of the division of labor are evoked to explain the advent of Taylor's scientific
management cum Fordism system (TFS) in the USA and their impact on productivity increases. Or

the concepts of focal firm, and the continuation of the TFS in Japan are used in order to clarif

JIT/QC system and its usefulness. Overall, the unit of analysis in this chapter is the firm, and
exploration conducted seeks to identify the deeper reasons for firm expansion , which if

transmitted to sectors and, finally, the economy leads to industrial growth. The link between fi
sectors and macro economies will be further analyzed in the next chapter. Finally, mainly the

industrial or manufacturing sector will be considered in this chapter, thus overall excluding th
primary and tertiary sectors of the economy.

Figure 4.1 (see below) summarizes the whole set of OIs (shown in the second column) and their
impact on the process of economic growth (this impact will be further explained in this chapter
and further explored in subsequent chapters). However, as this Figure shows there are other
elements in this process, which will not be treated here, such as the role of entrepreneurs and

managers, wars, international treaties and so on. The previous chapter briefly analyzed the role
resources, demand, and institutions. Also, it should be emphasized again, that TIs are not the

object of this study, even though they are analyzed in some necessary instances. Finally, althou
1

Chapter five will substantially expand on these deeper reasons.
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some specific OIs are included under the umbrella of the U S A , and others under Japan, all OIs
exist to some extent in both countries. Thus, for instance, the inside sub-contracting system was
also part of the Japanese economy, although this is mainly analyzed in the American context.
Lazonick (1990, p. 293) can provide us with a concrete example.

"...In the late nineteenth century, Japan, like the United States, had skilled workers, often emp
as internal subcontractors, who exercised considerable control over hiring, firing, and the
organization of work on the shop floor. But there was one critical difference between US and
Japanese shop-floor relations in this era. Japan's skilled workers did not form collective
organizations that sought to enforce craft control on the shop floor... "

Production and
distribution forms:
Putting-out vs factory systems,
craft vs m a s s production and
distribution, integration of m a s s
production and distribution
Entrepreneurs,
inventors,
managers,
employees

Industry structure:
Total number of firms, S M E s , type
of market (oligopoly, etc.), large
firms, clusters, industrial districts,
sub-contractors

Natural
resources
Political and
government
institutions:
Economic and
cultural
Technical
policies
innovations
Historical
circumstances:
Wars, natural
catastrophes
International
circumstances:
Treaties of Trade,
international
competition,
protection

Firm structure:
M-form, etc., vertical integration
diversification, focal type,
conglomerates, management
layers and functions, labor
relations
Production process:
JIT/QC, layout, location,
scientific management,
shop floor
Networks:
Zaibatsus, Keiretsus
cooperation
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Figure 4.1

OIs, the r e m a i n i n g scenario, a n d e c o n o m i c g r o w t h

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The second section deals with the OIs that took
place in the USA and their role in promoting productivity and growth. These OIs are: the
replacement of the putting-out system by the factory system, the advent of big business and

vertical integration, the advent of scientific management and Fordism, and finally mergers, produ
diversification and conglomerates. The third section concentrates on the development of the
JIT/QC system in Japan. Finally the fourth section synthesizes all OIs into three fundamental
groups, or axes so that the whole study becomes easier to undertake .

2

Categorization of concepts is always the first step before further analysis can be undertaken.
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4.2 AMERICAN FIRM ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH
The domestic production system w a s prevalent in the U S A for a long period up to the 1850s, and

beyond to a lesser extent. The factory system started its inroad slowly and accelerated after th
1850s. At the same time several other OIs took place in the USA, as analyzed extensively in

Chapter two. The domestic system itself had replaced the handicraft system from the 16th century

by relying on a greater division of labor under the coordination of a central, usually merchant,
coordinator. Dietrich (1994) suggested that the main advantage of the putting-out system,
compared to the handicraft one was the possible development of a division of labor, whereas the
disadvantages included embezzlement, cheating, quality control, and large inventories. These
disadvantages were also the cause for the gradual domination of the factory system over the
putting-out system as will be briefly shown in the first sub-section.

4.2.1 The replacement of the putting-out system by the factory system of
production
Jones (1999) explained the emergence of the putting out system during the 17th and 18th centuries
in Britain as being due to the following factors: divisible processes of production in certain
industries, simple technology, cheap rural labor surpluses and cheap transport of semi-finished
material. Thus fixed costs were low, division of labor could be practiced, and, at times of
depression, the merchants who hired domestic workers could easily reduce production. On the
contrary, in other industries such as iron, porter, glass, paper and sea-salt, which were

characterized by technological non-separabilities, plants were much bigger and closer in nature
the factory system. The latter, despite "...the advantages of a reduction in embezzlement, an
improvement in scheduling, better quality control and the evident profitability of the Crowley

empire3..." did not take off until later, from the 1780s, with the emergence of new technologies
the silk and cotton industries (Jones, 1999, p. 23).

3

A. Crowley established in 1691 one of the earliest factories that relied onfreelabor to manufacture nails
Expansion soon followed to produce numerous items of hardware and ships' chandlery to finally create an
enterprise that".. .was undoubtedly a giant in the age of pygmies" (Jones, 1999, p.22).
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New technology seems to be the main factor influencing the appearance of factories. This involve
new machines, sometimes larger and more automatic than before, and a central power source such
as a steam powered machine. Furthermore, as Langlois (1999, p.55) says, "...obviously, if

increasing extent of the market led to what I have called the volume effect- more highly-skilled
machines embodying more durable 'dyes' - then there is likely some connection between the
extent of the market and the factory system...". With more of this technology inside factories,
fixed costs rose and at the same time the marginal productivity of labor rose as effort levels
increased. This usually meant higher wages for factory workers than for the outside and inside
contractors (cf. Jones, 1999, and Langlois, 1999). However, despite this difference in wages, the
employers still made a profit because, in the factory system, supervision could be done more

effectively, discipline was generally easier, and hence the workers intensified their efforts to
produce the required output (cf. Marglin, 1974). Whether a better or more effective supervision

was the critical factor in deciding in favor of the factory system cannot be easily demonstrated
Other factors could also have been as essential; for instance, at the same time, as demand grew

substantially, supply bottlenecks induced more inventions and innovations which in turn drove th

cost of capital down further, thus increasing the capital stock and consequently necessitating t
presence of all workers under the same roof to operate more machines and capital equipment.

The factory system replaced the previous systems very slowly; perhaps the whole 19 century was

needed for the complete transition to the factory system in both Britain and the USA. This is no

surprising considering the complexity of the situation as described very succinctly in the previ
two paragraphs. Certainly, both technical and organizational innovations (TIs and OIs) played a

simultaneous role in this historical transformation. The division of labor concentrated in a sin

location meant some sort of deskilling of work, more specialization and at the same time it enta
new methods of supervision and management. It also entailed more entrepreneurial possibilities
and innovations (cf. Pollard's work, 1968, for more details on this topic).

Langlois (1999) distinguishes three organizational alternatives (see Table 4.1), which adequatel
describe the various production modes relevant to this sub-section.
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Table 4.1

T y p e s of production systems
W o r k force concentrated

W o r k force dispersed

Process supervision

Factory system

—

Product monitoring

Inside contracting

Putting out

Source: Langlois (1999).
Each one of these alternatives has a different set of transaction costs (TCs). In this respect Langlois
(1999, p.46) said that writers like Williamson and North explained the arrival of the factory
in terms of greater efficiency based on lower TCs, such as those due to embezzlement,
coordination and supervision, and monitoring of product quality. Thus, for example, Williamson

(1980) argues that the factory economized on buffer stocks (work-in-process inventories) rela

to an inside or outside contracting system. However, the TCs approach has been heavily criticiz
by other scholars (for example, Dietrich, 1993a remarked that both costs and benefits are

important in determining the final outcome), especially the economic historians (cf. Jones, 199

Yet, as Jones (1999, p. 41) remarks, together with the paramount impact of technology, there is
evidence supporting the TCs arguments.

The factory system emerged during the so-called 'industrial revolution' in Britain, and coinci

with an acceleration of economic growth in that country. The same process took place in the USA

about fifty years later. This process was closely related to the emergence of new dynamic secto

such as the mechanical ones, which were more inclined to quickly adopt the factory system. Thes

leading sectors supported the existing and prospering textiles industries already fully-fledg
the accelerating economy. More will be said about leading sectors in subsequent chapters.

4.2.2 Big business and vertical integration

The factory system was expanding during the 19th century in all directions. In the USA, endowed
with a huge array of resources including usable plant space, factories kept growing m size. In
chapter two, where this process was described, it was shown that from the 1880s the systems of
mass distribution and mass production began. What were the underlying economic reasons for
such changes, which ended up with the appearance of the so-called big business?
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Technology (as TIs) seems to have played a preponderant role. As Von Tunzelman (1995)
described, using Rosenberg's work (1969, 1972), the American manufacturing system was, from

the beginning, based on the routine assembly process, which in turn was based on the development
of interchangeable parts and the corresponding industry of machine tools. Von Tunzelmann (1995,

p. 203) mentions five advantages of using interchangeable parts: first, the ability to replace a
defective part with another equally usable one; second, dispensing with expensive and time-

consuming handicraft labor; third, dispensing with one-off designs through standardization; four

huge possibilities of further developing machines and tools; and fifth, an obvious impact on the
increase of speed of throughput.

In due course, interchangeable parts were linked to two main organizational directions: first, t

assembly line and continuous processing introduced in some industries in the last 30 years or s

the 19th century (e.g. production of cigarettes, or beverages) and epitomized with the productio

cars by Ford; and second, to using the equipment much more flexibly to produce various products,

which eventually led to the Japanese so-called 'lean' system (to be described in the next sectio

In the USA, as analyzed in Chapter two, overall technological progress, including the

interchangeable parts' contribution to this progress, was related to the system of mass distribu
first, then mass production, then to the integration of mass distribution and production with a

parallel development of vertical and horizontal integrations, and finally leading to the big bus
we know today. At the same time there has been a tendency for the creation of monopolies or
oligopolies in many industries within the American economy. What were the most important

reasons for this evolution in firm and industry organization from the point of view of economic
theory?

The primary point to elaborate is the answer to the following interdependent questions: why do

firms exist, how do they grow, what is their most efficient size? Perhaps the most important fac

having an impact on the answers to these questions is the existence, the evolution, and the acti

of the so-called entrepreneurs cum managers. One of their most remarkable traits is to be able t
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identify new and hitherto unrecognized market opportunities under conditions of uncertainty.
Second, entrepreneurs and managers take risks, lead their companies, and instill trust in the
functioning of their firms. Third, and not less important, it is to innovate (in this respect
Schumpeter's work, 1934 or 1942, is most relevant). These innovations can be TIs, or OIs, or both,
or other types of innovations (introduced in Chapter five).

Despite obvious historical trends for firms to become bigger and bigger in the USA from the
second half of the 19th century until the 1980s, economists, in general, considered the issue of
firms' organization as non-existent, or as simply a black box. Influenced by the strong analytical
tools of the neo-classical theories, economists ignored the content of this black box until Coase
(1937) and Williamson (1975, 1985) a m o n g others disturbed the calm waters of these theories.
Demsetz (1997, p.426) summarized the latter as follows:

"...Neoclassical theory's objective is to understand price-guided, not management -gui

resource allocation. The firm does not play a central role in the theory. It is that well-

'black-box' into which resources go and out of which goods come, with little attention paid to

this transformation is accomplished. In the theory's core model, perfect competition,

transformation accords with the dictates of known technology and prices. Management has no r
influence..."

Without entering into rather fruitless debates as to whether we should or should not discard
neoclassical theories, mention is n o w m a d e of some of the developments in the theory of the firm
since Coase's seminal contribution in 1937. According to this author, and m a n y others w h o
followed him, a firm exists because market transaction costs are higher than the organizational
costs4 involved in producing a profitable quantity within the boundaries of the firm. Also a
comparison between these two costs in terms of marginal dimensions will determine to a great
extent the degree of vertical integration. Bounded rationality (cf. Simon, 1997) and uncertainty (cf.
Knight, 1921) are necessary conditions for the role of transaction costs (TCs) to be effective. In
addition, the establishment of property rights is a prerequisite for TCs to exist.

4

These costs include the following elements (Hill, 1994, p. 314): costs of hierarchy (e.g. sal
level management, and related incentives); inefficiencies due to information-processing problems within the
structure of hierarchies; inefficiencies due to internal politics or influence costs (the latter were introduced
by Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p.573), "... they arise from attempts to relocate and protect rents and quasirents within the organization..."
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The internalization of transactions into a firm enables the exploitation of economies of scale and
scope, which in turn determines the size of that firm. Related to this internalization are the
elements of opportunism and asset specificity. The former expresses the tendency that employees
have to take advantage of the imperfections of employment contracts and hence to 'cheat' in the
production process. The latter refers either to physical or h u m a n elements in the transaction and
involves assets, which are not freely available for other uses. In general, the greater the degree of
opportunism and asset specificity, the more likely it will be that internal governance will replace
market governance. Thus, the most integrated firms also have the most specific assets in their
possession. All this is a brief s u m m a r y of Williamson's work (1975, 1985, etc).

However, Hodgson (1998) suggested that the TC-based view of the firm can and should be
complemented by the competence-based view. For instance he says (p. 189):

"...An important but not exclusive factor explaining the existence, boundaries, nature and
development of the firm is the capacity of such an organization to protect and develop the
competences of the groups and individuals contained within it, in a changing environment... "

These competences create a culture, an institution, trust and loyalty none of which is translated
a contract but rather it becomes tacit knowledge difficult or impossible to buy and sell. This
cultural transmission facilitates group and individual learning and eventually increases firm
productivity, thus perpetuating the existence and development of firms. Finally, it should be
emphasized that all these elements are path-dependent and hence historical analysis is relevant.

This last point also implies that the competence-based approaches of the firm are part of, or
complementary to, the more general evolutionary theory. A s Hodgson states, these approaches "
...fit more closely to the philosophy and methodology of the evolutionary paradigm pioneered by
Nelson, Winter and others..." (Ibid, p. 192). Thus, Chandler (1992, pp. 92-3) argued that
American and G e r m a n firms (as opposed to British ones) grew fast in world markets because they
were
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"...driven much less by the desire to reduce transaction, agency and other information cost

much more by a wish to utilize the competitive advantages created by the coordinated learne

routines in production, distribution, marketing, and improving existing products and process

In other words, organizational capabilities developed in a dynamic firm are based on routines an
procedures, which can be defined as what an organization actually does every day. Thus a firm's
routines are a subset of its capabilities. O n e could say that the latter are future or potential routines.

The existence and growth of firms can also be seen through the lens of some other similar theori
The principal-agent theory ( P A T ) w a s analyzed more extensively by Williamson (1985), Milgrom
and Roberts (1992). According to this lens, the basic relations between the owner and the manager
of a firm, or between the manager and the employee, are subject to the problems of asymmetric
information between these pairs of authority, which, in turn, leads to the more general problem of
moral hazard. Similar to P A T is the managerial theory of the firm ( M F T ) according to which the
main concern is that managers act with the aim to maximize their utilities rather than the profits of
the firms in which they work (some good examples of this approach are found in the writings of
Marris (1966), or Odagiri (1981), or Jacobson and Andreosso-O'Callaghan (1996), and Baumol
(1967). Jacobson and Andreosso-O'Callaghan (1996) in their chapter about the theory of the firm
also include the 'co-operative g a m e theory' ( C G T ) , whose creator was Aoki (1984). This author
proposed that the firm serves ".. .as a nexus for co-operative relationships between the employees
and the shareholders which makes possible the optimal redistribution ofriskas well as the efficient
collective use of skills, knowledge, and funds..." (p. 69). Customers, suppliers, and financial
institutions are all influential players in this co-operative game. Here, one can recognize the typical
Japanese firm, as described throughout this thesis. Last but not least, it is important to mention
Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) contribution. They suggested that technological non-separability is
the main factor in explaining the existence offirms.For instance, as it is essential for workers to
co-operate in order to loadfreight,or to do some other similar major activity, the firm exists
because it monitors team performance.
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All the above theories5 explain why, in parallel with the development of big business from the
of the 19th century, w e also have the phenomenon of vertical integration either of production or
distribution or of both6. This trend continued unhampered until the 1960s and to some extent the
1970s.

"... This amounted to the replacement of the market economy by the corporate economy. In 1969,

K. Galbraith predicted that the inherent advantages offirmsover markets in allocating reso

and permitting long-term planning would result in increasing dominance of capitalist economi

a small number of giant corporations. During the 1980s and the 1990s, these predictions wer

refuted by a sharp reversal of the trend toward increased aggregate concentration..." (Gra
1998, p. 319).

The trend is now to disintegrate, to specialize again, to be more flexible, to collaborate wit
firms, and to reinforce core competences (Ibid). However, this applies to the U S A and some other
countries only, since Japan had followed a different path from the beginning (for example through
focal, flexible firms as this explained in the next section).

Transaction costs and capabilities are generic concepts explaining vertical integration of fir
Some more precise factors for such integration that also contain these generic concepts are shown
in Table 4.2. In Chapterfive,emphasis will be put on some other reasons, such as those related to
the concept of 'kinetic costs'. However, this table provides a good background regarding the
effects on industrial growth. T h e underlying deeper economic theories for the boundaries of the
firm are linked with the T C economics as represented by Williamson (see above), and the
evolutionary economics as represented by Nelson and Winter (1982), Hodgson (see above) and
Chandler. The latter in 1992 said:

"...The point is that an understanding of the changing boundaries of the firm required an

awareness of the specific capabilities of thefirmand the characteristics of the industry and
in which it operates at thetimethe changes were made... " (p. 89)

5

In Chapterfive,these theories will be complemented with some important extensions such as the concept
of'kinetic costs' and they will all be put into the framework of system analysis.
Big business are also due to vertical integration, and not just to the mere expansion of firms.
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Table 4.2

R e a s o n s for/against vertical integration 7

REASON FOR/AGAINST VERTICAL INTEGRATION

EFFECT
Linking two stages of production at a single location reduces transportation costs: c o m m o n +++
ownership is necessary

(positive)

Differences in the optimal scale of operation between different stages of production
(negative)
Strategic dissimilarities between business or different stages of production
If organizational capabilities in different vertical activities are independent of one another,
lack of specialization inhibits the development of individual capabilities
Extend monopolistic positions from one stage of the industry to another.

+-H-

Rapid responsiveness to uncertain d e m a n d and n e w product development opportunities
Problems andrisksat one stage of production expand into other stages
Small number of firms in the industry or small size of the industry (e.g. depending on the life

+++

cycle of firms and industries)
Substantial requirements for specific investments and assets in physical, h u m a n and site-

+++

specific capital
Great difficulty of specifying and monitoring contracts (e.g due to uncertainty, or asymmetric +++
information)
Avoidance of taxes and regulations (e. g. price controls)

+++

Complementarities between design and manufacturing capabilities (e.g. in the case of digital

+-H-

logic integrated circuits)
Network industries such as railroads

-H-+

Wish to implement price discrimination

-H-+

Elmiination of market power for greater monopolistic profits

+++

Source: Based on Grant (1998), Carlton and Perloff (1990), Williamson (1975, 1985). Legend: '+++':
positive; and '—': negative.

Chandler's last point about the influence of the characteristics of the industry and market on a
has been extensively analyzed by Porter (1980, 1990), who introduced the five forces of
competition (threat of new entrants, bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of suppliers,
rivalry among existing competitors, and threat of substitutes), the generic strategies (cost
leadership, differentiation, cost focus, and focused differentiation), the value chain, and the

national diamonds (firm strategy, structure, and rivalry; demand conditions; factor conditions; a

related and supporting industries). According to his work, competition within an industry through
the forces of rivalry, threat of new entrants, bargaining power of buyers and suppliers, and the

7

In Chapterfive,vertical integration will be briefly analyzed in thetightof the theoretical extensions i
Chapter, for example the 'process of movements'.
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threat of substitutes has a considerable impact on the growth of firms and changes in their
boundaries.

Furthermore, and perhaps more important, there is a wide range of vertical relations that can be
developed between firms, out of which vertical integration is only one type of such relations.
Figure 4.2 summarizes all these types of vertical relationships as a function of the degree of
commitment and formalization. For example, franchises have a high degree of contract
formalization and a rather low degree of commitment, whereas vertical integration, as it takes
place within the boundaries of the firm, has a high degree of commitment and a low degree of
contractual formalization.
High

&

Low
Low
Source: Grant (1998), p. 325

De g ree of C o m m itm ent

Hig h

Figure 4.2 Types of vertical relationships between firms or within firms

Vertical integration led to the appearance of the M-form of internal managerial organization,

which gradually replaced the functional structure of large firms. Did this continuous process o
multi-divisionalization contribute to economic growth in the USA? There exists some evidence,

which suggests that the M-Form firms are better performers than other type of firms. For instan
Rumelt (cited in Scott, 1973, p. 143) has shown that from 1950 to 1970, the product divisional

firms scored higher on all the conventional financial measures (e.g. sales growth, earnings gr
etc) than the other type of companies. Also, as Chandler (1969, p. 278) mentions, and based on
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governmental study in 1963, "...In 1947, the 200 largest companies, many of which had not yet
become fully diversified and decentralized, accounted for 30% of the value added by
manufacturing. By 1963, when most of them had adopted the new strategy and structure, they
accounted for 41% of value added...".

From a more theoretical point of view, Williamson (1994, especially pp. 372-379) mentions the
following arguments for a better economic performance of multidivisionals than other types of
firms:
• They enjoy more disciplined internal organization in terms of stronger incentives, better
accountability, and superior internal resource allocation.

• Value creation (entrepreneurship) and loss reduction (administrative function by top manager
are both realized.
• Internal organization allows the squeezing out of managerial discretion.
• Economization on bounded rationality and attenuation of opportunism.
However, Hill (1994) makes a valuable remark: although he agrees with the fact that the M-form
of firms is a superior type of governance (according to Williamson' s thesis), "... for a firm
realize value from hierarchical governance, the correct internal organizational structure and

systems must be in place..." (p. 307). This precondition is essential as the theoretical extens
Chapter five below will show. There it will be suggested that the 'process of movements' (POM)

(akin to the internal organizational structure of Hill's remark) is at the heart of firm opera
thus the 'process of contracts' (akin to the hierarchical governance of Hill's remark) depends
the POM.

The M-form of governance is closely related to diversification. Scholars have attempted to exp
a diversified firm with the aid of transaction costs theory. If the TCs of using the market

mechanism exceed the bureaucratic costs of a management hierarchy, then the firm will internal

these costs and thus diversify its production into new products and hence there will be horizo

integration. This argument resembles that explaining the process of vertical integration. Howev

there is a difference, in that a diversified firm can realize economies of scope whereas a ver
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integrated firm can realize economies of scale. Furthermore, Hill (1994) says that economies of

scope through diversification emanate from unutilized excess capacity in human capital as Penro
had already claimed in 1959. However, a TCs approach to understanding firm expansion through
diversification is not sufficient. As Milgrom and Roberts (1992) remark "...firms seeking

profitable expansion are most likely to be successful by identifying the areas of their own spe
competencies, investing to build those competencies, and introducing products where the

competencies give them a cost advantage or a marketing advantage..." (p. 570). In particular, fo

mergers, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) mention the following transaction costs to be the reasons f

potential failure: "...conflicts of corporate culture, political battles leading to influence co
misbehavior by the central office of the acquiring firm, which reneges on promises made to
managers and employees of the formerly independent subsidiary..." (p. 574).

4.2.3 The role of scientific management and Fordism

The American system of manufacturing as it existed up to the early 1980s started at least 100-1
years earlier (cf. Locke, 1996). The mass production system based on scientific management and
its extensions, and on Fordist methods, provided the American economy with an edge over all
other economies during that century. This sub-section links elements of these methods to some
important theoretical issues in economics, and analyzes the implications for productivity and
economic growth.

Before analyzing this new order in business management that had slowly started by the 1880s, a

brief reminder of the old order which was based in the more sophisticated industries such as th
mechanical ones, on the inside contracting system, is presented.

"... contractors were prosperous entrepreneurs who engaged skilled people to do vital shop floo
production work. But the system also encouraged 'scams' that resulted, as Frederick Winslow

Taylor described it, in 'a jungle of restrictive practices, ca'canny, hanging-out, or soldierin

of which induced efficient production in standardized American process manufacturing... " (Lock
1996, p. 19).
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O n the other hand, scientific m a n a g e m e n t w a s based on different premises. George (1972)
summarized Taylor's ideas as follows (p.93):
"...First: Develop a science for each element of a man's work, which replaces the old rule-ofthumb method.

Second: Scientifically select and then train, teach, and develop the workman, whereas in the pa
chose his own work and trained himself as best he could.

Third: Heartily cooperate with the men so as to insure all of the work is being done in accordan
with the principles of the science which has been developed.

Fourth: There is an almost equal division of the work and the responsibilities between the

management and the workmen. The management take over all work for which they are better fitte

than the workmen, while in the past almost all of the work and the greater part of the responsibi
were thrown upon the men... "

In this quote, it is worth noting the contrast between the old paradigm of organization and the n
one proposed by Taylor. However, there is more to it (George, 1972, pp. 96-99):
• "...Scientific management involves a complete mental revolution8..." (Taylor, 1947,
p.27).
• Systematic research to determine all aspects of work.
• Establishment and use of standards in every phase of management.
• Systematic planning and control.
• Conservation, not waste in effort, materials, time, and so on.

On the last point, the Taylor Society in its early days enunciated the following aim:

"... To earn through a waste-saving management and processing technique, a larger income from a

given expenditure of human and material energies, which shall be shared through increased wage
and profits by workers and management... " (Quoted in George, 1972).

This aim is obviously related to increasing productivity. Hoxie, an early critic of Taylor's idea

and suggestions, also emphasized the purpose of scientific management as being the elimination of
'avoidable wastes' in the process of production (quoted in Nyland, 1996).

8

Nelson's (1992) book contains valuable contributions by several authors on the theme of '
revolution'.
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What were the consequences of the implementation of scientific management? George (1972,

p.96)9, in his extensive historical account, suggests the following positive outcomes (regardin
other scientific management proponents, see also further below):
• Not only improvements on the shop floor, but also in other parts of the firm such as sales,
general administration, and so on.
• More effective utilization of equipment, labor, and materials.
• More accurate controls, routing, and planning, mainly through measurement of time
requirements of carrying out various tasks.
• For labor, better placement, more opportunities for advancement, higher wages, better
working conditions, etc.
• A more reliable product.
• A better work force.
• A better understood customer.

Scientific management was not only expressed by Taylor, but also by several other scholars afte
and before him10. According to George, 1972, p. 96, "...Babbage, among others, had traveled
much the same road..." before Taylor. Gilbreth was a contemporaneous 'competitor' with Taylor,
and he introduced the complementary motion study to Taylor's time study. The scholars who
extended the Taylor cum Gilbreth ideas and actions were Gantt (the Gantt chart, service as an
objective), Munsterberg (industrial psychology), Scott (applied psychology to motivation and
advertising), Emerson (efficiency principles, objectives of a firm), Person (emphasis on total
of management), and Fayol (first comprehensive theory of management) (George, 1972, Chapter

7). It is worth noting about Emerson, that his concept of efficiency was based on the eliminat
waste. All these pioneers of scientific management, plus some others such as Church, Diemer,
Duncan, Brandeis, Hartness, Bloomfield, Hoxie, Drury, Tead, Cooke, Parsons, LefBngwell, and

Herford, Hildage, and Jenkins (George, 1972), were all active in the 1910s and/or 1920s (or eve

9

Similar conclusions were reached by other scholars, for instance Drury (1922), Nelson (1992), V
(1979), and others.
10
A recent collection of the contributions of some of these authors is found in Urwick and Brech (1994).
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beyond). The movement of the new management science, of course, continued later with many
other scholars such as Sheldon, and Mayo.

Overall, during the period of the 1910s to 1920s, social and economic conditions favored the

diffusion of rationalization, standardization, and simplification; thus, the Americans achieve

significant lead in the organization of work and accelerated productivity. In this respect, Ko

(1996, p. 269) said: "...The critical factor was not the organizational capabilities of manage
hierarchies, but the American national strength in the rationalization of work and the

standardization of production..." The same author remarks that Taylorist ideas had spread wide
by the 1920s; thus, by 1935, 34% of all manufacturing firms with more than 250 employees
reported the use of time and motion studies.

However, scientific management was not the only revolution in organizational matters that took
place in the 1910s. It was also the semi-automatic assembly line process engineered and
introduced by Ford. Though American factories had already introduced continuous-process
machinery on the floor to increase production throughput from the 1870s (Chandler 1977, Locke
1996), Ford's assembly line, in operation by 1913, epitomized this mass production process.
Fordism11, when introduced in the 1910s and 1920s, needed Taylor's principles about

standardization, work codification, and time studies. Above all, it most likely needed more th
anything else Gilbrerth's motion studies as Kijne (1996) correctly remarked.

Was Taylorism complementary to Fordism, or were these two systems rivals? Though these

dilemmas will not be fully resolved in this study, the impact of both philosophies, one way or

another, has been profound and positive on American organization of businesses, be it small or
big. The principles of Taylorism cum Fordism and their various applications are of primary

importance for this thesis. In this respect, the stand suggested by Aglietta (1976) and by Bla
etal (1985) is adopted:

11

The term Fordism is a generic term that encompasses more than what Ford innovated in the fi
instance, it also includes the further split of the professional division of labor to comprisefinancialmanagers
or marketing specialists introduced by Sloan of General Motors (Womack et al, 1990).
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"...Fordism took up the principles of Taylorism and put them more effectively into practice, t

obtain an ever greater intensification of labor. Fordism further developed the mechanization of
labor, increased the intensity of work, radicalized the separation between manual and mental
labor... " (Aglietta 1976, p. 117)

"...Taylorism, then, differs from Fordism in that the former describes a set of techniques for the
management of labor and the latter a particular configuration of a production system seen as a
combination of process and product technologies with human labor in a specific form of work
organization... " (Blackburn et al 1985, p.44):

It is now time to ask the question: how is the Taylorist-Fordism system (TFS) related to some
fundamental economic theories ? T h e following interdependent propositions are suggested and
briefly discussed below 13 :
• The more meticulous the division of labor organized by the TFS is, the more waste and
transaction costs are reduced.
• The introduction of standards by the TFS creates a better institutional framework.
• The whole enterprise is affected by the TFS.

Antonelli (1998) remarked that economic analysis has recently appreciated the role of standards as
institutions (rules) that shape both markets and organizations. T h e y are non-pure private goods that
contain technical, commercial and procedural information, are part of technological and
organizational changes, have an impact on the competition process, and "...affect radically the
division of labor and the organizational setup of firms..." (ibid, p. 79) .

Since standards are institutions they provide the structure for exchange that determines the costs of
transacting and the costs of transformation (North, 1990, 1992). Standards reduce the variety of
asset specifications, increase the frequency of transactions and reduce market and intra-firm

2

TFS will be further explained through the theoretical extensions of Chapter five.
These propositions are conclusions reached by the scholars in the brief discussion that follows.
4
There are various types of standards, such as product ones and document ones. In this sub-section
reference is made to the compatibility standards that are related to processes (see Antonelli, 1998, for
relevant definitions).
13
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uncertainties, they increase the number of parties involved in the market place or within the fi

reduce opportunistic behavior, and reduce the size of governance structures (.Antonelli, 1998)15.

Another main feature of the TFS, as described above, is the relentless pursuit of continually

reducing waste in the production process. This reduction in waste is for instance translated int
reduction in inventories, reduction in unproductive work (due to a more meticulous and adequate

division of labor), and so on16. This pursuit means that the production possibility frontier (PPF

not attainable in the short run; in the long run, reduction in waste would drive the firm (or th
economy in general) closer to its PPF. However, in the long run, at the same time, the PPF is

displaced upwards due to technical and organizational innovations (TIs and OIs), thus the firm i

continuously situated below and inside the PPF (points A and B in Figure 4.3). In addition, ther
a continuous interplay between OIs (and/or TIs) and the elimination of waste, that is, waste is
reduced because of OIs (and/or TIs), and on the other hand OIs (and/or TIs) are introduced

because of the existence of waste. Consequently, there are many possibilities as to where the fi
is situated in the first place and where it dynamically relocates itself.

Figure 4.3

Taylorist-Fordism system (TFS) and the production possibility frontier
(PPF)

The TFS strives, through its organizational changes of work on the shop floor and everywhere in
the firm, to shift the current point A (in Figure 4.3) of production towards the ever moving
outwards PPF line because it reduces waste and uses resources and inputs more effectively. Here

reference can also be made to the X-inefficiency theory of Leibenstein (1966), according to whic

However, this author does not include the elements related to inn-a-firm impacts.
For a recent analysis of the meaning of waste and its importance to governance and TCs, see Williamson
(1994)
16
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one of the main reasons for not having non-allocative efficiency is an incomplete specification

labor contracts (cf. also Tisdell, 1996, p.238). A study by Kilby (as cited in Franz, 1997) show

that simple alterations in the physical organization of a plant such as work flows throughout t

plant, changes in plant layout, and waste control increased labor productivity substantially. Ki

pioneering study is used by Frantz (1997) as quantitative evidence of Liebenstein's X-efficienc
theory, but it can also be used to support the arguments in this thesis17.

The issue of reducing waste and its impact on increasing productivity is a major issue in this
thesis and will be taken up again on several occasions, for example in this chapter where the

JIT/QC system is introduced, in Chapter five where waste will be more specifically defined, and
Chapter seven where waste reduction through its decrease in inventories will be quantitatively
tested against increases in sectoral productivity.

It is also worth noting that the TFS is very often related to mass production and big business
monopolistic or oligopolistic nature. In such a case, Schumpeter's (1942) creative destruction

through the existence of imperfect markets generates more economic growth, not through Paretian
efficiency (Tisdell, 1996, p. 237) but through X-inefficiency (my addition).

The more meticulous division of labor according to the TFS will now be briefly discussed. The

first known reference to the paramount role of the division of labor and hence specialization w
made by Plato (as quoted in George, 1972, p. 16), when he said: "...One makes men's shoes,

another women's, one lives entirely by the stitching of the shoe, another by cutting the leather
man whose work is confined to such a limited task must necessarily excel at it..." (Plato's

"Republic" contains a substantial account of this topic of specialization and division of labor)
modern times Smith (1776) became famous with his detailed analysis of the pin factory where he

showed that 18 different operations within that factory raised labor productivity dramatically,

much above the level of productivity of the case when only one person makes pins by him/herself

1 7

Frantz (1997) has included many other quantitative studies to support the X-inefficiency theory.
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Smith (1776) gave three basic reasons for this huge increase in productivity. First, improved
worker dexterity from concentration upon one operation; second, saving time through not having
to m o v e between tasks; and third, invention of m a n y machines in order to mechanize labor
operations. Out of these three, thefirsttwo have been criticized (cf. V o n Tunzelmann, 1995).
Thus, a fourth reason is given by the last author (Ibid, p. 36):
"...A fourth advantage was not defined by Smith but put forward in 1832 by Charles
Babbage...Babbage argued that the division of labor would allow slotting individual workers

vocations for which they were bestfitted,particularly those most closely matching their skills

providing what he referred to as a mental division of labor. This fourth factor became famous (

notorious) as the foundation for 'scientific management' along Taylorist lines in the 2
Century..."

Furthermore, the more meticulous division of labor and specialization brought about by the TFS
can be linked to another important relationship affecting economic growth, as established by Smith
(1776) again. This states that the market expands more and more as there is gradually more
specialization in the economy and vice-versa, that the enlargement of the market permits greater
division of labor, and the link of this two-way relationship being the growth in productivity. This
is a very important conclusion to be drawn from this analysis because it fully supports this thesis,
which emphasizes the role that organizational changes play in accelerating economic growth.

Recently, two articles by Yang and Borland (1991), and Borland and Yang (1992) have given
more evidence about this close link between division of labor and economic growth, especially
through a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth based on the issue of
specialization. These two authors, by introducing the s o m e h o w vague notion of 'transaction
efficiency' and allowing for increasing returns to scale, concluded that "...As long as the division
of labor has evolved to a sufficient degree and the potential for further division of labor remains,
the rate of growth of per capita income will increase over time..." (Yang and Borland, 1991, p.
462). Also, as the two authors confirm, their conclusions have captured Young's (1928) insight
that increasing returns to scale in the economy depends on the progressive division of labor.

109

The final point examined in this sub-section is the relationship between the TFS and the theory o
transaction costs (TCs) applied in intra-firm cases and not in inter-firm cases. Within the

organization of firms, the points made in the first pages of this sub-section suggest that the a

use of the TFS principles involves the following TCs-related traits. First, a more scientific wa
determining each employee's job tasks reduces TCs since the division of labor becomes more
detailed and precise. At the same time the adjacent opportunism is also lessened, thus providing
more effective governance. Second, the introduction of planning and control reduces uncertainty

about the future, thus again reducing TC and opportunism as well. Third, the shift of supervision
from shop floor foremen (through the elimination of inside contractors) to middle managers
reduces the TC within the echelons of overall management of the firm18. Furthermore, the TFS is

not only related to TCs but also to other aspects of output such as learning aspects, or time and
motion studies and so on. In Chapter five, OIs, and hence the TFS, will be more precisely linked
with the full set of firm operations.

4.2.4 Summary of the role of OIs in promoting industrial growth

In this brief sub-section a summary of the findings of the previous sub-sections will be presente
Although the objective was to follow a historical sequence in explaining OIs since 1850 in the
USA, it has perhaps become apparent that there is a considerable overlapping between theories,

OIs, and periods of time. For example, the division of labor issues developed in sub-section 4.2.

is easily applicable to the other two sub-sections, or the TFS is also related to the development

big business and integration outlined in sub-section 4.2.2. This is an important remark insofar a
the economic growth phenomenon is concerned. However, from each sub-section the elements
which are conducive in promoting economic growth in each historical sub period can be extracted.
Table 4.3 summarizes these findings.

The underlying reason for choosing the appropriate elements in each column is the potential
increase in any kind of productivity (e.g. labor productivity or total factor productivity). In

18

Note that a more detailed account of the type of TCs within a firm was provided in the previo
based on the article of Bouttes and Hamamdjian (1997).
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Table, the putting-out system was not included, as it would make the comparison even more
difficult. In addition this Table mainly includes those elements that are more closely linked

the thesis. That is, OIs that are a significant driving force of economic and, in particular, i
growth. The quantification of the links between elements of each production system and

productivity is rather non-existent on a sectoral or macro level; on a firm basis there is, gen
more empirical work. For a quantitative example of how the original scientific management

applications increased productivity in a particular firm see Peters (1980). The empirical analys
Chapter seven regarding the impact of the JIT/QC system on American industrial growth will

indicate the limited empirical evidence in this respect (however, on a firm basis more quantita
evidence regarding the JIT/QC is provided in sub-section 4.3.4 of this chapter).

Table 4.1
.
Characteristics of main production systems
Factory system (sub-section M a s s production/big
Scientific m a n a g e m e n t
1)

3.

Transaction costs reduced
Better quality control for a larger
production
More specialization

4.

Inventories decreased

business system (subsection 2)
Transaction costs reduced
Development of core
competences
Division between
Entrepreneurs and managers
Transport costs reduced

5.

Improvements in scheduling

Moral hazard reduced

6.
7.

Increased coordination
Intensification of efforts

8.
9.

Improved supervision

Increased coordination
Organizational and technical
non-separabilities
Supervision more difficult
Creation of Externalities
Greater size of markets

1.
2.

N e w TIs

N e w TIs

a n d F o r d i s m (subsection 3)
Transaction costs reduced
Quality of products
increased
Greater division of labor on
the shop floor
Reduction in wasteful
efforts, materials, time
Cooperation between
employees increased
Increased coordination
More control of labor by
management via planning
Improved supervision
Establishment of standards
Develop a science for each
element of a person's work
Variety of asset
specifications decreased

4.3 JAPANESE FIRM ORGANIZATION AND INDUSTRIAL
GROWTH, THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Throughout their long-term development Japanese firms have followed their o w n distinct path, as
discussed in Chapter two. Aoki (1990), amongst other scholars, has extensively analyzed many
aspects of the Japanese firm, especially from the governance point of view. In this section

Ill
particular attention is paid to the OIs of JIT and QC (through TQM or TQC), which have been
the center of Japanese management innovations since the end of WWII. The implementation of

TQC/JJT has been the necessary condition for the high and sustained economic growth of Japan

for most of the years since WWII. This section links JIT/QC with theoretical economic concep
and with other OIs such as networking. First, however, emphasis is placed upon showing how
Japanese firms became ready to accept and develop the holistic JIT/QC system.
4.3.1 Preconditions: from focal firms to Fordism and to the lean system of
production
Chapter two analyzed the historical evolution of the Japanese firm during the last 150 years or so.
A summary of this evolution can be found in Table 4.4, reproduced from Fruin (1992).
Table 4.4 A chronology of evolving hierarchy: factory, firm, and interfirm network

Time

Enterprise type

Interfirm type

Factory type

1890-

M o d e m industrial

N a m e s a k e groups with

Primary factory without well-

1920

enterprise

commercial and financial

developed capabilities for scale

emphasis

economies

1920-

Large, m o d e m

Financially based, hierarchical

Secondary factory with

1955

industrial enterprise

groups with emerging/emergent

organizational capability for

manufacturing emphasis

scale and some scope
economies; functional
integration via local
centralization

1955-

Interdependent, large

Task force/product focused,

Focal factory with

2000

m o d e m industrial

reciprocity-oriented,

organizational capabilities for

enterprises

management -intensive groups

scale, scope, learning,
transaction-cost economies;
decentralized coordination

Source: Fruin (1992, p. 63)

The catching up efforts of the Japanese society to reach Western standards has been paramount in
explaining many of the country's economic features. For example, "...traditional labor-

management practices, such as the internal contracting system, disappeared within several d

of the introduction of Western models of industrial relations..." (Fruin, 1992, p. 59). The

factories, though widely spread out after WWH, "...first appeared during the inter-war peri

when the level of economic development did not permit nation-wide coordination of output bu
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did demand local and regional centralization of business functions. Balkanization of markets
yielded smallish corporate head offices, incomplete divisionalization, and robust manufacturing
works..." (Ibid, p. 210).
Table 4.5 Characteristics of focal factories

IMPORTANCE FEATURE
High

Management-intensive

High

Learning is emphasized

Low

Similar to strategic business units in functions and significance

Low

Similar to subsidiaries and affiliates of big American firms

High

Link between production and distribution

Very High

Linked with corporations and interfirm networks

Very high

All distinct functions are localized: applied technology research, product and
process research, market research, product design and planning, design engineering,
trial manufacture, sales coordination etc

Low

Unbalanced product specialization (a number of products are produced in varying
amounts)

Medium

Interactive, feedback process

Very High

Focus efforts in well-defined activities

High

Complementary activities between focal factories

High

Organizational interdependence, hence permeable boundaries joining factory, firm,

High

and network
Usually low-volume manufacturing (due to imitation of foreign technology, a
recently formed mass consumption society)

High

Often a cluster of focal factories orbiting the core firm, but having their o w n
dynamic centers of technological competence

Medium

If the focal factory is part of a core firm (e.g. Toshiba) then strategic planning
remains in the hands of divisional and corporate-level managers

High

The number of product families is limited

Very High

mnafirm and interfirm economies of scope

Source: Information gathered from Fruin (1992)
In this sub-section it is worth summarizing the characteristics of Fruin's 'focal factories' because
they are the place where the lean production system took place with all its traits of JJT/QC,
networks, and industrial cooperation, which will be the object of the next few sub-sections. Table
4.5 summarizes the salient characteristics of these factories.
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The features of the Japanese focal factory (especially those of organizational and managerial

interdependence, localized resources, and focused efforts in well-defined activities), immensel
helped introduce quality control and just-in-time philosophies after WWII (see sub-sections

below). However, the latter were also linked to the impact of scientific management on Japanese

business tmnking from as early as the 1910s. A recent article by Nakagawa (1996) explained how

this happened. This author tells us that in 1911, Yasunari published an article introducing sc
management (SM), hence before Taylor's own book. In 1913, Dceda published a book entitled
"The Secret of Saving lost Motion", which was heavily based on Taylor's work and which sold

more than 1.5 million copies. In addition, several Japanese scholars spent time with Taylor be

he died in 1915. In June 1925, the first overseas branch of the Taylor Society was established

the Institute of Industrial Efficiency in Tokyo. By 1917, there were 6 Japanese factories prac
SM, as against 169 in the USA.

The pioneering of SM applications in Japan took place in the repair works of the Japanese
National Railways (JNR). This company introduced the entire system of SM step by step, whereas
many other firms did it only tentatively and fragmentarily. For example, when the concept of

work-study was introduced to the employees of JNR, great care was taken to obtain their consen
and cooperation. Also, the chief person who led the SM effort at JNR, Yamashita, had said:

".. .Kaizen should not be produced only by the engineers and managers. If all the men in the s
do not engage in operations to achieve kaizen, essence of shop management would not be
achieved..." (Quoted in Nakagawa, 1996, p. 172). Overall, JNR became the progenitor of all SM

installations in Japan. Finally, during the period 1931 to 1945, in other words during the ind

rationalization movement and wartime production, several industries became large enough and ha
sufficient technological sophistication to be ready for a SM approach.

Post WWII witnessed the development of the Toyota or lean production system (LPS), which will
be the underlying topic of many sub-sections below. As Ohno, the man who conceptualized the

LPS, suggested, all the methods and concepts embodied in the LPS are also part of the original
approach as invented by Taylor:
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"...For example, JIT (just-in-time) and the Kanban system were derived from the concepts of

standardization, routing and line balancing, key concepts of scientific management. Supplie

relations are seen as an integral part of total production process...Havingflexiblejob structure

that promote job multiskilling is not in conflict with the principle that every worker should us
standard operating procedure as determined by time and motion study and as described by his job
card... " (Nakagawa, 1996, p. 164).

However, the common points between the LPS and SM did not preclude some specific
developments to Japanese society. For instance, as Littler (1982, p. 157) said: "...Taylorism in the
West involved the rigid separation of planning and doing, resulting in the downgrading of the
foremen's role. Whereas in Japan the foremen/oyakata retained considerable production planning
responsibilities..." T h e JIT/QC philosophy developed in Japan is a unique system, a Japanese
invention, which nonetheless has its roots in the principles of S M .

Other scholars suggested that the two systems are not unrelated to each other. For example,
McMillan (1996, p. 285) remarked:
"...As it turns out, the Toyota system has theoretical origins in scientific management. More

fifty years ago, Taylor's student and assistant, Henry Gantt, developed planning tools which to

look at the total production sequence in an attempt to develop assembly balancing techniques. T

kanban system requires higher levels offixedcosts for additional tooling, materials handling,

factory layout, but operating costs are substantially lower than the traditional mass assembl
system... "

Fujimoto (1998) tells us a similar story: "...The Toyota system has adopted various elements of
the Ford system and hybridized them with their o w n indigenous system and original ideas. There
is an obvious continuity between the t w o systems..." (p. 22). Thus, whereas Ford introduced an
extensive standardization of jobs with a parallel vertical separation between single-skilled workers
and elite industrial engineers, Toyota's standardization emphasized continuous improvements on
the shop floor through a flexible and multiskilled workforce.

Another aspect that is worth mentioning here is that in some respects there is a similar evolution
from a pre-Tayloristic system to a Tayloristic one in both the U S A and Japan. Thus, as Taylor
reacted to the inside-contracting system and proposed the takeover of the shop floor management
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by engineer-planners, in the same way Ohno in Toyota replaced the foremen-craftsmen by the
flexible system, now known as JJT/QC, hence emphasizing the multiskilling modality of the
workforce (Fujimoto, 1998).

Is the JJT/QC system as developed in Japan also related to the focal factory system (FFS)

described earlier? One of the main themes of the latter is the focus on well-defined activities
complementary between factories under a decentralized organizational interdependence. This

theme has greatly facilitated the JTT process and outsourcing, as the efficiency of such a proc

greatly depends on the close links and cooperation between focal factories. Also, another centr
theme of the FFS is the emphasis on learning to continuously improve imported technologies

(TIs). This theme has greatly facilitated the QC process, which is interrelated with the JIT sys
It is worth quoting Krajewski and Ritzman (1999, p. 744) who used the concept of 'focused

factories' (similar to the FFS) and directly related it to the implementation of the JIT pull s
a company case. The sub-sections below will further analyze the close link between the FFS and
the LPS.

4.3.2 Just-in-time (JIT) manufacturing: a basic description
Although there are some suggestions that the JIT system was introduced in the 1920s in the USA
through the 'hand-to-mouth' purchasing approach (Langlois and Robertson, 1989), this system
became known to the world as such through Japanese initiatives (Harrison A. 1992, 1994;
Schonberger, 1982, 1986; and Imai, 1991, 1997). Historically, the JJT system became known to
the Western world through Toyota's rigorous implementation of JTT principles, as developed by
the two Japanese pioneers Taichi Ohno and Shigeo Shingo from the mid 1950s to the late 1970s.
However, as Schonberger (1982, p. 17) remarked, according to his own sources, the shipbuilding

industry initiated the JIT idea with inventories "...20 years ago..." and subsequently this ide

spread to other Japanese companies; and all this took place before Ohno and others started writ

about JIT in the mid-1970s. Nonetheless, the story told by Fujimoto (1998) indicates that it wa
Toyota's founder who introduced the term just-in-time:
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"...The idea and slogan of 'Just-in-Time' was created and advocated by Toyota's founder-

entrepreneur Kiichiro Toyoda during the 1930s...When Kiichiro started the automobile busin

hefirstposted the words "Just in Time' on the walls, and told his subordinates to receive ju
twenty engine-blocks in the morning and no more if only twenty were needed that day. Kiichiro

frequently walking about the factory and threw away anything above what was needed... " (p. 23)

Furthermore, the proper JIT process started in the 1950s with the introduction of the formal
mechanism Kanban

by Ohno, w h o also took m a n y ideas from the textile industry where he had

previously worked. Thus, Toyota w a s the pioneer of the JIT system, and it was mainly through
Toyota's experience (and the other car producers) in the 1970s, that the JIT system spread rapidly
to other industries. For instance, "...In the electrical industry, Matsushita (a m u c h larger but less
well-known company than Sony) developed its o w n version. Shingo thought that the Matsushita
production system was better than Toyota's. Instead of using kanban to signal the need for more
parts between separated operations, Matsushita concentrated on placing operations next to each
other so that there was no need for signaling..." (Harrison A , 1994, p. 180). Furthermore, it must
be emphasized that as Q C in general started in Japan immediately after the end of W W I I , many
Japanese companies were ready to adopt the complementary system of JJT later in their evolution.
Already in 1951 Toyota implemented the 'Idea Suggestion System' to continuously reduce
production costs (Fujimoto, 1998); this subsequently became the basis for kaizen and T Q C .

A first succinct but holistic definition of JIT is given in Harrison A. (1994, p. 175). This au
distinguishes threefrontsin the quest for excellence regarding the JIT philosophy or, as it is also
called, 'Lean Production', or 'World Class Manufacturing':
•

Techniques are systematically put in place to attack all sources and causes of waste.

• Everybody is included and participates in the JIT process and management.
•

Continuous improvement searches for the ideal case of zero scrap, defects, and

inventories.
Strictly speaking, the JTT system is only a major part of the 'lean' system; however, the former can
only be successful if it becomes holistic in its nature and thus it becomes equivalent to the latter.
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W o m a c k et al (1990, p. 13) sheds some light on the definition of the lean production system
(LPS):

"...Lean production (a term coined by IMVP researcher John Krafcik) is 'lean' because it uses

of everything compared with mass production- half the human effort in the factory, half th

manufacturing space, half the investment in tools, half the engineering hours to develop a ne
product in half the time. Also, it requires keeping far less than half the needed inventory on
results in many fewer defects, and produces a greater and ever growing variety of products..."
Note that in the just mentioned I M V P (International Motor Vehicle Program) researcher's article
(Krafcik, 1989), it becomes evident that lean production, flexible production, and m i n i m u m
inventories through the JIT process are all intrinsically interrelated.

Briefly the aim of JIT is to meet demand instantaneously with perfect quality and no waste. Hence,
T Q M or T Q C and JIT are complementary strategies in order to excel in manufacturing. Since
Total Quality primarily means that "...The customer is the next process..." (Ishikawa, 1985), the
JIT/QC course of action involves m a n y areas of the production chain, and especially it involves
the design part, sales/distribution, and the supply component. According to Harrison A. (1994),
there are three elements in JIT/QC management: elimination of wastes, total quality control, and
importance of people. Thefirsttwo elements are further explored in various parts of this study, as
they are fundamental in the analysis and synthesis of relevant concepts . The element of
importance of people is less systematically analyzed, as it is indirectly included in other concepts.
These elements are schematically shown in Figures 4.4,4.5, and 4.6.

A v o id
o v e rp rod uction

E lim in ate w a it in g
tim e s

M in im ize tra n sport

E lim in atio n of w a s te
'Cle a n ' the
p ro c e ss

A im a t z e ro
in v e n tories
Any
defective
'goods'

Source: Based on Harrison A. (1994, pp. 182-83)
Figure 4.4 The elimination of wastes process
19

For example, the elimination of wastes process is inherently linked with the 'process of movements'
(POM) explored in Chapter five.
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M a n a g e m e n t leadership
• set future c o u r s e
• consistency
C o ntinuous
im p ro v e m ent

Integration of effort
• c u s t o m e r is the
next process
• break d o w n
ba m e rs

• habit of

imp ro v e m ent
• pursue
perfection

Prevention
• error-proofinc
• SPC

O w nership
• correct y o u r o w n
errors
• line stop
authority

D e tection
• vis ibility of
problem s
• detect at
source

Source: Harrison A. (1994). SPC stands for statistical process control.
Figure 4.5 Elements of total quality
Cre ativity
• aim of job
• responsibility
• incubation tim e
• e n c o u r a g e ideas to g r o w

QWL

Discip line
• enforce safety and
quality-critical
s ta n d a rd s

Fie xibility
• job rotation
• re m o ve barriers

People preparation

• involvem ent
• security
• enjoyment

Personal d e v e l o p m e n t
• develop excellent

Equality
• r e m o v e unfair policies
• sin gle status

Autonomy
• delegate
• line stop
• material scheduling
• data gathering and problem
solving

Source: Harrison A. (1994). Q W L stands for quality of working life.
Figure 4.6 Importance of people

A few comments are worth mentioning regarding several techniques that are major features of JLT

companies (Harrison A., Ibid). First, the 'focus' technique that is related to the product focu
point is related to the ample evidence provided from Fruin's work that the Japanese firm is

basically a 'focal' firm. In relation to the 'lay-out and flow' technique, it is well known t
"U" pattern of arranging machines substantially improves the HT/QC process (see for example

Abegglen and Stalk, 1985, or Donchess, 1990). In addition, there is another element of layout

relevant to this process, that is, the product-focused machine layout that often has the U-sh
pattern. Thus, Ohno, in his implementation of the HT system in Toyota, converted the engine-
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machining, transmission and suspension factories into product-focused machine layouts (Fujimoto,
1998)20

In relation to the 'flow scheduling' technique, the aim is to synchronize all operations throughout

the factory so that accurate inventory timing takes place. This is achieved with the use of kanba
cards, as the following rules show (cf. Harrison A., 1994):
1. Each container must have a kanban card, indicating part number and description, user and
maker locations, and quantity.
2. The parts are always pulled by the succeeding process (the customer or user)
3. No parts are started without a kanban card.
4. All containers contain exactly their stated number of parts.
5. No defective parts may be sent to the succeeding process.
6. The make (supplier section) can only produce enough parts to make up what has been
withdrawn.
7. The number of kanbans should be reduced.

Figure 4.7 explains the 'inventory reduction' and 'enforced improvement' techniques; Harrison A.
(Ibid, p. 190) comments: ".. .Problems such as late and defective materials and machine downtime
(the rocks) have been covered with a sea of inventory so that the boat can float. Enforced
improvement aims deliberately to confront the problems, and by finding solutions to the basic
causes of the problems allow the water level to be reduced..." This reduction of the 'sea of
inventory' is the very visible result that any efficient JIT/QC company achieves. Thus, it makes
sense to use this gauge (reduction or not of inventories) in order to measure the efficiency of
sectors, industries and the whole economy (the importance of inventories reduction is shown m
various other passages of this study, as it is a crucial element of the analysis).

20

From the principles point of view, the application of proper layouts can be traced back to other earlier
cases (for instance, cf. Chandler, 1977 for steel plants, or Pollard and Robertson, 1979, for shipbmldmg
plants, etc.).
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Source: (Harrison A., 1994)
Figure 4.7 Productivity problems and inventories
Krajewski and Ritzman (1999), amongst so many other scholars, also analyzed the JJT systems
and proposed similar characteristics21.

4.3.3 The JIT/QC process and its relationship with other management and
organization Issues
One of the experts on JIT/QC and operations management Schonberger (1986, p. 4) has described
the following three major events during the history of American manufacturing management:
1. The beginning of scientific management around 1900 with the suggestions and
experiments of Taylor, Gilbert and others.
2. The Hawthorne Studies of motivation at Western Electric, around 1930.
3. The beginning of the JTT/QC implementation in some pioneering companies in the
USA in the 1980s.
When Schonberger wrote this in 1986, it was still difficult to assess the importance of the

system. However, 15 years later, as will be shown in Chapter seven, that system played a lead

21

Krajewski and Ritzman (1999) analyzed the following traits: a pull method of materials flow, a
consistently high quality, small lot sizes, uniform workstation loads, standardized components and work
methods, close supplierties,flexible workforce, line flow strategy (e.g. product layout), automated
production, preventive maintenance, continuous improvement.
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role in reviving and strengthening most industrial sectors in the USA, as well as accelerating
economic growth in that country during the 1990s.

The impact of JJT/QC on manufacturing management can also be seen by examining alternative
organization pyramids as shown in Harrison A. (1994, p. 196), as Figure 4.8 shows.

^
Top-down command
structure many layers

Traditional organisation
pyramid
Source: (Harrison A., 1994)

The 'coal face' where the
Value-Added work is done

f
1

Organisation pyramid in a
Q c ompany: supporting
company members at the
'coal face'

T

Figure 4.8 Alternative organization pyramids

This new organizational pyramid in a JIT/QC company can only work if there is cooperation at a
levels of economic activities: between employees and employers, between employees, between
managers, between the company and its suppliers, between the firm and other firms in the same
industry, or in the same industrial district, or in the same keiretsu. With such universal
cooperation, the motivation process of everybody increases with the aim of growing as much as
possible by producing quality products; at the same time, transaction costs are substantially
reduced. Another way of looking at the integration of the JIT/QC system within the overall
Japanese management apparatus can be seen in the reproduced Figure 4.9, taken from Keys et al

(1994, p. 385). The most important aspect of the model is the last column of that Figure entit
'Effectiveness'. As the authors remarked (p. 386):
"...If Japanese management practices are superior to Western practices, the advantages should

observable in terms of productivity, product quality, and the utilization of human resources..
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Source: Keys et al (1994, p. 385)
Figure 4.9 Japanese management apparatus and JIT/QC
This is exactly what happened after WWH in the USA and Japan (but in different sub-periods and
opposite directions). Productivity, product quality and the utilization of human resources were
much higher in the latter country than in the former, as will be extensively shown in Chapters six
and seven. How does the holistic JIT/QC system compare with systems that do not contain
JIT/QC? Table 4.6 summarizes the differences and similarities between the JJT/QC system and the
non- JTT/QC system.
Table 4.6

Comparison between the J T T / Q C and non-JIT/QC systems

Characteristics

JIT/QC System

Non- JIT/QC System

Labor division

Flexible work teams

Rigid work segmentation

Setting standards

Standardization methods

Standardization methods

Inventories

L o w inventories (high stocks are a waste)

High inventories for flexibility

Discipline

Self-discipline of workers

Through strict hierarchy

Production runs

Small batch sizes

Long runs

Planning flow

Last stage first

First stage first

Set up times

Frequent

Infrequent

Operating control

Decentralized

Centralized

Interdependence

Increased

Lowered

1986,1996).
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Another way of examining the relations between JTT/QC and other OIs is by answering the
question: why did JIT/QC take place in Japan and not in the USA? The answer also lies in the very
Japanese characteristics of the focal factory analyzed by Fruin (1992), and summarized in sub-

section 4.3.1, as well as in the tightly integrated system of keiretsus, and the whole society.
respect, Abe (1997, p.305) said: "...The establishment of hierarchical keiretsu (which could be
described as multilayered production and distribution networks involving vertical interfirm
integration) paved the way for the just-in-time system...". The JTT/QC was devised and
implemented in Japan because of several concurrent factors, such as cooperation between
employees and employers, cooperation between SMEs and keiretsus, cooperation between the
government and the private sector, cooperation between all levels of the managerial hierarchy,
relative independence of factory management within the focal firms, limited natural resources,
an adequately educated workforce to imitate foreign technology (TIs)22.

On the contrary the JTT/QC philosophy overall has not been a feature of the American capitalist

system (except in the last 20 years, as will be shown in Chapter seven), because that system, as i
was developed in the period between 1880 and 1930, contained elements of OIs that did not agree
with the JJT/QC philosophy (e.g. tendency for big business, emphasis on TIs and not OIs, etc).

Despite this overall tendency, there were some instances, as in the auto industries in the late
where practices such as 'hand-to-mouth' purchasing were more closely related to the JIT/QC
process (Langlois and Robertson, 1995, p. 62). Overall, mass production and scientific
management explicitly separate each worker's functions and each management level's functions in
a meticulous way, which excludes cooperation between them in the manner described in the
previous paragraph and elsewhere in this report. Also, the dominance of big business over the
whole economy, and SMEs, and the abundance of natural resources in the USA allowed the
American system to fully take advantage of economies of scale and scope (as shown by Chandler

and other scholars), and, hence, the JIT/QC philosophy was not necessary until very recently in
development of the American system.

The imitation of foreign TIs will be further explored in subsequent sections and chapters.
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4.3.4 Benefits from implementing the JIT/QC process and economic growth

In Chapter two some of the benefits associated with JTT/QC were briefly indicated. In
section a more detailed exploration of these benefits will take place. Imai (1997, p. 45)

summarizes the benefits from implementation of HT/QC as follows (explanation of Japa
words in the quotation are provided below).

"...Opportunities for cost reduction on-site may be expressed in terms of muda. The

reduce costs in gemba is to eliminate excess use of resources. To reduce costs, the f

activities should be carried out simultaneously, with quality improvement being the

The other six major cost-reduction activities may be regarded as part of the proces
broader sense:
1. Improve quality.
2. Improve productivity.
3. Reduce inventory.
4. Shorten the production line.
5. Reduce machine downtime.
6. Reduce space.
7. Reduce lead-time.
These efforts to eliminate muda will reduce the overall cost of operations... "
Note that muda means waste and gemba means shop floor or work place in general. Quality refers
to both process quality and gemba quality. The former includes the quality of work in developing,
making, and selling products or services. The latter refers to managing resources and it includes
thefiveM's, namely man, machine, material, method, and measurement. Although the author does
not advocatefiringemployees, the JIT/QC will tend to "...reduce the number of people on the
line; the fewer line employees, the better..." (Ibid, p. 46). A s will be shown in Chapter seven, this
is exactly what happened to the leading sectors of the American economy in the 1990s, namely a
substantial increase in productivity with a concurrent small increase, steady, or even a decrease in
employment (depending on the manufacturing sector).

Furthermore, as Imai (Ibid) explains, the two aims of improving quality and reducing
mutually incompatible, and a JIT system encompasses both issues of cost and delivery. Once
kaizen is started in gemba, shortcomings in upstream management will be identified in the process
and eventually a good quality system will be in place, thus embracing everybody and everything m
the company and also its suppliers. "...By eliminating all kinds of non-value-adding activities, JTT
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helps reduce costs..." (Ibid, p. 49). Further evidence of the substantial benefits the JIT/QC system
offers to firms and eventually to the whole economy, is provided by numerous other researchers.
The following paragraphs are just a small sample of this evidence. W o m a c k et al (1990), in their
comprehensive study of the L P S related to the world vehicle industry, included several tables that
show the higher productivity of the L P S vis-a-vis the non-LPS; one of these tables (Ibid, p. 92) is
reproduced here (Table 4.7).

Table 4.7 Comparative auto performance production: characteristics, volume
producers, 1989 (averages for plants in each region)

Performance
Productivity (hours/veh.)
Quality (assembly defects/100 vehicles)
Layout
Space (sq.ft./vehicle/year)
Size of Repair Area (as % of assembly space)
Inventories (days for 8 sample parts)
Workforce
% of Work Force in Teams
Job Rotation (0=none, 4=frequent)
Suggestions/employee
Number of Job Classes
Training of N e w Production Workers (hours)
Absenteeism
Automation
Welding (% of direct steps)
Painting (% of direct steps)
Assembly (% of direct steps)

Japanese
in Japan

Japanese
in North
America

American
in North
America

All
Europe

25.1
82.3

36.2

97

7.8

7.8

12.9

14.4

2.9

2

16.8

21.2

60

65

5.7
4.1
0.2

9.1
4.9
1.6

69.3

71.3

17.3

3

0.9
0.4

0.6
1.9
0.4

5

2.7
1.4
8.7
370
4.8

67.1
46.4
11.7

14.8
173.3
12.1

86.2
54.6

40.7

76.2
33.6

76.6
38.2

1.7

1.1

1.2

3.1

61.6
11.9
380.3

85

Source: W o m a c k et al (1990, p. 92)

The same authors explain that the LPS's better performance is due to three reasons in terms of OIs:

"...The truly lean plant has two key organizational features: It transfers the maximum numb

tasks and responsibilities to those workers actually adding value to the car on the line, and
place a system for detecting defects that quickly traces every problem, once discovered,

ultimate cause...So, in the end, it is the dynamic work team that emerges as the heart of th
factory..." (Ibid, p. 99)

Kim and Takeda (1996), tested in their study (using 81 questionnaires in Japan) the hypothesis
the implementation of a JIT system will improve the effectiveness of the production control
management system and competitiveness, and found that H T techniques are effective in promoting
productivity. K o b u and Greenwood (1991) remarked that increased living standards

m
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industrialized nations, and in s o m e of the developing countries, and increased competition have
made customers more selective. One component of this new competition is that many markets are
being quality driven rather than price driven. A manufacturing firm implementing a JIT system
through a network of suppliers guarantees the highest quality delivery of goods. The same authors
then analyze the causes of the decline in US competitiveness in the 1970s and 1980s. They also
put forward several critical questions, one of them being: "...Why do we have to live with twice
the layers of management, five times the cost of keeping the books, and ten times the inventories
of our international competitors?..." (p. 59). Schonberger (1982, 1986, 1996) showed in an
extensive and convincing way the benefits of JIT/QC in Japan. His conclusions are summarized in
Figure 4.10. The essence of his deductions is that there is higher productivity by using less
material, labor, and indirect inputs for the same or higher-quality products.
Deliberate
withdrawal of bifer
inventories/workers

Ideas for
cutting
lot sizes

Lot size
reductions

Less material, labouand indirect inputs for the same or higher output - higher^Productivity
Less inventory in the system = faster market response, better forecasting, and less administration
Source: Schonberger (1982, p. 26)
Figure 4.10 The benefits of the JIT/QC system
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Although HT and QC are intrinsically interrelated, it is also necessary to examine the benefits
QC more specifically. Watanabe (1991), who after having briefly tested some concrete firms and
industries, suggested four types of benefits of QC circles (p. 69).
• The development and production of low-cost devices and equipment.
• More efficient use of existing equipment, e.g. through a modified layout and working
procedure.
• The development of workers' capabilities.
• Intangible attitudinal and organizational improvements.

QC circles, their link with the suggestion system (millions of suggestions are made every year b

millions of workers at their work places) and their paramount impact on productivity, are relat
the high motivation of employees. The latter is based, according to Watanabe (Ibid), to three

factors: the lifetime employment system (mainly in the larger firms), the egalitarian remunerati
system, and the promotion system that typically prevails among Japanese industries.

It is also worth noting the more abstract analysis in Watanabe's (1991) article regarding the i
of innovations and QC circles. In Figure 4.11 this impact is shown as a function of time.
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Figure 4.11 Effect of innovations and QC circles

A summary of h o w to interpret Figure 4.11 according to Watanabe, is as follows.

128

• The effects of discontinuous dramatic innovations (e.g. introduction of the latest producti
techniques or management concepts) are depicted by the staircase-like solid line.
• Continuous incremental progress achieved through the QC circles is represented by the
ascending dotted line.

• Any system tends to start deteriorating as soon as it has been established. Thus, continuou
efforts for improvement are required. This is the effect 'x' (my term).
• For a firm F, without continuous improvements, the expansion path is actually ABCiDiEiF,
and not ABCDEF, due to the effect 'x'.
• For a firm with a QC circle program, the development path is ABC2D2E2F2.

As Watanabe (1991, p. 68) remarks, the path ABC2D2E2F2 (and hence the distance between F2 and

Fl in the figure) is followed by Japanese firms according to an American study: "...As the MI

Commission points out, this (distance) can be large enough to outweigh the effect of technica

breakthroughs, which seems to be exactly what happens in Japanese industries..." (Ibid, p. 68

Abbeglen and Stalk (1985, Chapter five), in a classical study exploring the Japanese firm, pro
substantial evidence of the benefits of the JIT process. Their main conclusions are:
• JTT eliminates the substantial amount of productive labor lost in material handling. For
example, in the factory of a US hand tool manufacturer, between 40% and 50% of workers'

time was spent moving material into and out of their departments. This is achieved by alterin
the layout of factories and machinery, by creating product areas, by developing multimachine
manning, by using simpler machines focusing on fewer tasks, and so on.

• The factory must first work as efficiently as possible in a manual way, and then automation
introduced.
• Overhead labor is greatly reduced with JJT.
• The adoption of JTT reduces the time required to manufacture a product.
• With JIT the entire factory is more flexible, and it works efficiently even when demand is
uncertain.
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.

"...The labor productivity improvements of the 'new' (JIT) factory are within the factory's four wa

Component suppliers can help achieve additional savings. If suppliers match their deliveries with
JIT needs of the factory, the management of the factory can be simplified even more. More important,

the supplier adopts JIT to provide this flexibility, the supplier will also enjoy savingsfrominc
productivity, and some of these savings will be passed onto the factory... " (Ibid, p. 108).
The last benefit is a positive externality generated by the JIT system, with cumulative effects
throughout the whole economy w h e n JIT/QC expands gradually to all industries.

Krajewski and Ritzman (1999, p. 749) mention the following operational benefits:
•

Reduction in space

•

Reduction in all types of inventories

•

Reduction in manufacturing lead times

•

Increase in the productivity of direct labor employees, indirect support employees, and
clerical staff

•

Increase in equipment utilization

•

Reduction in paperwork

•

Setting valid priorities for production scheduling

•

Encouraging participation by the workforce

•

Increase in product quality

It is worth noting that the list of authors who have written about JIT/QC and its benefits is too l
to be mentioned in this study. For instance, Sakakibara et al (1997) pointed out that from 1985 to
1990, over 700 JJT-related articles were published recognizing the importance of the JIT/QC
system.

At this stage it is worthwhile summarizing some of the main elements of the analysis so far.
According to the evidence presented in this sub-section, once the JIT/QC process is properly
implemented in firms, it raises production value added and productivity, which in turn raises the
rate of economic growth. If more and more companies use the JJT/QC process w e also have the
effect of positive externalities (pecuniary or otherwise) on the whole economy, since JIT/QC
involves m a n y people and firms at all levels. In addition, as it has often been remarked, JIT/QC is
not an isolated phenomenon within a firm, but it touches upon all aspects of its functioning and
working.
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In the remainder of this sub-section, the relationship between JIT/QC and economic growth from a
more micro point of view is examined by referring to transaction costs theory (TCT), competences
and so on. Reference will be mainly m a d e to Dietrich (1994), as his propositions are closer to
those advanced in this thesis than perhaps any other author in this respect (this author emphasizes
not only the transaction costs and capabilities of the firm, but also strategic, learning, and
organizational issues such as those related to the JJT system). Dietrich (1994, in particular in
Chapter 4) in his attempt to push the T C T beyond its present state, summarizes the inefficiencies
of the JIC (just-in-case) system of organization23 which is the usual non-JIT/QC system. Based on
the work of several other scholars, Dietrich groups these inefficiencies under the following
headings:
•

JIC does not respond to market changes flexibly enough.

•

JIC requires expensive information and monitoring systems to allocate intra-firm
resources.

•

JIC creates large expensive buffer stocks.

•

JIC conceals through buffer stocks production and quality problems.

•

JIC makes quality testing more expensive than building quality into production. A separate
quality control department increases overheads without increasing value added.

•

JIC requires arigidvertical hierarchy for co-ordination and control.

•

JIC inhibits the development of dynamic economic and learning effects.

Dietrich concludes that the only way to reduce the above inefficiencies is to opt for the JIT/QC
type of organization, which is superficially consistent with Williamson's 'relational team' (a
relational team is efficient w h e n h u m a n assets are specific and task non-separabilities are evident).
A detailed analysis indicates that JJT/QC's superior efficiency is not explicable in solely
transaction cost terms, mainly because the reduction in the ratio of indirect to direct labor (which is
a consequence of the JIT/QC process) would reduce the importance of non-separabilities, which in
turn would shift organizational characteristics away from the relational team towards an
obligational market (according to Williamson's categorization). Unfortunately, for the T C T , this
shift is not occurring; on the contrary, the opposite appears to be the case. Consequently Dietrich
23

See also Sayer and Walker (1992), and much earlier, Abernathy at al (1983) on the comparison between
JIT and JIC.
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suggests that in order to reconcile Williamson's TCT (and for instance Ouchi's 'clan' form of
organization, which is also based on the concept of relational team), w e should distinguish
between technological and organizational non-separabilities.

Once we make this distinction we can adequately use the concepts of 'core competences'
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) or 'idiosyncratic organizational assets' (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991),
and others, in order to gauge the importance of systems such as H T / Q C . T h e latter, despite its
static efficiency implications, derives its real superiority from dynamic costs and benefits. Thus, to
conclude Dietrich's analysis (1994, and his related article in 1993b), it is worthwhile to quote him
as follows:
"...Orthodox transaction cost reasoning, with its comparative static emphasis, has little

about these organizational innovations... Clearly, the emphasis in these non transaction co

contributions lies in, what is called here, the benefits of idiosyncratic, and tacit, organ
knowledge... " (1994, p. 64), and

"...The existence of modern organizations, involving just-in-time and total quality control sy

is dominated by benefit factors: the importance of idiosyncratic knowledge, dynamic advantage
and non-contractual motivation... " (1994, p. 66)

The JTT/QC system is, however, not without drawbacks. It, for instance, generates negative
externalities such as urban congestion, environmental and recycling costs (Cusumano, 1994). This
author also sees the following limitations of the L P S : long geographical distances, overseas
locations, stress on suppliers, too m u c h product variety, shortage of blue-collar workers, high cost
offrequentmodel replacement, high cost of frequent model line expansion, and too m u c h product
variety. Harrison B. (1994), in analyzing the negative side of flexible production, contends that
more and more Americans are facing involuntary part-time or part-year work, low wages, and few
benefits. Dassbach (1999) strongly criticized the JIT/QC system because it is not a 'win-win'
situation, but rather management wins and workers lose. Nonetheless, it remains that, as this
section has demonstrated, the JIT/QC philosophy has been providing firms with a n e w ground for
substantial productivity improvements. Thus, for Japan, such a production philosophy has been the
basis for substantial economic growth as Dicken (1998, p. 168) reminds us:

"...Although the Japanese production system has undoubtedly built heavily upon the new IT-base
technologies, including the intensive use of robotic equipment, it can be argued that it is
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'organizational' technologies developed within the Japanese system which have been far more
important to its postwar economic success... "

4.3.5 The role of networking relations and cooperation

Although networking between firms is not only a characteristic of Japan (for instance, see the c
of the Silicon Valley in the USA), Japanese firms through the networks of zaibatsu and then
keiretsu are important OIs to further explore. This sub-section analyzes the impact OIs have
mainly on the external organization of firms, or, in other words, on how firms are interrelated

through cooperation with each other. In Chapter two the role of firm networks as OIs was briefly
mentioned. Here this role will be related to economic theories and concepts. Perry (1999) has
made a substantial contribution towards understanding the role of business networks in several
countries. His main theoretical conclusions about such networks are as follows.

According to the transaction cost perspective, business networks take place when neither the

market nor the internal management hierarchy offers a satisfactory way of minimizing transaction

costs. In this case, networks ".. .combine elements of the two basic ways of managing transactio

by replacing the certainty of internal management or legally enforceable contracts by relations
based on trust, reputation and mutual dependence..." (Perry, 1999, p. 4). Are networks a third
permanent alternative to organizational structure in the economy? According to the modified
transaction cost perspective, Perry (1999, p.5) refers to Powell's (1990) table of attributes
(reproduced here as Table 4.8) to emphasize that networks have an advantage over the other two
forms of economic organization in three main areas: improved resource use and risk spreading,

flexibility and adaptability to changing market opportunities through specialization, and effec
accessing of information and skills.

According to a third perspective analyzed by Perry, and based on Granovetter's work (1985),

"...All economic transactions are embedded in social relations and entail cooperation as well as

competition, implicit relations as well as formal agreements..." (p. 6). Thus, economic relation
networks are also history dependent and inherited patterns of behavior may originate even from

pre-industrial societies. An extension of this perspective could perhaps be found in the notion
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cohesive power elite created by closely tied networks of corporate leaders, key policy-making
bodies, and elite social groups. The so formed inter-organizational networks "...are a vehicle for
enhancing the integration of the power elite and maintaining control of key social institutions..."
(Perry, 1999, p. 11).
Table 4.8

Attributes of networks, markets, a n d hierarchy

Attributes
Normative basis
Means of
Communication
Means of conflict
management
Degree of flexibility
Degree of
commitment
Tone of relationship
Preferred association
Elements of other
transaction types
present

Market
Contract, property
rights
Prices

Hierarchy
Employment
relationship
Routines

Network
Complementary
strengths
Relational

Haggling, legal
enforcement

Administrative fiat,
supervision
Low
M e d i u m to high

Reciprocity and
concern for reputation
Medium
M e d i u m to high

High

Low
Precision and/or
suspicion
Independent
Repeat trade,
contracts as
hierarchical
documents

Formal, bureaucratic

Open-ended, mutual
interests
Dependent
Interdependent
Informal organization, Status hierarchies,
market-like features
multiple partners,
(profit centers,
formal rules
transfer prices)

Source: Perry, 1999, p.5
As already mentioned, a key trait of networks is the trust implicated in various transactions (Perry,
1999; Zucker, 1986; Sako, 1992). Is trust a scarce commodity? Probably yes, as it heavily depends
on historical relations, the cultural disposition towards cooperation, and the "...extent of
commitment to higher goals in society..." (Perry, 1999, p. 16). In the opinion of this author, there
are certainly differences in all these factors from country to country, Japan being the obvious one
where all these factors exist in abundance and hence trust is at a high level, at least until the recent
recession that has occured in the Japanese economy over the last 10 years. This high density of
confidence in Japanese businesses has been one of the main reasons w h y strong networks
originated in Japan. This reasoning agrees with Dore (1987) w h o linked relational contracting with
a cultural pre-disposition towards mutual indebtedness in networks (cited in Perry, 1999, p.21).

The origins of networks in Japan have also been linked to the pressures of the economic
environment. Perry (1999, p. 21) summarizes this link.

"... The small size of the Japanese domestic market ruled out the possibility ofpursuing econom

of scale in the fashion of Fordist mass production. The entire year's output of the Japanes
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automobile industry, for example, was then equivalent to one and a half days ofproduction in th

United States. A shortage of resources and space for storage further enforced the experimentati

with the low-inventory manufacturing methods that developed into the just-in-time system. Amon

the practices that had to be learned to make this system viable was 'governance by trust' in su
contracting relations... "

All the issues developed in this sub-section are strongly pertinent to the Japanese type of busines
as already indicated. Japanese networks take several forms. O n e of them, the zaibatsus and later
keiretsus, was more extensively described in Chapter two. There are also industrial districts
(Whittaker, 1997; Perry, 1999), small-business cooperatives (Perry, 1999), industry associations
(Perry, 1999), and so on. .An examination of these networks leads to the following main
characteristics (Perry, 1999, especially Chapter five).
• Cooperation between individuals and firms
•

Specialization of production

•

A high degree of trust and preference

•

Minimization of transaction costs

•

Long-term associations that reduce therisksof changing demand

•

Increased flexibility for product development and design

All these characteristics contribute to accelerating economic growth, since they m a k e production
more efficient.

Based on other sources, Perry (1999) summarizes some of the above points in the following
sentence.

"...Specialization results in a high use of market transactions relative to internal managem

coordination. Transaction uncertainties are contained by managing external relations with
networks of interfirm mutual obligation with a long-term focus... " (p. 44)

Though subcontracting is not a strong type of networking since it is usually based on independent
bilateral relations (whereas networks involve several bilateral and mutual relations, and are thus
interdependent), mention is m a d e here of only s o m e basic features of the subcontracting system of
an obligational nature (see below) in Japan and will again be based on Perry's (1999, pp. 147-154)
synthetic w o r k (which itself is based o n the contribution of m a n y other scholars' work). First, a
series of contracts, related documents and customary practices, govern the business relationship;

135

thus, the legal framework is supplemented by the prospective sanction of a bad reputation. Second
both parties are expected to be guided by a commitment to a long-term association through

sincerity and patience. Third, buyers expect their suppliers to make progressive reductions in c
each time contracted prices are reviewed (usually twice yearly). Obligational contracting took

place in Japan during the high- growth period of the 1960s. It has the following five features. F

there is high asset specificity in the investments made to facilitate subcontracting. Second, th

utilization of relatively customized inputs with design expertise at least partly conducted by t
supplier. Third, there is opportunity to obtain advantage through product differentiation and

diversification and reduced product cycles. Fourth, there is the strategy of market stability, in

respect of both final sales and the buyer's preparedness to smooth out market fluctuations. Fina
trust becomes relatively inexpensive due to continuous market growth.

Besides Perry's work, other scholars increasingly have been attempting to identify the benefits
networking, e.g. Ebers (Ed) (1997); also, Edwards and Samimi (1997) who attempted to explain
the successful Japanese interfirm networks with the theory of transaction costs. Ebers (1997)
observes that ".. .in recent years, we have witnessed remarkable growth in various forms of co-

operation among organizations...", not only in the USA, but also in Europe (Korea and Japan have
always been network-inclined in their industries). According to Ebers (1997), the motives of
networking are summarized in two aims: increased revenue and decreased costs.

It is also necessary to emphasize again the close relationship between the JIT/QC system and
networks. This system, as has already been explained, links the production of a firm to the
production of other firms through the buyer-supplier relationships. Consequently, as networks
offer a more cooperative version of the market, JTT/QC becomes even more efficient because we
have reinforcement of positive externalities in both directions. Networks assist the smooth
functioning of JTT/QC, and the latter assists the smooth functioning of networks.

Finally, a short note on clusters is now due. Clusters can be regarded as being part of a certai
of network, and their importance as an important factor for competition, mainly from the
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geographical point of view, can be stressed. In this respect, Porter's (e.g. 1990) analysis becomes
very relevant. Effectively, Porter has advocated the significant contribution clusters m a k e to
competition and faster economic growth. In a recent article, Porter (1998) includes a m a p of the
U S A identifying the most eminent clusters within the American economy, such as Silicon Valley,
Seattle aircraft and boat building, and others. H e also suggests "...clusters increase productivity
vis-a-vis outsourcing or vertical integration..." (p. 10) through the following factors.
•

Improving access to specialized inputs and information

•

Facilitating complementarities a m o n g cluster participants

•

Improving incentives and performance measurement

•

Improving the rate and success of innovations

•

Lowering barriers to n e w business formation that improve the environment for
productivity

•

Increase public investments in infrastructure

Thus, despite the tendency for globalization and easiness of access to local resources, industrial
clusters seem to proliferate not only in the U S A but also in other countries (for Japan, cf. Perry,
1999, 4th Chapter, or Whittaker, 1997). Hence, as Porter reminds us, location economics is still
very important.

The strengthening of competition is a significant advantage of clusters. In Perry's (1999, p. 82)
synthetic work, w e can find five reasons for the strength of industrial districts. First, there is a
blend of well-established enterprises alongside high rates of n e w firm formation. Second, there is
an extended social division of labor. Third, within the cluster there is intense competition among
firms that specialize in the same phase of production, but, at the same time, there is a high level of
interfirm cooperation, as specialized firms must collaborate with firms in a complementary phase
of production. Fourth, rapid innovation diffusion (spillover effect) is realized through the
geographical concentration, cooperation, and flow of personnel between firms. Finally, social and
economic cohesion helps perpetuate the life of the district.

However, clusters, and generally all types of networks, seem to adjust to their own environment of
such factors as capabilities, transaction costs, the scope of TIs, the presence or absence of
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economies of scale, the stages of product lives, and so on. Hence, a Chandlerian firm is not always
the 'best'firm,or a keiretsu is not always the 'best' network. Alternatively, the TI of computers
has been developed in a particular type of 'innovative network', the Silicon Valley type for
instance, and not in the context of Japanese or Marshallian, or Italian networks (Langlois and
Robertson, 1995, Chapter 7). All this shows that competition, efficiency, and growth are
contingent on m a n y particular aspects of the space and time in which they take place, something
that has been advocated throughout this study.

4.4 THE THREE AXES OF OIs
From previous sections it has perhaps become apparent that OIs are interrelated; this will be
further demonstrated in this section in which an attempt will be m a d e to group all OIs into three
main axes.

4.4.1 The main axis: scientific management cum Fordism versus JIT/QC or LPS
This sub-section expands on the sub-section 4.3.1 regarding the importance of Scientific
Management c u m Fordism for the evolution of Japanese firms. In a recent article, Wilson (1996)
argued that H. Ford was a JIT pioneer. His comparison between Fordism (or the original model T
production system) and JIT/QC is illuminating, as shown in Table 4.9 which contains m a n y of his
ideas. Fujimoto (1999, p. 59) also arrives at a similar conclusion: "...Toyota's JIT method and the
Ford system of the early days (Henry Ford's era of Highland Park experiments in the 1910s) had
much in common..."

Overall, as Wilson (1996, p. 30) said: "...The difference between them (Ford and Toyota) arise
from Ford's restricted product line, and from the very different labor and industrial environments
each faced..." Furthermore, modern Fordism has some differences with the original one as
implemented by Ford. For example, in the modern version, staff continues to produce regardless of
quality until a batch finishes; also, though original Fordism intended to reduce inventories, m o d e m
Fordism accumulates inventories. This is contrary to the JIT/QC system according to which
workers stop their routine work until any defects in machines or tools etc are completely repaired,
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and hence inventories are minimized since the quality of products is high. Nonetheless, even
modern Fordism and JIT/QC still have many of the similarities shown in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9

C o m p a r i s o n of original F o r d i s m a n d J I T / Q C

Original Fordism
Mass production of model T for
almost 20 years m a d e large on-hand
stocks unnecessary
Dependence on high quality through
machine and traveling inspectors
High levels of staff turnover
Labor force non-homogeneous, non
well-educated, little loyalty to
employers
The greatest distance any material
has to be trucked is 20 feet
The central stockroom and high
work-in-progress eliminated
Often machines are arranged in a
circle
Long term contracts with suppliers

JIT/QC
Adaptability to rapid responses in
markets and decreasing product
life cycles
Dependence on high quality
through team work and kaizen
L o w levels of staff turnover
Labor force well trained, loyal to
employers and homogeneous

C o m m o n feature
Decreased inventories

Deliveries directly to the assembly
lines
Minimize inventories, zero if
possible
" U " shaped layouts

Continuous flow

Ford's suppliers were often far away,
and rail transport was the only
method available
Ford's variable costs were often
drastically reduced

JIT suppliers are often very close
to the factory, and there are m a n y
ways of transportion
Variable costs are reduced because
less direct labor is required

Long term contracts with suppliers

High quality of products
—

M i n i m u m inventories
Layout is important
Long term contracts with
suppliers

Variable costs reduced

Source: Information compiled from Wilson (1996)

However, the differences between Fordism and the L P S are more substantial if w e follow some of

the arguments elaborated by other scholars. For example, Fujimoto (1999, p.60) says: "...Toyo
knowledge transfer from the Ford system was rather selective...", for instance, Toyota's

production architects emphasized semi-synchronization (e.g. Kanban) with small-lot productio
and supplier outsourcing. Wood (1989) remarked that if we interpret the Fordism system as
implying a complete separation of conception from execution (e.g. no cooperation between
workers and management), then the LPS would be distinguishable from it. This author concludes

that, overall, the LPS with its emphasis on harnessing tacit skills and latent talents of wo

substantially differs from Fordism, which is based on disposable labor, on training for imme
needs, on supervision by specialist engineers, and on jobs narrowly defined. The Japanese
approach of labor management explicitly involves workers in kaizen and quality control through

which every worker is encouraged to think like an industrial engineer. This entails cooperat
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the development of skills, especially those tacit skills that will allow avoiding making mistakes
and getting it 'right-first-time'.

According to Wood (1989) there are six elements, which greatly facilitated the development of
tacit skills, and hence the promotion of the L P S . First, the segmentation of the labor market
involves the use of temporary and contract workers all of w h o m can act as a buffer for the
employment security of the permanent workers. Second, wages are not only determined by the
employees' skills, age and seniority, but also by their performance. Third, trade unionism is
structured on an enterprise basis. Fourth, the supervisors and team leaders are given a strong
training role. Fifth, regular team meetings are held to discus standards, performance levels, and
operational problems. Finally, there is job rotation.

The division between Fordism and the LPS has been the object of many studies such as that of
Piore and Sabel (1984) w h o mainly analyzed the various systems in a rather distinct way, that is
the craft versus the mass versus the flexible specialization types of production. However, these two
authors also suggested that the spread of flexible specialization "...amounts to a revival of craft
forms of production..." (p. 17). A s will be emphasized below w e can create paradigms of
production, which might not be, in reality, separate entities but s o m e h o w mixed. McLoughlin and
Clark (1994) have summarized some of Piore and Sabel's ideas, reproduced here as Table 4.10.
Table 4.10

K e y aspects of F o r d i s m a n d flexible specialization

Aspect

Fordism

Flexible Specialization

Product market
Product variety
Dominant organizational form
Production system

Stable
Standardized
Large corporation
M a s s production / inflexible
technology
Deskilled
Adversarial

Uncertain
Differentiated
Small firms/decentralization
Small batch/ flexible technology

Job control
Industrial relations

U p skilled
Cooperative

Source: McLoughlin and Clark (1994, p. 50)
As it has already been hinted earlier the various types of production can be overlapping to each
other, or evolve in a parallel way, or influence each other. A s McLoughlin and Clark (1994, p. 53)
said: "...Continuity with the Fordist phase of industrial capitalism, rather than a 'radical break'
from it, appears to provide a more compelling starting point of analysis..." This continuity is
nicely shown in Figure 4.12. A few comments are worth making in relation to this Figure. First,
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the Post-Fordist region, which has as a variant the flexible specialization sub-system, combine
high degree of all three factors in determining the region, that is a high level of labor
responsibility, process variability and product innovation. Second, both the initial Fordist
paradigm and the Neo-Fordist one contain a low degree of labor responsibility. Third, the three
factors depicted on the three axes of Figure 4.12 show combinations of OIs only, thus TIs are
implicitly incorporated in these factors.

From these comments it now becomes apparent, that the Japanese LPS, corresponding to the PostFordist region of Figure 4.12, represents a continuous evolution of the initial Fordist system.
However, it must be emphasized that the LPS, once established in a large part of the economy,
made a significant impact on growth in the same way as the initial Fordist evolution made a

significant impact on growth a few decades earlier. These impacts will be outlined quantitativel
in Chapters six and especially seven.

Labour jr >V
responsibility

/

\

Source: McLoughlin and Clark (1994, p. 55)

Figure 4.12 A model of production systems
The distinction between the LPS and the SM system can take other directions. Coriat and Dosi
(1998) tell us that
"...Whereas the Tayloristic approach has been aimed to separate the functions of production,

maintenance, quality control, planning, etc. and to fragment the tasks required by each function
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the Japanese way on the contrary has been to create work stations where the different tasks are to
different degrees reaggregated... " (p. 119)

A similar conclusion is reached by Lazonick (1990, p. 286). However, as the same authors (Coriat
and Dosi, 1998) remark, the Taylorist legacy is not abandoned by m a n y Japanese firms but rather
it is 'regained'. This is achieved in two ways: first, through flexible work standards and
transferable work components; and second, through the implementation of the so-called
'management b y eyes' as elaborated and designed b y O h n o , according to which everything can be
very easily visible and hence any worker can, for instance, stop the line any time in order to make
sure that quality and quantity of workmanship is absolutely guaranteed. In addition O h n o (1988)
emphasized that this procedure should not only apply to the machines but also to the methods of
production, the circulation of Kanbans, the levels of inventories, etc. Furthermore, the famous
'five-dollar day' w a g e introduced b y Ford to boost workers' motivation is matched by a system of
individual and collective performance bonuses in the L P S . Coriat and Dosi (1998) summarized
their findings as follows:
"...Japanese practices may indeed be considered as a profound organizational innovation

originally grounded in the local adaptation of Taylorism and Fordism, which eventually led to a

distinct archetype of organizational routines for problem solving and governance of industri
relations... "(p. 122)

This brief comparison between the two organizational schemes shows that there are two forces that
shape them. First, they both (the original American and the Japanese ones) have a c o m m o n
background, namely the attempt to rationalize the production process24, which started mainly with
Taylor's principles and Ford's application to mass production. Second, they both diverged to
accommodate for other national influences such as size of the market, industrial relations, cultural
traits and so on. These two points are well summarized in the following conclusion reached by
Lillrark(1995,p. 981):

"...It should be noted that while the Japanese were, and still are, Frederick Taylor's best stud

as far as work simplification and rationalization goes, they never adapted the American personne

24

Fujimoto (1999, pp. 63-64) mentions that as the indigenous craft-type system persisted in Toyota
production processes during the 1930s and 1940s, the first step that Ohno took was to standardize jobs. Also,
Toyota introduced in 1951, from America, a formal teaming in 'scientific management' for supervisors (Ibid,
P- 70).
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management principles of Scientific Management, such as piece-rate pay and strict division of
labor..."

A similar view is expressed by Sayer and Walker (1992) in their comprehensive study of the
relevant concepts of Fordism, flexibility, JIT, and so on:

"...So, unlike neo-Fordism, JIT arose neither from the problems facing Fordism in the recession o

the late 1970s and early 1980s, nor from the possibilities offered by microelectronics, but as a
attempt to adapt western manufacturing practices to the context of post-war Japan... " (p.180)

The axis of Taylorism-Fordism versus JIT/QC or LPS is also related to other issues examined in
this study. For instance, it is illuminating to quote Coriat and Dosi (1998, p. 116) again.

"...The 'Tayloristic Revolution' describes at the level of production routines a process which co

evolves with the reshaping of the organizational structure of the firm, entrusting the gener

knowledge on coordination and strategies upon professional managers-as described by Chandler
Later on, we shall also argue that the modes of international adaptation of such 'American'

(Chandlerian and Tayloristic) corporations have deeply affected for a long period the growt
patterns of each country... "

To close this sub-section, Tsutsui's (1998) revealing analysis in now used to further support the
relevant arguments. This author has historically explored the proposition that Japan's L P S or its
equivalent JIT/QC are fundamentally based on 'Taylorite' premises and principles: ".. .Drawing on
a c o m m o n heritage of Taylorism, neither 'Japanese-style management' nor contemporary
American practice has transcended the intellectual confines of Scientific Management..." (Ibid, p.
244) After the introduction of S M in Japan in 1911, the 'efficiency movement' in the 1920s, the
'industrial rationalization' of the depression-era, the mobilization campaigns of W W H , the postwar
drive for productivity, the Q C initiatives and the drive for m i n i m u m production waste of JIT
during the after W W I I era, all embodied the ideological framework and the concrete shop-floor
methodology of SM.

More precisely, "...the ideological backbone of 'Toyotism' was patently Taylorite: at the core of
the 'lean' model lay a compulsive urge to eradicate all waste within the manufacturing process,
reduce costs, and boost the efficiency of labor..." (Ibid, p. 180) T h e eradication of waste (as this
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was also mentioned in sub-section 4.2.3) was accompanied by a parallel tendency for
standardization (Ibid, p. 181). Toyota's pioneering production system (that led to the LPS and

JIT/QC system) ".. .was based on the rigorous application of the two Taylorite methodologies mos

highly developed in Japan, time-and-motion study and layout design25..." (Ibid, p. 183) Regardin
the QC process, Tsutsui (Ibid, p. 216) concludes that the QC pioneers in Japan regarded the

Taylorite rationalization of the work process as an essential prerequisite to QC. In particular
motto was that QC starts and ends with standards. In addition, over the last 20 years or so, QC
circles (see also previous sub-sections in this chapter, such as 4.3.4) have been regarded as a

Japanese OI because they are based on cooperative small group activities that involve kaizen and
feedback to the management. However, even QC circles are based on the Taylorite imperative to
appropriate craft knowledge from shop-floor workers for managerial staff.

Overall, all the above scholars' analyses point to the proposition made in this study that an
important axis of OIs is the axis that starts with SC cum Fordism and extends to the JIT/QC
system. There are different variations of the content of this axis according to the historical

and country considered, but this axis can safely represent the internal OIs of firms . Conseque
this axis of Taylorism-Fordism versus JIT/QC or LPS, enriched with Chandlerian elements, can be

considered as one of the main driving forces of economic growth (besides the well known force of

TIs and others). Moreover, this axis is the main one of this analysis because it is related to t

internal structure of the firm and hence it is more closely linked with OIs, that is the organi

of work, tasks, routines, and so on. This is more extensively dealt with in the following chapte

4.4.2 The other axes of OIs
The purpose of this section is to group all OIs under some very broad categories in order to

facilitate the analysis and synthesis of this study. In the previous section one such category w

identified, namely the 'main axis'. In order to identify more significant categories, all the a

25

These two methodologies are part of the process of movements (POM), which is the center of internal OIs.
This will be fully analyzed in the next chapter.
26
Chapterfivefurther analyzes the internal character of this axis, where the concept of 'internal OIs is more
precisely defined.
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of a firm within the economy are shown, as a system, in Figure 4.13. The main elements of this

system are the value chains of the two products, which are linked with the two factories and then

internal structure and organization of firm F0, and the firms and customers that this firm is lin
with. The internal organization of this firm is the main axis; the firms in the network together
Foconstitute the network axis, whereas parts of the value chain not yet in the production of F0

constitute a potential vertical integration process. Thus, Figure 4.13 shows how the three axes a

integrated into a larger system that encompasses the three axes and the value chain of production

All three axes are dependent on each other. Thus, Fordism is intrinsically related to mass
production and vertical integration, whereas HT/QC is intrinsically linked with flexible or lean
production; both underlying axes promote industrial growth in a contingency framework of
conditions, that is, under the path dependency of country and history conditions. Also, mass
production is linked with a rather thin type of networking (less cooperation) between firms
whereas the LPS is linked with a rather dense network of firms (more cooperation).

The relationships between the three axes of OIs27 can also be shown in Figure 4.14. The y-axis

represents the 'main' axis as defined and analysed in the previous sub-section. Hence, between th
two pure extremes of either Fordism or HT/QC there exist systems which have in various degrees
elements of the two extremes. Note that these links express tendencies and not absolute laws.
Thus, generally, the x-axis as represented by the vertical integration line (1) on the Figure is
positively related to Fordism (the higher the Fordist state of the firm, the higher the tendency

vertical integration ceteris paribus); on the contrary, the x-axis represented by the networking

(2) on the Figure is negatively related to Fordism (the higher the Fordist state of the firm, th
the tendency for networking ceteris paribus); as the JTT/QC is the other extreme of the
Fordism/JIT/QC axis, the above relations are reversed for JIT/QC.

A n attempt to combine some OIs together is encountered in other studies. For example, a graphical
representation of networks, coordination integration and degree of ownership integration can be found m
Langlois and Robertson (1995, p. 124).
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Note that all the OIs identified in Chapter two and summarized in Table 1.1, or Figure 4.1 of

chapter, can be interpreted in terms of these three axes, or a combination of them. For example
putting-out system is part of the vertical integration axis, the keiretsu part of the networks
so on. Furthermore, it is proposed that what happens inside the firm (represented by the main

is rather more important than what happens outside the firm (as represented by the other two ax

This will be become much clearer in the next chapter. Moreover, the above three axes concern t
analysis of OIs. In order to make the study more comprehensive and complete, more elements

should be included. For example, other types of innovations, such as the TIs (which include ne
products), the influence of sectors, etc should also be considered. These extensions will take
in the next chapter.

4.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has in a methodical way determined the main features or reasons of the major OIs
have been the driving forces of productivity and hence industrial growth. Each sub-section

identified these features within a more theoretical framework of various salient aspects. Two

particular sub-sections, namely 4.2.4 and 4.3.4, summarized the main reasons of how industria

growth is generated by OIs. These reasons cannot be properly understood unless they are analy
in the context of the particular OI considered, as effectively carried out in this chapter.

In addition, section 4.4 by synthesizing the common traits and background of all OIs, made th

underlying reasons for considering OIs as significant forces of growth more evident. Thus, th
main axis of Fordism cum HT/QC was synthesized and briefly compared with the other two axes

of OIs, namely vertical integration and networking. The latter provides more credibility to t

substantial benefits the JTT/QC system brings to firms and industries. These three axes can a

used to differentiate between the firm evolution in the USA and Japan (thus, in that respect,
complementing the brief comparison undertaken at the end of Chapter two). According to the

findings of this chapter, for the USA, the main axis and the axis of vertical integration wer
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two axes on which the American firm evolution was based. For Japan, the main axis and the axis
of networking were the two axes on which the Japanese firm evolution was based.

Thus, overall, this chapter has scrutinized specific OIs in terms of several concepts and theor
that make OIs a substantial moving force for the process of industrial growth (and economic
growth as a consequence). The three axes synthesize all the OIs and provide a useful tool for
analysing economic growth. However, these axes and, in particular, the main axis and its

paramount importance will not be fully understood until the completion of Chapter five. Chapter

six and seven will relate the main axis -and to a lesser extent the other two axes- to industri
growth in a more quantitative way.
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CHAPTER FIVE
J/TUE PROCESS OF FIRM OPERATIONS: CORE O
ATOMIC/SYSTEMIC MODEL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous three chapters, OIs were at the center of the analysis in order to demonstrate
need and the importance of the link between OIs and economic growth. In Chapter two, a
historical survey of the industrial growth of the USA and Japan revealed that OIs played a

substantial role in promoting this growth in the last 130 years or so. In Chapter three, the fi

general links between OIs, TIs, and economic growth were established from a theoretical aspect.
In Chapter four these links became more concrete as very specific OIs were scrutinized in both
countries, again from a theoretical viewpoint.

More particularly, in the last section of Chapter four, it was established that the 'main' axis
intra-firm operations, represented by the Fordism cum JTT/QC alignment, was the predominant
force generating industrial growth (ceteris paribus regarding the other axes of the analysis).

chapter, it remains to furthermore justify why this main axis can be considered as the predomin

force. This can take place by further examining the nature of firm operations in order to advan
deeper into the core (firm) of industrial evolution. The need for a deeper analysis also comes

two other factors; first, OIs are related to a different process of firm operations from that o

and second, industrial growth is generated by specific firms that lead the overall economy beca
of the adoption of OIs (ceteris paribus).

Thus, in this chapter, two main objectives will be realized. First, OIs will be theoretically a

to some concrete processes of operations within the boundaries of firms, so that the deep cause
the growth of firms can be better understood. Second, the link between the growth of firms and

growth of industrial sectors, as well as the growth of such sectors and the growth of the overa
economy, will be established. An atomic/systemic model of economic growth will also be
suggested as a consequence of the analysis carried out in this and the previous chapters.
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Consequently, this chapter complements in a valuable way the findings of the previous three
chapters.

The main purpose of this chapter is therefore, to make the proposition that in order to properly
explain the close link between OIs and economic growth, one must explore the engine that drives
economic growth- namely the internal operations of firms. When firms grow because of the
appropriate OIs, the whole economy grows as well. The extension of the theory of the firm will

take place in the second section. In the third section the role of leading firms and sectors, as

the imitation process assisted by networks and globalization, complement the picture drawn in th

first section. The fourth section synthesizes the elements of the first two sections plus elemen
previous chapters in order to suggest a firm-based atomic/systemic model of economic/industrial
growth.

This chapter closes the set of four chapters that are related to the theoretical background

supporting the thesis that OIs have a significant impact on industrial and, hence, economic grow
At the core of this background lies the internal structure and organization of the firm.

5.2 A SYSTEM OF FIRM OPERATIONS, OIs, TIs, AND T
GROWTH OF FIRMS

The existing literature is briefly reviewed in the first sub-section. The complete system of fir
operations is introduced in the second sub-section. The existence and evolution of firms is

explained in the third sub-section, while in the fourth sub-section the fundamental sub-processe
are linked with OIs and TIs. The purpose of all this analysis is to dig deeper into the process
economic growth by shedding light into its core, namely the internal operations of firms. The

intention is to show that once we know all types of costs and benefits related to all activities

practices of a firm, we would be able to better understand the growth and evolution of firms and

hence be able to review and suggest policies for improvement in terms of strategies, leadership,
and so on (Sanidas, 2002a).
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5.2.1

T h e n e e d to bridge the existing g a p in e c o n o m i c theory

In Chapter three, a general review of concepts related to the theory of the firm was offered. In
Chapter four a more detailed analysis of this theory was presented with the aim to explain the
process of vertical integration1. This sub-section appraises some selected articles to indicate

need to extend our analysis beyond transaction costs theory (TCT) and firm capabilities, in order
to capture the process of firm evolution and growth. Williamson is one of the main proponents of

the TCT; in a relatively recent article (1997) he contrasted the non-TCT with the TCT as follows:

"...Thus, although the theory of thefirm-as-productionfunction is a useful construction for

examining a wide variety ofprice and output issues, it is not an all-purpose theory of the firm

purposes of ascertainingfirmboundaries (the make-or-buy decision), the nature of the employmen

relation, the appropriate choice of financial instrument, corporate governance mechanisms,
divisionalization and the like... " (p. 2)

Thus, the firm as a production function, hence as a function of capital, labor, or technology inp
is not sufficient to explain m a n y other aspects such as governance. In addition, each generic m o d e
of governance is supported by a distinctive form of contract law, and is influenced by both the
institutional environment (political, legal, customs, norms) and the behavioral attributes of
individuals (emanating from bounded rationality and opportunism). Consequently, the T C T
extends the concept of the firm and its variations into a different dimension2.

However, the TCT has been criticized by several scholars. One of the early criticisms was that of
tautology as Williamson himself w a s aware of (Ibid, p. 13), according to which almost anything
can be rationalized by invoking suitably specified transaction costs. A n example of this problem is
the conclusion Wallis and North (1986) reached about the American economy, namely that 4 5 % of
national income was devoted to transacting in 1970. Dietrich (1993a) emphasized the point that

not only costs but also revenues must be taken into account when exploring aspects of governance.
Another criticism of the TCT concerns its neglect of firm capabilities. Dietrich (1994) offers a
very good account of what the T C T is and h o w it should be complemented by the exploration of

1

Some more recent collections of relevant articles are edited by either Foss and Knudsen (1996),
and Malerba (1996) or Foss (1997).
2
A recent synthetical book on the theory of thefirmemphasizing the T C T is Ricketts (2002).
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capabilities (reference to Dietrich's w o r k w a s m o r e extensively m a d e in Chapter four). A recent
collection of relevant articles that stress the importance of such capabilities is provided by Foss
and Loasby (1998); these editors in their introductory chapter (p. 5) said:

"...He (Richardson) disagrees with Oliver Williamson's emphasis on combating opportunism: like

Edith Penrose, he believes that the primary reason forfirmsis the co-ordination of the growth and
use of knowledge, including knowledge of performance skills... "

Langlois (1992) has pointed out some significant elements regarding the role of capabilities. First,
in a graph, reproduced in Figure 5.1, the boundaries of a firm are clearly indicated at the point A*,
hence the segment OA* illustrates activities within the limits of the company. In this figure, &
represents "...the normalized per-unit cost premium the firm must pay for the output of a
particular activity if it integrates into that activity, measured relative to the per-unit cost it would
incur by obtaining the output on contract from a distinct firm. W h e n e v e r this premium is negative,
there is a cost advantage to internal organization..." (p. 109).
AC
$

A c tivitie s
Source: Langlois (1992)
Figure 5.1

B o u n d a r i e s of a firm

Second, Langlois (Ibid) remarked:
"The cost premium, and therefore the location of A*, will depend on a number of factors. As

transaction-cost economics suggests, it will depend on the bureaucratic costs of internal

organization and the transaction costs of market relations. But in this story, the location of

AC curve also depends on the internal capabilities of the firm and the external capabilities
available in the market. That is to say, the price premium includes both governance-cost and
production-cost differences... " (p.l 10)
Hence, according to Langlois, 'production-cost differences' include firm capabilities, which
encompass, inter alia, the organization of the company, that is, h o w the routines of the humans
and machines are linked together. In the long run, however, transaction and governance costs tend
to become zero as activities b e c o m e increasingly routine. In the end, as capabilities themselves
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change over time, the firm boundaries change accordingly. Langlois and Robertson (1995) in their
comprehensive study of firms, markets and economic change have extended Langlois's (1992)
analysis. Table 5.1 summarizes s o m e of theirfindingsregarding the firm's evolution through time.
Table 5.1

Short
run
Long
run

T h e effects of spreading k n o w l e d g e o n the boundaries of the firm

Degree of
idiosyncrasy

Transaction
costs

High

High

Low

Low

Availability
of particular
capabilities
Thinly
distributed
Widespread

Uses for
particular
capabilities

Relative cost
of
internalization

Few

Low

Degree of
vertical
integration
High

Many

High

Low

Source: Langlois and Robertson (1995, p. 42)

In Table 5.1, it becomes obvious that there is a continuous interplay between capabilities and
routines versus transaction costs through time (as these two authors show) between firms and
industries (Ibid, pp. 43-45). In addition, transaction costs become dynamic in the sense that they
express the costs of persuading, negotiating, coordinating, and teaching outside suppliers. The
degree of idiosyncrasy needs some extra clarification: "...The idiosyncratically synergistic
resources that bind organizations together are, in fact, most frequently forms of knowledge that are
difficult both to acquire and to communicate to others..." (Ibid, p. 13) Overall, h o w the firm
evolves heavily depends on its capabilities, besides its transaction costs and its strategies (though
the latter are not shown in Table 5.1). Finally, capabilities and the organization of resources are
also linked together: ".. . H o w the firm is organized- h o w the routines of the humans and machines
are linked together- is also part of a firm's capabilities..." (Ibid, p. 16)

The close link between capabilities and routines w a s extensively explored by Nelson and Winter
(1982). Nelson (1996, p. 110) includes core capabilities as one of the three strongly related
features of an adequately described firm, the other two features being strategy and structure. H e ,
then summarized his work with Winter (1982):

"... Winter and I have proposed that well-workingfirmscan be understood in terms of a hierarch

of practiced organizational routines, which define lower-order decision procedures for choos

what is to be done at lower levels. The notion of a hierarchy of organizational routines is the

building block under our concept of core organizational capabilities... " (Nelson, 1996, p. 111)
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Hodgson, (1998) also makes the distinction between a TC-based theory of the firm and a
competence-based theory. For instance, he argues that a firm cannot be broken down into selfemployed producers trading with each other, not because of higher T C but because of
entrepreneurial, managerial skills, and practical knowledge existing in an organized group of
individuals (p. 183 and 192). This argument will be taken up again in the following sub-section.

In a similar way, Kogut and Zander (1992) emphasized the role of knowledge for the firm:

"...This article seeks to lay out an organizational foundation to a theory of thefirm.To r

Polanyi's puzzle of tacit knowledge, organizations know more than what their contracts ca

The analysis of what organizations are should be grounded in the understanding of what they kn
how to do..." (p. 383)

Note that the idea that 'organizations know more than what their contracts can say' is a theme
often encountered in several extracts of books and articles. For instance, Coriat and Dosi (1998)
remarked: "...It might be generally misleading to reduce whatever pattern of intra-or inter
organizational relations to a set of 'contracts' (whether optimal or not)" (p. 124).

How is this tacit knowledge related to capabilities in a more concrete way? Khalil (1996), in
review of T C T , examined three separate approaches to describe the nature of the firm. First,
according to the transaction-cost approach, neither the firm nor the market is seen as an
organization as both of them are simply different forms of governance. Second, firm competence
is about organizational capital, cultural and motivational values, as well as enclaves for interaction
and learning. Third, the process view emphasizes path dependence, routines, habits, norms, or
generally institutions. However, Khalil concluded:

"... What sets one organization apartfromanother is strategic action...the three major app

to the theory of thefirmbasically cannot account for the asymmetry of power and purposeful
action... "(p. 299)

In addition, Khalil (1996, p. 295) refers to Demsetz (1988) and Pitelis (1998) to complement h
analysis on the competence-bundle perspective. The former argues that firms arise when there are,
ceteris paribus, management economies of scale due to the reduction of production cost generated
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by teamwork. T h e latter author argues that it is supervision within the firm that reduces production
costs. Furthermore, Demsetz (1988) has emphasized the point that it is the comparison between the
sum of management and transaction costs incurred through in-house production, and the same s u m
incurred through using the markets, that is more relevant to explore than just a comparison
between management and transaction costs. Pitelis (1998) has emphasized the point that the
exploitation of the productive benefits related to teamwork and knowledge enhancement in the
context of an administrative organization could be the driving force behind the emergence and
evolution of firms.

In a more general context than that of the authors examined so far, Dosi and Malerba (1996)
attempted to support their arguments regarding organizational learning by what they called 'a
theory of co-evolution linking organizational forms, technologies and institutions'; thus,
institutional conditions seed and constrain corporate learning, whereas "...organizational and
technological change might yield the possibilities of both mis-matching (the authors' emphasis)
between the three domains considered here-organizational forms, technologies and institutionsand also unexpected opportunities for innovation..." (p. 19) However,

"...From a theoretical point of view, we still do not know very much about the details of th
revolutionary processes... " (p. 20)
In the articles presented in Dosi and Malerba's edited book (1996), w e see m a n y attempts to be
more precise regarding the evolutionary nature of firms by exploring the coevolution processes of
organization, technology and institutions.

The above quotations and references suggest that besides the elements of TCT, we also have the
following points that constitute the nature of the firm:
•

Capabilities and competences (generic concept)

•

Organization between humans and machines ('technology')

•

Routines

•

Culture and motivation

•

Tacit knowledge and learning

•

T e a m w o r k and supervision
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•

Strategic and purposeful actions

•

Institutional embeddedness

However, there are some other traits of TCT as laid down by Coase (1937), and yet ignored by
later scholars. Thus, Coase (1937, pp. 396-7) says that a firm will tend to be larger, the less the
costs of organizing, and the less likely the entrepreneur is to m a k e mistakes. In turn, ".. .the costs
of organizing and the losses through mistakes will increase with an increase in the spatial
distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the transactions..." For example,
inventions such as the telephone tend to reduce the cost of organizing spatially. Furthermore,
"...all changes which improve managerial technique will tend to increase the size of the firm..."
Consequently, w e have the following elements to complement the above bullet-type list:
•

Spatial distribution of transactions

•

Mistakes by the entrepreneur

•

Managerial technique

To make the above concepts a bit more concretely related to a particular situation, mention of the
work by Coriat and Dosi (1998) can be m a d e again. They argued that Taylor had the pioneering
understanding that the organization of production is equivalent to questions of know-how and
competence. Hence, Tayloristic practices represent a "...coevolution between forms of incentive
governance, routines, competences, under circumstances of acute interest conflict..." (p. 114).

This brief review of concepts begs at least the following question: could we more precisely def
the firm capabilities, apart from 'individual or team competences-skills and tacit knowledge', or
routines, and so on? Together, all the above elements coming from different directions and
theories, are apparently either in conflict with each other, or overlapping in nature, or not
interconnected. For example, what did Coase m e a n by 'managerial technique' and h o w is this
related to routines and capabilities? O r h o w is the element of 'organization between humans and
machines' related to 'mistakes by the entrepreneur'? T h e objective n o w will be to find a proper
'niche' for all these elements, and m a n y others, and at the same time create a comprehensive and
interconnected framework for all of them so that they can be used in a systematic w a y for any
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purpose. In other words, a taxonomy of firm operations and hence costs and benefits is needed.
Once this taxonomy is established, OIs and TIs can be re-defined and further explored.

5.2.2 The Complete system of five fundamental firm operations

Table 5.2 (see below in 5.2.2.2) summarizes the findings of this sub-section; in order to pr
explain the contents of this Table, an example-case will gradually introduce the intricacies
key propositions, then, Table 5.2 will be explored in detail. Also, the issue of measurement
elements of Table 5.2 will be briefly explored.
5.2.2.1 Introduction to the five sub-systems
Suppose a bicycle is produced only by individual producers, each one of them producing or

assembling only parts of it. Also, for simplification suppose that there are 15 parts needed t
produce and assemble a bicycle. Then we have 15 individual firms3, located in different areas

city (this is not a necessary condition of this scenario). In this extreme case we have the f
costs involved in producing bicycles.

First, we have the physical costs (PCs) involving the quantity of labor (L) of the entrepreneu
worker (called F -a man for simplicity), the corresponding rent of the quantities of machines

tools (K) that F uses in producing his part, and the quantity of intermediate goods (M). Seco
have the transaction costs (TCs) between F and the other individual producers with whom F's

produced part is connected, and between F and his customers. These costs involve short and lon
term contracts between F and his suppliers and, or, his customers.

Third, we have the kinetic costs (KCs), which arise from the following reasons. F's business

premises consist of a certain area split into various sub-areas where he performs various task

related to the diverse stages of production of the part. The way the layout is organized in t
machines, tools, and other facilities determines his movements during the day, or week. These

3

These firms with only one entrepreneur/worker are chosen in this example in order to simplify the analysis
and emphasize that the fundamental firm operations exist with any size of firms.
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movements also depend on the way he has organized the sequence of stages, or sub-stages, and
their timing, and on the nature of individual tasks F performs.

Fourth, we have the strategic costs (SCs), which are due to the various decisions the individua

producer makes regarding issues of production, such as the choice of, and relations with, supp
and customers, choice of embodied technology, determination of prices, planning of production

and so on. All these decisions are subject to mistakes, hence the involved costs. Finally, we h
the wisdom costs (WCs), which include the accumulated knowledge in general and, in particular,

regarding technology, the outcome of self-education and training, tacit knowledge and experien

self-motivation, leadership over F's dealings with suppliers and customers, the information fl
between him and the latter, and so on4.

Whenever we have costs we also have gains. Hence, the above five types of costs can also be

benefits. In addition, the link between costs and benefits can be thought to exist in the evol
process of each type. Consequently, the evolution, or process, of accumulating wisdom can

involve costs and benefits of wisdom, the evolution of movements in the factory involves costs
and benefits of movements, and so on. Thus we have the following five processes: that of

strategies (POS) (related to SCs), that of movements (POM) (related to KCs), that of contracts
(POC) (linked to TCs), that of wisdom (POW) (linked to WCs), and that of K, L and M physical
factors (POP) (related to PCs).

Let us suppose now that two of the individual producers "discovered" through their processes o

wisdom and strategies that they could get together, cooperate and produce their own parts in a
manner. Thus a new firm is now created replacing two old ones. What could be the reasons for
their decision to merge? The answer lies in examining the five processes of firm operations
(POFOs) separately. The POM is at the core of important changes. The two individual producers
by helping each other can now speed up some sub-stages of production on the shop floor, by

rearranging the layout, the sequence of steps, the timing, and by altering the individual tasks

All this will be further explained in this section and chapter.

158

perform. Thus, if before merging, one firm produced the main metallic tubes and the other firm
produced the wheels, the two individuals can now jointly produce both items and assemble them

as well. If we assume that jointly they can now make and assemble 8 sets of cylinders and whee

in a week, whereas before the merger took place they could only produce 7 cylinders and 6 whee

separately, the two entrepreneurs, by combining their efforts and changing the organization of
their work on the shop floor, increase their productivity significantly5.

However, the merging of the two individual firms also creates a new situation from the POC's
point of view. First, the two partners must now find common ground regarding their mutual and

parallel operations, according to which they can form a contract about all the issues involved

instance, about how to share their division of labor, how to share their profits and so on. Se

between the two partners, the elements of some coordination and leadership are now needed; the

can include these elements in the formal contract or they can just agree on them informally. T
very probably, they have to reconsider their contracts with suppliers and customers.

Regarding the POP the situation after the merger is also different. The quantity of L remains

same (two workers now working together instead of two before working separately). However, the

amount and perhaps quality of K is now different in several ways. First, new premises are need
to shelter the new combined shop floor and overall business. Second, some of the machines and
tools on the shop floor are now redundant, due perhaps to duplication, and probably some new
equipment is now needed to accommodate the joint effort of the two individual entrepreneursworkers. Third, some equipment for carrying out administrative tasks, such as a fax and a

computer, need to be eliminated if it is duplicated. Overall, the PCs are dependent on the KCs

perhaps vice versa. In other words, normally, it is better to first determine the most efficie
of organizing the shop floor and then determine what capital is needed, although sometimes it

possible to have some constraints as to the specific equipment available in the market and hen
these constraints will in turn impact on the POM.

5

This is not exactly the same situation as the outcome of specialization and division of labor. This point
become more apparent as we progress into this chapter.
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The POW is also influenced by the merger. The two businessmen must now learn how to work

together, how to play the roles assigned to themselves in their business in all aspects, event

train themselves in new areas; they will also acquire new experiences because of the merger a
because of the process of learning by doing, skills and tacit knowledge. These WCs primarily

depend on the KCs because what takes place on the shop floor influences everything else in th
business. To a lesser degree they also depend on the PCs and TCs. For instance, the adopted

equipment and its usage might necessitate some new training, or the nature of contracts signe
might have an impact on the way the tacit knowledge develops, and so on.

Finally, the POS is also affected by the merger. New avenues of expansion are now open to the
new firm, hence some important decisions must be taken as to how to expand and in what
directions. These SCs are affected primarily by the KCs and the WCs. For example, the new shop

floor might allow a further expansion by integrating another part to produce internally (afte
having considered the TCs between this firm and other firms).

Let us now consider the example (scenario) of the production of product x (this could be a
manufacturing or service type or any other type)6. For each POFO, the main elements of each
POFO will be included (indicated in italics). These elements are summarized in Table 5.2 (see
sub-section).

The POW: The firm has an experience of several years in producing product x, thus it has

accumulated explicit (as shown in documents of the company) and tacit knowledge regarding all

aspects of the value chain (not just technology). Also it has generated a particular culture o

showing high motivation and positive attitude which are mainly due to the ability for leaders

many top managers and the owners of the firm. Education and training for employees have alway

been abundant thus reinforcing the competences created and accumulated through time regarding

several aspects of the value chain. In particular, various techniques of analysis, R&D, and ma

intelligence are strong features of this firm. However, despite a strong culture for conducti
6

For an application of the five POFOs to real cases see further below and the end of Chapter
the D u Pont company.
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R&D7 the firm is not good at imitating knowledge of other firms or organizations. Also at times
the culture and overall knowledge or wisdom of the firm is such that its survival is at stake,
needs for exploitation of environment and sophistication for innovations become limited. This
like all firms has its idiosyncrasies especially regarding the acquired ability to enhance the

communication flows, and to reduce the limitations of bounded rationality All these elements sh
the abilities and memory of the firm. However, its accumulated knowledge, wisdom and memory

also contain the outcomes of bad experiences, and knowledge that is limited and hence insuffic

The POS: All employees, and in particular, managers of the firm in their everyday occupations

carry out some intentional or unintentional thinking in order to execute their tasks. This thi

often related to taking decisions regarding strategies, objectives, and plans in order to acqu
possess power by attacking or defending against competitors and to dominate the market.

However, this firm loses its momentum of initiatives for action relatively often and falls into
inertia, probably because many top managers are risk averse. Probably this happens because
mission and vision are not clear or not enterprising enough due to poor forecasting, lack of
inspiration and tendency for mistakes. Overall there is too much uncertainty in the realm of
decisions.

The POM: The design of offices, shop floor, warehouse, departments, sections and all types of

space and distance related areas, where work is performed, is such that in most cases the layou

machines and people helps the coordination of various tasks. In such cases teamwork is facilita

with appropriate timing, procedures, routines and cooperation. The organization and links of al

tasks in a coherent system facilitates the execution of tasks, assists in the implementation of
projects, and creates a positive feedback mechanism for the performance of routines. The
organization of tasks is such that physical and non-physical efforts are within the limits of

ergonomics, and employees are satisfied, especially as ihe fatigue is within normal limits. Ov

7

A strong or weak culture for R & D is part of the P O W , but an R & D department of thefirm1
department or section is primarily a place for particular types of work to be carried out, and as sue
of the P O M , though the other P O F O s are affected as well, especially the P O C .
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the infrastructure of space, distance, timing, logistics and movements of people and equipment is
such that waste is reduced to a m i n i m u m .

The POP: The firm hires the people (labor) it needs carefully8 according to the requirements of all
aspects and issues examined under the other four P O F O s . The same principle applies to the
purchasing of equipment (machines, tools), space and structure, energy, as well as materials and
intermediate goods. A s another consequence of the interplay between the other four P O F O s the
level of inventories of all kinds (materials, intermediate goods, unfinished final products, and
finished products) is rather high in this firm (for example in comparison with other firms). Also,
defects offinalproducts are rather high, thus indicating that their quality must be improved.

The POC: The functions, control and authority of employees, managers and owners of this firm
are properly documented through legal contracts, although numerous informal rules or institutions
(such as accounting rules) prevail in the transactions between employees (for instance, workers
never leave w o r k exactly at the finish time). Contracts are also written for the relations between
the firm and customers as well as suppliers, and other parts of the society (e.g sponsorship of a
sport team). T h e legal form is that of a company but it is not listed on the stock exchange as yet.
Together with contacts, a set of standards is n o w specifically related to most inputs and outputs of
factors and products. The overall governance

of the firm (a loose M-form) provides many

incentives to the employees to lessen their opportunism and enhance their trust. The main purpose
of the superstructure of all these elements is to minimize friction in all transactions of the firm.

Two examples from the introduction of the mass production system by Ford provide further
understanding of the P O M and P O C 9 . Regarding the P O M , W o m a c k et al (1990, p. 28) said:
"...Ford soon recognized the problem with moving the worker from assembly stand to assembly
stand: Walking, even if only for a yard or two, tooktime,and jam-upsfrequentlyresulted as faster

workers overtook the slower workers infrontof them. Ford's stroke ofgenius in the spring of 1913

at his new Highland Park plant in Detroit, was the introduction of the moving assembly line, whi
brought the car past the stationary worker. This innovation cut cycle timefrom2.3 minutes to
minutes... "

8

The qualification 'carefully' depends on the bounded rationality and mistakes of everybody working in this
firm.
9
.Another example of the P O M and generally thefiveP O F O s is the introduction of the 'cell manufacturing'
by Dell, discussed further in Chapter six.
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As for the P O C , W o m a c k et al (1990, p. 43) said about the outcome of the Ford-Sloan production
system:

"... The result was an ever-growing list of work rules that unquestionably reduced the effici
Ford's mass-production factory as workers fought continually for equity and fairness... "

Furthermore, some examples of the importance of layout, as part of the POM, are now provided.
The usual U-shape layout of workers in a typical JIT/QC system is shown on the left in Figure 5.2

(the 'w' or 'x' represent pairs of workers and machines), instead of the straight-line or L-shap
layout in a non-JTT/QC system (on theright).In this example the same number of workers (w) use
the same number of machines but productivity is not the same in both layouts. Evidence as
indicated by various authors shows that the U-shaped line adopted by Japanese firms increases
productivity in relation to the L-shaped line adopted by firms not following the JIT/QC system.
For example, Goldman (1993) suggested that the U-shaped line generates reciprocity, cooperative
teamwork, immediacy in non-verbal communication and feedback, thus breeding a long-term
bonding relationship between workers. All this boosts labor productivity.

W...W...W...W...W...X

Figure 5.2

The layout of production: U-shaped and straight line

Another example of layout is the one described by Bornholdt as quoted by Wilson (1996, p. 28):

"...There is another advantage in placing the machines in accordance with the sequence of

operations; even though some machines are not worked to their full capacity the amount invest

them is well paidfor from the fact that it is not necessary to carry nearly so much stock as whe
machines are grouped according to their classification... "
Hence, a reduction in inventories brought about by a different layout of machines reduces costs
and enhances productivity. For this second example, we would have a situation similar to that
shown in Figure 5.3.
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Machines A

Machines B

Machines C

Machines A

I
I
According to the s e q u e n c e of operations
Figure 5.3

Otherwise

T h e layout of production: sequence of machines

The layout effect can embrace the whole plant. Blaug (1963, p.13), for instance, said: ".. .th

reorganization of a plant may be as factor-saving as the introduction of new machines..." The
plant example (Carnegie's new steel works) analyzed by Chandler (1977, Chapter eight) is also
relevant here, as are many other examples, such as those provided by operations management
scholars (for instance, Krajewski and Ritzman, 1999).

In summary, the five POFOs constitute the fundamental elements of producing work: we need
knowledge (POW) and rules (POC) in order to decide (POS) how much of each factor (POP) is

efficient to execute the desired work in an organized way (POM). If we only have rules, quant

of factors, knowledge and decisions, work cannot take place unless there are the right moveme

of execution and effort. Thus, the POM (not necessarily the shop floor10) is the 'heart' of th

Another way of expressing the five POFOs is the following: any activity or operation that in
physical movement of either people or equipment is part of the POM. Thus, although the
accumulation of knowledge is the outcome of the POW, the organization of learning is the
outcome of the POM (movements needed to go to the class etc). Although a firm has formal and

informal contracts or rules, the process of generating them is the outcome of the POM. Althoug
managerial decisions are the outcome of the POS, if the generation of these decisions need a
meeting of the involved managers in a room, then the movements and energy associated with

organizing, setting and attending the meeting is part of the POM. Also, the quantitative rela
between the quantities of capital, labor, etc is the outcome of the POP.
10

The 'shop floor' is considered to include, in a more general sense, all types of administrative and
managerial offices which are involved in producing work.
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5.2.2.2 The elements of the five POFOs
Table 5.2 summarizes all the elements belonging to each POFO in detail. Some comments are

necessary in order to clarify the boundaries and content of each POFO. The third line describes t
nature of each process; thus, the process of contracts (POC) is the superstructure of the firm
because it governs the structure of the firm; this structure contains the various factors of

production (POP); in contrast, the process of movements of these factors is the infrastructure of
firm; the POW represents the survival instinct and capabilities of the firm; finally, the POS is
drive for power by taking appropriate initiatives and decisions. The fourth line describes the
essence of each process by referring to some key words that complement the meaning of the
acronyms POM etc; thus, for example, the POW is about the ability and the memory a firm has in
order to use accumulated knowledge. The sixth line expresses the main economic purpose of each

process; thus, the aim of the POC is to produce as little friction as possible, the target of the
is to produce as little waste as possible, and so on.

All the other lines below the sixth line contain the main elements of each process. Thus, the
quantities of inventories and defects are part of the POP only; the teamwork effort through
coordination, appropriate layout, procedures, timing and organization, which all involve
movements of some sort are part of the POM only; anything related to knowledge and
accumulated abilities of wisdom are part of the POW only, for example, culture, the ability to
undertake R&D, the ability to motivate and to be motivated, and so on11. The existence of

opportunism, incentives, trust, standards, and so on are a consequence of the rules established i
the firm through various types of contracts, and hence they are part of the POC only. Any
initiatives to create power and momentum in the business environment, which involve strategies,
vision, planning and so on are part of the POS only. Of course, any element of any POFO can and
does influence any element of any other POFO.

"

—
~
ftnrl but rather is a costly, focused
Mated* (1992) has empirically shown that ".. .learning is not a tree gooa, o
and muludimentional activity...", p. 857).
11
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All these five costs and benefits corresponding to the five POFOs are strongly inter-dependent
they are separate entities from a conceptual viewpoint. For example, a different layout on the

floor, or a different sequence of sub-stages of production will perhaps entail a new ratio of L

or new type of tools, or it will have an impact on experience and tacit knowledge, and so on. A

different types of tools and machines will perhaps influence the strategic process, which in ru
will have an impact on the layout of the shop floor, and so on. The combination of the five

processes is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of individual firms, and th
dynamic evolution through time and space (see sub-section 5.2.3).
Table 5.2 Elements and traits of each process of firm operations (POFO)

POW

POS

POM

POP

POC

Survival

Process of
strategies
Power

Process of
movement
Infrastructure

Process of
factors
Structure

Process of
contracts
Superstructure

Abihty and
memory

Initiatives for
action

Movement
relations between
factors of
production

Rules of the
relations between
the factors of
production of P O P

Wisdom costs

Strategic costs

Kinetic costs

Quantity
relations
between
production
factors
Physical costs

Purpose: to
decrease negative
knowledge12
Experience

Purpose13: to
produce fewer
mistakes

Purpose: to
produce less waste

Purpose: to use
fewer factors

Strategies

Timing

Quantity of
labor

Tacit knowledge

Everyday 15
decisions
Planning

Procedures

Quantity of
machines
Quantity of
tools

Purpose: to
produce less
friction
Contracts with
employees14
Legal form of the
firm
Contracts with
suppliers

Culture

Vision

Layout

Quantity of
space

Contracts with
customers

Information flow

Mission

Routines

Quantity of
materials

Contracts with
society

Competences

Objectives

Teamwork

Legal standards

R&D

Attacks

Coordination

Quantity of
intermediate
goods
Inventories

Imitation

Defense

Implementation

Defects

Institutions

Process of wisdom

Education and
training

12 <

Distance

Transaction costs

Accounting rules

Negative knowledge' is knowledge that cannot assist the P O S (and the other POFOs) anymore, that is,
knowledge that is not 'updated'. It is, in general, knowledge that instead of assisting the operations of firms,
it slows them down.
j* The purpose is related to the costs of each process, hence 'reduction' and not 'increase' is relevant
i5 The analysis by Bouttes and Hamamdjian (1997), as presented in Chapter three is relevant here.
These decisions emanate mainly from management and are not related to the problem-solving decisions
on the shop floor which are an element of the P O M .
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Innovations

Inertias

Execution

Energy

Governance

Leadership

Momentum

Organization

Quantity of
buildings

Trust

POW

POS

POM

POP

POC

Techniques of
analysis
Needs

Power of the
firm
Domination

Effort nonphysical
Effort physical

Authority

Motivation
Exploitation

Initiatives
Inspiration

Fatigue
Cooperation

Control
Opportunism

Bounded
rationality

W o r k satisfaction

Ownership

Idiosyncrasy

Thinking for
decision
making 16
Forecasting

Tasks

Incentives

Attitude

Uncertainty

Ergonomics

Functions

Marketing
Intelligence
Sophistication

Mistakes

Logistics

Autonomy

Policies

Problem solving

Negotiations

Psychological
states

Organizational
defensive
routines17

Mechanisms of
feedback

Documentation

Explicit
knowledge
Design of
products

Risk

Performance

Reactions to
fortuitous
events

Ad hoc nonroutine
movements

Operations
research
techniques

Standards

Operations
research
applications (e.g.
PERT)
Work
rationalization

Thus, there is no overlapping between the five types of costs or the corresponding processes,

because each one of them is linked to a separate aspect of the overall process of production

can be more clearly seen by examining the elements of each POFO as shown in Table 5.2. Thus,
for example, the wisdom process and costs belong to a distinct sphere of states and dynamic

changes, as there are no elements of the other processes, which also belong to the wisdom pr

Although there is a strong interdependence between all individual elements of all processes,
elements are unique for each POFO they belong to. For instance, the 'objectives' element of
16

This tlnnking for decision-making can be intentional or unintentional, the latter being m
emergent character of an open system (See Fujimoto, 1999).
These routines are "...routinized policies or actions intended to prevent the experience of embarrassment
or threat..." (Argyris, 1999, p. 215). For example, executives frequently send mixed messages, thus creating
information noise (Ibid).
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POS does not overlap with the 'competences' element of the POW though competences (as

knowledge outcomes of innovations) may influence the setting of objectives (as strategic outco

of innovations); or, the set of 'incentives' element of the POC does not overlap with the 'rout
element of the POM though routines may influence the setting of incentives; and so on with all
elements of Table 5.218.

This dual character of the five POFOs, namely their interdependence and at the same time their

non-overlapping nature can be compared with a probability tree for dependent events. Thus, if o

process (or experimental event) is to flip a coin, and another process is to choose a colored b

from a bucket, as Figure 5.4 shows (Taylor, 2002, p. 453), then the probability tree is shown a
lower part of the same Figure 5.4. The joint probabilities of the two dependent events are the

relevant issue here: the flipping of the coin event does not overlap with the picking a ball f
bucket event (in other words the two events are totally different in their nature) and yet the
outcome of the latter event depends on the outcome of the former event (process). This tree of

joint probabilities is similar to what takes place in each POFO19 as the following example show
Flip> £» coin

7"1.

•
H e a d s

Tails

4

4

\CH> <s> <S2> / \<®><s><s>^/
Bucket "I Bucket 22

t u c k e t ~l
H e a d
F=lipp> st.

B u c k e t

2

Source: Taylor (2002, p. 453)
Figure 5.4
Interdependent events a n d probability tree

18

Although the elements of Table 5.2 have been carefully compiled by the author during the research of this
thesis, it is possible that some elements are missing or that some elements are placed in the wrong process. It
is hoped that more research will eventually complete the defining and categorizing of the unique elements ol
each POFO.
19
Probabilities are only one way of expressing outcomes related to the interplay of thefivePOFOs. Given
the uncertainty and bounded rationality that characterizes the decision making process offirmoperations,
the probabilistic view of the five P O F O s is very plausible in reality.
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Suppose that the top management must decide between objective x and objective z (this decision is
part of the POS) with corresponding probabilities 0.4 and 0.6. Objective x is related to a new
whereas objective z is related to a new OI. The knowledge about these innovations is the
consequence of the POW system. The conditional probability that the proper TI related to the

objective x will emerge from the POW is 0.55; whereas the conditional probability that the prop

OI related to the objective z will emerge from the POW is 0.6520. The choice of the TI or the O
will directly affect the routines of the POM. If the TI is implemented, then the conditional

probability that the routines of the POM are successfully altered is 0.48, whereas if the OI is

implemented, then the conditional probability that the routines of the POM are successfully alt
is 0.41. The same procedure is repeated for the other elements of the POM and POW, and for the

other FOFOs. Overall, the joint probabilities21 of all chain actions that originate from the ini
initiative of management regarding objectives x and z show the interdependence of the five
POFOs and at the same time their non-overlapping nature.

It is also useful to emphasize the links between the propositions contained in the traits of Ta

and the existing relevant literature. Some of these traits are recognizable; scholars in econom
have always paid attention to the POP, recently to the POC and to a lesser extent to the POW.
Labor and capital, or more precisely their quantities, have always been the economists'
preoccupation as to how these two factors have an impact on numerous economic phenomena.

Almost the same conclusion holds for the POC, which has received a substantial attention in the
last 30 years or so (despite the seminal article by Coase earlier in 1937). Regarding the POW,
concept of human capital and its importance have been analyzed quite substantially, as well as
some other elements of this process mainly by management scholars (e.g. core competences). The

POS has also been the target of the management discipline, mainly through the so-called strateg
management stream. Finally, the POM has mainly been the object of analysis of operations
management, again almost completely neglected by economists.

20

The sum of the TI probability of 0.55 and the OI probability of 0.65 does not equal one because the two
probabilities come from two different 'buckets' of the P O W .
21
Bayesian analysis can also be introduced in this analysis in order to include revised probabilities due to
feedback mechanisms.
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Furthermore, the famous 'division of labor', described by Plato, Smith (1776) and others, is
primarily the POM, POC, and POP in this analysis. Hence, the division of labor becomes more
precise and it is related to the whole process of a firm's expansion. In Smith's pin factory, no
mention was made to the effect of differences in how many alternatives exist in organizing the

division of labor in terms of space, time procedures (which is what the POM tells us), nor to the
effect of governance and trust in terms of transactions (which is what the POC tells us), nor to

effect of the various quantities of all inputs that might produce a given output (which is what t
POP tells us)22. The present analysis, with the introduction of the five POFOs, attempts to
supplement this division by analyzing how this allocation takes place; how the various tasks are

carried out, how they are related to each other, and what the alternatives are. Thus, it is not o

that each worker is specialized in producing one part of a pin- according to Smith's (1776) famou
example - but how exactly he or she works in his or her specialization and what the links are
between his or her tasks and the other workers' tasks. In addition, as all the POFOs are
interrelated, the division of labor depends on coordination, execution, experience, strategies,
quantities of inputs, standards, control, leadership, and so on (and vice-versa). As Heydebrand

(1989, p. 326) remarked: ".. .A particular division of labor may be both cause and consequence of

a particular form of coordination and control..." Thus, it is possible that the division of labor
becomes very detailed, precise, and rigid as it was the case with a Fordist type of production
process, or it becomes more flexible and blurry as it is the case with the JTT/QC process.

In addition, the term 'capabilities' in the relevant literature can now be more precisely pinned
down according to the proposed theory here. Thus, any elements (or their combination) of the
POM, POW, POC, and POS are these 'capabilities'. In this way, capabilities can originate from
routines (POM) or from a clear vision (POS), or from standards (POC), and so on. Hence, it also
becomes evident that the distinction between the standard production function (POP) and the
governance function (POC) according to Williamson's work (1996) is not sufficient to explain the
existence and evolution of firms. Capabilities are needed as well (as sub-section 5.2.1 has
2

The POP has been subsequently thoroughly incorporated into the analysis of division of labor by
numerous other scholars.
3
This standard production function was initially extended in Chapter three and will be more precisely
defined in this chapter.
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indicated), and these capabilities are represented by the POM, POW, POC, and POS systems
m
24

more detail

5.2.2.3

Measurement

of the elements of the five POFOs

The following methods are proposed for measuring the POFOs. First, according to a stepwis

procedure, in order to calculate the net benefits for the POM we must measure the change

POP and the impact on productivity by changing the POM but without changing the POC, POW,

and POS (which is possible if we do not change contracts, training, strategies etc). Seco

order to calculate the net benefits for the POC we must measure the changes in the POP an
impact on productivity by altering the POC but without changing the POW, the POS and the

Third, for the evaluation of the POW, we hold constant the POS, POC, and POM and make the

appropriate changes in the POW in order to see the ensuing net benefits by measuring cha

the POP and the impact on productivity. Fourth, we can make changes in the POS in order t

calculate its effects on productivity by measuring changes in the POP and holding consta

remaining POFOs. Finally, if we hold constant the POC, POM, POW, and the POS, then we can

measure changes in productivity caused by changes in the POP itself. All this is possibl

the elements of the five POFOs are not overlapping. With another experiment, we would be
measure the changes in net benefits and productivity when two or three of the POFOs are

the same time. In this way, we could indicate the synchronic effect of the relevant POFOs

hence the marginal effect of individual POFOs (when compared with the results of the firs

experiment). Note that with this method we can only measure the individual effect of each
25

based on changes in the POP, thus measuring labor or capital or total factor productivities .

The synthesis of firm operations that fully explains the importance of OIs, or TIs or other economic
phenomena, as will be seen further below, is a contribution of this study. Some scholars emphasized the
importance of the POP, some the importance of the POC, some the importance of capabilities and
competences (hence the P O M , POS, and P O W ) , but the synthesis of all these operations is rather absent.
Some scholars have attempted to synthesize firm operations, but not in a complete way. For example,
Hagstrom and Hedlund (1998) suggested a three-dimensional model of the internal structure of the firm
comprising position (equivalent to the POC), knowledge (equivalent to the P O W ) , and action (equivalent to
the POS). However, the P O M is still absent in their analysis. Similar partial syntheses are also provided by
Coriat and Dosi (1998), or Nelson (1996), and others.
Also, note that these procedures will not be used in this thesis due to space constraints. The measurement
of the POFOs will be indirect, through the use of proxies, as will be shown in Chapter seven.
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A similar procedure is suggested by Baily and Gersbach (1995, p. 318) in order to measure the
impact of organizational changes on productivity (though combined with technical changes as
well):

"...Suppose we want to examine the cause of the productivity difference between two plants that
use similar machinery and equipment to produce the same products but that use different product
designs and organize their workplaces differently. Then techniques such as reverse engineering
process analysis are used to estimate the amount by which labor and material inputs could be
reduced if the products were redesigned so that the manufacturing design is comparable to best

practice, but where the organization offunctions and tasks remains unchanged except for those
changes required by the change in nranufacturing design. This procedure then allows an estimate
of the partial effect of product design on productivity..."

Such procedures, as just mentioned in the quote, namely reverse engineering and process analysis,
are c o m m o n in practice, especially recently (as Baily and Gersbach, 1995 show, and briefly
explained in Chapter seven). Process reengineering26, in general, is n o w a standard w a y of
reorganizing w o r k and of estimating the relevant costs (which are almost exclusively part of the
P O M ) (Krajewski and Ritzman (1999, pp. 108-116). Figure 5.5 illustrates a good example of a
process chart that can be used for reengineering purposes, and at the same time it shows the
movements and procedures involved that generate the P O M

for a services firm27. Process

reengineering usually cuts costs dramatically, especially b y reducing employment, as Krajewski
and Ritzman (Ibid, p. 88, p. 108, etc) s h o w in their examples. This confirms Edquist et al (2001)
w h o demonstrated in their analysis that organizational process innovations are labor-saving if the
compensating effects are not taken into account (further on this point see Chapters three and
seven).

Furthermore, the use of proxies in econometrics is well known regarding the quantification of
economic phenomena, and once these proxies are 'discovered' and are well justified analytically,

26

"...Reengineering is the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of processes to improve performance
dramatically in terms of cost, quality, service, and speed..." (Krajewski and Ritzman (1999, p. 108).
27
O n purpose a servicefirmis chosen so that it demonstrates that the P O M and all the P O F O s are applicable
not only to the manufacturing sector but to any sector of the economy.
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they can be used in empirical work. One such proxy is used in Chapter seven to measure the
impact of the JTT/QC process on American manufacturing sectoral productivities28.

Summary

Process: Emergency room admission
Subject Charted: Ankle injury patient
Beginning: Enter emergency room
Ending: Leave hospital

Step
no.

Time
(min)

Distance
(ft)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
13
19

0.50
10.0
0.75
3.00
0.75
1.00
WO
4.00
5.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
4.00
2.00
4.00
1.00

15
—
- 40
—
40
—
60
—
—
200
—
200
—
—
60
—
130
—
20

•

Activity
y

Operation
Transport
Inspect
Delay
Store

+•

m

•
•*•
•
>
T

Number
of steps
5
9
2
3
—

» T

X

Time
(min)
23
n
8
8
_

Distance
(ft)
—
8 15
—
—
_

Step description
Enter emergency room, approach patient window
Sit down and Wi outpatient history
Nurse escorts patient to ER triage room
Nurse inspects injury
Return to waiting room

X
X
X
X
X
X

Wait for available bed
Go to ER bed
Wart for doctor
Doctor inspects injury and questions patient
Nurse takes patient to radiology

X

Technician x-rays patient
Return to bed in ER
Wait for doctor to return
Doctor provides diagnosis and advice
Return to emergency entrance area

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Check out
Walk to pharmacy
Pick up prescription
Leave the building

Source: Krajewski and Ritzman (1999, p. 114)
Figure 5.5 Example of a process chart

Also, it is possible to use the various characteristics of the five POFOs or organs,29 as sh

Table 5.2, in order to quantify the impact of an OI, such as the JIT/QC or the M-form of fir

governance, on a firm. This is feasible if, for instance, we have a sample of cross-section

the traits of a POFO for firms producing the same product. Thus, in this case we can use the

known method of questionnaires and surveys in order to arrive at a detailed exploration of t

28

Most of this study is 'dedicated' to the justification of adequate proxies, based on solid a priori economic
analysis.
29
The system of the five POFOs can be likened to a body: the P O W is the part of the bram related to
learning, knowledge, and memory. The P O S is the part of the brain related to the process of decision
rnaking. The P O M is the muscles and nerves that allow movements to take place. The POP is the ditterent
parts of the external environment (e.g. food, oxygen) plus some substances prepared m the body itselt (eg.
amino acids) that are used in order to produce movements. The P O C is the parts of the body that set the rules
for all the body to function (e.g. hormones, skin).
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significance of POFOs. The surveys will contain questions on each specific element of each POFO
(for example, regarding the impact of the P O M the elements of timing, layout, routines,
ergonomics, etc should be the object of longitudinal surveys).

Finally, it is worth mentioning an attempt to measure a very important component of the POM,
namely the ergonomics part. T h e Toyota Verification of Assembly Line ( T V A L ) is an indicator
that measures the workload of each assembly job based on a formula developed by Toyota
(Fujimoto, 1999, p. 235). This formula is a function of task duration time, work posture, and
weight of parts/tools and its aim is to improve physiological aspects of employee satisfaction, so
that assembly jobs are less demanding. B y using this indicator, "...assembly process planners
could identify physically demanding jobs in an objective manner, prioritize the workstations to be
improved, and concentrate efforts for improvements (e.g., automation, power assist devices, work
design changes) on the workstations with high T V A L scores..." (Ibid)

5.2.3 Existence and evolution of firms and economic growth
Any system of the five P O F O s is equivalent to a firm30. However, systems continually evolve.
Thus, any modification in L or K or M would theoretically lead to a n e w firm, since any alteration
in the quantities of the factors of production entail, or c o m e from, changes in the other four
POFOs 3 1 . Consequently, any change in any of the five P O F O s would generate a n e w firm. Thus,
the suggested definition of the creation of a firm is summarized as follows: every time there is a
change in at least one of the five P O F O s , there is a n e w firm. This analysis is similar to the one
proposed by Kaldor (1934) almost 70 years ago. It is worth noting his proposition.

"...The most satisfactory definition of a firm is that of a 'productive combination possess

given unit of coordinating ability'...Firms whose coordinating ability changes, while prese

their legal identity, would not remain the same firms; but then all the theoretically relev

characteristics of a firm change with changes in coordinating ability. It might as well be trea
therefore, as a differentfirm..." (Kaldor, 1934, p. 69 and p. 70)

30

The last section of this Chapter puts the system-firm into the context of larger systems, such as networks
and sectors.
31
The P O P is not simply a reflexion of the other POFOs. There is no one-to-one relationship between the
POP and the other POFOs. In other words, for example, a 1 0 % increase in capital does not mean a 10 A
increase in the accumulation of knowledge.
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Note that Kaldor's 'coordinating ability' very probably encompasses all POFOs except the POP.

Overall, it seems that this analysis allows for a perpetual creation of the firm, thus corrfirmi
dynamic nature and Schumpeter's (1942) continuous 'creative destruction'. Thus, the existence
and evolution of a firm are related to the existence and evolution of the five POFOs. How can we
make more precise the link between evolution (or revolution) of firms and evolution (or
revolution) of the five POFOs? The previous two sub-sections have already provided some
insights to this question; the following paragraphs will expand on these insights.

First, and perhaps most important, changes in the POM can increase productivity32 and hence
profits considerably. The reasons for this increase are the advantages of the specific elements
the POM contains, such as routines, teamwork, etc. For instance, procedures and routines of

assembly lines can always be improved through the introduction of either a TI or an OI, or both o
them33. Second, the POW can increase productivity and hence profits considerably. This can be
achieved by enhancing experience, information, competences, and all the other elements of the

wisdom process. For example, if imitation of foreign technologies can be easily achieved then new
growth is possible, by starting a firm or expanding an existing one. Third, the POC can have the
same effect as the previous two processes. This can be accomplished by more flexible and
effective contracts, better institutions, and so on. Fourth, the POS can also increase the
productivity of a firm by virtue of the specific elements of this process. For instance, the

possibilities of having a new vision and of crafting new strategies are a sufficient condition fo

firm to evolve. Fifth, the acquisition of new equipment containing technical innovations within t
framework of the POP has the potential to generate positive changes in productivity.

However, a change in each one of the five POFOs separately is not sufficient. We must also

compare all variations in all these five processes to evaluate the resultant costs and benefits.
32

Firms, generally, have often other objectives besides productivity increases, for example higher market
penetration. However, what counts at the end, on a sector or national basis is productivity increases because
market penetration differences between firms cancel out within a sector or within a country or within the
globe.
3
It is often necessary and unavoidable to form a team in order to carry out a particular task (for example, if
an item is too heavy to be lifted by one person, then a group of workers will lift it), and hence afirmevolves
to do so.
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added benefits exceed all added costs, then the creation or the modification of a firm takes pl
The evaluation of these POFOs can of course be based on wrong assumptions due to bounded
rationality and incomplete wisdom, and hence mistakes can easily occur leading to wrong

decisions, disappearance of firms, creation of firms that should never have been created in the
place, and so on.

What then are the reasons for the expansion and development of firms? A corollary of this
question is: what is economic growth due to? The purpose, to increase productivity, leads to
changes in any one of the five POFOs, which in turn leads to firm growth. If most firms in an
industry grow this way, and if most industries grow as well, then overall we have economic

growth. Though this growth is based on increasing returns to scale due to increases in producti
extra growth can also take place through a group of firms and industries which grow under the

regime of constant returns to scale. Furthermore, the simple expansion of existing firms, witho

contemporaneous creation of other firms can also lead to growth if the resulting changes in the
various POFOs have an overall positive outcome.

The relationship between the five POFOs and economic growth is now perhaps more evident but is
also, unfortunately, more complicated. The usual production function so often used in economic
essays on economic growth is primarily concerned with the mechanisms of POP, that is the

quantities of the various factors of production, and their mutual substitutions; more recently,

quality of labor and capital have also been included in these production functions, thus touchi
elements of the POW (e.g. education). However, in order to properly explain economic growth, we
should include all elements of the five POFOs35. Through the expedience of the concept of total

factor productivity (TFP), everything, which is not explained by the physical factors of product

or their qualities, is attributable to the content of TFP; this leftover substance is very ofte

technology or ...anything else. In the analysis presented in this study, TFP can be attributed t
many specific elements of the POM, or POC, or POW, or POS or all of them together.

34

This cost-benefit analysis is only part of the functioning of the system-firm The system has
features of emergence. This will be explored in the last section of this chapter.
The last section of this Chapter expands on these issues.
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The evolution of firms depends on the evolutionary interplay between the five P O F O s . In this

respect the following schema will help in grasping the most probable sequence of interdepend
between the various POFOs: POS •* POW •* POM •* POP •» POC •» POS •* .. .etc.

Of course, it is possible that once we are at one particular POFO the sequence is reversed i
to get feedback36, for example, POM -» POW -» POS •» POP * POC * etc.

Initiatives are taken by the POS (which is not necessarily represented by the upper managemen

but also by the participation of many other employees) in order to change the POM on which th
whole production system depends 7. These initiatives can spring from the two types of

technological innovations, namely the OIs and TIs (or other types of innovations, see next su

section 5.2.4). The TIs, though in terms of R&D belong to the POW, are finally incorporated i

the POP as intermediary goods, or machines, and so on. However, very rarely, if ever, are the

not affected at the same time when a TI is introduced; thus, the POM is changed, and hence th

other POFOs as well. If the initiatives of the POS are generated by the will to introduce an
the POM is primarily affected, and in turn all the other POFOs are affected. In particular,

is altered, if TIs are also introduced as a parallel act to the new OIs. This further sugges
are not a handmaiden of TIs, or vice-versa38.

5.2.4 Links with OIs, and TIs, and other innovations
The relation between the five POFOs and the major production systems (PSs)39 can now be
analyzed. As seen in previous chapters, several relatively distinct industrial processes of

production were determined: the handicraft system, the putting-out system, the factory proce

mass production system, and the lean production system. Perhaps, the Internet production sys

that is still emerging, is another PS. The evolution of these production processes through t

36

Feedback mechanisms are an important element of open systems. This will be further explored in the last
section of this chapter.
37
Evolutionary learning capabilities are intrinsically related to the sub-system POS, but also to all the other
POFOs separately or to the whole system of thefivePOFOs. This point is particularly stressed m the last
section of this chapter.
38
A good example of how TIs affect the division of labor, and how in turn some other OIs such as power
relations and transaction costs affect TIs, is provided by Robertson and Alston (1992).
These PSs are OIs or a combination of OIs.
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be gauged by considering the importance of each POFO for each one of these systems. For this

purpose, the following procedure is only indicative of how the POFOs can be used in this respec

For measurement purposes, a scale from 1 to 6 is used to indicate the increasing positive effe
the POFOs. Thus, the score 6 would mean the most positive in terms of labor productivity,

whereas 1 would mean the least positive, or the most costly (except for the elements of the POP
which simply indicate quantities). Table 5.3 summarizes the scores based on the author's

judgment; hence a strong element of subjectivity is included. However, the fact that one system

has replaced another (even though not totally) would mostly support the verdict (hence it is a

post 'prediction'). In addition, the subjectivity in determining the scores in Table 5.3 is ba
some assumptions or facts. The quantity of labor has reached a maximum with the mass
production system, but it has since then been decreasing for the manufacturing sector. On the
contrary, the quantities of capital, energy, as well as the benefits of POM and POW have been
monotonically increasing. The POM has been more and more productive because better
procedures, routines and other features have been improving through time thus capturing the
benefits of teamwork and efficient movements. The POW has also been gradually more productive
because wisdom increases through time.
Table 5.3 Importance of the POFOs in the major production systems
(manufacturing sector)
Handicraft

Domestic

Factory

Mass

Lean

Internet

POM

1

2

3

4

5

6

POP, for L

1

1

3

4

3

2

POP, for K

1

1

3

4

5

6

POP, for energy

1

1

3

4

5

6

POC

4.5

2

3

3

3.5

4

POW

2

3.5

3.5

4

5

6

POS

1

2

2.5

3

3.5

3

Total 40

8.5

9.5

12

14

17

19

O n the other hand, the P O C was at its m a x i m u m level of performance in the handicraft system,
because there were mostly one to two units of labor producing complete and relatively simple

40

The total score excludes the quantities of the factors of the POP, since this total only me
productiveness of each POFO.
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products. Then, with the advent of the domestic system, the problems of making effective

contracts started appearing. Since then the POC became gradually better, though slowly, as the
other POFOs improved as well. Finally, regarding the POS, a similar trend to the POC has been
taking place, though, very probably the Internet system (which is only included here as a

suggestion for a new emerging system) is losing some of the abilities to take strategic and o
decisions due to the competitive nature of Internet transactions. Note that the total of each

scored in Table 5.3 is an approximate indication of the performance of each PS because the sc
are subjectively determined and the weight used for each POFO is equal. Despite this flaw, it

interesting to note that the passage from the handicraft to the domestic system took almost t
centuries to be completed, hence the close score between the two systems (8.5 and 9.5).

The relation between the five POFOs and the major OIs can also be analyzed in the same way, a

OIs and PSs are inherently linked. For instance, the lean production system is identified with

ITT/QC philosophy, or mass production is based on Fordism in many respects, and so on. OIs, in
broad sense, encompass all POFOs except the POP. Thus, for example, the OI of vertical

integration (VI) cum mass production is a mixture of the four POFOs (excluding the POP). If a
firm decides to further vertically integrate parts of the value chain, the POM will primarily

affected, as the new parts will have to be integrated into the existing POM. Also, the POC wil
substantially reconsidered. The evolution of the OI of VI depends on how each organ (POFO)
changes according to the particular nature of the introduced OI or TI. Thus, for example, as
products become more and more sophisticated the embodied technology TI primarily affects the
POW (accumulated knowledge and memory), which strengthens the focal character of specialized

firms and hence encourages outsourcing. In the same way, as the use of the JIT/QC system into
more and more firms in the economy takes place, this system principally impinges on the POM,

which again strengthens the focal character of specialized firms and hence encourages outsour
Thus, the gradual reinforcement of the POM and POW, and not so much the POC as the

transaction costs theorists would have suggested, is the main reason behind the recent tenden
for vertical disintegration.
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If we take another Vl-related OI, for example the introduction of the M-form of governance, the

various POFOs are affected in similar ways. Thus, the POC is affected from the rules and contra
point of view indirectly based on changes of the POM, as the latter is heavily and directly
influenced because the actual effort of work in terms of teamwork and other tasks is different
under the M-form than under other forms of governance. The POS is also indirectly involved in

this case, as well as the POW and the POP. The five basic processes suggested in this chapter c
be eventually used to empirically test the importance of the various types of firm governance,
using the unique characteristics of each process as described so far and as these traits are
summarized in Table 5.2.

If we consider the JIT/QC system, it is worth showing the POM as the single-card kanban
procedure depicted in Figure 5.6, where it becomes clear that the POM is about movements and

kinetic energy or costs, as explained in a previous sub-section. It also becomes clear that the
several ways of arranging these movements in the same space in order to produce a given amount

of output, hence there is always room for improvements in the organization of the kinetic energ
so that there is always room for increasing productivity. These improvements can occur with or

without changes in the quantities of the physical factors of production, that is the POP (or ev
with or without changes in the other POFOs). The JIT/QC system is much more than the kanban
procedure, as explained in Chapter four. However, most of the characteristics of LPS (timing,

procedures, layout, routines, cooperation, problem solving, etc), and of the TFS as an equivalen

system to the LPS (both the LPS and TFS belong to the main axis) are directly related to the PO

Consequently, it now becomes more apparent why it was suggested in Chapter four that the axis o
JIT/QC versus SM cum Fordism is the main axis of OIs and the most important one.

Another way of appreciating the direct link between the POM and the main axis is by examining

the implementation of JIT/QC which takes considerable time, effort and costs to complete. Thus,
as Krajewski and Ritzman (1999) argue, more cooperation and trust is needed for this
implementation to take place successfully. Accordingly the POM and POC are affected. In

addition, the reward systems and labor classifications need to be altered, thus the POC is invo
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again. The workers might feel more stressed and pushed to work harder, thus the POM is affecte
this time. The layouts also need to be altered, thus the POM is involved again. ".. .A survey
firms using JIT systems indicated that the single most important factor in successful
implementation is changing product flows and layout to a cellular design..." (Ibid, p. 752).

*•— 4 H

Karttsw* cart* torpmJiKa 1

— flffP' Xagtfoiat caret tor pcioauca 2

AstemWy !*» 1

AssaaiMy trie 2
PuB contafeters

Source: Krajewski and Ritzman (1999, p. 743)
Figure 5.6 Single-Card Kanban System

Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the P O M is usually put into placefirstand then all
other processes follow, although after the initial interactions between the POS and the POW
made their own impact. Substantial evidence on the leading role of the POM (for instance, via
JIT/QC) is provided by Womack and Jones (1996), and Mintzberg and Quinn (1991) who explored
many firms and their successful attempts to radically change their firm operations. Another

of showing the precedence of the POM over the other processes (again after the initial 'debate

between the POS and the POW has reached the appropriate decisions) is the relationship between
the POM and the POC; overall, the ambiguity of transactions and contracts are generated by
organizational ambiguities. For instance, if the POM is not clearly demarcated (team work,

routines, layout, coordination, etc) contracts with employees cannot be clearly defined eithe

Following the above analysis in all sub-sections of this section (5.2), it is n o w appropriate to be
more precise as to the exact configuration of OIs. The discussion in this thesis so far was
41

This does not mean that all tasks should be meticulously defined. It is possible to have multitask workers,
as is the case for the JIT/QC system.
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concentrated on the distinction between OIs and TIs. However, innovations that emanate from
each one of the five POFOs are different types of innovations. Thus, OIs are generated by
elements of the POM exclusively because this process is the only one to include aspects of

organizational energy, such as procedures, routines, timing, layout etc. If we take an OI, as
described so far, for example the JIT/QC system, then, we have the following schematic
interactions between all POFOs. First the POM and POP (as it incorporates TIs, see below)

provide feedback to the POS and POW, as to the possibilities of improving the POM. Second, th

POS decides to implement JIT/QC. Third, the latter will primarily affect the POM. Fourth, the
suggested changes in the POM will affect the other POFOs. This sequence of interactions can

be represented by a decision tree as suggested in sub-section 5.2.2.2. In brief the followin
summarizes this sequence:
(POM and POP)^ POS*POW*POS*JIT/QC * POM * (POS, POW, POP, POC, POM)42

Regarding the TIs, a distinction must be made as to whether a TI is produced in the firm (for
example as a new product) or a TI (produced by another firm) is incorporated in the stock of

capital and intermediate goods. In the first case of a TI produced in the firm, the knowledg
wisdom of the firm is increased through R&D, hence the POW is affected, and if this TI is an

intermediate good or a type of equipment that increases the capital stock, then the POP is a

as well. Consequently, TIs are exclusively generated by the POW and/or incorporated or embod
in the POP. In brief the following schemas summarize the sequence of the decision tree:
• (POM and POP)-» POS*POW*POS* (TI to be produced: final good)* POW -»

P O M * (POS, POW, POP, POC, POM)

• (POM and POP)-> POS*POW*POS* (TI to be produced: intermediate go
equipment) •* (POW and POP) * P O M * (POS, POW, POP, POC, POM)

• (POM and POP)-» POS*POW*POS* (TI to be adopted) * POP * POM* (POS
POW, POP, POC, POM)

According to this analysis, when the firm produces TIs, the POW is affected (wisdom is enhan

and hence these TIs can also be called 'wisdom innovations' (Wis). There are, of course, many

This schema and the ones that follow are only indicative of what can take place in reality.
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other Wis. For example, the QC circles43, as previously described, can generate much more
knowledge and competences.

In the same way, innovations that emanate from the POS ought to be called strategic or 'decis
innovations' (DIs), and those innovations stemming from the POC are "contract innovations"

(CIs). For example, if we consider the OI of vertical integration (VI), the decision to verti

integrate is primarily a strategic decision, because it examines the relative position of th

a-vis the other firms, in other words the firm's competitive advantage (Grant, 1998; Thomson
Strickland 2001). If we consider the OI of M-form of governance of a firm, the decision to

implement this form directly impinges on the POC and indirectly on the POM44. In this case, w

have an example of a CI. Hence, we have the following schemas that represent the DI of VI, an
the CI respectively:
• (POM and POP)^ POS*POW*POS* (DI to vertically integrate) -> POS -» POM*

(POS, POW, POP, POC, POM)
• (POM and POP)^ POS*POW*POS* (CI to introduce the M-form) -> POC
P O M * (POS, POW, POP, POC, POM)

To summarize the propositions made in the last few paragraphs, OIs can be directly generated

the POM; TIs are an outcome of the POW and embodied in the POP; DIs are the result of the POS
CIs are generated by the POC; and generally, Wis are the outcome of the POW. Hence, we have
five different types of innovations, although up to this sub-section only OIs and TIs were

differentiated. The three axes of OIs as suggested in Chapter four are combinations of the fo
POFOs, thus excluding the POP which incorporates TIs. However, we now know that the main

axis is primarily due to the POM and is, through the interdependence of the POFOs, influenced

the other POFOs Also, the POS primarily generates the axes of VI and of networks, although th

other POFOs are indirectly present. Figure 5.10 in the last section of this chapter shows the

t3

The organization of Q C circles belongs to the P O M ; however, the concept of such circles and thenoutcome in terms of knowledge is a WI.
44
Whether or not, actually, the top management decides to take into account the consequences on the P O M
if a change in the governance form is implemented is debatable. Here, it is suggested that these
consequences are taken into account. However, the conclusions remain the same in any case.
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results45. Finally, it has become more apparent by now, why the axis of JTT/QC versus SC and

Fordism is considered to be the main or the most important one. It is because the other two axes o
VI and networks can 'collapse' onto the main axis as the POM is the process which is most
affected in each case.

5.2.5 Epilogue
The complete system of costs and benefits assigned to all the operations of any firm as suggested

in this section offers a new ground for analysis of the theory of the firm. This new ground has th

possibility to explore the existing concepts of factors of production, transaction costs, capabil

and so on, in a more concrete and systematic way. In addition, it becomes a holistic and integrate

tool of analyzing all conceptually feasible and possible types of operations in a firm46. Thus, T

5.2 in sub-section 5.2.2.2 summarizes all the interdependent alternatives of operations and henc
costs and benefits that take place during the functioning of a firm.

Consequently, these five basic processes of firm operations can be used to analyze and describe
many phenomena in the world of business, such as the occurrence of TIs or OIs (e.g. the JIT/QC
system), the creation, evolution, and growth of firms, the occurrence of the historical modes of
production (e.g. the mass production mode), and so on. Furthermore, the taxonomy of firm
operations, costs and benefits suggested here throws some extra light on the vivid ongoing debate

as to the relevance of transaction costs, capabilities, competences, technology, and other generi

concepts that are used to explain the existence and evolution of firms. For instance, according to
this taxonomy, technology expressed as TIs, (as opposed to OIs), are primarily an area of the POW
and POP, whereas technology expressed as OIs, (internal), are an area pertinent to the POM.
Overall, any one of the five processes can potentially generate extra growth.

45

The proposition of an atomic/systemic model in the last section of this chapter will complement the
propositions made in this section and will further clarify the traits and importance of OIs. A gradual refocus
of the analysis of OIs was necessary in this study from very general issues in Chapter two, to more concrete
issues in Chapter four and finally to even more precise elements in this chapter.
46
In section 5.4 the system of P O F O s will be further integrated into a larger systemic model of economic
growth.

184
Finally, this system of firm operations, and the adjoined costs and benefits seem to unite
apparently distinct disciplines such as management and economics since the five fundamental

processes create a continuum of analysis of the functioning of firms from their management and

formulation of strategies to the maximization of returns, under conditions of bounded rationali
and so on. This system is not static but dynamic in the same way as the aims and life of a

competitive human being are not static47. An example of how concepts more frequently used in th

discipline of management are also expressed in the present taxonomy is the so-called "resource
based view" (for example, see Grant, 1998). This view is a generic term for indicating the

importance of rare and strategic resources for the purpose of a sustainable competitive advant
Such resources can be part of any of the five organs of the firm. For example they could be
elements of the POW, or the POM, and so on.

5.3 LEADING FIRMS AND SECTORS, INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
AND DIFFUSION OF OIs
In the second section of this chapter the nucleus of industrial growth was explored. That is,

specific operations which take place inside firms. Thus, the focus of analysis became gradually
more narrow from the general historical review in Chapter two, to the set up of a general

theoretical framework in Chapter three, to a more precise relationship between OIs and industr

growth in Chapter four, and finally to the core of firms, namely the five POFOs. However, in or

to complete the analysis, the focus has to become less narrow again so that the role of OIs in
industrial growth and hence economic growth can be fully explored. In other words how can

growth on a sectoral basis occur, if initially growth occurs only in one firm or several firms

Thus, there is a need to explore the role and significance of leading firms and sectors, and th
be the object of this section.

5.3.1 Leading Firms
In the previous section it was established that five primary processes or energies constitute

basic components of the functioning of a firm. Out of these processes the POM was identified a
47

The last section of this chapter will link the five POFOs to evolutionary concepts such as o
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the container or carrier or vehicle of OIs, and hence its direct link to this study. As OIs aff
P O M and consequently all the other P O F O s , the firm is also affected accordingly. In general,
leading firms o w e their existence to the outstanding performance of one (such as the P O M ) or
more of the five P O F O s , because it is normal to expect that there are substantial differences
between the P O F O s of variousfirms.Furthermore, once w e k n o w h o w a firm expands in terms of
its fundamental energy forces, namely the five P O F O s , w e can explore h o w some firms grow
faster and larger to become leaders in their corresponding industries. Subsequently, the leading
firms can drive some industries to become leading sectors in the economy, andfinallythe latter
moves forward into sustained and even higher rates of growth.

The process of creative destruction, as initially developed by Schumpeter (1942) and subsequent
taken up by m a n y other scholars, is a good starting point for this analysis. The following passage
(p. 83, 1975 edition) summarizes the concept of destruction.

"...The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from

the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of indu

mutation-ifl may use that biological term- that incessantly revolutionizes the economic str

from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This proc
Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism... "

Thus, this process continuously creates and destroys. It takes place every time there is someth
new in the market, such as a n e w product, a n e w technical method, a n e w method of production ,
an OI, and so on. In addition, this leads to the conclusion by Schumpeter that it is monopolistic or
generally large firms and not perfectly competitive firms that generate economic growth, because
the former have the means and the power to create and destroy. (Ibid, Chapter VIE).

Based on these Schumpeterian premises, it is possible to expand the analysis further. Let us
assume that in thefirstplace an industry is almost perfectly competitive, in the sense that there are
many firms supplying an almost identical product and that entry into the industry is quite easy.
One of the existing firms, or a newly created one that just entered the industry, discovers a n e w
technique (e.g. a n e w OI) that reduces the cost of its product quite substantially in relation to the
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good already sold in the market. This innovation will transform the innovating firm into a
dominant one within the industry, because this company now has a comparative advantage vis-a-

vis the other companies due to its lower cost of production, the new features of the product t

wield a better quality, and so on. In other words the innovating firm will experience increasi
returns to scale, will grow faster and soon become a leading firm in the industry.

In this way this innovative firm will destroy the calm waters of the existing firms and will c
storm, which will eventually generate a new situation in the industry with rather predictable
consequences. Namely the innovative firm will become the leader. This leadership has the

tendency to lead to a monopolistic situation in the industry, unless other firms quickly imita
leading firm or become even more innovative. In this case the tendency would be the formation
an oligopoly or monopolistic competition in the market. Thus, the existence of a non-perfectly
competitive environment in the economy, which is the case in reality, is equivalent to saying

there are some stronger firms and some weaker firms (in the sense of leadership as in the exam
above). This entails that some firms survive and perhaps lead, whereas other firms vanish

according to the principles of natural selection (in this respect, evolutionary economics is r

here, cf. Boulding, 1981, or Nelson and Winter, 1982). This selection takes place because there

differences, sometimes substantial, between firms in terms of the five POFOs, that is, the POM
the POW, and so on.

The above example shows how a leading or dominant firm is born. Economic history is full of
other examples; some of them have already been noted in Chapter two. Some of these instances,

whereby innovating firms became leading firms within their industries, still operate in the gl

markets as leading companies. These instances are only a small sample of what actually happene

in economic history not only in the USA and Japan but also in many other countries. The result
are shown in Table 5.4. These leading firms in Table 5.4, and many others, became leaders
because of their innovations in many areas, such as new technical or organizational features.

example, Sony became one of the leaders in Japan and the world by developing new products such

as the transistor radio, the Trinitron color TV, the Walkman, the compact disc player, the flo
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disc, and others (Beamish, 1999). All these new products show the importance of TIs. In addi

it is well known that Sony has excellent product quality, which was achieved through good OI
such as the JIT/QC system48. Other dominant companies developed very effective POM, POW,

POC, POP, and POS, which allowed them to evolve into sustainable and expanding growth. Thus,

Ford Motor Company developed the semi-automatic Fordist assembly line (which is an element o
the POM)49 and became the world leader in the vehicle sector. Toyota developed the JIT/QC
system (POM) and became the leader of the automobile industry in Japan. General Electric

became one of the first fully multidivisional companies (POM and POC) and together with thei
technical expertise (POW) became the world leader in electrical machinery.
Table 5.4

E x a m p l e s of m a j o r leading firms

Leading firm

Founding date

Industry

Boeing (USA)

1910s

Transport

Bridgestone (Japan)

1931

Tyres

Coca-Cola (USA)

1886

Food

Dell (USA)

1984

Computers

Eastman Kodak (USA)

1884

Instruments

Ford Motor (USA)

1903

Transport

General Electric (USA)

1892

Electrical machinery

Gillette (USA)

1901

Fabricated metals

Goodyear Tire and Rubber (USA)

1898

Rubber, tyres

Intel (USA)

1968

Electronics

IBM (USA)

1914

Machinery

International Paper (USA)

1898

Pulp and paper

Johnson and Johnson (USA)

1885

Chemicals

Fuji (Japan)

1934

Film

Matsushita (Japan)

1918

Electrical

Microsoft (USA)

1975

Computer Software

Mitsubishi (Japan)

1918 (corporation)

Machinery, cars, etc

Sony (Japan)

1945

Electrical/Electronic

Toyota (Japan)

1930s

Transport

Source: These data are based on Chandler (1977, 1990), Harris Corporation (1996), Abegglen and Stalk
(1985, p.168), and Internet sites for most of the Japanesefirms(for the founding dates).

For some more concrete historical evidence (besides Chandler's monumental work, for which see

below) reference is now made to Knoedler (1990) who examined three leading companies in thr

leading industries at the turn of the 20th century. Here is his conclusion about one of them
"...In 1903, DuPont, now the largest explosives producer in the United States, turned to a

efficient strategy to dominate the industry. The key to this new strategy was DuPon
The same TI can lead to bad or good quality depending on the OIs.
The appropriate TIs of course supported the P O M .

188

organizational innovation: the bureaucratic, hierarchically organizedfirm,headed by an execu

department whose primary job was to conduct long-range and strategic corporate planning. The
executive department quickly moved to rationalize production in DuPont's large number of
acquired plants and subsidiaries, and as a consequence, lowered its unit costs to levels
competitors could not meet... " (p. 399)

General Electric and AT&T achieved the same result in their respective industries, as DuPont did
despite the Sherman Antitrust Act.

It is worth noting that a leading firm in a given sector can be succeeded by another leading fir
which in turn might survive being on top for only a limited time, and so on. A good recent
example of the succession of leading firms is in the industry of personal computers, that is, from
I B M to C o m p a q and n o w to Dell. O f course this presupposes that the initial leading company did
not become a monopoly, thus stifling all competition, though the tendency for monopolistic power
is always present in m a n y situations (in our example, I B M was a virtual monopolist for some
time).

The analysis of leading firms cannot be satisfactory unless reference is also made to Chandler's
work, since this author has provided monumental evidence about their importance. His theoretical
views are summarized in the following points (1992).
•

The first firms to invest in manufacturing, marketing, and management exploited
economies of scope and scale, and consequently quickly dominated their industries.

• In the new and transformed capital-intensive, oligopolistic industries, the first movers and
challengers competed for market share in national and international markets. Such
competition kept oligopolies from becoming monopolies.
•

The

cumulative

learning

honed

by

such

oligopolistic

competition

generated

organizational capabilities that became powerful barriers to n e w entrants. These
capabilities and the resulting retained earnings became the basis for their continued
growth.
•

The first movers can be either n e w firms or established ones.
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5.3.2 Leading sectors and diffusion of OIs

The importance of leading firms and leading sectors in determining economic growth is not new.
According to Thomas (1972) this importance was already a hot topic in the 1950s, mainly with the
work of Perroux (1955), Hirschman (1958), and Blaug (Rostow's contribution will be separately
analyzed further below). Perroux's 'poles of growth' are based on the effect of the lower costs
achieved by the propulsive and key firms and industries, and the diffusion of growth to other firms
and industries through the working of the input-output table. The effect of lower costs is easier
within vertically integrated industries through lower input prices and higher demand for lowerpriced outputs. Thomas's (1972) analysis tells us that the external economies generated by the
poles of growth acquire their significance from the assumptions of dynamic disequilibrium
(formulated by Chenery, Scitovsky, and Rosenstein-Rodan amongst others), which states the
existence of an interdependence between investments of one firm or industry and the profitability
of another. Furthermore, as Perroux indicates, poles of growth eventually can become poles of
stagnation, thus the Schumpeterian thesis about creative destruction is pertinent here.

Thomas's (1972) emphasizes the fact that leading firms and industries have scale economies and
innovations as the major sources of internal economies that generate economic growth.
Indivisibilities, increased production, specialization, more efficient methods of organizing
production, and the learning effect influence economies of scale. In addition,

"... We find in growth pole literature the suggestion that the lead firms and industries that

supposedly accrue substantial scale economies also greatly benefitfromthe economies res

from process, product, and organizational innovations. However, we have little quantit

knowledge of the economies that accrue as a result of investments in research and development
thefirmor industry... " (Ibid, p. 64)

This was published in 1972. Since then, a huge literature on the role of R&D has demonstrated
importance in economic growth through the actions of leading firms and sectors (cf. Rostow, 1990,
or endogenous growth models, the evolutionary type of analysis, and to some extent neoclassical
writers). This, however, took place to the detriment of the role of organizational innovations.
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A final major issue will close Thomas's (1972) review of growth poles, which is the issue of

diffusion. Based on some other studies he cites, he says that it frequently takes some 10 to 20

for major new techniques to be adopted by all major firms in an industry. Certainly this is tru

OIs such as the JIT/QC system, which took at least 10 years to spread out to other vehicle firm

after Toyota introduced it in the 1960s. This diffusion is related to the spreading out of inno

from the leading firm (s) to other firms within a given industry. It is worth noting that the m
of networks greatly facilitates the diffusion process. This is one of the reasons (as already
emphasized in Chapter two) of the prevalence of networks in the Japanese economy, that is, the

focal firm is part of a network or several networks so that innovations can be easily spread ou
from one firm to another.

With the advent of leading companies, a tendency for oligopolistic or monopolistic industrial
structures started forming in the USA and other industrializing countries such as Germany and

Japan about a hundred years ago. In Chapter two a brief account of this tendency has already be

provided. In turn, these new industrial structures led to the appearance of leading industries.
example, the oligopoly of electrical machinery companies led this sector to become one of the
leading sectors at the beginning of the 20th century in the USA. After WWH, IBM and Intel

became the leaders of their respective oligopolistic industries, which in rum became the leadin
sectors of the American economy at least in the last 20 years.

Rostow (1990), in his chapter 20 entitled 'What don't we know about economic growth',
emphasized the importance of technology (unfortunately only embodied), which has been
relatively neglected since the adoption in economics of the marginal analysis from the 1870s.

Thus, he puts forward eight propositions, one of which is particularly related to leading secto
states "...Schumpeter appeared to have in mind in his Theory of Development a pioneering
innovational breakthrough in a single major sector, followed by a strong bandwagon effect

bringing into that sector a large number of new firms, with entrepreneurs of lesser breed, to e

the demonstrated profitability of the innovation..." (p. 458). Rostow then mentions the time it

for some major industries in Britain to reign as leading sectors, which were about 40 to 80 yea
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he calculated them according to his own method. For example, cotton textiles were a leading
sector from the 1780s to the 1840s in that country. Also, Rostow, after extensively quoting
Kuznets's sectoral analysis according to which the American economy o w e d its growth from the
latter part of the 19th century up to 1930 to successive waves of expansion by leading sectors50
concludes:

"...In short, a modern economy is not driven forward by some sort of productivity factor operating

incrementally and evenly across the board. It is driven forward by the complex direct and indirec
structural impact of a limited number of rapidly expanding leading sectors within which new

technologies are being efficiently absorbed and diffused. And it is this process of technologi

absorption that substantially generates, directly and indirectly, the economy's flow of investm

via the plowback ofprofits for plant and equipment, enlarged public revenues for infrastructure,
and enlarged private incomes for residential housing... " (Rostow, p. 469)

Rostow's conclusion regarding the 'rapidly expanding leading sectors' is also the conclusion in
these theoretical explorations so far, and it will be freely used to justify the analysis in the
forthcoming chapters where empirical evidence for the role of key industries in promoting
economic growth in the U S A and Japan is presented. However, it must be stressed again that
Rostow w a s exclusively preoccupied with the impact of TIs on the fate of leading sectors, whereas
the analysis presented here is almost exclusively preoccupied with the impact of OIs. Whether
Schumpeter's bandwagon effect mentioned above is stronger in the case of TIs than in the case of
OIs, is difficult to say and is outside the scope of this study. However, at least within the
boundaries of the same country, OIs will not be easier to transfer from the leading firm to other
firms and to other industries than TIs despite the fact that TIs often involve specific assets, patents
and stronger secrecy than OIs do. Overall, it seems that the bandwagon effect, plus the more
general demonstration effects, plus Hirschman's (1958) externalities (due to linkages) are the main
mechanisms of transmission and diffusion of not only the TIs but also the OIs .

In order to demonstrate the importance of leading sectors in terms of timing and succession,
reference can be m a d e to a diagram used in Best (1990), which is reproduced as Figure 5.7,
50

For this see also Street (1988).
A good recent summary of the literature regarding leading sectors from the 1950s is provided by
Robertson er al (2001).
51
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regarding the Japanese manufacturing sub-sectors. It can be seen that as resources were shifte
from unskilled-labor intensive sectors through medium capital- and raw-material-intensive or

labor-intensive industries to knowledge-intensive sectors the diamond shifted from the lower t

upper quadrants. A similar diagram could be used to demonstrate the links between OIs, leading
sectors and dynamic changes in the economy through time. Thus, the knowledge-intensive

industries in Japan are those that mostly introduced significant OIs (this will be further sho
Chapter six).
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Figure 5.7 Evolution of Japanese industrial structure

5.3.3

N e t w o r k s a n d diffusion of O I s

It is not only the leading firms and leading sectors, which generate economic growth. It must
stressed that a strong impetus for the substantial impact of leading firms and sectors on the

economy is the imitation process for survival of the non-leading firms. This imitation is a po

tool of the learning progression of any modern society, and in particular in the business worl

very good example is the strong competition that exists in the American computer industry. For

the last seven years or so most of the leaders in this industry made considerable efforts to i
the amazing growth of Dell Computer Corporation so that they could maintain their leading

position, and unless they succeeded in doing so they would have been relegated to the follower
position in the market (Thomson and Gamble, 2001). Needless to say that the imitation process
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not easy to carry out as the case of Dell (and many others) indicate: Dell is now the world lea
personal computers.

The imitation process can be facilitated by some other factors in the economy. Thus, the role
played by a third driving force on the micro economy, namely that of networks of firms (which
were extensively analyzed in the previous chapter), reinforce this imitation process. A network

medium of business that heavily influences firms and industries as well as markets. It is a nex

firms and industries that facilitates communication, transactions, diffusion of innovations, an
cooperation. Consequently, within networks, the boundaries of a firm become blurry52. In a
schematic way, Figure 5.8 shows two networks that transact with each other.
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Network 1
Figure 5.8

Network 2
Firms, networks, industries a n d markets

The firms Fl to F4 belong to the industry F, the firms Gl and G2 belong to the industry G, the

firms HI and H2 belong to the industry H. Network 1 contains all 8 firms of these 3 industries;
however, these industries contain more firms than those belonging to network 1. As for network

it also contains firms from other industries. Firm F3 is the leading firm of industry F; the fi

is the leading firm of industry G, and so on. The market forces are stronger between networks t

between firms within the same network. However, competition is very strong at every level of th
network or industry.

In addition, particular mention must be m a d e regarding the formation of clusters, industrial

districts and other similar entities that include networks, industries, and firms. The importan

these entities was analyzed in the previous chapter. However, in this sub-section, it should be
emphasized that leading firms and industries are almost always closely linked with clusters or

52

Nonetheless, there is always a boundary of the firm that allows it to organize itself. The firm is an
evolving open system that must always improve its organizing abilities in order to survive (see also last
section of this chapter).
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similar organizational entities, thus making the role of these firms and industries even more
important in the process of economic growth.

5.3.4 Globalization and diffusion of OIs

The diffusion of OIs throughout the economy of a nation is generated, as we saw in the previous
sub-sections, by the leading firms in the first place and subsequently by the leading sectors,
also by networks. However, the diffusion of OIs from one country to another also needs to be

clarified. Certainly, leading firms can, through their overseas operations, transfer their inno

to other countries; these firms become the so-called transnational corporations (TNCs). Also, th
diffusion of OIs can take place through other channels such as the publication of well-known

books and scholarly activities in various universities; a good example of this type of diffusio

briefly described in Chapter four with the dissemination of Taylor's writings and its impact on
organizational behavior within the Japanese economy.

Some prevalent theories of why some firms establish production plants in other countries are
briefly described in Dicken (1998, Chapter six). Thus, for example, an MNC prefers to establish

plant in a different country from its origin because it has a specific advantage in terms of as
such as knowledge, organization, and human skills. This is exactly what took place with many
Japanese carmakers such as Toyota and Honda; they had the specific advantage of the
revolutionary OI of JIT/QC, which they transferred to their overseas plants and created a
competitive edge against the local car manufacturers in the USA and other countries (Dicken,
1998, p. 339, lists 12 Japanese automobile plants in the USA, established in that country from

1982 to 1989). In addition, the specific asset advantages the MNCs possess are safely internaliz
by establishing overseas plants, thus markets are also internalized and their specific asset
advantages are protected from being imitated by other firms for a longer time. However,

eventually, the process of imitation is unavoidable and local firms gradually copy the specific
knowledge of the MNC. A similar description of the diffusion process through globalization is
provided by Gersbach and Baily (1996); these authors emphasize the important role of the

'productivity leaders' (transplants) in this process and provide some relative measurement of t
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relationship between a globalization index and relative productivity (cf. graphs 11 and 12 of thei
article).

The imitation process is further analyzed and quantified in Chapter seven of this study in which i
is verified that the Japanese system of JIT/QC has been successfully transplanted in the U S A
during the last 2 0 years or so. It is interesting, though, to note here, that changes in appropriate OIs
in the framework of a globally competitive environment can have a significant impact on
economies and indeed on any economy such as the American one. Lazonick predicted this in 1990
as this extract testifies.

"...During the 1990s, new ventures in the institutional transformation of the shop floor must
confront outmoded labor-management relations and work practices as well as conflicting

ideologies of the 'rights' of management and labor that are deeply embedded in the American past.
At the same time movements toward cooperation and commitment must confront the value-creating
power of the new competition... " (p. 298)

Thus far, it seems that the leading MNC firms, through their specific advantageous assets (e.g.
OIs) prefer to establish overseas plants in order to become global in operations, and increase or
conserve their market share and profits, but, at the same time, by transplanting some of these assets
local firms will eventually imitate the M N C s in terms of these transferred specific assets.
According to this process some convergence will eventually take place in most cases, whereby the
leading M N C firms will be successfully imitated by local leading firms. However, convergence of
TIs or OIs is not universal. A s Dicken (1998, pp. 198-99) observes:

"...It is virtually impossible to transfer the whole package of firm advantages and practices to a

different national environment...Recent detailed empirical research...provides strong eviden

support the view that nationally-based differences between TNCs tend to persist contrary to t
notion of a convergence towards a standard global model offirmstructure and behavior... "

In this respect, Dicken (1998, p. 198)) provides a list of differences between American, German,
and Japanese T N C s in terms of corporate governance and financing, R & D , and direct investment
and intrafirm trade. S o m e of these differences have already been mentioned in the detailed analysis
of the characteristics of American and Japanese firms in previous chapters.
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There are other reasons w h y leading M N C firms establish plants overseas, including lower labor

and location costs, tax incentives, and so on. However, these reasons are not covered here as th

are less directly related to OIs. Furthermore, the process of globalization, and thus diffusio

some OIs, is more pronounced in some sectors than in others. For instance the automobile industr
becomes gradually more concentrated and more interconnected at the same time as it becomes

more global (Dicken, 1998, Chapter ten), and consequently, the diffusion of various organizati
practices becomes more intense.

It must be stressed that the diffusion of OIs through globalization tendencies can be further
explored if we take into account the analysis on a POFO basis. Thus, the characteristics of the
POM differ from country to country for firms that produce similar products, such as cars, and
hence a firm in one country that has a comparative advantage in its POM can potentially exploit
advantage by locating its operations in a different country. This is what happened with the
Japanese car manufacturers that heavily invested in the USA and consequently took advantage of
their superior JIT/QC system (in Chapter seven this point will be tested empirically within a
general framework of all manufacturing industries). Similar examples can be found for other
POFOs.

Finally, the diffusion of OIs through TNCs can also be seen through their networking capabilit
Thus, within the framework of the global economy the TNCs have been more and more involved

in networking with more and more countries, other TNCs and smaller firms. The traditional 'arm's
length transactions' of the international economy are increasingly complemented by the other

types of linkages, namely joint ventures, marketing agreements and especially the subcontractin
system. This more complex and denser network of economic relations instigated by the TNCs, and

especially the larger ones, creates more value added to the world economy (Dicken, 1986, p. 184)

Out of the above four types of linkages perhaps the most important is the one relating the large

firms with the smaller ones, that is mainly the subcontracting and sourcing systems which starte
becoming international in extent only from the mid 1960s (Dicken, 1986, p. 188). Subcontracting

197
firms have been described as performing 'shock-absorbing' functions for large firms, which is
pertinent to MNCs given their international or transnational exposure.

5.4 AN ATOMIC/ SYSTEMIC MODEL OF ECONOMIC GROW
5.4.1 The functional model

As a consequence of all the analysis so far, a functional model is initially proposed in order t
explain the process of economic growth. At a second stage, a systemic model is proposed. Figure
5.9 shows the main points of the functional model (most of these points have been extensively

covered in other chapters53). Each one of the factors functionally affects economic growth, in th

sense that it is through the individual factor's functional qualities that such growth takes pla
example, if cooperation between employees and employers is prevalent in an economy, then firm
growth and overall growth is enhanced. Consider the following factors more specifically. First,

poorer the country the lower the average income and the more unsatisfied the demand for all good

is, which in turn generates more growth if the remaining conditions are met. This is a necessary
but not a sufficient, condition for high economic growth. This is another way of expressing the

controversial convergence theory of growth (for the latter see for example Barro and Sala-i-Mar

(1995), or Jones (1998) for a comprehensive review). The application of this condition to the tw
economies under study clearly shows that Japan's lateness of economic development when
translated into substantial unsatisfied demand created a solid basis for higher economic growth
than in the USA for most of the periods of the last century.

Second, another necessary, but not sufficient, condition for high economic growth is a continuou
flow of minor and major organizational and technical innovations. This took place in both Japan

and the USA, though in different ways, in different periods and in different intensities, as pre
chapters have demonstrated.

53

Only the direct effects are shown through the arrows. However, the indirect effects (for example,
institutions are affected by OIs, etc) also contribute to the process of economic growth, but they are not
shown with arrows.
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Third, another necessary condition for high economic growth is competition and rivalry amongst

domestic firms in all industries. Such competition, especially if accompanied by some cooperati
and networking, enhances not so much economies of scale but economies of scope. The latter
come from not necessarily joint production under the same roof and firm but as joint production

separate establishments (as per Fruin, 1992, see previous chapters). In turn, strong competition
economies of scope increase value added, which eventually leads to high economic growth. The
chance of a larger number of companies creating a larger value added than a smaller number of

enterprises is very high, since the various stages of production are increased with a larger nu

of firms. In other words horizontal and, especially, vertical integration reduces the value add

a given product, especially in heavy manufacturing industries, such as cars. In addition, strong

competition and a large number of production establishments are also closely related to the sys
of sub-contracting.

H o w is this third condition translated in the two countries? In the U S A the tendency for big
business, vertical integration, mass production, formation of oligopolies and a limited number
firms has meant slower economic growth than in Japan (ceteris paribus) over most of the last

century. The contrary is true for the Asian country. Domestic rivalry in Japan is very strong in
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several industries, and this rivalry has helped the country to become an export-oriented nation

(Sakakibara and Porter, 2001). However, it should be added that not all the Japanese industries a
exposed to domestic and international competition, contrary to the entire American set of
industries which have been exposed to international competition for a long time. This two-faced
Japanese competition is one of the deep reasons for the recent prolonged recession in the Asian
country (this recent period will be more extensively covered in Chapter six).

Fourth, economic growth and industrial organization depend on the scarcity or abundance of

resources and markets. Thus, Japan, with a relatively limited amount of resources, technology and
markets at the beginning of its economic development, adopted a different mode of economic

organization than the USA and its renowned richness in all these factors (this point of the rela
abundance of resources was analyzed at the end of Chapter three).

5.4.2 The atomic model based on the five POFOs

However, the functional model presented so far is superficial, in the sense that it does not ind
in a deep or causal way exactly how economies of scale and scope, or competition and so on are

generated. To explore this more atomic model (atomic in the sense that it goes deeper into the c
of the economic process), Figure 5.10 summarizes the key propositions based on the largest part

this chapter. This model is also systemic in the sense that it functions like a system (see belo

Thus, in Figure 5.10 it can be seen that the core, or atom, of industrial growth (and hence over

economic growth through the various linkages between the broad sectors of services, agriculture,

mining, and manufacturing) is what takes place inside the firm, and especially the leading firm,
which is continually in the process of creative destruction. Within this firm, various types of
TIs, and other types of innovations emanate from the five POFOs. These innovations are the
moving forces of industrial growth. Thus, OIs originate from the POM, the TIs from the POW and
the POP, and many other types of innovations through the POC, POW, and POS (for example,

more efficient learning within the POW, better contracts within the POC, better strategies withi
the POS and so on) in order to increase productivity and hence growth. Regarding OIs, three
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specific interdependent groups were synthesized in Chapter four, namely the JIT/QC main axis,
the vertical integration axis and the networks axis.

The Leading Industrial Firm and the Five POFOs
POM

POP

POC

POW

• JIT/QC-Fordism
Axis
• Vertical
Integration Axis
• Networks Axis

Extended Production Function

I
T

Increase in Productivity
Increase in Quality

• B a n d w a g o n and Demonstration Effects
• Externalities Effects
• Globalization Effects

I

Diffusion to Other Firms in the S a m e Industrial Sector

I

Leading
Industrial Sector

Sectoral
Systems

Figure 5.10

54

^
Diffusion to Other Sectors

~~7
Other Leading
Industrial Sectors

S y s t e m s of
Innovations

Other
Industrial Sectors

Evolutionary
Learning
Capabilities

The Process of economic growth; an atomic/systemic Proposition

54

This Figure emphasizes the role of industrial growth generating economic growth. However, the role of
services growth could be as important.
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Thus, it is now possible to extend and relate the production function suggested in chapter t

the five types of POFOs, and costs. The equation Q = f (M, K, L, O) of that chapter can now b
expanded analytically to become.

Q = F (M, K, L, POM, POC, POW, POS) (5.1)

Hence, the variable 'organization' O is more precisely split into the four POFOs, namely the

POC, POW, and POS, although the OIs originally are generated by the POM and indirectly impact

on the other three POFOs. In addition, from the duality theorem we can deduce the shadow pric

of all the factors of production, physical and non-physical. Thus, the transaction costs (TCs
the shadow price of the POC, the kinetic costs (KCs) are the shadow price of the POM, the
wisdom costs (WCs) are the shadow price of the POW, and the strategic costs (SCs) are the
shadow price of the POS. Furthermore, the maximization of such a function (5.1), called the

'extended production function', will lead to the following Lagrangian X . This is only indic
some possible ramifications in economic theory55.

v w m KCs TCs WCs SCs , ,
=
=
=
=
X=
MP
MP
MP
MP
MP
lvlr

K

lylr

L

lvlr

M

lvlr

POM

lvlr

POC

=

=
MP

lvlr

POW

(5.2)
MP

ivlr

POS

where MP stands for marginal product, v is the price of capital, w is the price of labor, m i

price of materials and intermediate goods. This set of equations primarily means that the qu

of K, L, and M do not only depend on their relative prices but also on the relative prices of
POC, POW, and POS. The consequences of function 5.1 and equation 5.2 are too numerous to be

analyzed here, and they would introduce a new set of issues to consider for another agenda of
research.

OIs (and other innovations) based on the interplay between the five POFOs generate productiv

increases and product quality increases that make the innovating firm a leader in its own in

sector, which eventually becomes a leading sector in the economy especially if other firms a

the OIs of the leading firm. Thus, the full 'cycle' of economic growth starts from the leadin
and propagates to other firms within the same industry. During this propagation there is a

A full analysis in a general equilibrium model would probably be richer in relevant conclusi
such a model is, perhaps, contradictory to the continuous creative destruction process suggested in this
thesis.
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continuous interplay between changes in the five POFOs within firms, which in turn continuously

alter the position of competitive advantage of the various firms within the same industry. Thus
some companies become weaker, even die, whereas some others become stronger and even
dominate. There is an incessant 'creative destruction'56 to use Schumpeter's term57. As already

seen in the previous section 5.3, leading firms generate leading sectors through the bandwagon,
demonstration, externalities, networks and globalization effects.

A leading industrial sector, together with other leading industrial sectors plus other sectors
take advantage of the leading sectors (on the importance of established sectors in relation to

leading ones, cf. Robertson et al, 2001), propel the broad overall industrial sector of the eco
and eventually the whole economy. The impact of leading sectors on the whole economy, though

not analytically covered in this thesis (although it will be descriptively covered in Chapter s

empirically in Chapter seven), can be easily understood by the following example. Based on data

available regarding the German automobile sector, the impact of such a leading sector in simila
economies such those of the USA and Japan is similarly huge: according to the VDA (Association
of the German Automotive Industry) (2000), "...In 1998 the gross product dependent on the
development, manufacture, sale and use of motor vehicles represented almost a fifth of the
national product..." The importance of the Auto industry in both countries, the USA and Japan,

thus paramount, and this conclusion helps us to appreciate the strong competition between the a
sectors of these two countries in the last 50 years. In particular, it is worth noting that as

JIT/QC was the system that propelled the Japanese auto industry in its way to dominate the worl

56

Eliasson's (1994) pertinent construction of what he calls the 'experimentally organized economy', which
considersfirmsas 'experimental learning machines', captures this process of continuous creative destruction
to some extent. Thus, the accumulation of firm-based knowledge ('organizational learning') is the source of
business competence and the driving force behind macroeconomic growth. In this setup, business failure
becomes a standard cost of such growth and the constant competitive struggle betweenfirms,through
innovations, failures and successes moves the macro economy. However, this model has to be adapted to
include the elements of thefiveP O F O s and the role of leadingfirmsand sectors.
57
Malerba (2002) summarizes the differences between Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark H
innovations. Mark I is more related to 'creative destruction' and is characterized by technological
opportunities, low appropriability, and low cumulativeness at the firm level, whereas Mark II is more related
to 'creative accumulation' and is characterized by high appropriability and high cumulativeness. This
distincion is more appropriate to the nature of TIs, but a more thorough study on the links between OIs and
TIs could probably include this distinction for analysis purposes (see also Chapter three).
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market58, the same system, JTT/QC, was also the moving force behind the revival of the American
auto sector in the last 20 years (Chapter seven provides evidence for this argument).

5.4.3 The system approach to the atomic model
Leading firms and leading sectors per se are not sufficient to make the proposed model really

dynamic. For this reason, the concept of 'system' will be used as an overall context in which fir
industries, markets, and other entities operate in order to produce, consume, and trade. In
particular, the five POFOs, each one separately and all of them together, can be considered as a

system together with the different types of innovations, firms, leading firms, sectors, and leadi
sectors. The next few lines are only a brief description of the importance of system analysis in

explaining the model depicted in Figure 5.10. First, a brief analysis of a system is provided her
based on Buckley (1967). In the present study, the process or complex adaptive system59 is used
which is primarily characterized by the elaboration or evolution of organization. Here
'organization' points to the idea that the aggregate characteristics of a system are not only
different from, but also often not found in, the components (of the system) alone. Thus when we
say that 'the whole (the system) is more than the sum of its parts' we do not mean the numerical

addition of its parts but their unorganized aggregation. In addition, the organized parts of a sy
transmit not only energy, but also information (meaning). Overall, the most important element of

such an organized whole (being more than the sum of it parts) is its emergence : ".. .it is becau

present behavior is always both emergent from the past and conditioned by possible future results

that it is never precisely predictable and always involves an element of spontaneity..." (Ibid, p
99)

See Kawahara, 1997, for a detailed account of this 50 year old intense competition of the leading auto
sector in the U S A and Japan, including the impact of the JIT/QC system.
59
The other two types of systems are the equilibrium model that reaches equilibrium but loses organization,
and the organismic or homeostatic model that maintains a high level of organization against ever-present
tendencies to reduce it (Buckley, 1967, p. 40).
60
The concept of emergence dates back to 1877 according to Sawyer (1999). This author provides a good
example of an emergent system in his analysis of improvisational theater. Also, emergence is inherently
related to creativity within systems.
51
A n emergent system agrees with the contingency view of management mentioned in several parts of this
study.
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This complex evolutionary system (in this paragraph, each one of the five POFOs are indicated fo
each major concept in brackets at the end of a sentence) adapts to its environment through a
selective process of concatenated acts. This selective process needs to be organized through

organizing sub-routines (POM). If these routines do not match the current state of affairs, work
physical and logical, must be done to bring the system up to date (POM). This work consists in

the formation, strengthening or dissolution of functional linkages between various acts or basic
sequences of acts (POM). The total configuration of these linkages embodies the total state of
readiness (orientation) of the system (POS). Information is needed to logically work on this

orientation which is continually updated so that the system adapts and evolves (Ibid, pp. 48-49)
(POW). This complex evolutionary system is also open (POS, POW):
"...The important distinction between open and closed systems has often been expressed in terms
of 'entropy'62: closed systems tend to increase in entropy- to 'run down'; open systems are
'negentropic'- tending to decrease in entropy, or to elaborate structure..." (Ibid, p. 51)

Thus, an open system is negentropic, because it differentiates and elaborates with respect to it
internal structure, as its growth takes place, in order to resist against the entropic process.

the tendency towards increasing disorder (see also Clark, 1988). To express all this in terms of
five POFOs, let El be the entropy of the POM during a particular stage of development of the

firm. Together with the influence of the other four POFOs, the POM is altered in order to releas
more energy, thus lowering entropy from El to E2. The entropic nature of the POM within the

complete system of the five POFOs is a distinct characteristic of OIs (TIs as new products or ne

processes do not have this trait since TIs depend on the OIs in order to be generated and comple

successfully) as was already alluded to in Chapter three. Finally, this open system also contain

tension (POC), and its information processing is purposive (POS), thus necessitating a mechanism
of feedback63 (POS, POM). In turn, this mechanism depends on certain internal parameters or

62

A n early advocate of the importance of entropy in economic theory is Georgescu-Roegen (1971). His
pioneering analysis is still pertinent today because of the development of evolutionary economics. A founder
of the latter, namely Boulding (1981), used the concepts of open system and self-organization as well as
entropy in his analysis (Dopfer, 1994).
63
In Chapter seven one of the econometric models used ( V E C M ) incorporates the mechanism of feedback.
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criterion variables remaining within certain limits (POM). Thus the system is to some extent selfregulating (Ibid)64 ( P O W ) .

The negentropic nature of the system of the five POFOs has another important consequence for
this study. A s the changes that take place in the five P O F O s and especially in the P O M should aim
at lowering entropy, thus disorder, the manifestation of this decrease in entropy (if it takes place) is
a reduction in waste: inventories, defects in products, strikes, non-cooperation between employees,
corruption, and so on. Consequently, the more negentropic the O I (as represented by the P O F O s )
is, the more entropy is decreased, the more efficient the firm is and hence the lower the waste is:
lower inventories, better quality of products, and so on. This important result is used as a
theoretical support for the choice of the proxy used in Chapter seven to measure the positive
impact of the H T / Q C system on American manufacturing sectoral growth.

Important elements of this just described complex system have been recently used by some
scholars to explain and explore the following cases. Fujimoto (1999) in his detailed examination of
Toyota's manufacturing system called it the 'multi-path system emergence' with an ability of
preparedness:
"...I don't reduce the historical process that formed Toyota-style manufacturing routines to
randomness. Instead I describe it as the interplay of both intended and unintended consequences for
the people w h o created the system I call this highly irregular historical process multi-path system
emergence, in which decision makers often don't know beforehand which path will lead to
successful outcome-deliberate planning, environmental imperatives, intuition, imitation, or luck..."
(p. 8)
This system can also be considered as a transmitting and creating information system comprising
three layers of organizational capabilities: first, 'routinized manufacturing capability' (taking
place in a steady state of repetitive production, development, and transactions). Second,
'routinized learning capability' (affecting the pace of continuous or repetitive performance
improvements, and being recovered from system disruptions or deterioration). A n example of this
layer is the application of T Q C . Third, 'evolutionary learning capability': "...Anonroutine ability
64

Recently, another characteristic has been added to complex adaptive systems, that of 'punctuated
equilibrium' which expresses discontinuous changes (Wollin, 1999; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). Also,
the concept of punctuated equilibrium has paralleled a more thorough exploration of complex evolving
systems (Wollin, 1999).
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that affects creation of the above routine capabilities themselves through irregular processes of
multi-path system emergence..." (Ibid, p. 17). This third capability is also linked with the
organizational culture of 'preparedness': a company such as Toyota is well prepared for
reinterpreting, refining, and institutionalizing established routines. Also "...it must convert
the intended and the unintended consequences of its actions, the lucky breaks and the well-laid

plans, the temporary successes and the failures, into long-term competitive routines..." (Ibid, p
23). Fujimoto (1999) has analyzed the JIT/QC system as a specific case of system emergence, and

hence this thesis fully supports this author regarding the evolutionary and dynamic development o
firm capabilities through the introduction of the five POFOs65 and the present atomic/systemic
model of industrial growth.

Edquist (1997), Edquist et al (2001) use the concept of system to describe the systems of

innovations (SI) approach for studying innovation. Edquist (1997) enumerates nine characteristic

first, innovations and learning are at the center of focus, thus they are treated as endogenous t
system variables. Second, SI are more than systems of R&D, and include not only economic but

also institutional, organizational, social, and political factors. Third, a historical perspectiv
natural in SI, thus emphasizing path dependence and feedback. Fourth, differences between SI are

stressed and focused upon, and hence there is no optimality (equilibrium) attached to the evoluti
of SI. Fifth, there is interdependence and non-linearity between the elements (firms, customers,

demand, etc) of SI, thus there is emergence66 in the systems. Sixth, SI include both 'technologica

(e.g. new products) and organizational innovations67. Seventh, institutions play a central role i
Eighth, SI are conceptually diffuse and pluralistic. Ninth, SI are characterized by conceptual
frameworks rather than formal theories. Overall, contrary to mainstream economics, "...the SI

approach incorporates both explicit principles of change and a view of innovation as a collective

learning and selection process, inherited from evolutionary economics..." (Edquist et al, 2001, p
4). The close relationship between SI and evolutionary theories was also recently analyzed by

65

Fujimoto's 'evolutionary learning capability' is a dynamic interplay between the POW and the PO
primarily) and the other three P O F O s (POC, P O M , and POP).
Thus, the 'emergence' trait also appears in this analysis according to the concept of system.
67
See Chapter three for a more detailed account of Edquist's (1997, 2001) contribution to the distinction
between TIs and OIs.

207
Saviotti (1997) who argues that "...systems theory and non-equilibrium thermodynamics predict
structure formation, qualitative change, indeterminacy, irreversibility, path dependence, and
multistability, properties that are commonly displayed by national Sis..." (p. 182).

Malerba (2002) proposed the concept of 'sectoral systems of innovation and production' (SSIP)

based on the evolutionary theory and the system approach. SSIP are multidimentional, integrated
and dynamic systems of sectors, thus having a knowledge base, technologies, inputs and demand,

and generating new and established products for specific uses. The agents that carry out market
and non-market interactions for the creation, production, and sale of these products are

"...individuals and organizations of various levels of aggregation, with specific learning proc

competencies, organizational structure, beliefs, objectives and behaviors..." (Ibid, p. 248) Th
interactions take place through communication, exchange, co-operation, competition and

command, and they are shaped by institutions. In addition, the co-evolution of all these elemen

changes and transforms SSIP according to four theoretical traditions. First, sectors change ove
time via laws of motion, dynamics, emergence68, and transformation. Second, sectoral boundaries
change over time through mutual links and interdependencies. Third, the SI approach (see the

paragraph above) is adopted. Fourth, evolutionary elements are included: processes of creation,

replication, and selection with emergent properties and metastable nature. Also note that in th
whole process of SSIP interactions among firms and non-firm organizations are included and
geographical boundaries are considered as well.

This brief description of the systems approach of key elements of innovations and production
makes the atomic/systemic model of economic growth presented in this section a comprehensive,

dynamic, evolutionary, and innovative model. At the core of this model is the sub-system of the

five POFOs of firms. These POFOs, (which are in turn five sub-systems) include all possible and
probable operations of firms, such as the well-known generic transactions, competences,
capabilities, technologies, or more precisely the POM, POC, POP, POW, and POS. As a

consequence of the POM, its interactions with the other POFOs and with the other elements of th

68

Thus, the 'emergence' trait also appears in this analysis according to the concept of system.
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whole system (which includes the SI, the sectoral systems (SS)69, and the emergent evolutionar
learning capabilities) specific OIs, TIs, and other types of innovations are generated that
growth of firms, sectors and the whole national and global economy70. Figure 5.11 shows this
model.

Figure 5.11

T h e complete atomic/systemic m o d e l

The exact w a y of h o w all the actors of this model are interlinked together would necessitate m u c h
more research to be determined. For example, the SI "...has not had so much to say about how

innovations translate into economic growth. It is more a theory of innovation than a theory of

growth..." (Gregersen and Johnson, 2000) However, it is one of the intensions of this thesis t

pinpoint more precisely how innovations and in particular OIs affect economic growth through t
introduction of the five POFOs. The main message of the latter is that unless the researcher

Sectoral systems are defined to include SS like the SSIP suggested by Malerba (2002).
Clark (2000) in his holistic approach to organizations examines their competition 'between contexts', thus
making the analysis very general (for example Ford would have failed if he had started his model T from
England, Ibid, p. 201).
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the core of the firm (the five POFOs) the economic process cannot be complete. For instance,

Reati (1998) proposes a descriptive model that links several variables together (see Figure 5.1
order to explain how a process71 technological revolution affects demand and output. Thus,
employment in the sector is the result of two factors acting in opposite directions: first the

increase of productivity in the sector producing the final commodity i, which reduces employment
and second the rate of growth of demand for commodity i, which increases employment-the

compensation effect. The net result depends primarily on the price elasticity of demand and to a

much lesser extent the income elasticity. However, how the rate of change in productivity of the

sector involved is linked with the technological revolution is not explained. If we introduce th
five POFOs, it is possible to determine more precisely which POFO affects firm growth and hence

sector growth. For example, as it is briefly indicated in this chapter and Chapter seven, the J
process (an OI) primarily affects the POM and hence productivity increases through the POM.
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Source: Reati (1998, p. 93).
Legend: p\wi) = percentage rate of change in productivity of the sector involved with the technological
revolution
Pi = price of final commodity i
e i = price elasticity of demand for final commodity i
p* = percentage rate of change in productivity of total economy
w = wage rate
rj; = income elasticity of demand for final commodity i
r; = percentage rate of change in demand for final commodity i
X; = output offinalcommodity i

Figure 5.12

71

H o w a process technological revolution affects d e m a n d a n d output

Read's (1998) analysis is similar to that of Edquist et al (2001). Also, note that these explanations depend
on the interaction between process innovation and product innovation: the process innovation introduces
better product quality thus enhancing product innovation.
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A final remark will supplement this section. It concerns the micro basis of national economies.
This study argues that national economies have their growth-generating core in the micro sector
and in particular in the firm and its OIs. T h e former U S S R is a good example to recall; Chandler
(1992, p. 84) summarizes it.

"...On the other hand, the economies that followed the Soviet model- relying on central plann

agencies to coordinate production and distribution and to allocate resources for the futur

prevented managers in units of production and distributionfromlearning how to coordinat

effectively. These managers never developed hands-on organization knowledge about curren

facilities, available supplies and market demand. The failure to develop such capabilities ha
central to the disintegration of these centrally planned economies... "

Ten years after this article was written, one can add that the USSR, and most of the other former
Soviet type of countries, have also shown this failure in their very poor economic performance
during these last ten years or so (cf. the G D P growth rates, World Bank, 2001).

5.5 CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to lay the firm-oriented foundations, via mainly the propositions
of the five P O F O s , for a firm-based atomic/systemic model of economic growth that expresses
more precisely the creative destruction process. Thus, with this model, the importance of the role
of OIs becomes more obvious, and justified. In addition, the production function suggested in
Chapter three, which explicitly incorporates OIs, becomes clearer after the theoretical evidence
provided in Chapter four and in particular in this chapter.

This chapter examined two main issues. First, a new way of analyzing the expansion of firms by
looking at their core through the prism of thefiveprocesses of firm operations and hence costs and
benefits. Second, the inclusion of the importance of leading firms and sectors became a necessary
condition to the overall exploration. These two main issues constitute the basic framework in
which the various elements of OIs are embedded. This can then lead to an integrated
atomic/systemic model of industrial growth. T h e existence of the P O M at the center of the five
firm organs is found to be equivalent to the various OIs, and hence any productivity improvements
in the P O M (either directly, or indirectly through the other four organs) entail firm growth. Once
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this growth is transmitted via the actions of leading firms and leading sectors to the rest of
economy within a more general framework of systems of innovations, sectoral systems and

evolutionary learning capabilities, then overall industrial growth takes place. Table 5.2 and F
5.10 and 5.11 summarize Chapter five.

In addition, the establishment of the five fundamental operations or organs of the firm has gr

contributed to a better understanding of the growth and expansion of firms, as well as the rela
issue of the three axes of OIs introduced in Chapter four. Thus, the phenomenon of vertical
integration and its corresponding OI axis does not only depend on a broad comparison between

transaction costs and production costs, but it depends on the evolution of the five firm organs
operations, namely the POM, POP, POC, POW, and POS. In the same way, the two other axes of

JIT/QC and networking also depend on these five organs or forces (the relative importance of e
one of these five POFOs was indicated in some instances).

Chapter five concludes the series of four chapters whose main aim was to provide theoretical

evidence that OIs, or disembodied technology, have their own place of merit in the exploration
the very complex phenomenon of industrial and economic growth. The next two chapters will
provide some empirical evidence to this phenomenon and to many other issues that have been

raised so far regarding the importance of OIs in shaping and developing industries. In particul

Chapter six a general discussion of the importance of leading manufacturing sectors (and firms
the USA and Japan in terms of OIs will take place; thus Chapter six is a necessary link to the

previous four chapters and especially the fifth one as it emphasizes the connection between OI

leading sectors and industrial growth. In Chapter seven, the axis of JIT/QC of OIs will be furt
explored by quantitatively linking this axis to manufacturing sectoral growth in the USA.
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6. OIs AND MANUFACTURING SECTOR GROWTH IN
THE USA AND JAPAN
6.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous four chapters, the important role of OIs in promoting industrial growth in the U
and Japan has been extensively discussed from a theoretical point of view. In this chapter, a

general discussion of manufacturing sector growth1 in these two countries will provide additiona
support for this view. Emphasis will be given to the role of leading firms and sectors in terms

OIs. This chapter is primarily descriptive, and discusses sectoral performance in terms of OIs a

at times in terms of OIs and TIs together. Also, some basic quantitative evidence will be provid
however, a more rigorous empirical exploration is conducted in the next chapter.

Two periods will be analyzed separately; first, from the end of the 19th century up to WWH

(section 6.2), and from the 1950s up to the end of the 20th century (section 6.3). For the forme

period and for the USA, growth rates of real output and total factor productivity (TFP) for var

critical sub-periods will be calculated, and appropriate conclusions will be drawn regarding th
impact of OIs on manufacturing sub-sectors. For Japan, due to the lack of substantive data, a
simpler analysis will be conducted by examining the time series of some basic manufacturing

sectors' real production. For the second period2, a graphical representation of the 3-digit indu
sectors of the two countries will be shown, with the aim of comparing the growth in real output
and TFP between sectors and between countries; at times this comparison will be assisted with

basic cointegration analysis, which will facilitate the drawing of relevant conclusions regardin
OIs. Most emphasis will be given to the American economy. In this second section the recent
prolonged Japanese recession will be examined in the light of OIs and leading sectors. Also, a

parallel examination of TIs and OIs in some key industries in the two countries will be provide
In addition, for the second period after WWH, a more detailed analysis about some specific
1

This discussion is a logical continuation of the last section of the previous chapter.
Note that the difference in analysis between the two periods is basically due to the availability and validity
of data; thus, a more rigorous analysis will be carried out for the period after W W I I .
2
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industries regarding the impact of OIs will be undertaken (section 6.4). For the American

manufacturing sectors during the period 1960s to 1980s, Chandler's analysis will be extended to

include the importance of other OIs such as the JIT/QC system (section 6.5). Finally, section 6
provides a summary of the major conclusions from this chapter.

6.2 THE PERIOD FROM THE END OF THE 19TH CENTURY T
JUST BEFORE WWII
6.2.1 USA

Kuznets (1971) analyzed the structural changes of all industries in the USA in terms of shares

output and growth for the period from 1880 to 1948. Chandler says in this respect: "...Kuznets'
support the assertion that the industries spearheading American economic growth were those

dominated by a small number of large managerial enterprises..." (Chandler, 1990, p. 226) In thi
section, the data used by Kuznets is scrutinized in order to link sectoral growth with OIs.

Two variables will be examined, namely the growth in the real output of manufacturing sectors,
and the corresponding TFPs (the definitions and discussion of which are provided in Chapter
seven where they will be extensively used). Although the data for this period are not as

comprehensive as that of the last 50 years, available records from official American sources ar

used to construct these two variables on a 2-digit SIC equivalent sub-sector basis. The results

be deemed to be quite accurate for the purpose of this analysis, which is to detect differences
each one of the two variables (real output and TFP) between the sub-periods 1899-1914, 1915-

1929, and 1930-1937 and relate these differences to various OIs. Unfortunately, no relevant dat

are available for the computation of TFPs before 1899. Table 6.1 summarizes the results analyze
in this section. Upon examination of this Table, some conclusions can be drawn. First, and most

importantly, although the rate of average annual growth in real output was almost as high durin
1915 to 1929 as it was during 1899 to 1914, the TFP average annual growth was substantially
much higher during 1915 to 1929. For the period 1930 to 1937, as might be expected, both real
output and TFP declined equally because of the consequences of the Great Crash. A pronounced
slowdown of industrial productivity during the period 1890 to 1913 was also observed by David
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(1990, p. 356). Second, sectoral growth in terms of real output and T F P (referring mainly to the
period 1915-1929) can be grouped into several categories as shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.1 Sectoral productivity growth in the USA from 1899 to 1937
Real
Output Annual % Real Number Empl/t
Real
Output Annual % Real Number Empl/t
Empl/t Output Deflator Aver/e Output Establ/s per Empl/t Output Deflator Aver/e Output Establ/s per
TFP(%) Growth
Establ/s (000) (in 1929 $)
(000) (in 1929 $)
TFP(%) Growth
Establ/s
growth
Tobacco
Food
growth
11
42000
0.43
140
472
1899 476
6041
0.56
14959 9
15
51502
1.48
196
770
0.64 -0.12
1914 760
11050
14
4.21 13951
16
3.03 55325
1.00
126
1284
1.60
1929 872
13730
1888
1.00
0.20
4.45
67
22
2.85 48763
0.86
98
1484
0.31
0.88
0.20
1937 1049
16862
852
1.95
115
Textiles
1899
716
1914 1013
1929 1190
1937 1209

2076
3500
6662
7231

0.50
0.61
1.00
0.73

Wood
1899
1914
1929
1937

602
718
651
473

2037
1940
1583
1142

0.35
0.53
1.00
1.06

Paper
1899
1914
1929
1937

100
182
258
301

332
794
1761
1834

0.60
0.65
1.00
1.03

Chemicals
1899
170
1914 269
1929
382
1937
377

829
1713
4254
4911

0.63
0.74
1.00
0.89

Rubber
1899
1914
1929
1937

37
174
1102
1089

2.70
1.73
1.00
1.01

39
89
172
150

Clay, Glass etc
1899
243
1914 405
1929
372
1937 331

Total man/g
1899 4850
1914 7513
1929 9660
1937 9786

-1.26
0.22
-2.58

-0.24
1.31
0.21

4.57
6.02
1.07

-0.32
-1.23
-3.48

32456
37949
20928
11747

9.28
8.12
0.52

1895
2344
2973
3084

7.11
9.89
1.93

7669
10698
9327
8337

24.68
35.56
-0.15

301
342
525
578

Apparel
364
618
681
779

1203
2289
3866
3055

0.52
0.60
1.00
0.98

0.07
0.74
-1.67

6.02
4.59
-2.62

12619
18015
22470
16389

29
34
30
48

Furniture
19 111.2
19
169
31
248
40| 225.4

1277
985
1392
1256

0.35
0.74
1.00
0.90

-0.57
1.68
-0.39

-1.52
2.75
-1.22

2614
4844
5491
4469

43
35
45
50

Printing
244
406
566
555

965
1805
3122
2871

0.42
0.52
1.00
0.94

-0.06
0.63
-0.94

5.80
4.86
-1.00

24363
34241
27364
22674

10
12
21
24

22
31
60
25
41 133.8
45| 138.6

173
429
4737
6150

0.72
0.92
1.00
0.85

-0.04
0.22
-0.28

9.87
66.95
3.73

308
591
922
934

101
102
145
148

Leather
130
265
260| 341
351
328
362
260

1435
1959
1747
1510

0.41
0.56
1.00
0.94

-0.10
0.61
-0.45

2.43
-0.72
-1.70

5785
6798
4285
3249

46
50
82
111

Primary and fabricated metals
591
2209
0.84
1107
5362
0.66
0.05
1549
10641
1.00
1.25
9895
0.98 -0.62
54 1635

9.52
6.56
-0.47

14949
25205
13785
11933

40
44
112
137

83
149
226
234

121
150
160
198

53
78
87
98

Petroleum

505
1203
1655
1622

Non-electrical machinery
1899 456
1468
1914 774
2266
1929 769
4250
1937 795
4393
Transportation
1899
70
1914 331
1929 631
1937 680

-0.15
0.76
0.81

5930
6756
7415
6096

0.54
0.51
1.00
1.00

0.52
0.56
1.00
1.00

-0.28
1.18
0.79

1.75
2.61
-0.84

0.33
1.18
-0.09

-0.35
2.05
-0.18

312
1000
5365
5894

0.54
0.90
1.00
0.91

-0.21
2.04
-0.17

21984
36434
71220
74687

0.50
0.64
1.00
0.90

-0.35
0.94
-0.16

9.21
2.50
-0.25

11571
14793
8788
6114

21
27
42

3.62
5.84
0.42

8995
15792
8529
7327

51
49
90
109

14.70
29.10
1.23

3404
4151
2246
1958

204754
4.38 268436
6.37 206663
0.61 166794

Electrical
49
156
421
374

190
627
1735
1801

0.49
0.58
1.00
0.91

0.39
2.25
0.69

15.33
11.78
0.48

592
1048
1861
1597

Miscellaneous
21
138
434
80
293
842
281
290
2334
347
288
1687

0.50
0.72
1.00
0.92

-0.11
1.68
0.08

6.27
11.81
-3.47

14123
21504
12545
10690

24
28
47
59

Sources:
i)

Creamer et al (1960) for the data of nominal output and real output (1929 prices) (Table
A-10), and total capital stock in 1929 prices (Table A-8).
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ii)

U S Bureau of the Census (1975) for the data on number of employees, payroll, value
added, and establishments (Series P 58-67).

a.

TFP, as estimated, includes as inputs the number of employees, materials or intermediate
goods, and stock of capital (see Chapter seven for the exact formulae and other
information on TFP).
The output deflator used in the calculation of the T F P is derived from the series of nominal
and real output.
The materials series used in the calculation of the T F P is derived from the series of nominal
output and value added.
S o m e numbers for some years are only estimates; this does not affect the overall picture of
Table 6.1.

Notes:

b.

Table 6.2

Sectoral growth in the U S A (1899-1937, based on the subperiods of Table 6.1)

Category

Very high growth in
output (above 12%) and
very high growth in
T F P (around 2%)

Sectors

Transportation
Electrical Machinery
Rubber

High
growth
in Average (or low)
output (above 6%) growth in output
and high growth in (about 2%) and
T F P (around 1.2%)
Average (or low)
growth in TFP
(around 0.70%)
Paper
Tobacco
Chemicals
Textiles
Clay, Glass etc
Apparel
Primary and
W o o d (lowest)
Fabricated Metals
Printing
Miscellaneous
Leather

Very high growth
in output and low
or average growth
in TFP or viceversa.
Food (high TFP)
Furniture
(high
TFP)
Petroleum
(low
TFP)
Non-Electrical
Machinery
(very
high
TFP)

Source: Based on Table 6.1.
The results in Table 6.2 depict the qualitative analysis so far carried out in this thesis.
Manufacturing sectors, such as transportation, and machinery (both electrical and other) led the
American supremacy in industrial development during the second half of the Second Industrial
Revolution (1915-1929).

W h a t have been the reasons for the differences between the period 1899-1914 and 1915-1929, and
for the differences between sectors in terms of OIs? The most important reasons can be
summarized as follows. First, during 1915-1929, the expansion took place through an expansion in
firm size. This can be testified by reference to several factors, such as vertical integration,
integration of mass production and distribution, and a continuous evolutionary technological
improvement (as opposed to the revolutionary technological improvement which took place in the
last three decades of the 19th century). Statistical support for this expansion through integration
be seen in Table 6.1, with reference to the ratio of the number of employed people per
establishment. This ratio increased dramatically during 1915-1929. Note, that although these
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developments (vertical integration and integration of mass production and distribution) started
the end of the 19th century and continued during 1899-1914, it w a s not until 1915-1929 that these
changes spread out into all layers of the economy and not just in the largest companies (for the
latter, details can be found in Chandler, 1962, 1977, 1990 etc).

Second, the initial steps of rationalization in industrial production, better known as Scientifi
Management or Taylorism, started during 1890 to 1910 and did not really become applicable until
later during 1915-1929 and beyond, especially with the advent of Fordism in the Transportation
sector. Tugwell (1927) and, more recently, Nyland (1989) in their detailed accounts confirm the
conclusion that applications of Taylorism (for example through Fordism, cf. Nyland, 1989, p. 141
and generally Chapter four) became increasingly prevalent in the American economy during W W I
and in the 1920s. In addition, Tugwell (1927, p. 126) argued that:

"...So far as specific cases go, it would appear that scientific management has contribu

enormously to increased productivity. Judged by the test of measuring material outputs before

after the introduction of the system, the cases cited above, and others, show a definite cor
between the introduction of the system and increased productivity... "

Tugwell (1927, in particular Chapter four) gives a detailed account of many industrial cases tha
benefited from various applications of scientific management (such as time-and-motion studies).
H e suggests that productivity increases that took place in American manufacturing between 1914
and the mid 1920s were due to a large extent to the advent of applications of Taylor's principles .
As can be clearly seen from Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the sectors which grew most rapidly both in terms
of real output and T F P were those for which Scientific Management, Taylorism, and Fordism
became most applicable, that is mainly the transportation, electrical machinery, primary and
fabricated metals, and non-electrical machinery sectors (Chandler, 1977; Tugwell, 1927). It is
worth noting for the latter that although its real output did not grow very fast, its T F P did.

Third, and as a corollary to the second point, since TFP seems to be so small before 1915, one
could conclude that almost all growth in real output took place because of corresponding increases

These principles were extensively analyzed in chapter four.
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in capital, labor and materials. Furthermore, OIs during 1880-1914 "allowed" the increases in

these inputs to take place because they set the right organizational and managerial environ
such growth of inputs and output. Specific reference is made here to OIs such as vertical

integration, or integration of mass consumption and mass distribution, centralization of th

management process, replacement of owners by salaried managers, as well as the replacement o

the domestic system by the factory system. Most likely the domestic system almost completely
disappeared by the end of the 19th century (Chandler, 1977), but the new system had to still

itself out for another 15 years before it also contributed to some extent to the sharp incr
TFP.
• 1899 to 1914
D1914 to 1929
• 1929 to 1937

3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00

-1.00

KJK
S

§ M

c*>

"

U....

-2.00

c

• *n

!«

x

-ttr

*

-3.00

Source: Author's calculations based on Table 6.1.
Figure 6.1 USA, TFP manufacturing sectors, average annual % growth, 1899 to
1937

In order to further support the above comments, Figures 6.1 and 6.2 summarize the TFP and re

output annual growth rates for the three sub-periods examined. TFPs and real output did no

in a parallel way in all sectors; for instance, though the petroleum industry's real output

about 65% annually from 1914 to 1929, TFP only grew by 0.22% annually during the same period

On the contrary, although the electrical industry's real output grew by about 12% p.a. duri

1929, TFP grew by 2.25% p.a. during the same period. These differences are due to OIs, TIs a

other types of innovations4. In the above examples, the petroleum industry grew so fast pri

because of capital investment (hence a low TFP)5, whereas the electrical industry had a much
higher TFP growth mainly because pioneering electrical companies such as GE had set such an
internal organization that new products were produced in mass by following Tayloristic and

4
5

TFP includes OIs, TIs, and other innovations, as explained in the previous chapter.
In Chapter seven more precise relationships between TFP, capital, and other factors are p
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Fordist methods. Similar comments apply to other industries such as that of transporta
example, Chandler, 1977).
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Figure 6.2
U S A , manufacturing sectors, real output, average annual %

growth,

1899-1937

As quantitative support of the conclusions in this sub-section, it is worth quoting the analysis
carried out by Kogut (1996). This author emphasized the importance of the Taylorist

rationalization process that took place in the American economy during the period 191

"...Taylorist ideas had spread remarkably wide by the 1920s, from manufacturing to the

organization of the offices and hospitals. By 1935, 34 per cent of all American manufa

firms with more than 250 employees reported the use of time and motion studies..." (Ib

Using these time and motion studies he statistically tested the determinants of the s

American foreign direct investment in 1930 and provided evidence that it was not size

nor R&D, nor marketing, but the degree of standardization of the work that was the si

determinant. Furthermore, "...the multidivisional structure was, itself, an expression

application of rationalization to the newly evolved corporate hierarchy, complete wit
accounting principles..." (Ibid, p. 268).

6.2.2

Japan

In Japan, there are two main reasons why a detailed analysis similar to that for the

possible or as important. First, a detailed analysis is not possible because of very b
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only 8 manufacturing sectors (see Figure 6.3) have appropriate records and capital stock is not
included in them. Second, a detailed analysis is not important because for most of the period

examined the textiles industry consistently constituted about a third of total manufacturing. F

6.3 shows the data for real output of these 8 sectors. It is obvious from this graph that the in

total production has very closely followed that of textiles. Also it can be seen that in the 19

sub-sectors of machinery, chemicals and metals have accelerated their growth. To see this pictur
more clearly, two more figures are shown.

•* N. o CO <D Oi <N to CO r- ^
s: -O 'CO CO a> CM *0 oo *- ^J- N- ©
N N O C B O f f l O O O ' O O . O r ' f ' - ' - N ' N ' N n B O c t
c o o o o o o o o o c o o o o o c o o> a > o > o > o ) a > o > o ) 0 5
0)0>a)OjO)

Source: Graphs based on data provided in Klein and Ohkawa (1968)
Figure 6.3 Japan, real output indexes for 8 industries
Figure 6.4 shows the 5-year moving average of the sub-sectors textiles, food, forest products,
stone, and miscellaneous, whereas Figure 6.5 shows the 5-year moving average of the sub-sectors

textiles, chemicals, metals, machinery, and miscellaneous. It becomes clearer in these graphs th

textiles became a strong leading sector in the last 15 years or so of the 19th century. The submachinery followed its own path both at the beginning of the period examined and from WWI to
the 1920s. This latter part of the path has already been explained in Chapter two mainly through
the fact that the demand generated by the combating nations dissipated after WWI. Another

important observation is that both the machinery and metals industries grew together and had some
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exceptional rates of growth in some sub-periods such as those at the end of the 19th century
again at the beginning of the 20th century.

0.25 T—-• ~~-—————— —~ —~r-—- *

-0.15
Source: Graphs based on data provided in Klein and Ohkawa (1968)
Figure 6.4
J a p a n , manufacturing sectors, 5-year m o v i n g average of growth rates

Source: Graphs based on data provided in Klein and Ohkawa (1968)
Figure 6.5
J a p a n , manufacturing sectors, 5-year m o v i n g average of growth rates

In order to see more clearly the periods where there was some important divergence of growth

rates between sub-sectors, cointegration analysis was used and two cointegrating vectors were

calculated to detect these periods. Figure 6.6 shows the results, whereby it becomes obvious

the main divergence and structural changes took place firstly in the 1930s and to a lesser e
the period of WWI, the 1920s, and at the turn of the 20th century.
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Figure 6.6
J a p a n 8 industries, 1 8 7 4 to 1940,2 cointegrating vectors

These brief remarks can now be related to OIs in Japan during the period examined. According to

the analysis conducted in Chapter two, the focal factories took off on a big scale in the 1930s

Also, during and just after WWI, the Japanese industrial system, and in particular the machiner
sub-sector, was re-organized and many new firms were created, mainly as a response to foreign
demand. These Ol-related structural shifts coincided with some constitutional changes as well,
which always play a preponderant role in the business sector in Japan. For example, the

government in the 1880s initiated large scale privatization, or in the 1930s it encouraged indu

growth for military reasons. Furthermore, the textiles sector played an overwhelmingly importan

role for a long period in Japan because it continuously reorganized itself to become decentrali

and flexible to accommodate global changes. Overall, as Japan was still an agricultural country

most of the period under consideration, and though it becomes perhaps easy to overemphasize the

importance of OIs, nonetheless the latter played an important role especially in the leading se
of textiles initially and those of machinery and metals at a later stage.

6.3 THE PERIOD FROM THE END OF WWII UP TO THE END OF
THE 20TH CENTURY
6.3.1

Analysis of the A m e r i c a n a n d Japanese series of manufacturing sectoral real
output

Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the growth patterns of real output for the USA and Japan from 1963 to
1998, for two manufacturing sectors -industrial chemicals and electrical machinery (another

6

These sectors have played a leading role in American economic history.
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sector is shown further below and the remaining sectors are shown in Appendix 6.A1). Also on t
same graphs two more variables are shown, namely the first difference of the two indexes of
industrial production (called 'iadus'). and the second difference of the two indexes (called

jdjadusl). These last two series offer a way of detecting stationarity and cointegration, whic

turn can be used to conclude whether a given sector followed the same pattern of growth or not

through time in the two countries. A formal test of cointegration was also carried out for ea

of sectoral series to confirm these conclusions (some of these tests for the 'non-ferrous meta
sector are shown in Appendix 6.A2).

Source: Based on U N I D O , 2000. The variables 'jadus' and djadus' are fluctuating around zero, as expected.
Note: The y-axis represents index numbers.
Figure 6.7
Industrial chemicals, real output index

Source: Based on U N I D O , 2000. The variables 'jadus' and djadus' are fluctuating around zero, as expected.
Note: The y-axis represents index numbers.
Figure 6.8
Electrical machinery, real output index

From these Figures we can draw some interesting conclusions. First, for almost every sector,

Japanese growth was very strong up to the mid 1970s (the catching-up stage with the USA), then
slowed down, and finally decreased in the 1990s. However, over the whole period, the Japanese
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growth rates have been higher than the American ones in most sectors as Figure 6.10 shows. Tab
6.3 summarizes the relative strength of each sector's growth between the two countries.

Table 6.3

G r o w t h rates in real output f r o m 1 9 6 4 to 1998, industry differences

Category (1)
American growth was
higher than that of
Japan

Category (2)
American growth was close
to that of Japan

1. Beverages
2. Textiles
3. W o o d

1. Food
2. Industrial Chemicals
3. Rubber

4.
5.
6.
7.

4. Pottery and China
5. Glass
6. Other Non-Metal Minerals

Furniture
Printing
Plastic
Non-Electrical
Machinery
8. Others

Category (3)
American growth was lower
than that of Japan
1. Other Chemicals
2. Petroleum Refineries
3. Miscellaneous Petroleum
Coal
4. Iron and Steel
5. Non-Ferrous Metals
6. Fabricated Metals
7. Electrical Machinery

and

8. Transport Equipment
9. Professional and Scientific
Equipment
10. Apparel
11. Leather
12. Footwear
13. Tobacco
14. Paper

Source: Based on U N I D O , 2000.

For thefirstcategory, out of the 8 sectors, it is worth noting the substantial gradual decline of the
main leading sector of the Japanese economy up to the 1930s (Minami, 1986), namely textiles.

Also, it is worth noting non-electrical machinery (which includes computers) where the Americ

have always been the leaders (however, note that the higher American growth in this sector is

substantial). In the second category, it is worth mentioning the equal strength of industrial

chemicals and rubber. In the third category out of the 14 sectors almost all heavy manufactur
industries have been more dynamic in Japan than in the USA during the whole period 1964 to

1998. It is precisely in these 'heavy' sectors that the Japanese firms, entrepreneurs and man

have been mostly innovative in terms of OIs. Overall, Japanese growth rates have been higher,
almost as high, in 20 out of the 28 sectors considered.

Furthermore, and as the Figures (see this text and Appendix 6.A1) for each sector show, the two

national real output series for every industry need in most cases to be twice differenced in
be cointegrated. This means that the two national economies have been following their own
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independent paths of growth. These paths have been much more dependent on their underlying

historical background and their own OIs than their own TIs, since Japan has always been in m

cases an imitator of foreign and, especially, American technology (see sub-section 6.3.4 bel

An example, based on the Non-Ferrous Metals industry, will demonstrate the evidence given by
formal cointegration methodology. Thus a steadily faster growth of the Japanese sector than
American one during the period 1963 to 1998 is shown, as Figures 6.9a and 6.9b exhibit.

Source: Based on U N I D O , 2000. Note: The y-axis represents index numbers.
Figure 6.9a
Non-ferrous metals, indices of industrial production, 1963-1998

From Figure 6.9a we would expect no cointegration as the two national series grow at differe

speeds. Effectively, as the full printout shown in Appendix 6.A2 indicates, all the appropri
such as the one based on the maximum eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix, confirm the noncointegration of the two indexes of real output for non-ferrous metals. From Figure 6.9b we
conclude that the first difference between the Japanese and the American series of output

is not enough to produce a stationary series; however, when "jadus" is differenced once more

("djadus") then we have a stationary series; the unit root tests conducted for the four tim
(the two original ones plus jadus plus djadus) confirm these conclusions.

Source: Based on U N I D O , 2000. Note: The y-axis represents index numbers.
Figure 6.9b
Non-ferrous metals, first a n d second differences, 1963-1998
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6.A3 for the corresponding names.
Figure 6.10 Real output, annual % growth rates, for the USA and Japan, 1964-98

The period 1964 to 1998 will now be split into 3 sub-periods so that more appropriate concl

can be drawn. These sub-periods are between 10 and 13 years long and each one of them includ
a major depression: the period 1964-1976 includes the effect of the first oil price shock,

1977-1986 includes the effect of the second oil price shock, and the period 1987-98 include

1990-91 depression. Figures 6.11 and 6.12 show the changes in growth between the 3 sub-perio
considered.
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Figure 6.11
Japan, real output annual % growth rates, for 3 sub-periods

From these Figures (6.11 and 6.12) the following comments can be made. For the U S A the period

1964 to 1976 saw the highest growth rates in almost all sectors, with the lowest growth rates

occurring in the third period 1987 to 1998. However, there are some outstanding exceptions t

pattern. For the latter period two industries are now leading the American economy, namely n
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electrical machinery (mainly the computers component) and electrical machinery (mainl

semiconductors). These two sectors have been experiencing the highest growth rates (a
double the others) amongst all 28 industries during 1987-98, and higher growth rates

other two sub-periods. Also, during 1987-98, Iron and Steel has been strongly revivin

continued its steady high growth. It will be further shown in this, and the next, cha

currently leading sectors of the American economy have been, more than any other sect
following and imitating Japanese OIs7.
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Figure 6.12
U S A , real output a n n u a l %

g r o w t h rates, for 3 sub-periods

For Japan it is remarkable how the two oil price shocks considerably slowed down almost all
sectors during the second period 1977 to 1986. The three exceptions to this pattern were the two
machinery sectors, especially electrical machinery (in which the Japanese semiconductor subsector was booming during that period), and the professional and precision instruments sector (in
which the photographic equipment and the watches sub-sectors established themselves in the
world). During the third sub-period 1987 to 1998 all sectors experienced a deep plunge, with the
least affected sectors being the electrical machinery, chemicals, non-ferrous metals, petroleum,
paper, and transport. Some explanations will be provided in sub-section 6.3.3 regarding Japanese
manufacturing industries' protracted recession during the 1990s.

7

The machinery sectors, mainly computer related, certainly experienced strong continuous growth in TIs
during the lastfiftyyears or so. However, it was only in the third sub-period 1987-98 (see Figure 6.12) that
these two sectors really boomed, thus supporting, even more, the assertion made here that OIs was the real
reason behind the extra strong growth of output or T F P during 1987-1998 for these two sectors. This will be
further shown in sub-section 6.3.4, section 6.4, and in Chapter seven. Even the role of a booming demand for
computers can be indirectly attributed to the combined effect of, primarily, OIs, and TIs, because these
innovations allowed for computer prices to decrease substantially, hence for demand to increase accordingly.
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In addition, for each sub-period, the growth rates are compared for each sector between the two
countries (see Figures 6.13a, 6.13b, and 6.13c). Some remarks are necessary. First, during the
period 1964 to 1976, only a limited number of industries showed a higher growth rate in the USA

than in Japan (beverages, wood, furniture, printing, plastic, and 'others'). Second, during both
periods 1977 to 1986 and 1987 to 1998 the Americans did perform better than the Japanese in

most industries. However, an interesting reversal took place between these two periods. Whereas,
during 1977 to 1986 the Japanese grew faster in the three leading sectors of non-electrical
machinery, electrical machinery, and professional and precision instruments, the situation was

reversed during the period 1987 to 1998. This is an important finding and will be further explor

in the next chapter where it will be shown that when the Americans imitated the Japanese in term
of OIs they started performing like the Japanese (which means they grew very fast)8.

Second, there were some sectors (chemicals, petrol, non-ferrous metals, and paper) for which the
Japanese growth was still positive in the 1990s. It is especially remarkable for the chemical

industries to have been growing strongly and continually during the whole period of 1963 to 1998

despite some criticisms. For example, Arora et al (1999) observed "...The availability of impor
technology and the general backward state of the chemical industry itself enabled users - firms
downstream sectors - to play a more prominent role in the chemical industry.. .The keiretsu
structure therefore exacerbated the tendency, caused by import protection, toward production at
scales that were too small to be economic..." (p. 245). However, it was precisely the Japanese
characteristics of the chemical industry organization -keiretsu structure, many producers, and

degree of product customization etc- that was the reason for the strong continuous growth of tha
industry. Furthermore, as it can be seen in Figure 6.7 that both the American and Japanese
chemical sectors grew in the same or parallel way after the mid 1970s, despite substantial

differences in OI traits between the two countries9. This confirms one of the key assertions of
study that OIs are conducive to higher economic growth according to specific country contexts,

8

This acceleration in growth is due to the introduction of OIs. However, new OIs are needed all the time for
the growth to be sustained (ceteris paribus).
9
Like in all industries, the TIs in Japan were mostly imported (see previous quote from Arora et al (1999).
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and hence what is good for one country may not be for another in terms of OI
innovations.

O 64-76, USA
• 64-76, JAPAN

Source: Based on UNIDO, 2000.
Figure 6.13a
Real output annual %
1964-1976

growth rates for the U S A and Japan, for
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Source: Based on UNIDO, 2000.
Figure 6.13b
Real output annual %
1977-1986

growth rates for the U S A and Japan, for

Source: Based on UNIDO, 2000.
Figure 6.13c
Real output annual % growth rates for the U S A and Japan, for
1987-1998
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6.3.2 TFP and real output in the USA and Japan from 1960 to 1985

Figure 6.14 shows the average annual rate of change in TFP for Japan and the USA for 28 2-digit
sectors from 1960 to 1980, as calculated by two expert teams, namely, first by Jorgenson et al

(1995), and second by Kuroda et al (1996). The methodology used by both teams was quite similar

and based on Jorgenson (1990). The Figure shows that the differences between the two sources ar
insignificant. Other similar work (for example, Denny et al, 1992) confirms these results. The

main conclusion out of this comparison is the higher TFP in Japan than in the USA in almost all

industries, with the clear exceptions being the agriculture, construction, printing, petroleum,
rubber, and services sectors. Hence, the overwhelming majority of the manufacturing 2-digit
sectors exhibited higher TFP growth rates for Japan than for the USA during that period.

Source: Kuroda et al (1996); Japan (J) (third bar) and U S A (J) (fourth bar) refer to Jorgenson et al (1995).

Figure 6.14

TFP annual % changes for 1960-1980, for both the U S A and Japan

Another conclusion from this Figure is that both countries have been experiencing higher growth

rates in TFP in almost the same sectors, namely the electrical machinery, precision instruments

non-electrical machinery, transport and communication, and fabricated metals. Japan's growth ha

been more pronounced in the chemicals, fabricated metals, lumber, leather, transport equipment,
miscellaneous manufacturing, and finance sectors.

Figure 6.15 concentrates on TFP growth rates from 1960 to 1970 and from 1960 to 1985, as
calculated by Kuroda et al (1996). As expected, TFP was much higher in general for the former
period in Japan, because the 1960-1985 period included two major depressions due to oil price
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shocks. O n the contrary, these depressions did not affect the U S A to the same extent (which is not

a surprising result for this country on account of its large natural resources). Furt

comments made for Figure 6.14 are also valid for this Figure. Figure 6.16 shows the r

growth of real output for Japan and the USA for the period 1960-1985. These rates are

with the rates of TFP. The Japanese growth rates are much higher for both real output
D
•
D
•

Japan 60-70
USA 60-70
Japan 60-85
USA 60-85

Source: Kuroda et al (1996). 'Japan 60-85' and 'USA 60-85' are shown on the third and fourth bars of the
Figure.

Figure 6.15 T F P annual % changes, 2-digit sectors, for 1960-70 and 1960-85, for the
U S A and Japan

Source: Kuroda et al (1996). In the legend, 'ro' means real output.

Figure 6.16

Real output and T F P annual % changes, for 1960-85, U S A and
Japan
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Why did the Japanese economy achieve such a high and sustained economic growth during 1960
to 1985, which was much higher than that experienced by the USA during the same period? What
role did OIs play in this development? The leading manufacturing sectors in Japan have been
mainly electrical machinery, motor vehicles, precision equipment, miscellaneous manufacturing,

and, to a lesser extent, fabricated metals, chemicals and fabricated textiles. In all these prin

industries (and others in general) the quality of the product10 has been the principal force thr

which Japanese firms quickly penetrated foreign markets such as the American one; these markets
have always been open to free competition from abroad (this openness started after WWH,

contrary to Japan which remained more protective of its infant industries until quite recently)
However, this statement about quality begs the question of why Japanese firms achieved such a
reputation for quality in their products after WWII. Chapters four, five and seven extensively

answer this question (summarized in the next paragraph). On the contrary before WWII the qualit

of Japanese products was absent (for confirmation of this historical fact see Best (1990), Odag
and Goto (1996), and Juran (1995)).

In previous chapters, some evidence was provided about the historical predispositions that are
necessary during a certain period for a particular new structure to be formed in a subsequent
period. This new structure may represent a noticeable break in economic terms. This is exactly
what happened to Japan after WWH. The pre-conditions were the existence of a cooperative focal
firm specializing in its core competences, with a strong emphasis on human development, strong

networks, and cooperation, plus a patriotic government. The new structure was the establishment

of a practical spirit for quality products through the implementation of philosophies such as t

JIT/QC system (hence low inventories), the market penetration criterion in business, government
support, a large number of SMEs, a strong domestic competition for many manufacturing subsectors under new more democratic institutions, and so on (other chapters cover most of these
points in more detail).

10

Fujimoto (1999, p. 104) considers four dimensions for a product to be competitive: productivi
throughput time, product quality, and flexibility. However, it should be added that all these dimensions- thus
including quality- are strongly interrelated when considered in the context of the OI of JIT/QC, as explained
elsewhere in this study and by Fujimoto (1999).
" Even at present, many Japanese industries are still protected in various ways (Porter et al, 2000).
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6.3.3

T F P a n d real output in the U S A a n d J a p a n f r o m 1986 to 1997: explanations
of the recent Japanese economic downfall

The following Figures (6.17 and 6.18) summarize the comparative data for T F P and real output

between the two countries during the period 1987 to 1998. These Figures clearly show that

has been going through a deep recession during the last 10 years or so, especially in com

the USA. The manufacturing sectors that exhibited the least reversals are non-ferrous meta

transport, electrical machinery, chemicals, iron and steel, and paper products. A full exa

and explanation of this recent decline in Japanese economic performance cannot be undertak
here. However, in relation to this study some partial relevant views are suggested.
£187-98, TFP, JPN
• 87-98, TFP, U S A

Source: Based on UNIDO, 2000 for both countries; the capital stock data were obtained from N B E R , 2000
for the USA, and from the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) for Japan.
Figure 6.17
1987-1998, T F P annual % changes in Japan a n d the U S A

Source: Based on UNIDO, 2000 for both countries.

Figure 6.18

1987-1998, Real Output (RO) annual % changes for Japan and the
USA
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If we examine all the graphs of sectoral real output for Japan and the USA since 1963 (see
Appendix 6.A1), it is noticeable that m a n y sectors in Japan stopped growing after a certain date
prior to the recent recession. Hence, although for both of these countries leather, footwear, apparel,
and tobacco have been declining or remained stagnant since the 1970s, m a n y other sectors
declined or remained stagnant only for Japan and not for the U S A . These were furniture, w o o d
products, textiles, and beverages. In total, eight out of the 28 3-digit manufacturing sectors have
been performing poorly or even negatively. If, on top of these industries, w e add several service
sectors notorious for their inefficiency in Japan (such as public services, and banks), then this is
suggestive that Japan still is a dual economy. Thus, w e have the leading sectors -transport,
machinery- and their satellites -iron and steel, other metals etc- which have been the pioneering
moving forces of the Japanese economic miracle, and on the other side w e have all the remaining
sectors in manufacturing and services which lag behind in performance and effectiveness.

Many scholars have made similar comments. Porter and Takeuchi (1999) have emphasized the
micro-economic nature of recent Japanese failures. First, they stress ".. .the consensus over Japan's
past success has c o m e overwhelmingly from the robust growth of a relatively small number of
industries..." (p. 67) such as semi-conductors, machine tools, steel and vehicles. In addition
Japan's exports are dominated by a relatively small number of industries in "...automotives,
consumer electronics, office machines, and production machinery. In huge areas of the economy
there are few if any successful exporters, including chemicals, packaged goods, services, and
health care..." (p. 72). Second, the same authors in their extensive study (1999, p. 78) remark:

"...Many of Japan's failures can also be traced to fragmented, inefficient, and anachronistic

domestic sectors such as retailing, wholesaling, logistics, financial services, health care
trucking, telecommunications, housing, and agriculture. By design, government policies

created two Japans: one composed of highly productive export industries, the other containi

domestic sectors... The inefficient Japan drives up business costs across the board, weakeni
competitiveness of the export industries... "

From the OIs point of view the same writers Porter and Takeuchi (1999) recognize the importance
of JJTVQM in Japan's economic growth (p. 71):
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"...The model of Japanese corporate success centers on the notion that a company can achie

both high quality and low cost by employing- and continuously improving-fundamentally bett

managerial practices. The idea is that companies compete by relentlessly staying at thefront

best practice. This model is not an abstract theory but stemsfromextraordinary advances mad

Japanese companies after the introduction of now well-known managerial practices, such as to
quality management (TQM), lean production, and close supplier relationships... "

However, still from the OIs point of view, the same authors pinpoint some relative weaknesses in
Japan's organizational structures. These are various activities such as planning and control,
finance, logistics, distribution, order processing, customer information, and after-sales service,
information technology, the Internet, marketing, and office operations. Consequently, Porter and
Tekeuchi (1999, p. 81) suggest that the "...companies must m o v e from an exclusively egalitarian,
seniority-driven model to one where doing things differently is rewarded in compensation,
advancement, and opportunities for entrepreneurship..." In the book version of the just cited
article, Porter et al (2000, p. 189) recommended that Japan must m o v e beyond competition just
based on quality products to competing on strategy and innovation that result in 'true profitability'.

According to Mroczkowski and Hanaoka (1998), the following changes have already been taking
place in Japan:
1. Performance-based evaluation and rewards: by 1995, 7 5 % of Japanese companies
administered pay by competency and merit (and hence not by seniority), whereas in 1987
the relevant percentage was 5 4 % , and in 1978 it was 4 2 % . These figures are supported by
other surveys as well.
2. Evidence of change in social values: Japanese employees' attitudes are moving away from
loyalty to the company and towards identification with their profession.
3. Manipulation of working time: overall hours worked (including overtime) are being
reduced in larger companies. Also the use of flextime systems is increasing. However,
both these elements are not true for S M E s .
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4. Early retirement: this means a job transfer to a subsidiary or affiliated company under less
attractive conditions. Again, SMEs lag behind the larger firms in implementing this policy
(in 1995,17% as against 40% respectively).
5. Lifetime employment and transfers: the "koyochosei" (employment adjustment) is now
replaced by the "shukko" system (either temporary or permanent transfer to other
companies)12.
6. Employment of women and foreigners: between 1992 and 1995 the proportion of women
in management positions has doubled, although is still low by international standards.
Although the attitude of employers has changed rapidly, 40% of Japanese companies
employ foreigners whose status is still inferior to that of Japanese workers.

The same authors (1998) predict that probably by 2010 the Japanese management system, at least

in terms of human resources, will be like that in the West. This prediction is based on surveys t
conducted with Japanese company managers, academics, and management consultants. However,
it must be added that it seems too difficult to change a history of more than a 100 years within
time frame of 10 to 20 years. Japan will emerge out of this new crisis (like many other crises

during the last two centuries) with a new organizational outlook, which will be a marriage betwee

the old features and some new ones and hence it will not be just another Western country. In this

respect it is important to refer to Fujimoto's (1999, p. 6) analysis: "...'Japanese-ness no longe
seems such a magic bullet, and it's now clear that the organizational capabilities (my emphasis)
individual companies-especially Toyota- make a real difference..." Thus, for Toyota, these
capabilities have been taking place during the 1990s, together with some developments in TIs, as
summarized by Fujimoto (1999) in his analysis of Toyota's new assembly systems13. In addition,

for Toyota, there is a strong force of what Fujimoto calls 'the organizational preparedness' that

12

Lincoln and Nakata (1997) have similar views on most of these issues.
These systems included the autonomous complete assembly line (eventually combining the physical,
functional, and organizational elements of the new system), the in-line mechanical automation concept
(based on trial and error steps of implementation), the Toyota verification of assembly line (an ergonomics
evaluation system also mentioned in Chapter five as an example of measurement of the P O M ) , and the lowcost equipment for better ergonomics (Fujimoto, 1999, Chapter seven). As this author mentions, an
intraorganizational evolutionary mechanism exists in Toyota which is still based on selection mechanisms
generated at the bottom of the management hierarchy, or genba, and on a high level of standardization and
documentation (Ibid, pp. 268-9).
13
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constantly associates the outcomes of the system emergence (emergence to find solutio
opportunities for capability building14 (Ibid, p. 273).

The analysis conducted in this sub-section so far has shown that Japan still has much

accomplish in order to have a more stable economy. It is often forgotten that this co
enormous progress since W W I I does not necessarily mean that problems of under development no
longer exist. The Japanese dual economic nature will eventually disappear, but until then many
changes in terms of OIs must take place. This is consistent with one of the key points of this thesis,
namely that OIs which are good for one country's economic growth are not necessarily good for
another and that OIs which are good in one historical stage of economic development are not
necessarily good for another historical stage. This point is consistent with the contingency theory
of management.
Several other authors have taken a similar stance. It is worth noting that 20 years ago, Abernathy,
Clark, and Kantrow (1983), expressed the same ideas and predicted a Japanese downfall:

"...The modern Japanese system of production is not some manufacturing Nirvana,fr

tensions and problems that beset such systems elsewhere. It is the result of a set

choices and trade-offs and is appropriate not to every economic context imaginable b

the specific context of postwar Japan. If that country's social or political sta

problematical, if the work force ages too greatly, if expectations about living sta

quickly, if key industries cannot sustain their rate of growth, if- in short- changi

the lie to the assumptions on which much of that production system rests, it will inev
strain... " (p. 84)

This extract hints at the contingency theory of management, and the 'changing conditi
mention have actually taken place during the last decade in Japan. In brief, there are no leading or
key sectors any more in that country (as demonstrated by the sectoral analysis above), the
population is aging rapidly, the younger generation has higher expectations about living standards
without the willingness to do the 'dirty' jobs any more, and social and political stability is no
longer so strong in Japan (for example see EAAU, 1997).

14

For all these concepts see the last section of Chapter five.
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The importance of leading sectors in the present economic situation in Japan has become a key

issue in economic circles of that country, according to Ito (1996, p. 236): "...Unless there is
structural reform, new industries will not emerge and the slow growth will continue. The
appropriate kind of reform and the new leading industries that might emerge are debated

intensively in Japan..." This author examined several sectors which might benefit from structur
reform in terms of promoting competition: airlines, telecommunications and broadcasting,
financial services, distribution, agriculture and land use. The same author, like many others,

analyzed the importance of the share and land price bubble and its collapse in the late 1990s i

explaining the long recession in Japan. Finally, it is worth noting the role of the globalizati
tendencies present in many Japanese firms and its consequences in terms of growth in Japan and

terms of changes in OIs such as the sub-contracting process. Ito (1996, p. 220) quotes some fig
of employment that are very revealing of the globalization tendencies: the number of employees
Japanese Asian and North American subsidiaries substantially increased between 1990 and 1994,
whereas employment in Japanese manufacturing fell in a comparable way during the same period.

Regarding the sub-contracting system, there is gathering evidence that it has undergone substan
change to accommodate for the very weak demand for consumer products. Turner (1994) observed
that Japanese companies were sub-contracting more labor-intensive work overseas, particularly

within Asia; also, he remarked that the keiretsu system was beginning to loosen up. A similar v
is expressed by Sugiura (2002) who talks about the meltdown of the automobile keiretsu, the
metamorphosis of industrial agglomerations, and the weakening of the entrepreneurial spirit.
However, we cannot as yet generalize; for instance Lincoln et al (1998, p.242) concluded,

"...While some prominent keiretsu partnerships are indeed loosening, elsewhere the form is aliv
and well..."

Other radical changes are taking place in the last few years; for example, the competition with

imports is intensified (Lux, 1997); also, Japan finally 'goes web crazy' (Rohwer, 2000). This new
direction will certainly alter several economic structures as this last author comments.
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"...Japan is what you might call a middleman economy, and if there is anything the Internet is

great at, it's killing off middlemen. Whether it's banking, retailing, or health care, the In

lower transaction costs, reduce the number of workers, and streamline communications... " (Ib
116)
All these changes and perhaps m a n y others15, such as firing of employees (a rare phenomenon
before this prolonged recession), are indicative that m a n y n e w OIs will eventually emerge and
probably n e w leading sectors will come forward. Thus, L u x (1997, p. 38) suggests: "...By
combining the best of Western management with the best of Japan and the dedication of Japanese
employees, companies that will be able to accomplish this transformation process successfully will
become awesome competitors again..." K o n o and Clegg (2001) also suggest a n e w hybrid
Japanese model of management and production that will retain m a n y existing features and adopt
new ones such as horizontal alliances and more flexible employment. Finally, the dilemma about
whether the 'Western' or 'Japanese' overall system of production is superior is only a rhetorical
question. A s emphasized several times so far, what is 'good' in one country or in one period (for
instance, regarding OIs or TIs) is not necessarily 'good' in another country or in another period.

6.3.4 The role of TIs in the USA and Japan since WWII

In this sub-section a comparison of TIs in the two countries will be outlined (although the an
is far from exhaustive). This comparison is more an account of what happened in Japan than in the
U S A , but since Japan has been mainly an imitator of technologies the comparison is rather
implicit. A s will be seen both nations adopted similar technologies almost everywhere, despite
some lags and leads of a short duration, mainly because Japanese firms substantially copied
American firms. This process of technical copying w a s accompanied by adaptations and
appropriate changes to fit local circumstances; however, the Japanese also introduced n e w
products mainly in the electronics industry (see below) and in personal items such as crystal quartz
watches and automatic cameras (cf. K o n o and Clegg, p. 206). Thus, the conclusions of this
comparison further support the argument that differences between the rates of growth of American

15

Some propositions for changes are quite radical. For instance, Tezuka (1997) proposes that the intense
competitive nature of many Japanese industries might be an impediment to economic growth.
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and Japanese industries are due to differences in OIs and not TIs, since TIs have been basicall
similar in the two countries in most cases.

Before briefly analyzing some major industries in terms of TIs (and incidentally of OIs) it is
mentioning six important aspects of the Japanese way of importing foreign technology (Odagiri
and Goto, 1996, pp. 39-40).

1. Imported machinery and equipment assisted many industries in a critical way to improve
product quality and productivity. Domestic machinery manufacturing then tried to reverseengineer, by copying the imported capital until eventually they completely replaced it.
2. Japanese firms eagerly sought technological agreements primarily with the USA and also with
European firms.
3. Consultants, mostly Americans, were hired to help to modernize the production processes.
4. The purchase of blueprints was also common.
5. Japanese companies often sent their engineers abroad to seek promising technologies.

6. Japan restricted foreign direct investment (FDI) until the gradual liberalization in the lat
1960s and the early 1970s. However, even today, FDI still remains at a relatively low level.

6.3.4.1 Iron and steel industries

These industries in Japan, like the others described in this sub-section (and generally like al

industries), were initially protected by government measures until they took off and, at the sa

time, they were very competitive in their structure as oligopolies. This competition was one of
main reasons why some leading steel firms in Japan were pioneers in introducing new imported
technologies and subsequently substantially improving on them. Following Odagiri and Goto's
(1996) account, some examples will illustrate the industry.

At the start of the 1950s, Kawasaki Steel decided to build a new large plant despite the fact t

two-thirds of the existing furnaces were then idle in Japan. The real novelty of this plant was

related not to TIs but to OIs in terms of location and layout. Whereas it was common to build a
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ironworks near a coal mine or an iron-ore mine, Kawasaki's entrepreneurial spirit (through

president) built the new plant near the huge market of Tokyo and it developed a layout suc

movements of materials and half-made products were minimized. This OI was soon followed by
other steel producers in a very competitive oligopolistic market.

However, it was also TIs that made Japanese firms the best in the world during the second

the 20th century. In the first place, the new technology of a basic oxygen furnace was impo

from Austria, but it was soon found that there were major problems in operating such furna
These problems were resolved with some TIs introduced by the Japanesefirmsand in particular by
the Yawata Company, which invented an oxygen converter gas recovery system that was soon

adopted worldwide. Second, another technology known as continuous casting, that was origin
developed in Switzerland, was imported by the Kawasaki firm w h o built a n e w plant with this
technology in 1967, pushed again to take such a risky decision by the intense prevailing

oligopolistic competition. By 1980 the process of continuous casting had been adopted by 6
Japanese plants but only 2 0 % of American plants (Odagiri and Goto, 1996, p. 152). A s these two
authors remarked:

"...As a result of this and other innovations, Japan's productivity increase has outp

other countries with companies starting to export technology and know-how in plant con

and operation to many countries, including both developing countries, such as Bra

developed countries, such as Italy and the USA. In 1974 receipt of royalties exceeded paym
thefirsttime among Japanese industries... "

These 'other innovations' referred to in the above quote were not only TIs but also, and p
mainly, OIs as these two writers emphasized. The OIs included the active participation of workers
in management and technical matters, so that firms attained company-wide involvement in

productivity improvement. Florida and Kenney (1992) analyzed some of these OIs in Japan an
Japanese F D I in the U S A ; thus, the firm N K K , for example, pioneered the use of Q C circles in the

steel industry; the same authors have also stressed differences between the American and J
TIs and OIs, for instance "...The U S steel industry was the paradigmatic case of 'Taylorist'

scientific management.. .In contrast, the Japanese steel industry developed a system of pr
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organization and labor-management relations that harnessed workers' intellectual as well as
physical capabilities..." (Ibid, p. 150).

6.3.4.2 Automotive industries
Cars were first developed by the Europeans at the end of the 19th century, but it was the
Americans, with Ford's mass production, that popularized car consumption in the 1910s and

1920s. The Japanese made many attempts to establish their own vehicle industry from the start

the 20th century (Odagiri and Goto, 1996), but it was only in the 1930s that they finally succe
with Nissan and Toyota. Again, the technology (TIs) was mostly imported or, through reverse
engineering, adapted and probably improved. Odagiri and Goto, (1996) provide us with some
details. Nissan, in their Yokohama plant before WWII, bought the whole production equipment

including jigs and tools as well as technology from the Graham-Paige Company in Detroit, and

shipped them to Japan (this American company was the 14th largest auto producer in the USA bu
was planning to liquidate because of financial difficulties). Nissan repeated technology
importation after WWII when it formed a tie-up with British Austin.

For Toyota the story is similar to Nissan's, but is more creative in terms of both TIs and OI

of Toyota's engineers stayed in the USA at Ford and other plants, and upon his return to Japa
started to disassemble a Chevrolet engine and copy it in an experimental plant built within
Toyoda16 Automatic Loom. Eventually, Toyota decided to use many of Chevrolet's and Ford's

parts and also buy many materials and components from outside suppliers. This was the origin

this company's supplier system. By 1938 Toyota had an R&D division, thus putting an official

emphasis on its determination to create its own car technology. This took place much later a
WWH with the development of the Corolla model and so on.

The impossibility of foreign firms exporting to Japan, or setting up production facilities w
Japan, led some of them to sell their technology (TIs) to Japanese firms. Thus, Rootes (UK,

producer of Hillman, later acquired by Chrysler and then Peugeot), Renault (France), and Willy
16

Toyoda is the original name of Toyota motors.
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Overland (USA, producer of jeep, later acquired by American Motors and then Chrysler)
consented to sell their technology to, respectively, Isuzu, Hino, and Mitsubishi. After these tie-ups
started in 1952-3, Japanese firms succeeded in complete domestic production within 5 years
(Odagiri and Goto, 1996. p. 196).

These brief reports of some major car producers in Japan clearly show that the technology (T
both the U S A and Japan w a s similar, since the Japanese mostly imitated Western vehicle
producers. Consequently, one can safely conclude that the success of the Japanese car industry did
not lie in TIs but in OIs. Odagiri and Goto, 1996. p. 202 s u m m e d up the situation as follows.
"...The strength of the post-war Japanese automobile industry is probably most evident in

ofproduction management and human resource management, including training programs and t

TQC (total quality control) movement. Toyota's kanban and just-in-time production syst
keiretsu supplier system are well-known... "

6.3.4.3 Electrical and electronic industries

Table 6.4 shows the major electrical appliances introduced in the postwar era (Mowery and
Rosenberg, 1998). These appliances were mostly western innovations, but the Japanese firms also
contributed, especially after 1970 with n e w electronic goods (see below). Although color T V was
initially developed by the Americans and Europeans in the 1960s the Japanese not only, once
more, successfully imitated at the beginning, but they also introduced their o w n creations in terms
of the Trinitron tube by Sony and solid-state color receiver by Hitachi (Clark, 1987). Several other
new products were developed in this industry, such as games machines, high quality L C D s and
D V D s , as demonstrated below.
Table 6.4 Major electrical appliances introduced in the postwar era
1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

Refrigerator-freezer
Television
Clothes dryer
Automatic washing
machine
R o o m air conditioner

Color television
Dishwasher
Central air conditioning
Space heating

Microwave oven
Heat p u m p
Trash compactor
Food processor

H o m e computer
Large-screen television
Video cassette recorder
Compact-disc player

Frost-free refrigeratorfreezer
Waste disposal

Source: Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998, p. 108

H o m e satellite receiver
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Although the Americans invented the transistor in 1947 it was only in 1955 that the Japanese
succeeded in making a transistor themselves after some years of struggle, especially in purifying
silicon to almost 1 0 0 % . Odagiri and Goto (1996, p. 166) quoted one of the Japanese 'inventors',
Kikuchi saying: "...Some people say that the transistor was just a borrowed technology. I would
like to say from m y o w n experience that the transistor is a kind of thing that, if you can copy it, it
in itself is a spectacular achievement..." Sony's transistor radio tells us a similar story. Though
Sony had already developed and marketed tape recorders by 1952, it was not until it m a d e the
transistor radio another successful consumer product that this company became a household n a m e
and a multinational. A t the beginning of production and marketing of this radio the ratio of defects
was very high despite the huge efforts by Sony's officer Ibuka to technically improve the transistor
quality; at the same time competition with other large domestic producers became intense very
quickly. A s Odagiri and Goto (1996, p. 168) narrated:

"... The only solution was to reduce defects. According to Ibuka, it was the instinct and insis

a female production worker to scrutinize all the processes to find out the causes of defects.

Following her suggestions, the engineers started the cumbersome task of testing every produc

every point of the process and came to the conclusion that the use of antimony caused the proble

After several trials, they started using phosphorus instead and the yield rate greatly improved
innovation helped Sony to solve both of the problems above and put the company in a more
advantageous position in its competition against other larger rivals... "

Sony's case just briefly described also shows another aspect of interplay between OIs and TIs.
That is, the workers' participation in improving the product and the production process, which is
an OI, had a positive impact on TIs.

Integrated circuits (ICs) became a practical device around 1959 with the invention of solid-stat
circuits by Texas Instruments, and the introduction of planar processing to interconnect circuit
elements at Fairchild Semiconductors in the U S A . Despite some n e w methods to bypass the planar
processing by Hitachi and Toshiba, semiconductor technology w a s further advanced in Japan
because of the world'sfirstelectronic calculator introduced by Sharp in 1964 (Odagiri and Goto,
1996, p. 171) priced at US$1400. B y 1969, Sharp had reduced its price to U S $ 3 0 0 by using
American large-scale ICs (LSI) (produced by Rockwell). Before this last version, Sharp had used
Japanese metal oxide semiconductor ICs produced by Mitsubishi, Hitachi, and N E C . In 1971 there
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were at least 20 Japanese and several foreign firms (thus making a total of 33) producing a

calculator to the one by Sharp. The calculator war eventually ended leaving only two survivor
Sharp and Casio.

However, as Odagiri and Goto (1996, p. 173) remarked: "...The Japanese suppliers had by then

established LSI technology and their reliability in quality and delivery helped them to rega

position as the main suppliers of semiconductors to calculator producers..." For instance, in

of quality, in a test of about 300,000 memory chips (bought from American and Japanese firms)

conducted by Hewlett-Packard in the late 1970s, none of the Japanese lots was rejected on acc

of failures, whereas the failures for American chips ranged from 0.11 to 0.19 per cent (Ibid,
274). As extensively analyzed elsewhere in this study the quality control and just-in-time
processes (JIT/QC) were the main weapons that Japanese firms had against American technical
superiority, in order to establish themselves in world markets. Thus, once more, OIs seem to
themselves as being very important in promoting industrial growth through leading firms.

Finally, regarding the origins of microprocessors, Intel in the USA was the innovator in 1971

the 4004 model. Once again the Japanese firms were the followers, though, as Odagiri and Goto

(1996, p. 173) remarked, it was also a Japanese engineer who helped Intel to develop the firs
microprocessors which triggered the PC (personal computer) revolution.

6.4 THE GROWTH OF SOME LEADING FIRMS AND SECTOR
IMPORTANCE OF OIs
6.4.1 The semiconductor industry

(A story based on Langlois and Steinmueller's (1999, pp. 19-78) analysis of the world evoluti
this industry).

This industry started with the invention of the transistor by American researchers in the Be
telephone Laboratories after WWII. This invention became innovation17 in business through
AT&T's commercial applications and this company's policy to let the diffusion of the new
17

".. .Innovation is the initial commercialization of invention..." (Grant, 1998, p.267).
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technology to many other interested parties. Subsequent researchers and entrepreneurs gradual

established what is known today as 'Silicon Valley", a Marshallian industrial district, in th
In the first place germanium metal was used for the transistor, but it was taken over by the
substance towards the end of the 1960s. During that time the American Defence department was
the main user. By 1960-61 the Americans were producing and consuming about 10 times more
semiconductors than the Japanese, and 20 times more than the major European countries.

Meanwhile, Japan, through some governmental protectionist policies, boosted its semiconductor

industry, which, as a result, had an export surplus from 1956 to 1968. About 70% of this indu
market remained in consumer electronics such as transistor radios.

Then the integrated-circuit (IC) era arrived. This era revolutionized the whole electronics i

and eventually the whole economy. This can be seen through the explosive way that ICs grew in
30 years (from about 1960 to 1990): ".. .Transistor counts per IC increased from 10 to 4,000

first decade of the industry's history; from 4,000 to over 500,000 in the second decade; and
500,000 to 100 million in the third decade..." (Ibid, p. 32). One of the impacts this new
revolutionary technology had on the American semiconductor sector was that the vertically

integrated American electronics companies, that had led to the production of vacuum tubes, an
that had been able to stay in the race during the discrete semiconductor era, became almost
completely non-existent by 1975 from the top list of leading firms. At the same time many
relatively new and smaller specialized manufacturers entered the market; this was consistent
the strategy of 'core competences' (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) as the authors Langlois and
Steinmueller remarked (1999, p. 33).

Meanwhile, a parallel strong development of the computer industry helped IBM become the

dominant firm not only in computers but also in semiconductors during the 1970s. Thus, in the

USA, there was, besides the two giant captive producers AT&T and IBM, a cluster of many, smal

highly specialized merchant firms, which focused on their core competences while expanding th

technical abilities. All these companies faced two options, either to produce high volume sta
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products such as memories or/and to produce differentiated products. For a time, they were ab
do well with both sets of strategies.

However, during the period between late 1970s and late 1980s the situation changed dramatical

Whereas in 1978 American sales of semiconductors and ICs constituted 59% and 74% respectively
of the world market as against 28% and 20% for Japan, in 1989 the corresponding figures were
43% (semiconductors), 45% (ICs) for the USA and 48% and 47% respectively for Japan. The

authors (Ibid, p. 41) explained that since the profit margins of the American semiconductor (

IC) industry had always been relatively low, not enough investment was possible from retained
earnings for a flexible and dynamic production path with serious ups and downs of economic

activity. On the contrary the Japanese firms, being more vertically integrated than the Ameri

ones in this particular industry, were able to mobilize internal capital resources to make th
necessary investments to expand capacity and enhance manufacturing quality18.

Indeed, the Japanese firms expanded their production of IC capacity in order to produce for t
emerging dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) market in very large quantities. This strategy

was assisted by a strong internal end-use demand originating mainly from consumer electronics
and to a lesser extent from telecommunications19. This entire situation was further assisted
active involvement of NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) and of MITI. Did the Japanese

finally dominate the world semiconductor industry?20 The answer is no. The American resurgence
took place from the late 1980s and is still running its course. Despite the concentration of

American firms on producing NMOS (negative metal oxide semiconductor) in the first place, the
switched to the more used CMOS (complementary MOS) with considerable success. Overall,
"...What evidence is there that American firms improved their manufacturing productivity

significantly?" the authors asked (Ibid, p. 49). Besides the indirect evidence that they held
market shares in a number of product segments,
18

Malerba (1985) has more holistic views. Overall, "...the successful catch-up of the Japanes
conductor industry vis-a-vis the American industry during the large-scale integration period can be
explained by supply, demand and policy factors..." (Ibid, p. 205)
19
The importance of demand, as well as supply and public policy in relation to technological evolution for
the period up to about 1985 is well described in Malerba (1985).
20
Meanwhile the Europeans were never able to threaten the American-Japanese supremacy in this field.
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"...There is also more direct evidence. One of the factors driving the success of Japanesefir
memory products in the early 1980s was the higher quality of the chips they produced. For

Japanese chips, defect rates- thefractionof chips that prove to be defective - were probably hal

one-tenth the rates for American products. By the second half of that decade, however, America

firms had dramatically increased expenditures for quality control, imitating Japanese pract

such as total quality management (TQM), greater attention to preventive maintenance, an
automated process control and monitoring. By the early 1990s, American manufacturers had

probably begun to match the defect levels of their Japanese counterparts. Intel reportedly red
its defect rate by a factor of 10. There is also evidence that American firms have improved

manufacturing yield rates and direct labor productivity since the early 1990s... " (Ibid, p. 49).

Furthermore, the American semiconductor (and CI) industry (AST) gradually became more
narrow-product focused, and more specialized, building on existing competences in design
(especially of logic and specialty circuits, such as the microprocessor unit ( M P U ) . The increasing
decoupling of design from production reinforced this specialization; at the same time, the A S I
became more globalized.

Finally, the governments' role in shaping the new situation was positive but not significant to t
point of being predominant. For instance, the American and Japanese authorities signed the
Semiconductor Trade Agreement ( S T A ) in 1986 to control prices and monitor outputs, which
induced the M I T T to create a mechanism to police and manage the Japanese cartel of chip
producers. Eventually, for other reasons as well, that cartel collapsed. In the U S A the
Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Consortium (Sematech) mainly contributed in the
enforcement of cooperation between the American chip producers, thus imitating again the
"Japanese M o d e l " of collaboration, cooperation, and coordination within the system of keiretsus.

The revival of the ASI can be gauged by considering the firm Intel which became the largest IC
producer in the world with sales of $9.85 billion in 1994, $1 billion more than the second largest
producer N E C of Japan. Intel's principal competitors are also American firms, such as Motorola,
Cyrix and A M D . Based on the same source, Table 6.5 summarizes the differences between the
ASI (especially during its revival between the late 1980s and n o w ) and the Japanese
semiconductor industry (JSI). The emphasis in this Table is put on various aspects of OIs.
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Table 6.5

Differences between A S I a n d JSI

The ASI

The JSI

Smaller independent firms clustered in industrial
districts

IC producers are also typically computer producers

Efforts concentrated in core competences

Failure to develop a vibrant domestic personal
computer industry
M o r e vertically integrated firms
Consumer-related applications
Memory-intensive chips production (e.g. D R A M s )
M a s s production and low value per unit produced

Fragmentation and vertical specialization
Finer division of labor
Wider network of capabilities
Burgeoning domestic personal computer industry
and market
Computer-related applications

N o major consumer-related n e w products in the last
12 years or so
Design-intensive logic chips production (e.g. Intense competition between large producers,
MPUs)
mainly keiretsus
High value per unit produced
The D R A M s market penetrated by other Asian
countries (especially Korea, Taiwan)
Recent practices of T Q C , JIT
Traditional practices of T Q C , JIT
Source: Based on Langlois and Steinmueller's (1999). A S I stands for Japanese semiconductor industry, and

ASI for American semiconductor industry.

6.4.2 The personal computer (PC) industry and the Dell Computers Corporation
(Dell C C )
(A story based on Thomson and Gamble's (2001, pp. C-132 to C-173) analysis of the evolution of
this industry in the U S A in the most recent period).

Dell C C is one of the most successful business stories in the U S A in the last 20 years. It is also an
excellent example of how an entrepreneur (M. Dell), his managers and his personnel have

pioneered the introduction of OIs (and not TIs) in order to become the industry's leader no

the USA but also globally. The initial OIs were marketing-oriented: Dell's new company in 198
was able to sell IBM clones at about 40% below the price of an IBM PC; also, Dell sold his

computers directly to large customers and eventually to individual customers through the int

By late 1997 Dell had become the global industry leader in keeping costs down by achieving wh

Dell called a 'virtual integrated' firm- "...a stitching together of Dell's business with it
partners and customers in real time such that all three appeared to be part of the same
organizational team..." (p. C-136).

Overall, Dell's three golden rules have become: (1) Disdain inventory, (2) Always listen to the
customer, and (3) Never sell indirect. The first rule will now be closely scrutinized.
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The companies which started the PC industry in the 1980s manufactured many of the components
themselves, thus being at least partially vertically integrated. However, as the industry grew very
rapidly, as TIs were introduced morefrequently,the P C manufacturers could not keep pace with

being experts on all fronts, thus more and more specialist firms emerged that could mass-produc
cheaper and technologically advanced components. Consequently, vertical disintegration became
more and more prevalent in P C producers. Dell CC'sfirststeps consistent with its established rule
to sell directly to customers captured this tendency for vertical disintegration. All this entailed two
fundamental features of this company: an extensive outsourcing and virtually no in-house stock of
finished goods inventories. Dell's build-to-order policy has been working in all directions.

Dell CC established long-term relationships with its best suppliers, such as Intel and Sony, an
the basis for JIT delivery of suppliers' products to Dell's assembly plants. At the same time Dell
C C itself practiced JTT, thus yielding major cost advantages and shortening the time it took for
Dell to get n e w generations of its computer models into the marketplace. T h o m s o n and Gamble
(2001, p. C-150) quoted Dell himself explaining the economics of minimal inventories.

"...If I've got 11 days of inventory and my competitor has 80 and Intel comes out with a new 45

megahertz chip, that means I'm going to get to market 69 days sooner. In the computer industr

inventory can be a pretty massiveriskbecause if the cost of materials is going down 50% a ye

and you have two or three months of inventory versus 11 days, you 've got a big cost disadvantag

And you 're vulnerable to product transitions, when you can get stuck with obsolete inventory

The results of this deliberate JIT philosophy are impressive: only a few days of inventory for
components and a few hours for others. In 1995, Dell C C averaged an inventory turn ratio of 32
days; in 1999, the ratio was 6 days' supply; the long-term goal is to reach a 3-day average supply.
All these efforts have m a d e Dell C C the low cost leader of the P C industry, and a high profit
company.

Still regarding the JTT system, it is worth quoting the authors Thomson and Gamble (2001, p. C147_48) about a change of the operations on the shop floor that generated a huge productivity
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increase. This quote shows in a very concrete manner a good example of the process of
movements ( P O M ) and its related kinetic costs, as fully explained in the previous chapter.

"... Until 1997, Dell operated its assembly lines in traditional fashion, with each worker perf

a single operation. An order form accompanied each metal chassis across the production flo

drives, chips, and ancillary items were installed to match customer specifications. As a

assembled PC arrived at a new workstation, the operator, standing beside a tall steel rack

drawers full of components, was instructed what to do by little red and green lightsflashingbe

the drawers containing the components the operator needed to install. When the operator was

finished, the drawers containing the used components were automatically replenishedfromth

other side, and the PC chassis glided down the line to the next workstation. However, Dell

reorganized its plants in 1997, shifting to 'cell manufacturing' techniques whereby a te

workers operating at a group workstation (or cell) assembled an entire PC according to custo

specification. The shift to cell manufacturing reduced Dell's assembly times by 75 percent
doubled productivity per square foot of assembly space... "

A summary of Dell CC's OIs is now presented so that a whole picture can be obtained.
Build-to-order manufacturing
Partnerships with suppliers
JTT components inventories
Direct sales to customers
Award-winning customer service and technical support
Pioneering use of the Internet and e-commerce technology
Strong demand forecasting skills
Comparative advertisements
T e a m work at all levels
Avoidance of hierarchical structures in governance

All these OIs (the TIs were almost entirely absent) made Dell CC the leader in the PC industry
surpassing previous leaders such as I B M and C o m p a q in a very short time. N o w , Dell CC's main
competitors are trying to imitate the leader by introducing their o w n JIT process, their build-toorder manufacturing and to speed n e w models to market. However, it is hard to duplicate Dell's
approach, as previous cases in other industries have shown (see Chapter seven for more details on
the dissemination of the JIT/QC process). Thus, as of mid-1999 Compaq's order-to-delivery time
was approximately 12 days versus 3.1 days at Dell (Thomson and G a m b l e (2001, p. C-165).
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To sum up this fascinating story, M. Dell started his company from scratch in 1984 and today
the world leader followed by Compaq, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Gateway, Toshiba, about 30,000

resellers of generic or 'house-label' PCs in North America alone and countless thousands more
worldwide. All this was achieved by adopting, or introducing, OIs and virtually no major TIs

all21. Dell's story in the PC industry is similar to Toyota's story in the car industry, as f
importance of OIs is concerned22.

6.4.3 The chemical industry and the Du Pont Company

(A story based on Chandler's (1977, 1990) analysis of the evolution of this industry in the U
the last 100 years).

The chemical industry started its global character from the end of the 19th century through th
leadership of only a few American and German firms. The Japanese chemical industry gradually
became important in the last 60 years or so and now it ranks second after the j^merican one,
mainly by adopting technology (TIs) licensed from abroad or simply transferred with the

assistance of American specialized process design and engineering contractors (Arora et al, 1

Intellectual property rights, especially patent rights, have often been crucial in this manuf
sector. However, as will be shown in the following paragraphs, OIs also played a substantial

in the development of this sector. The American chemical firms remained the same as they were
initially formed around the turn of the 19th century in terms of vertical integration and

diversification until the late 1970s. But, by the mid-1980s some significant restructuring t

based on more specialization, especially regarding the high value added products, thus rever
the secular trend of diversification (Ibid).

In the USA the pioneers, who between 1880 and 1910 saw the huge potential in new chemical

technologies, remained leaders for decades. Nearly all the chemical firms listed among the to

1948 had been operating since the first decade of the 20th century. They heavily invested in t

There are other issues such as the issue of demand that are not included in this brief historical account. A
more comprehensive study should include arguments along the lines presented by Bresnahan and Malerba
(1999).
22
Reference is made primarily to the JIT/QC or LP system.
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production of new products, built the necessary product-specific marketing and distribution ne
and recruited the essential hierarchical management including teams of chemists and chemical

engineers. The great merger movement of the late 1890s and the beginning of the 1900s had less

impact on industrial chemicals than on most other .American industries. There were three merge
great significance: the E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Company formed between 1902 and 1904,
the General Chemical company formed in 1899 out of 11 producers of sulphuric and chemically

related acids; and the Barrett Company, consolidated in 1896 out of several firms producing co

products. The mergers permitted the transformation of these companies into centralized functio
departmentalized new organizations, which also sought diversification into new products.

By 1910 the structure of the various sectors of the chemical industry had become clearly defin
explosives, synthetic alkalies, and sulfuric acid, integration of production and distribution

in the domination of each branch by a single or two large firms. In electrochemicals the struc

more oligopolistic. In organic chemicals, in particular dyes and pharmaceuticals, the German f
movers dominated the American markets- only Monsanto Chemical formed by J. F. Queeny in 1902
was an American challenger.

The example of the Du Pont Company deserves more attention. In what follows, the most appropri

POFOs on each one of the events that shaped this Company are identified (see Chapter five abou

POFOs). In this firm the creators of the transformation from horizontal combination to vertical

integration, and from a loose agglomeration of plants to a centralized functionally department

structure (POC, POM), were trained engineers who knew first hand the most advanced administrat

practices on the railroads and in the steel, electrical, and machinery industries (POW, as qua
labor).

In 1896, Coleman Du Pont hired F. W. Taylor to install a new cost and control system at three
plants (POW, POM). Finally, it was the three Du Pont cousins who first completely reorganized
family business in the early 1900s. By 1903 the cousins consolidated the two previous related
horizontal combinations of the Gunpowder Trade Association formed in 1872 and the Eastern
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Dymamite Company formed in 1895. Their aim was to dominate the industry and for this they

listened to A. Moxham, one of the top managers, who urged them not to take on more than 60% of

industry's capacity so that control of the market would be more effective in slack times (POS)

plants of the constituent companies were placed into one of the three operating departments- b
powder, high explosives and smokeless powder (POM, POC). Branch offices manned by salaried
managers replaced the existing sales agencies (POM, POC). Soon, as in the General Electric
Company, product managers supervised the sales from headquarters (POC, POM).

The sales department and the three operating departments had their own vice president in charg

own engineering, research, control, personnel and accounting staff; advertising and informatio

also included in the sales department (POM, POC). As in the case of the other mergers the exec

committee of the board ran the company. But in Du Pont the executive committee consisted entir

of full-time time, experienced salaried managers- contrary to the case of General Electric (POW

Also, "...It differed from that at Standard Oil in that its members appreciated the distinctio
day-to-day administration and long-term policy making and explicitly expected to devote their
attention to the latter." (Chandler, 1977, p. 444) (POS).

Furthermore, another department, the development one, by as early as 1904 played a specific ro
advancing technical, managerial and organizational innovations - an exceptional innovation in

(POW, POM). This department had three divisions. The experimental one supervised the company's

control research laboratories; the raw materials division supervised the supplies and provided

information for and helped to plan and carry out the strategy of backward integration; the com

division contributed to information on markets and competition. Also, overall, the development
department was charged with reviewing and suggesting improvements in the company's
organizational arrangements (POS, POM, POW).

Under the command of young Pierre Du Pont the financial staff grew rapidly from 12 in 1903 to

200 a year later. Pierre Du Pont and his division heads pioneered the development and establis
of modern industrial accounting, which, by 1910, became standard procedure for 20th century
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industrial enterprises (POW). In cost accounting they concentrated their efforts on obtaining m
accurate information on overhead costs- here F. W . Taylor' s contribution ought to be recognized.
They also paid more attention to deterrnining actual selling and purchasing costs. Then they turned to
a more precise definition of profit and a criterion for evaluating financial performance ( P O W ) .

They found that the existing rate of return, defined as the ratio of earnings over sales or cos
developed by General Electric and other industrials to replace the railroads' operating ratio, was
inadequate and misleading. T o obtain a n e w more accurate rate of return theyfirsthad to develop
accurate data on investment in fixed and working capital. B y 1904 Pierre D u Pont's department was
presenting the executive committee with monthlyfigureson costs, income, and rate of return on total
capital investment for each of the company's 13 products. D. Brown, one of Pierre's subordinates had
then further defined the rate of return based on the notion of turnover, thus reflecting the intensity with
which the firm's resources were being used. This "Brown' formula is still used by D u Pont and most
other American enterprises ( P O W ) .

Two more OIs are worth mentioning. First, by the mid 1900s the executive committee agreed to
devote a m i n i m u m of one full meeting a month to capital appropriations in order to allocate resources
more efficiently (POS, P O M ) . The D u Pont brothers, Pierre and Irenee, set up a special office with the
full time task of reviewing and coordinating expenditures. All this helped to implement the policy that
there be no expenditures for additions to the earning equipment if the same investment could be
applied to some better purpose in another area of the company's business. Second, after 1906, the
treasurer's office began to m a k e short and long term financial forecasts (POS). B y the end of the
1900s top management for the majority of large industrial firms became, as it had at D u Pont,
collegial or group management ( P O M , P O C ) . It also became professional, consisting of full-time
salaried managers w h o devoted their carriers to the companies they operated ( P O W ) . The accounting
and other organizational innovations, some of which have been described here, created a n e w
environment in the American economy during the period examined. A s Chandler said:

"...With these innovations, modern managers had completed the essential tools by which th
hand of management was able to replace the invisible hand of market forces in coordinating

monitoring economic activities..." (Chandler, 1977, p. 448,). "...Well before World War I exec
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Du Pont Company had drawn together and perfected methods of business management that had the

beginnings on the railroads and were further developed by the mass marketers, by the practiti
scientific factory management, by the managers of the early entrepreneurial enterprises,
consolidators of thefirstmergers...(Jbid, p. 450).
From this brief review of D u Pont's evolution as a firm, w e can see that the P O F O s that mostly
and directly affected that firm were the POW and the POM.

6.5 AMERICAN SECTORAL GROWTH DURING THE PERIOD
OF THE 1960s-198Os: CHANDLER'S ANALYSIS AND
EXTENSIONS
In this last section, another link will be established between Chandler's work (as described mainly
in Chapters two and four) and some of the conclusions of this thesis, including results from
Chapter seven. Chandler (1994) attempted to answer the following question: Which American

industries better responded to the increasing competition, especially after the mid 1960s? This

response took place within the context of some specific OIs. As Chandler remarked: (1994, p. 58
"...This process of over-diversification and divestiture differed with the intensity of the
competition and with the characteristics of the industries managed..." as Table 6.6 shows.
Table 6.6

Type of
industry
High
technology

Stable
technology

Chandler's (1994) analysis of A m e r i c a n sectoral development
Industries included
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Low

•
•
•
•

technology
•
•
•

Chemical
Pharmaceutical
Aircraft/Aerospace
Computers
Office equipment
Electrical
equipment
Motor vehicles
Fabricated metal
products
Primary metals
Non-Electrical
Machinery
Rubber
Petroleum
Stone, Glass, Clay
Food / kindred
products
Textiles/Apparel
Timber
Paper

Source: Based on Chandler (1994)

Characteristics and
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

consequences

Maintaining world market share
Extensive, mostly self-financed R & D
j
Moving in n e w markets of even higher
technology
Minimal transaction-oriented mergers and
acquisitions but manager-led long-term mergers
and acquisitions
Developing new products
Serious cash flow problems
M a n y and mostly transaction oriented mergers
and acquisitions
Shortening of time horizon
Reductions in long-term investment in R & D and
capital equipment
Restricted opportunities for new products, hence
stability of the end-product

W e a k international competition
Small R & D expenditure
A small number of investment oriented mergers
and acquisitions
• Emphasis on distribution improvements
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As an example of Chandler's analysis, it is interesting to quote him regarding the fate of the

historical firm Singer during the period under consideration: ".. .As global competition inte

particularly from European companies, Singer began to use its earnings to diversify through t
acquisition of makers of control systems, machine tools, and aerospace defense products. This

scattering of resources and Singer's failure to reinvest to improve the facilities of its sew

machine operation resulted in large losses by the mid-1980s..." (p. 48). In 1987 Singer was t
over by P. A. Bilzerian who subsequently was sent to jail and fined $30 million for fraud.

From this brief account of Chandler's analysis in 1994, it is rather obvious that this pionee

writer has tried to explain the American sectoral failures of the 1960s up to the 1980s mainl
referring back to his investment criterion which played a substantial role during the Second

Industrial Revolution. For instance, for both the electronics and semiconductors sub-sectors i
USA, he says: "...In both, Japanese gains reflect American failures to maintain long-term
investments in R&D and production facilities..." (1994, p. 39). Thus, very often because of

excessive over-diversification, and the consequential excessive buy-outs, many firms and secto
failed to reinvest and improve the facilities of their business for which they had a strong
competitive advantage (good examples were the Steel sector overall, and the Singer company).

This is quite true, but the present sectoral analysis (of both Chapters six and seven) demonst
that when many American firms and sectors reorganized themselves through JIT/TQC and other
similar processes during 1987-1997, they did not need to further diversify and became again

competitive in the global markets. If we take the electronics and semiconductors sub-sectors a

it becomes obvious from the analysis presented in this study that especially these two sub-se
in the USA dramatically improved because of TQC, JIT and so on.

In other words Chandler did not consider some other aspects of organizational capabilities su
TQC, JTT. Other writers support this conclusion; for instance, Abe (1997) said that Chandler

teaches us that big business through large-scale operations and integration is imperative for
development of modern firms through a three-pronged investment in manufacturing, marketing,
and management. "...But recently, outsourcing and downsizing have come to be regarded as
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crucial elements of business strategy..." (Abe, 1997, p. 305). These new tendencies in stra
management are closely related to the JIT system (Ibid).

However, it is also true that Chandler, at least in a general way, was aware of the importan
core competences and resource based competitive advantages. Thus in his 1994 article he gave a
few examples of firms which followed the strategy of such competences (e.g. Caterpillar,
Ingersoll-Rand, F M C etc) and in his conclusion he wrote:

"...During the 1960s and into the 1970s, as American industries began to be challenged by

Europe and Japan, US firms over-diversified into business in which their capabilities ga

little or no competitive edge. So in the 1970s, and particularly in the 1980s, they pul
divesting themselves of units that did not mesh with their learned competencies and often
others that did. " (p. 58)

It is also worth noting that Chandler had an insight into the nature of competition that ex
the 'stable technology' industries when he said that such competition "...is based more on the
improvement of the existing product and processes, on better marketing and distribution, and on
better relations with suppliers and the work force..." (1994, p.25). Unfortunately he did not
examine in depth this insight, otherwise he would have very probably arrived at the same
conclusion emphasized in this thesis that is that the American companies failed to improve on
factors such as production process and relation with suppliers. O n the contrary the Japanese firms
succeeded in improving these same factors through the development of an efficient sub-contractor
network, TQC, JIT, Kaizen, stable labor relations and so on.

Another way of supporting the foregoing remarks is that in most of the industries under the
heading of 'stable technology', such as motor vehicles, primary and fabricated metals, and nonelectrical machinery, the Japanese firms excelled and grew m u c h faster than the American ones.
Hence, if the TIs used in these sectors remained relatively stable, and both countries used
approximately the same technology (TIs), w h y did the Japanese firms do better than American
ones? A s the results of previous sections confirm, the answer lies again in the superior
performance of the Japanese companies in terms of OIs such as T Q C , JTT, Kaizen and so on. In the
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common every day non-economist language, we all know how reliable and of high quality
Japanese cars and other products are.

Finally, it is worth noting that the present conclusions and remarks about Chandler's analys
similar to those by Lazonick's (1992, p. 278):

"...In the 1980s Japanese success in taking market share away from once-dominant US ma

producers made it clear that the prime source of Japanese competitive advantage was not

wages (as many Americans had chosen to believe in the 1970s) but superior organization

capabilities. Many American industrial managers also came to recognize that the major d

between the internal organization of US and Japanese enterprises was the extent to which J

managers developed skills on the shop floor and delegated authority to blue-collar worke
those skills to ensure a rapidflow of high quality work... "

Overall, Chandler's thesis did not explicitly take into account the impact of new OIs, such
LPS, on the growth of .American firms during the period of the 1960s to early 1980s. A s will be
seen in the next chapter, w h e n American manufacturing firms adjusted themselves to the JTT/QC
requirements they experienced acceleration in real output and productivity growth.

6.6 CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing discussion, based on some basic quantitative evidence, regarding manufacturing
sectoral growth from the 1880s to the 1930s and from the 1960s to the 1990s in the U S A and
Japan has provided some support to the qualitative and theoretical analysis of the previous four
chapters. Briefly, the following major conclusions are worth mentioning.

First, the periods 1899 to 1914 and 1915 to 1929 were the "golden" periods for many sectors
U S A . Especially during the latter phase of 1915-1929 productivity increases were remarkable and
were due to the appearance of n e w OIs (ceteris paribus) such as scientific management and
Fordism and consolidation of existing OIs such as vertical integration and diversification. The
leading sectors in terms of T F P were the automobiles, machinery and rubber industries, but most
sectors experienced very high growth rates in T F P and real output. For Japan the golden periods of
high growth in real output, mainly in the textiles, metals and machinery sectors took place during

259

WWI and during the 1930s when new leading sectors such as the machinery and metals industries
were propelled by the consolidation of focal firms.

Second, during the period 1964 to 1998, the manufacturing sectoral growth in the two countrie

was quite different; the differences,as detected by graphs and some cointegration tests, were

differences in the adopted OIs amongst other factors. Thus, during the 1960s up to the mid 198

most Japanese industries exhibited very high growth rates both in real output and TFP, contra

the American industries. This was primarily due to the high quality and low cost of many Japa

products, and hence it became easy for Japanese firms to penetrate national and foreign marke

This last conclusion is supported by the review of TIs in the two countries which confirms th

tendency by Japanese firms to imitate foreign TIs, though in some instances these firms domin

world markets by launching new products (mainly in the consumer electronics sector); thus, the

common TIs used in the majority of both American and Japanese firms reinforces the conclusion

that it was in the area of differences in OIs that a more comprehensive explanation can be so

for the substantial differences in manufacturing sectoral growth in real output and TFP betwe

these two countries in the period between the 1960s and the mid 1980s. During this period, th

most famous Japanese leading firms were in the transport, electrical and electronics sectors.

Third, during the sub-period 1987 to 1997 the situation was reversed between the two countrie

several ways. Whereas the machinery, both mechanical and electrical, industries led the Americ

revival of the American economy, in Japan there was no leading sector for the first time in a

time in Japanese economic history. Japanese industries are still in a deep and prolonged rece

since the beginning of the 1990s; a brief review of the reasons for this downfall seems to st

indicate that the dual character of the Japanese economy, the inexistence of leading firms an

sectors, and a search for new OIs in the management of firms in Japan are the main factors th
contributing to this recession.
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Fourth, more detailed accounts of three leading industries and their corresponding leading fi

add more evidence to the importance of OIs in manufacturing sectoral growth as discussed in t

chapter. In particular, the outstanding importance of JIT/QC was recognized in these case stu

Finally, Chandler's explanation of the growth of the American manufacturing industries during

period from the 1960s to the 1980s was briefly presented and extended in the light of the pre

thesis. This extension is mainly based on the evidence brought up in this study, including Ch

seven, that as long as these industries remained encaged in their Fordist mass production sys

they could not grow fast enough to match the international competition of, mostly, Japanese f
that already adopted the LP system during that period.

In the next chapter a more rigorous empirical analysis will seek to confirm the preliminary

conclusions reached in this chapter, especially regarding the American economic revival durin
the last 20 years or so of the last century.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
7. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE LINKS BETWEE
INDUSTRIAL SECTORAL GROWTH AND THE LEAN
PRODUCTION SYSTEM (JIT/QC) IN THE USA
7.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter a general discussion was presented about the importance of manuf

leading firms and leading sectors in Japan and the USA. This discussion was primarily de

In this chapter empirical evidence will be more precise and thorough by considering a pr

that of JIT/QC. The latter also represents the main axis of OIs, and is mainly influenced
POM1.

Milgrom and Roberts (1990) examined the complementary relationships between flexible

manufacturing technologies, shorter production runs, more frequent product redesigns, low
inventories, and other variables of modern American manufacturing and found that these

complementarities are an essential feature of a new era. In particular, lower inventorie

intrinsic part of all these complementarities. They summarized their research as follows

...Manufacturing is undergoing a revolution. The mass production model is being replaced

vision of aflexiblemultiproductfirmthat emphasizes quality and speedy response to

conditions while utilizing technologically advanced equipment and new forms of organizat

In "The Machine that Changed the World", Womack et al (1990) describe the lean production
system (LPS) that was devised and implemented in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s, and then

transplanted in the USA in the late 1980s and 1990s2. Whether this system is replacing the
production system, as the authors strongly suggest, or not, is debatable3. However, much

has taken place in the last 20 years to provide evidence of the benefits of the LPS to t

and American economies; for instance, Womack and Jones (1996) provide several real cases,

1

These concepts were analyzed in Chapters four and five.
This system was alluded to by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) in the above quote
3
In this study, it is suggested that there are many common elements between mass production/ Fordism and
lean production systems, which are both represented by the main axis (see Chapter four).
2

262
detail, about the successful implementation and the derived benefits of the lean process. An

equivalent system, which initially was extensively analyzed by authors such as Schonberger (1

1986, and 1996), and which is intrinsically related to the LPS is the Just-in-Time cum Qualit
Control (JIT/QC) system (already discussed in many parts of this thesis).

Kenney and Florida (1993), in their extensive analysis of the transfer of the Japanese system

production to the USA, summarized the LPS in three elements: efficient use of resources throu

the elimination of waste, low inventories, and just-in-time production and delivery practices
In what follows reference is made primarily to the JTT/QC system, though this can easily be
replaced by the LP system or any other equivalent system (in the sense that not all JTT/QC

practices are always enforced, or that there are some extensions of the basic system as descr

elsewhere4). The transplanting of the initially implemented LP system in Japan to the American

firms has been difficult and slow. It took about ten years from the late 1970s before the Ame

managers seriously decided to implement the JTT/QC system in a systematic and scientific way,
and about ten more years before the actual implementation took place on a substantial scale.
Several other significant studies have been produced recently about the whole process of

transplanting the JTT/QC system successfully to other countries, for example Liker et al (199

Lillrark (1995), and Young (1992). A detailed analysis of the mechanism of this imitation pro
is of course outside the scope of the present study.

In this chapter the American manufacturing sectors are the focus of empirical analysis (Sanid
2001). The hypothesis to test is that the LPS or its equivalent JTT/QC has been successfully

implemented in the USA in the last 20 years or so5. A similar analysis could have been carried

for Japan; however, the relevant quantitative results will provide stronger evidence for this

the empirical results support the imitator country (the USA) rather than the initiator count

4

For example, cell manufacturing is closely related to the JIT/QC system (Magjuka and Schmen
Steele et al, 1995; Chan et al, 1999). In addition, the most comprehensive JIT/QC system is the one
developed and used by Toyota. Fujimoto (1999, Appendix B ) describes 30 interrelated practices and
techniques. Other firms in Japan and other countries have adjusted the Toyota system to their own needs.
Another example is the 'agile' system, as an extension of the LPS, as described by Rycroft and Kash (1999).
5
For a complex evolving and emergent system as the LPS introduced by Toyota (Fujimoto, 1999), it is not
surprising that it takes many years to transfer even a small part of it to a different country.
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initiated the JTT/QC system). In this study more attention is paid to the intra-firm organiza

features of this system, though the inter-firm features are also indirectly explored since J

involves them as well; in addition, the inter-firm features in terms of sub-contracting relat
as important and more scrutinized in the literature6.

Section two establishes the crucial periods of implementation of JIT cum QC not only in the

but also in Japan so that a better understanding of the transfer process from Japan to the U

achieved. The quantitative evidence presented in section three uses several econometric tool
as regression and error correction models, and data of varying length for TFP and labor
productivity. Section four provides a detailed account of conclusions.

7.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JIT AND QC SYSTEMS IN
TWO COUNTRIES
7.2.1 Implementation of the JIT system in the two countries, chronology, industries,
a n d penetration

Abegglen and Stalk (1985) state that ".. .Toyota began development of the Just-In-Time syste

the late 1930s and made substantial progress in its implementation in the 1950s and 1960s..."

(p.93). Abegglen and Stalk (1985) also discuss the crucial relation between factory and suppl

"...In Japan the pattern has been for the factory to implement JIT first, then for the suppli

follow. By 1962 Toyota had instituted the JTT systemwide. Only then did it approach its suppl

Another ten years passed before the JIT system had spread to all of Toyota's suppliers..." (p
Overall, it can be suggested that Japanese firms started imitating the pioneer Toyota in the
of JIT from about the early 1970s.

On the other hand, it was only in the 1980s that JTT became known and applicable by American

firms (see, for example the story of the Oregon Cutting Systems company, one of the pioneers

JTT in the USA, as described by Bailes and Kleinsorge, 1992). In his classical book on JIT wr

6

For example, cf. Taylor and Wiggins (1997) for a relevant comparison between the American a
sub-contracting systems.
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in 1982, Schonberger said: "...In one sense it is a bit early to write about just-in-time
manufacturing management in the United States. JTT has scarcely been tested here...On the other
hand, the Japanese already have at least ten years head start- and m u c h more if one considers
Japan's long history of adaptation to its environment of resource scarcities..." (p. 83). What is the
penetration of JIT usage in Japanese industries? According to K i m and Takeda (1996), a survey of
81 usable questionnaires revealed the following results (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1

J I T in J a p a n

Type of industry

% of respondents

Iron and Steel

9.88

Metal products

16.05

Consumer electronics

23.46

Automobile

16.05

Precision

4.94

Other (computer, tooling, pharmaceutical, food, job shop)

29.63

Size of firms (number of employees)

% of respondents

Less than 300

25

More than 300 and less than 500

21

More than 500

54

JIT adoption

% of respondents

Partly JIT firms

ll.ll

Totally JIT firms

44.44 (mainly automobile and
consumer electronics industries)

Non-JIT firms

41.98

Source: Kim and Takeda (1996)
The average length of JIT implementation in Japanese firms is double or more than that of
American firms (the average length for U S companies was between 1.74 and 3.23 years as K i m
and Takeda, 1996, identified). This difference, perhaps, shows that JTT in Japan is part of a more
comprehensive and holistic approach to productivity increases than JTT in the U S A . In this respect,
it is also worth mentioning one of K i m and Takeda's (1996) conclusions: "...When the rental

265

relationships and wa culture is truly spread over the entire organization, the implementati
can be successful..." (p.50)7.

As already mentioned, it was only in the 1980s that TQC and JTT started being implemented by
increasing number of firms in the USA. It is for this reason that when Billesbach and Hayen

(1994) compared the effect of JIT over the long term for 28 American companies, they examine

data between the last three years of the 1970s and the last three years of the 1980s. Overal

seems that the Americans have been behind the Japanese regarding the implementation of JIT b
around 10 to 15 years, though this gap is now closing more rapidly.

From a study conducted by Baldwin and Gagnon (1993) the following results (Table 7.2) were

obtained from their survey of 200 large Ohio firms (the state of Ohio is part of the Midwest
industrial heartland of the USA). This sample contained both US and Japanese owned and
operated manufacturing companies (e.g. Honda of America)8.

Table 7.2

Percent of firms with a modified use of Japanese J I T / Q C principles

Principle

Purchasers

Vendors

Combined

Reduction of vendors

41

52

47

Quality certification

44

48

46

Quality circles

49

38

43

JIT

33

40

37

Ringi*

33

38

36

Long-term employment

26

29

27

Firms with usage of at least one principle

77

85

81

Source: Baldwin and Gagnon (1993)

The figures in Table 7.2 were confirmed by another study conducted by Stamm and Golhar (1991

according to which 29 out of 77 respondents (that is 37.7%) identified themselves as JTT fir

Rental means a joint responsibility between management and workers, whereas wa means harmony.
100 firms were labeled purchasers and were drawn from some end product industries. The vendors were
100firmsdrawn from the raw materials and related industries.
9
'Ringi' means management for emergent or unusual situations.
10
Stamm and Golhar (1991) provide evidence that smallfirmscan adopt JIT/QC practices.
8
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Billesbach (1991) analyzed the reasons foT implementing JTT in 68 American companies. About

50% of respondents considered that JTT was taking place because their competitors were enga

in JTT. This shows that American businesses were seriously recognizing the importance of JJ

1991. In a more recent study by White et al (1999), the implementation of JTT practices in a
sample of American firms was much higher, ranging from 50% to 92% depending on the type of

practice and the size of firms (p. 7); as these authors said: ".. .All the manufacturers in
sample had implemented at least one of the JTT practices, and 96.5 percent had implemented

least three of the JTT practices. About 20% had implemented all 10 JTT practices..." (p.6). T

10 JTT practices included: quality circles, total quality control, focused factory, total pr

maintenance, reduced setup times, group technology, uniform workload, multifunction employee

kamban, and just-in-time purchasing. It is worth noticing that in the USA the Bose Corporat
successfully developed the system JTT II (an extension of JIT practices) during the period

1993. Several other large American companies have implemented JIT II in their supply chains
IBM, Intel, AT&T, Honeywell, Roadway express, Ingersoll-Rand, and Westinghouse (Krajewski
and Ritzman, 1999, p. 748).

In another study, Daniel and Reitsperger (1991) compared 50 Japanese and 64 American

electronics firms. They found the following results. First, in Japan, 45% to 55% of the oper
managers received targets for both inventory units and costs, versus 15% to 25% in the USA,
indicating a Japanese focus on inventory reductions. Second, overall, there was a strong
confirmation of the authors' two hypotheses: first, a larger proportion of Japanese than US

managers received specific performance goals related to inventory reductions and flexibilit

second, there is a stronger correlation between the provisions of JIT related performance g

feedback in Japan than in the US reflecting the dynamics of working for perfection in produ

JIT is mainly used in the continuous flow industries: iron and steel, metal products, consum

electronics and electrical machinery, automobile, precision instruments, and chemical produc

(see for instance Kim and Takeda 1996, Billesbach 1991, Billesbach et al 1991, Billesbach a

Schniederjans 1989, Billesbach and Hayen 1994, Meric et al 1997). To a lesser extent JTT can
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be applied in process facilities like those of a textile industry (Billesbach 1994), or to a
industry which makes customized products such as furniture items (Golhar and Stamm, 1993).

Regarding the chemical industry, a recent study by Meric et al (1997), explains the low inven

level of Japanese chemical firms as the result of an extensive use of the JTT method in the
system.
Figure 7.1 shows, in summary, the evolution of JIT implementation in the two countries.
Japan
Toyota started

M a n y other companies increasingly followed

1950 1960 1970 " 1980 1990

USA
Absent

Start

Spreading out

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Figure 7.1 Chronology of implementation of JIT in the USA and Japan

7.2.2 Implementation of the QC system in the two countries, chronology, indus
and penetration

For Japan, quality products are an outcome that took place only after the 1950s (see Chapter

Thus, "...by 1960, cameras, sewing machines, and transistor radios were obvious success stori
The image of Japanese products as being cheap and shoddy was already being swept away in
certain industries..." (Nonaka, 1995, p. 542)11. In Chapter two it was briefly described how

reversal of quality manifested itself from the end of WWH. Here, only QC circles will be brie
reviewed, for which data is available. According to Watanabe (1991), "...scientific quality
methods were introduced in pre-war Japan by the National Railway Corporation, navy arsenals
and pioneering private sector companies such as Toshiba..." (p. 61). In 1958, a study team
back from the USA Feigenbaum's concept of TQC. In 1962 the JUSE (Japanese Union of
Scientists and Engineers) launched its quarterly QC Circle Magazine (QCCM) and urged

industries to organize workers into small study groups. By 1991, Watanabe remarked "...Japane

workers often discuss subjects related to their quality circle activities during a tea brea

" In this respect, see also Abernathy et al (1983 Chapter five).
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time or at an after-work social gathering..." (p. 62). How much did QC circles spread in t
Japanese economy since 1962? Table 7.3 shows the trend.
Table 7.3 Growth of QC circles and participants registered at QC Circle
Headquarters, 1962-90
Year
Q C Circles
Participants
1962

23

NA

1965

4930

70920

1970

33499

388543

1975

72475

723201

1980

115254

1062759

1985

223762

1831299

1990

313924 1 2

2454635

Source: Watanabe (1991)

QC circles are only one side of the Quality movement in Japan. TQC started earlier and spr
earlier. A s Goldman (1993) said: "...The transported T Q C philosophy radically transformed
Japanese organizations (such as Toyota, Nissan, Sanyo, Matsushita, Mitsubishi) during the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s... In sharp contrast, U S and European implementation of T Q C did not surface
until the late 1970s and early 1980s..." (p. 32). T o illustrate this contrast, a comprehensive study
sponsored by Ernst Young and the American Quality Foundation in 1991 has confirmed Japanese
superiority in terms of quality control vis-a-vis the U S A , Germany, and Canada (Bowles 1992,
Yearout 1992).

Senge (1999)13 has a similar view on the evolution of the Quality movement in the USA and
Japan. This author distinguishes three stages in quality as a learning process. The primary focus of
the first wave has been the front-line workers, and the aim was to champion continual
improvement and remove impediments such as quality control experts. This stage has been
replaced by the second wave in Japan from the 1980s. The primary focus of the latter wave has
been the managers themselves and the aim was to shift the changes from improving work
processes to improving h o w 'we work'. Quality circles and kaizen are an important part of this

12

However, since the registry's coverage is not complete, Watanabe estimates that in 1989 the total numbers
of practicing establishments and circles were 65800 and 743540 respectively. Also, the total number of
participants was estimated to be about 5.5 million workers. Furthermore, Q C circles are more concentrated
in larger companies (Ibid).
13
Part of this article had appeared again in the same Journal in 1992.
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second stage. The third wave is a blend of the previous two waves. US industry was operating
primarily in the first wave by 1992, and hence the goal of continuous improvement was still an
elusive target for most American corporations. T o illustrate this elusive target w e can use Shroeder
and Robinson's (1991, p. 74) remark that in 1986, Japanese companies received almost 48 million
improvement proposals from their employees, while their counterparts in the U S A received about
one million. K a n o (1993, p.29) 14 expressed similar views to those of the previous two authors:
".. .during the past 10 years, American improvement efforts, including T Q M , have gradually led to
good results in some industries..." (p. 29). For example, in the steel industry, in parallel with n e w
TIs brought into the industry in the late 1980s, T C Q and a better-qualified workforce have been
introduced and extensively implemented by most American steel makers (Dinnen, 1992).

A recent detailed study of the evolution of the "Quality Movement" in the USA in comparison t
Japan by Cole (1998), clearly shows h o w the Americans have only very recently been trying to
introduce and implement various quality control systems in the U S A . According to Cole,
"...quality means maximizing organizational behavior to enhance the satisfaction of present and
potential customers" (p. 43). Furthermore, according to the same author, there are two ideal types
or paradigms of quality, as summarized in Table 7.4. In 1980 most large U S manufacturing
companies followed the old quality paradigm whereas the leading Japanese firms had already
begun to assume more of the features of the n e w paradigm, which was developed in Japan between
1955 and 1980 (ibid, p.45). The author summarizes the situation in the early 1980s as follows:

"...For a great number of large and medium size American manufacturing firms across a br

array of industries (from air-conditioning to autos,fromconsumer electronics to comput

copiers to color televisions,fromsteel to semiconductor equipment, and from metal fabri

machine tools), especially those subject to international competition, the pressures
competitive response to the Japanese became incredibly intense. In almost all these

observers documented a major quality gap between US and Japanese companies in the early
1980s..." (p. 45).
H o w did the American business world respond? Already, in the 1970s, Japanese competition in
sewing machines, cameras, watches, and color T V s had provided the Americans with some good
examples of the actual Japanese threat (for instance, the whole American color T V industry was
14

Kano, a student of the guru of QC Ishikawa (1985) and an expert in quality management, had
visiting the U S A since 1977.
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lost to the Japanese during that period). The late 1970s and early 1980s was a period of

slow theoretical and ineffectual debate between the gurus of quality movement (Deming, Du
Crosby, Feigenbaum, Ishikawa); and a slow trial-and error process of tactics for quality
(ibid).
Table 7.4
T h e Quality paradigms
O L D PARADIGM
Internal orientation stressing conformity to
requirements
Just one of m a n y functional specialties

N E W PARADIGM
Internalize external customer preferences
A c o m m o n corporate-wide language of problem
identification and problem solving
A strong corporate competitive strategy

Not seen as a competitive element as long as you
match your competitors
A specialized function carried out by a small
number of experts reporting to operations
Emphasis on downstream fixes

All-employee involvement in quality improvements

A limited repetitive cycle of detect and repair

A well-defined problem-solving methodology

A stand-alone effort, with each functional
specialty acting to maximize its o w n goals
Based on whether a product or service is built or
delivered according to agreed-upon standards

Training activitiestiedto continuous quality
improvement
Integration of quality into the corporate-wide control
system of goals, plans and actions
Emphasis on cross-functional cooperation to achieve
quality improvement objectives
Anticipation of customer needs sometimes even
before customers are aware of them

A n upstream prevention focus

Source: Based on Cole (1998), pp. 43-44.

However, from the late 1980s and early 1990s more productive efforts took place, as testified by

the proliferation of a large institutional network of users, consultants, and other non-m

players. Cole analyzed seven such organizations; for example, the 1987 established Malcol
Baldridge National Quality Award, the American Supplier Institute whose activities took

late 1980s, and the American Society for Quality (ASQ). In particular, the ASQ membership

fast, as shown in Table 7.5. Table 7.6 supplements the evidence regarding ASQ's readersh
Cole (1998) testifies, similar trends occurred with the other organizations.

Table 7.5
YEAR

A S Q ' s membership
N U M B E R OF M E M B E R S

1979

32000

1988

57000

1997

133000

2000

187000

Source: Based on Cole (1998) up to 1997, and on A S Q (2000) for 2000.
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Table 7.6

ASQ's readership

SIC Industry

N a m e of Industry

Q P Readers

%

3000

Rubber and Plastic

14424

11.3

3300

Primary Metal

9616

7.5

3400

Fabricated Metal

21636

17.0

3500

Industrial Machinery

9616

7.5

3600

Electrical/ Electronic

26444

20.8

3700

Transportation

12020

9.4

3800

Measuring Instruments

14424

11.3

3900

Miscellaneous

19232

15.1

Total

127412

100

Source: ASQ's Quality Journal, July 2000

At the end of this long process of the American quality movement, what are the results? Let Cole
again summarize hisfindings(ibid, p. 4 4 and 70):

"...By the mid-1990s, US firms significantly narrowed (and sometimes closed) the quali

performance gap with the Japanese across a broad range of manufacturing industries, such as
autos and semiconductors ...By the mid- and late-1990s, quality disappeared as a major topic

media and was less and less a focus of top management's attention. This is a natural proce
manifested in the growing normalization of quality improvement as a management activity... "

The conclusion of this brief historical account is that the USA's Quality movement is rapidly
catching u p with Japan's pioneering efforts to increase the quality of their products after W W H .
This catching-up process has been accelerating over the last 20 years or so (in a similar w a y to
JTT).

7.3 QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND JIT/QC IN THE USA
7.3.1 Preliminary issues
From previous chapters and, in particular, Chapter four, where a detailed analysis of the JIT/QC
system and its benefits w a s presented, Figure 7.2 summarizes some of the most important points.
Figure 7.2 needs two extra clarifications. First, the L P S , or its corresponding JJT/QC, system need
not be exactly the same as the one pioneered by the Japanese firms, but it can be any system close
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enough or equivalent to the original one15. Thus, it can include extensions, modifications, and

on, providing that the aim of all these alterations is to reduce wastes, increase quality, sat
customers, reduce costs and reduce inventories. For example, Tomer (2001)16 said: "...Highperformance work systems are organizations that utilize a fundamentally different approach to

managing than the traditional hierarchical approach associated with mass production/scientific
management. At the heart of this emerging approach is a radically different employer-employee
relationship..."17 (p. 63). On the other hand, Im and Lee (1989) mentioned the following 'JTT

practices': small lot sizing, kanban, flexible workforce, JIT purchasing, dedicated lines, pla

compression, quality circle, preventive maintenance, mixed model production, level production,

U-shaped layout, cellular manufacturing, and automation (all these practices are of course par
the holistic JTT/QC system as explained, mainly, in Chapter four).

I ncreases quality
Reduces wastes
Satisfies customers
Reduces costs
Decreases inventphes

Figure 7.2

F r o m J I T / Q C to industrial g r o w t h

18

Second, h o w is the JTT/QC system related to technical innovations such as the adoption and spread
out of information technology (IT)? To answer this question reference will be made to a very

recent article written by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), which reviewed in some depth the rela

15

This point is also emphasized in the introduction of this chapter.
"16 This author introduced the concept of organizational capital in his previous articles, thus he recognizes the
importance of OIs.
17
See footnote no 3.
18
The reverse arrows in this Figure show that the H T / Q C is reinforced and becomes stronger with mcreases
in productivity. This two-way causation will be econometrically explored in a sub-section below when the
V E C model is examined. In addition, "...all causative analysis, as 1 have repeatedly emphasized, depends on
theory..." (Hicks, 1979, p.67). Thus, the results of this chapter cannot be properly evaluated unless they are
supported by the theoretical outcomes of all previous chapters. In particular, the propositions of Chapter five
regarding the atomic/systemic model are relevant here as the concept of system implies feedback and
reciprocity.

273
between TT, organizational transformation and business performance. These two authors' main
conclusion is:

"...In particular, both case studies and econometric work point to organizational complements

new business processes, new skills and new organizational and industry structures as a major dri
the contribution of information technology... " (p. 45)

Thus, these writers continue, if computer investments take place without a parallel organizatio

change, they can create significant productivity losses (p. 25). For example, Dell Computers an
MacroMed successfully combined the principles of the JIT/QC system with the necessary IT

investments to, overall, become flourishing in their own business (p. 27 and p. 29). In additio

is not even clear to what extent the IT has a positive impact on productivity; in this respect,
Solow's famous paradox that we can see the computer age everywhere except in the productivity

statistics19 perhaps still holds in many cases. For example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) wonder

whether we should be disappointed by the productivity performance of the down-stream firms tha

have invested in TT. Also, Gordon (2000) arrived at the interesting conclusion that in 88% of t
American economy the effects of IT on productivity growth are surprisingly absent. We should
also recall that the Japanese firms adopted the LP system without the assistance of personal
computers and Internet in the 1960s and 1970s. Schonberger (1982, p.15) said in this respect:

"...Just-in-time production is simple, requires little use of computers, and in some industries
provide far tighter controls on inventory than are attainable through US computer-based
approaches..." .

A crucial point must now be made, as this was identified and stressed in previous chapters (mai
four and five), and as shown in Figure 7.2. Two of the most evident and measurable effects of
implementing the JTT/QC system are a corresponding continuous reduction in inventories and a

continuous increase in product quality. These reductions are due to many reasons at the same ti

because this system affects the whole firm and many other firms via the supplier network. These
reasons are the consequences of the holistic JIT/QC process: for example, decreases in the lot
19

Cf. the special issue of the Canadian Journal of Economics, 1999, No 2, for several articles
Solow's paradox, e.g. Triplett (1999).
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increases in the repeatability of tasks, flexible automation, reduction in supply uncertainties
improvement in demand forecasts, and so on (cf. Krajewski, and Ritzman, 1999, Chapters 13 and

16 for a pertinent analysis). Thus, the LPS or JIT/QC is not just one factor, but is a holistic

that encompasses all areas of firm operations (the five POFOs of Chapter five20). Hence, unless

suggest that there is another system of firm operations (POFOs) that also reduces inventories a

increases product quality, the present analysis is valid. At the moment, such a competing syste
does not exist.

Out of the two main consequences of JJT/QC, only the reduction of inventories, as a ratio to sa

(see below for more details), will be used in this study. Data for increases in product quality
not available, especially on a sectoral basis. For an appreciation of how the reduction in

inventories is a consequence of the theoretical developments of previous chapters, see Figure 7
at the end of this chapter.

Furthermore, a significant reduction in inventories in the long run trend is the important issu
hence fluctuations due to the business cycle and other factors of a shorter-term length do not

this trend (see further discussion in sub-section 7.3.2.1). This longer-term preoccupation link
with significant overall organizational changes such as the adoption of the JTT/QC system. In

addition, in the empirical work that follows cross section data are used, thus any common facto

affecting the reduction of inventories to sales ratio across all manufacturing sectors are tak

account. However, a variable such as the interest rate will be included in the empirical work s
it affects both inventories (see sub-section 7.3.2.4 for more details) and the whole economy.

The empirical relationship between inventories and the JTT/QC system will be thoroughly tested
this section. Only very recently has such a relationship been tested by other researchers in a

systematic way. Thus, Lieberman and Demeester (1999) in their abstract said: "...The literature
JTT production suggests a causal link between work-in-process inventory and manufacturing
productivity. Such a connection has been described in numerous case studies but never tested

20

However as shown in Chapterfive,JIT/QC is primarily influenced by the P O M .
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statistically. This paper uses historical data for 52 Japanese automotive companies to evalua

inventory-productivity relationship..." These two authors used mainly Granger causality tests

find that a significant elasticity of about -0.1 applies to that relationship. In this sectio
general and comprehensive evidence of causality between industrial growth, as represented by

total factor productivity (TFP) or labor productivity, and the LPS or its equivalent JTT/QC s
as represented by the inventory to shipments ratio, will be explored.

Another recent study by Lieberman et al (1999) has attempted to answer the following questions
"...What factors determine the inventories held by manufacturing companies? Does classical
inventory theory explain the levels of inventory held in practice? Do Japanese management
methods, involving problem solving by shop employees and frequent communication with

customers, lead to lower inventories?..." (p. 44) The authors' findings are summarized as foll

".. .The data show that inventory levels are influenced by set-up and holding costs, producti
times, the extent of customer communication and the involvement of employees in problem

solving..." (p. 52), thus providing econometric evidence that the JTT/QC system has considerab
reduced inventories in manufacturers of automotive parts in the USA.

It is also worth mentioning an original study undertaken by Baily and Gersbach (1995), who

provide quantitative evidence of the importance of work organization in selected manufacturing

sub-sectors in the USA, Germany and Japan; the authors referred in particular to the LPS as pa

organizational factors that positively impact on labor productivity (for instance see pp. 330

their paper). Figure 7.3 summarizes the authors' findings (in particular, see the row entitled
'organization of functions and tasks', which is relevant to OIs) .

Four more remarks will close this introductory sub-section. First, the cross-sectional data (

straight or pooled) analysis circumvents a potential danger: some external factors such as gro

in the service sub-sectors are approximately common to all manufacturing sub-sectors and hence

21

Baily and Gersbach (1995) can be considered a pioneers in this respect and certainly provide more
credibility to the suggestions and propositions of this study.
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do not influence the results. However, in some of the models external or exogenous factors a
used, such as the rate of interest, unemployment and so on, in order to complement the analysis.
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Figure 13

Causes of labor productivity differences in the production process

Second, the dependent variables TFP or labor productivity contain, or imply, not only

organizational innovations such as the JIT/QC system but also other types of innovations s
technical or wisdom innovations (see Chapterfive).Thus, an attempt is made to incorporate the

impact of technical or embodied innovations on productivity. However, the main purpose in t
present exploration is to indicate that OIs such as the JIT/QC holistic system plays a (concomitant)
role in explaining differences in productivity changes across manufacturing sub-sectors. The proxy

used to represent the JIT/QC system, inventories to sales ratio (more on this ratio see nex
section), is a direct consequence of this system (as it has been shown in several parts of

thesis). JIT/QC and the path of this ratio involve all aspects of firm operations (the five
Chapter five), but in particular they involve the process of movements ( P O M ) which influences
OIs (Chapter five discusses all of these points in detail).
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Third, the econometric exploration presented in this chapter cannot, in itself, be properly eva

unless it is supported by the findings of previous sections and chapters. For example, if the JI

system is considered without the theoretical considerations previously developed, and without th
evidence already provided by other researchers on this topic, the present quantitative analysis
cannot be properly assessed. It is worth summarizing the important findings of all previous
22

sections and chapters that support the econometric analysis carried out in the next sections :

1. The JIT/QC system (a basic description is given in Chapter four) is a complex, evolving
and emergent one that is part of a more complex system involving other dimensions such
as sectoral systems and innovations systems (see Chapter five). It is also part of the main
axis of OIs, thus emphasizing internal organizational features that link this axis to the
other two axes (Chapters four and five).
2. The JTT/QC system is a major OI, based heavily on the POM. The latter conveys the
importance of differentiation and elaboration of internal organization necessary for an
open system to become negentropic (see Chapter five).
3. A major consequence of the negentropic nature of the JJT/QC system is the reduction in
inventories and defects, and a parallel increase in productivity23. Thus, the JTT/QC system
(or LPS) justifies the inclusion of OIs into the process of economic growth (see Chapter
three).
4. Examination of some cases of firms and sectors (see Chapter six) provided evidence that
JTT/QC increases productivity and reduces inventories (the major examples used are
Toyota motors and Dell computers).
5. Previous econometric studies on a firm basis established that there is a significant
elasticity between increases in productivity and reduction in inventories.

Fourth, it is useful to remark that such analysis is not the only way to provide evidence as to
impact of JIT/QC on economic growth. Based on the introduction of the five POFOs (see Chapter

five), the following fictitious example illustrates an evaluation of the successful implementati
22
23

Again, Figure 7.9 is useful in this respect.
Figure 7.9 helps to appreciate this point.
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and working of the JIT/QC process in a firm. The consequences for each one of the POFOs a

shown in Table 7.7 (based on the methodology suggested in Chapter five). The next step is

estimate the resulting overall benefits by combining the five POFOs. This is shown in Tab

(the number of'+' is subjectively determined and shows the degree of impact, for the sak
example). These benefits agree with the evidence provided in Chapter four. Thus, overall

implementation of JTT/QC generates substantial net benefits to the firm. As O'Grady (1988

115) in his case studies concluded: "...The costs associated with each of the implementa
low relative to the returns..."
Table 7.7

POFO
POP
POP
POP
POM

Costs and benefits of the five P O F O s for the .JIT/QC

SOURCE OF C H A N G E

COSTS

Reduction in L (per unit of output)
Reduction in existing K and M (per unit of output)
Increase in n e w K and M (per unit of output)
—
Reorganization of procedures etc: mistakes, extra time, trial —
and error process until JIT/QC is implemented
Running of the JIT/QC process
—
Implementation of n e w contracts, standards, mles etc
Rurining of n e w contracts, standards, mles etc
—
Training and education of staff for the adoption of JIT/QC
~
Development of n e w techniques of analysis
Accumulation of wisdom, knowledge etc
M o r e time for thinking and taking decisions during the ~
implementation of JIT/QC
Quicker decisions and better strategies during the running
of JIT/QC

POM
POC
POC
POW
POW
POW
POS
POS

Table 7.8

Resulting overall benefits for the

BENEFITS
+
+

+
+
+
+

JTT/QC

SOURCE OF C H A N G E

NET BENEFITS

POP

Mainly due to a relative reduction in L

i i ii

POM

Mainly due to better procedures of organized

Mil

POFO

work

POC

Mainly due to better governance and trust

++

POW

Mainly due to more abilities

+

POS

Mainly due to less erroneous decision making

+

TOTJ\L

All the above

In this section,fivedifferent approaches, or broad models, will be developed, starting from the

simplest (simple OLS regressions) and finishing with the most complicated (VEC model). Th
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cross checking each model's results with as many other different models' results as possible

Consequently, this section becomes a thorough empirical investigation of the hypothesized r

between industrial growth in the USA and JIT/QC. The first and simplest approach will be mo

scrutinized, as it will lay the foundations for all other approaches. Also, the most complex

approach will be more scrutinized, as it will thoroughly confirm the overall results. Final
that the number of data used in different approaches varies from 12 to 28 to 85 to 420 and

1008 (the reasons for the choice of the appropriate number of observations will become clea

the sub-sections below). Finally, Appendices 7.A1 to 7.A6 contain more information on the da
used in this chapter. Note that not all of the original data and derived data are included
Appendices, as this would have required the space of hundreds of pages.

7.3.2 Simple regression analysis (OLS)
7.3.2.1 Preliminary issues on productivity and the proxy

Two databases are used: the UNIDO ISIC 3-digit sectoral data from 1963 to 1997 (updated ver
2000) and the NBER 4-digit 459 sectoral data from 1958 to 1996 (June 2000). The UNIDO data
are supposedly consistent between countries and are recorded according to the ISIC 3-digit

classification (28 manufacturing sectors). They include a series for employment (E), value a

(VA), index of industrial production (RO), nominal output (NO), and nominal wages and salar

(W). For the calculation of TFP based on UNIDO (2000) data, the real capital stock (CS) fro

NBER publication (2000) was used, and the intermediate inputs or materials (M) were compute
as the difference between output and value added. For the calculation of TFP based on NBER

directly, the initial 459 sector TFP series was transformed into an 85 sector and then into
sector TFP series (to match as much as possible the 28 ISIC sectors) (for more details see
Appendices 7.A1 to 7.A6).

The TFP (UNlDO-based) was calculated for each year from 1964 to 1996 according to the
following formulation:

24

Each model has advantages and disadvantages. Thus, it becomes more rigorous to apply as m
as possible. However, the list of models used here is not exhaustive but rather selective.
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TFP' =RO' -w^E' -w2M' -(\-wx-w2)CS'

(7.1)

The variables TFP ,RO ,E ,M ,CS ,...are computed as the first differences in natural

logarithms of these variables, thus expressing rates of growth. The weights wi are the averages
each pair of years for which TFP is computed. For example:

w„ = ((W/NO)t + (W/NO),., )/2 (7.2)
These formulae are consistent with Jorgenson's work (1990, 1995, 2000); thus, one of the
assumptions underlying equations 7.1 and 7.2 is that factors are paid their marginal products,

inferring that there are constant returns to scale; otherwise, if there are increasing returns
then equation 7.1 leads to an overestimate of TFP. This is not an undesirable result to obtain

present analysis as the aim is to pinpoint sectors that experience increasing or decreasing re

scale. Hence, an overestimated TFP shows an increasing returns to scale sector which grows very

fast in terms of productivity25. Also, the empirical analysis in this section uses cross sectio

the assumptions and consequences are the same across all sectoral data, and thus there is no ma

or significant flaw or bias in the quantitative results. With these formulae, TFP is calculated

according to the gross output formula so that it includes the impact of materials and not accor
to the value added formula that excludes the impact of materials. However, the results and

conclusions presented here are not significantly different from the distribution of TFPs viewp
when using either of these formulae .

It is also necessary to briefly interpret the concept of TFP in terms of its relations with cap
production and labor. It can be easily shown that

(7)-<T) + <£) (73)'
L

25

L

K

See also Appendix I of Matthews et al (1982), for a general discussion of the assumptions and
measurement of TFP.
26
The value added formula ( TFP' = VA'- wE'- (1 - w)CS') usually gives TFPs which are often about
double of those TFPs when using the gross output formula. Some regressions in the analysis below use this
formula for comparison.
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and TFP= (I) - fi£) = £) + (1 - fiA (7.4),
L

L

A.

L

where TFP and all terms in brackets are expressed as growth rates (first differences in natural

logs). The constant /3 is capital's (K) share in total revenue, Y is production, and L is labor.
Y
Equation (7.3) can be interpreted as follows: Capital productivity ( — ) 2 7 expresses (is a proxy of28)
K
disembodied technology, or OIs in the present analysis, whereas (—) expresses embodied

technology, or TIs in the present analysis (for a good reference regarding this distinction, see

Reati, 2001). Consequently, according to equation (7.4) TFP is either the difference between lab

Y K
productivity (—) and a fraction of embodied technology ( — ) , or the addition of disembodied

Y K
technology ( — ) and afractionof embodied technology ( — ).

K

L

Furthermore, labor productivity can be split into two parts (Fujimoto, 1999, p. 331):
(work hours)/(unit) = (work hours)/ (value-adding time) x (value-adding time)/ (unit)=
factor productivity = density of transmission x speed of transmission.
Where work hours=value-adding time + non-value-adding time=
^average cycle time x number of units produced.

Both density and speed of transmission parts of factor productivity apply to both labor and cap
productivity. The density of transmission ((work hours)/ (value-adding time)) includes the
following elements: reducing workers' idle time waiting for the next material to come; walking

time for picking up parts and tools; machine breakdown time; tool change time; air-cutting time
and so on. All these elements are specifically related to the process of movements (POM) and
hence to OIs (as determined in Chapter five). The speed of transmission ((value-adding time)/

(unit)) includes the elements: increasing the worker's standard speed of motions; assembly-line
speed; stamping strokes per hour; the cutting and feeding speed with improved tools, materials

27

This ratio and the others which are part of (7.3) and (7.4) are expressed as growth rates in this section.

Y K
28

These ratios of (—) and (—) are only proxies of OIs and TIs respectively , since they are ratios of
Lt
K
quantities of output, capital and labor. Thus by definition, and according to the analysis pres
three, do not include organizational or technical features per se.
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machines; and so on. Most 2 9 of these elements are linked to TIs- related technology (process
technology according to Edquist et aPs (2001) terminology). O n e of the main conclusions
Fujimoto (1999, p. Ill) reached in his Toyota manufacturing system study is the following:

"...Traditional American auto factories of the 1970s tended to emphasize the 'speedup' (i

compression of value-adding time itself) approach and thus the technology-driven approach

mass production. The Toyota-style approach, on the other hand, often brings about signifi
productivity increases without introducing new production technologies... "
Thus, Japanese makers, w h o adopted the Toyota production philosophy, emphasized the density
approach based on improvements of the P O M . ".. .This latter approach- increasing information
transmission density- is the heart of the Toyota-style manufacturing system and the source of its
productivity advantage..." (Ibid, p. 105) This is also the heart of the atomic/systemic model of
economic growth presented in Chapterfive,and for which quantitative evidence is provided in this
chapter-

Finally, in this introductory sub-section, the proxy of the LPS or its equivalent the JTT/QC sys
is further explored. A s already indicated in sub-section 7.3.1 the reduction in inventories, as one of
the two main consequences of the JIT/QC system (the other one being the increase in product
quality), will be used in this study to represent the impact of this system on sectoral growth. The
variable ratio of inventories to shipments is preferred to that of inventories so that firm size can be
taken into account, and thus a bias can be eliminated from the empirical analysis31. The use of this
proxy follows from the extensive discussion in previous chapters and sections, where it w a s found
that the JIT innovation, and hence reductions in inventories, could only be successful if it is
implemented within a more general framework of JTT, T Q C , Kaizen, and employees' active
participation32. In other words this proxy is an inherent and integral part of the L P S . In addition,
the end-of-the-day aim of JIT management is to reduce inventories as m u c h as possible.

29

Not all of these elements are TIs-related. For example, performing each individual value-adding task more
quickly (a worker's intensification of efforts) is part of the P O M .
* In page 104, Fujimoto (1999) adds that this happened also in the early 1980s. A similar conclusion has
already been reached in mis thesis as will also become more apparent below in this chapter.
31
See also Flood and Lowe (1995) for their use of the stocks to sales ratio in their econometric study of
inventories in Australia.
32
Recently, a few articles have established a quantitative relationship between inventories reduction and
increases in productivity on a firm basis (e.g. Lieberman and Asaba, 1997; Lieberman and Demeester,
1999). For Japan, Fujimoto (1999) mentions that during the late 1960s and early 1970s many of Toyota's
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Source: Author's calculations based on the N B E R (2000) database. For the corresponding names of sectors
see Appendix 6.A3.
Figure 7.4
U S A , inventories to shipments ratio, 2 8 I S I C sectors
Figure 7.4 exhibits some selected sectors in terms of their inventories to shipments ratio (IRY)
from 1958 to 1996. Although not all sectors are shown in Figure 7.4 for clarity reasons, the
tendency has been the same for all of them. That is, either a reduction in the ratio of inventories to
shipments consistently since the middle of the 1980s or at least a constant ratio through time33. In
Figure 7.4 one can also see that the impact of the so-called business cycle on the inventories ratio
was not as significant in the 1990/91 recession as it w a s in previous recessions (e.g. 1974/75 or
1981/82). In addition, following the early 1980s, and through the most recent recession 1990/91,
the inventories ratio has been steadily decreasing34 T h e declining inventories ratio from the early
1980still1996 can be more clearly seen if w e consider the sector 382 (machinery, not electric) in
Figure 7.5a. This visual observation can be verified with two simple O L S regressions shown
below. In brackets under the coefficients are the t-statistics, which clearly s h o w that the ratio I R Y
definitely declined through the whole period from the early 1980s till 1996 (the negative and
strongly significant coefficient of the variable Y E . A R indicates this decline):
For the period 1958 to 1984: IRY= 21.4 + 0.04 x YEAR
(9.8)
(1.2)
For the period 1985 to 1996: I R Y =

73.2 - 0.6 0 x Y E A R
(14.8)
(-11)

first-tier suppliers dramatically decreased their inventory levels, thus contributing to a more efficient
network of car production.
33
Runkle (2000) provides some examples of firms from diverse industries that managed to considerably
reduce their inventories recently, including Dell Computers, compared with otherfirms.Chapter six has
explained that Dell has been a champion in adopting the JIT/QC system.
34
A similar phenomenon took place in Australia, where Flood and Lowe (1995) showed that a significant
change in the behavior of inventories during the period of the early 1980s to the early 1990s occurred that
was partly due to an increasing use of sophisticated inventory management techniques and greater
production flexibility.
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Figure 7.5a

U S A , sector 3 8 2 , inventories to s h i p m e n t s ratio (as % )

A similar result is obtained by examining the total manufacturing data. In Figure 7.5b we can s
that the continuous decline from the early 1980s is significant and 'unusual'35.
35.00
30.00

Oi

C4
CO
Oi

(O
CO
Oi

oo
CO

>*-^

3 £

CO <o
o to
IO
o> a> a> CO
Tf

to

Oi
to
Oi

CN
CO
oi-

io
CD
O)

CO
CO
CO

T—

K

O)

«*

f«~
Oi

1*. O
h- 00
05 CO

CO
00
CO

CO
00
CD

o>
a>
OO

CN
CO
CO

to

CO
OJ

Source and notes: For the period 1929-1970, the Tables E-24 (wholesale price index, industrial
commodities), P-13 (index of manufacturing production), and T-70 (manufacturers' total book value
inventories) of the Bureau of the Census (1975) are used to estimate the ratio of real inventories (T-70 over
E-24) to shipments (P-13) (this ratio is multiplied by the constant 20 to be comparable to the other line on
the graph). This ratio is shown as a thin line on this Figure (stopping at 1970). The thick line shows the ratio
of inventories to shipments provided by the Bureau of Census, Abstract, various issues, for example, in
Table 1308 of the 1991 issue.

Figure 7.5b

USA, manufacturing total, inventories to shipments ratio, 1929-1997
(as % )

The thick line is based o n consistent data from 1947 to 1997 (see the source and notes under the

Figure 7.5b). The thin line is based on an indirect way of estimating shipments. The almost par

thick and thin lines from 1947 to 1970 show that the estimated thin line is valid. Overall, thi
graph shows that from 1929 to about 1940 the inventories ratio has been influenced by the
consequences of the Great Crash and the Keynesian policies of the then American government.

35

A similar regression analysis to the one for the category 382 (see above) was conducted (not shown here)
that confirms this assertion.
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The inventories ratio has been strikingly constant (except for short term 2-4 year swings36) f

the late 1940s to the early 1980s (that is, for more than 30 years)37. So what happened sudden

from the early 1980s and that ratio started declining in a steady way? It has already been i

several times in this thesis that the answer lies in the gradual implementation of the holist
JIT/QC system in the USA from the early 1980s38.

In order to see the relationship between productivity and JJT/QC through its proxy, the inventories

to shipments ratio, Figure 7.5.c shows three variables as percentage growth changes from 1962

1996, namely TFP, labor productivity, and IRY, for the dynamic sector of machinery (ISIC 383)
the USA. Also, a good proxy for the business cycle, namely unemployment, is included in the
same Figure 7.5.c for comparison purposes.

Source: Author's calculations based on the N B E R (2000) database; for the unemployment series see Slavin
(1999).
Figure 7.5.c U S A , sector 383, T F P , labor productivity, inventories to shipments
ratio, a n d u n e m p l o y m e n t (total U S A ) , in % changes

Once more w e can see that from the early 1980s, I R Y started declining (as a trend), and at the

same time, the two measures of productivity started climbing (as a trend). The business cycle

shown by the fluctuations of the three series and the proxy of total unemployment is importan
36

It is important to emphasize that the observed decline of the inventories ratio during the last 20 years in
the American economy cannot be part of any long term economic cycle such as the Kondratieff cycle,
because, as can be seen in Figure 7.5b, this ratio was constant for about 30 years prior to the early 1980s.
37
A regression over this period, not shown here, corifirms this conclusion.
38
It was extensively shown in Chapter four that inventories decrease dramatically when JIT/QC is
implemented. Also, in Chapter five it was shown that the decease in waste, hence inventories, is a
consequence of the negentropic trait of OIs such as the JIT/QC system.
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only in the short term. In the econometric analysis that follows, in the cross-section models t
business cycle is taken into account by having included one major recession in each sub-period

examined, thus differences between sub-periods are due to other reasons than fluctuations aroun
the trend. For example, as is apparent in Figure 7.5c, the sub-period 1987-1996 examined below
picks up the strong inverse relationship between IRY and productivity through a significant

coefficient of the variable IRY, contrary to the other periods. This will be further shown in d
in the analysis of ensuing sub-sections. For the pooled time series, the variable unemployment
explicitly included in the regressions so that the business cycle is also taken into account39.

7.3.2.2 A cross sector analysis regarding TFP: simple regressions (N=12, 28, 85)

The TFP, as calculated according to equation (7.1) for the UNIDO (2000) data, is very similar t
that computed according to the NBER database (2000). There are, however, some noticeable

differences for a very limited number of sectors such as "Scientific Instruments" (SIC 385), fo

which there is a definite break (perhaps error in data) in the series of employment. Nonetheles
the distribution of TFP across the 28 sectors remains unchanged in terms of relative magnitude
(see Figure 7.6). It is also worth noting that Jorgenson's and Stiroh's (2000) calculated TFPs

the 2-digit SIC American sectors are very similar to those presented here, at least in terms of
distribution of their magnitudes.

Three periods are examined of approximately 11 years each (1964-76, 1977-1986, and 1987-

1996), with each one containing a major depression (in 1974/5, in 1980/82, and in 1990/91); als

note that the choice of the year 1987 as the beginning of the crucial third period 1987-1996 is
supported by an acceleration of Japanese direct investment in the USA during 1986, 1987, and

1988, mainly in the electrical and non electrical machinery, primary metals and steel, automobi

and transportation equipment, and rubber and plastics sectors (Kenney and Florida, 1993, p.88-8
39

For the sector 383, the following results show that even though unemployment (as a proxy of
cycle) is included in the regressions, the variable I R Y is still significant and has the right sign and
magnitude: T F P = 2.6 - 0.14 IRY - 0.08 U N E (the t-statistics are 6.2, -1.7, and -2.7 for the constant, IRY,
and U N E respectively; R 2 = 0.25). Also labor productivity (LAPRO)= 5.3 -0.35 IRY -0.03 U N E (the tstatistics are 11.6, -3.9, and -1.1 for the constant, IRY, and U N E respectively; R 2 = 0.34). U N E stands for
unemployment. The period examined is from 1962 to 1996. Note that the coefficient of IRY in the TFP
regression is less significant (90.5% level) than in the L A P R O regression (99.95%). These two regressions
are 'pilot' regressions of the more detailed analysis that follows.
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Tables II. 1 and II.2). Furthermore, according to the evidence brought in the previous secti

increasing number of American firms started implementing JIT/QC in a more systematic way fro
the second half of the 1980s.

Source: Author's calculations based on the U N I D O (2000) and NBER(2000) data bases.

Figure 7.6

U S A TFP 28 SIC sectors

The simplest regression to be explored in thefirstplace is the one that relates sectoral productivity
with the proxy of JTT/QC, namely the inventories to shipments ratio, denoted as IRY. The

econometric results are shown in Table 7.940. As expected, during the period 1964-76 (regre

of Table 7.9), the LP (JIT/QC) system, as represented by the variable IRY, made no contribu
all to the growth in TFP. During the period 1977 to 1986 (regression 2 of Table 7.9) JTT/QC

almost absent in the American economy and hence no contribution of this system to the TFP to

place during this time, though the improvement in the regression is noticeable (the coeffic
IRY has the right sign and the t-statistic is greater than that for the period 1964-76). On

contrary, and according to the analysis of previous sections, during the period 1987 to 1996

(regression 3 of Table 7.9), the JIT/QC system implementation in many firms and sectors of t
American economy significantly contributed to the acceleration of TFP.

40

Appendix 7.A3 shows the relevant data for the three periods. Overall, the sectors experiencing high
growth rates in TFP are those experiencing high decline rates of IRY.
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Table 7.9

Simple cross sector O L S regression results

Dependent TFP 64-76 TFP 77-86 TFP 87-96 TFP 87-96 TFP 87-96 TFP 87-96
(UNIDO derived TFP)

N (no of data)
Regression N o
Intercept
t-stat

IRY
t-stat
DEFL
t-stat

28

i[VA based)

(D

28
(2)

28
(3)

0.61
4.4
0.034

0.53
2.7
-0.113

0.37
1.3
-0.47

0.31

-0.84

-3.4

LAB
t-stat
DUM
t-stat

R2
SE

0.004
0.73
0.72
S D of dep/t
Diagnostic tests (p-values)
0.21
Serial cor/n
Functional
0.18
Normality
0.001
Heteros/ty
0.48

(NBER based)

28

28

85

(4)
1.84
8
-0.39
-5.1
-0.49
-9
-0.086

(5)
1.56
4
-0.48

(6)
0.27
-0.497

-2.4

-6.58

0.86
0.56
1.36

0.19
1.65
1.79

0.34
1.37
1.68

0.29
0.16
0.87
0.46

0.76
0.35

0.28
0.000
0.000
0.000

1.56

-1.65

2.49
3.9

0.3

0.027
1.05
1.05

1.16
1.36

0.54
0.18
0.91
0.78

0.01
0.43
0.000

0.9

0.9
0.5

In a similar manner the TFPs for 85 sectors are used, which are calculated from the original N B E R

459 SIC sectors (2000)41. The results of the regression are also shown in Table 7.9 (re

These findings for a much larger (N=85) sample significantly confirm the results of t

with 28 sectors42. Regressions (1), (2) and (3) are also run with the value added base

TFP. The results confirm the same proposition. For example, considering the 1987-96 pe

relevant results are also shown in Table 7.9 (regression 5). Note that the VA based T

larger in magnitude than the gross output based TFP, and hence the constant as well as
standard error estimate (SEE) are also accordingly much larger.

In this sub-section the contribution of the JIT/TQC will, in addition, be examined in

a more general model in which more variables are included in order to take into accoun

important influences such as competition, technology, and labor replacement. For the p

41

See Appendix 7.A4.
Furthermore, similar results were obtained to those above when the N B E R 28 ISIC 28-sector based
estimated TFPs were used instead of the U N I D O based TFPs (not shown here).
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1996 the results are shown in Table 7.9 again (regression no 4). For this regression the varia
TFP and TRY are defined as before. The variable DEFL is the actual gross output deflator and
represents two important factors: the degree of competition in the industry, and changes in

productivity43. The higher the change in producer prices (DEFL) during the period 1987-1996, th

lower is competition within the sector (ceteris paribus). For instance, some of the least comp

(in the sense of being more oligopolistic in nature or facing less substitutes) industries als
some of the highest price increases; these industries are tobacco, wood, chemicals, plastics,

non-ferrous metals. On the contrary some of the most competitive sectors show low levels of pr

increases; these sectors are textiles, apparel, fabricated metals, non-electrical machinery (ma
computers), and electrical machinery (mainly semiconductors).

The variable L A B shows the changes in labor input (employment) over the period 1987-96. It

represents two tendencies; first the internal (within the firm) changes in organization of lab

capital (e.g. less labor is needed because of the implementation of the JIT system)44, and seco

the external (outside the firm but within the sector) changes in organization (e.g. more or l

is needed because of more or fewer firms operating within the sector). A perusal of the releva

data shows that the competitive industries of all types of machinery (several SIC sectors) eit
increased employment only marginally or even reduced employment (as in the electrical
machinery sector)45.

43

This confirms the two way causality process between productivity and JIT/QC.
The correlation coefficient between I R Y and L A B is only 0.13, thus indicating that it is difficult to predict
the outcome of employment as a result of JIT/QC. However, in a multiple regression (OLS) in which
employment (LAB) is the dependent variable, and the three independent variables are IRY, real output (RO),
and the import to export ratio (IMEX) (see sub-section 7.3.2.3 for its precise definition) for the 28 sectors,
and for the period 1987-1996 (variables expressed in percentage changes) the outcome is more clear
regarding the relationship between employment and JIT/QC (T-statistics under the coefficients):
L A B = 0.227 +0.825 IRY + 0.634 R O -0.362 I M E X
R 2 = 0.61
(0.4)
(3.7)
(3.8)
(-3.4)
Thus employment and IRY have a significant elasticity of 0.82. The positive sign of 0.82 indicates that the
more I R Y decreases the lower the employment is, thus confirming Edquist et al (2001, p. 37) who
specifically state that some process organizational innovations related to work organization are labor-saving,
providing that the compensating effects are not strong enough to neutralize the primary effects of laborsaving. In this respect it is worth noting that during 1987-1996 employment for the whole manufacturing
sector remained virtually constant (see also Tables 7.10 and 7.11 below). This is an important result in itself
but its further development is outside the immediate scope of this thesis. Also note that the variable capital
stock (CAP) was included in the above regression but it was found to be insignificant.
45
These data also show that probably an OI such as JIT/QC, a 'capital-saving type' of OI according to
evidence provided in Edquist et al (2001, p. 36), has, overall, neutral or positive effects on employment.
However, as mentioned earlier (for example see Chapter four), there is evidence that JIT/QC is a labor44
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T h e variable D U M is a d u m m y to take into account the errors in the data for the sector 385
(precision instruments) as mentioned above. The exclusion of this sector leaves the other
coefficients of regression (4) unchanged, which further confirms the peculiar 'behavior' of this
industry46. Also note that both the employment data from the NBER and the UNTDO bases were

used in regression (4), in order to check the validity of the results. The latter remained unaltere
despite some differences in the two series (again the sector 385 exhibited the greatest difference
between the two labor series). Finally, it must be emphasized that the coefficient of the variable
TRY is much more significant in this enriched regression (4) than in the previous simple
regressions. This, once more, confirms the importance of the proxy for JJT/QC, as it has been
analyzed in detail so far.

In order to supplement the last m o d e l in which s o m e extra variables were introduced, another
dimension will now be briefly examined. The number of patents, a good proxy for TIs, by industry
in 199047 is regressed against the TFP annual growth for 1987-1996 (the dependent variable as
before), and the IRY variable (as before). The available data for patents are grouped in 12
manufacturing sectors, instead of 28, so the regression also has 12 cross sectional data (Food and

beverages, textiles, all chemicals, all petroleum, rubber and plastics, pottery and glass and clay,
saving O I (see also previous footnote), and hence if employment increases after the implementation of
JIT/QC this increase must be due to compensation effects such as increases in demand (Ibid, p. 84). This can
be further verified by the results of the following multiple regression (OLS) (for the definition of variables
see previous footnote plus the regressions of Table 7.9 above):
R O = 2.1 +0.48 L A B - 0.65 I R Y +0.1 I M E X -0.32 D E F L +0.35 C A P
R 2 = 0.70
(3.1) (3.6)
(-3.8)
(1.0)
(-2.9) (2.4)
As expected, the variable I R Y is highly significant with a very high elasticity of-0.65. The variable D E F L
(deflator) is also significant and has an elasticity of-0.32. This latter elasticity can be used as a proxy for the
demand elasticity with respect to prices and is definitely below one. This result agrees with Reati's (1998, p.
94) analysis, which indicates that if price elasticity of demand is less than one, then employment declines
when a process innovation is implemented (although the income elasticity must be considered as well). This
result cormrms the conclusion that JIT/QC (a process innovation) increases real product and productivity.
All these partial conclusions should be analysed in the light of the effects of various types of elasticities
(Edquist et al, 2001, Chapter five). The various models presented in the present chapter contribute in
clarifying some of these issues. Another conclusion is that, including the results of Table 7.10 below where
the capital productivity has substantially increased during the JIT/QC implementation period of 1987-1996,
JIT/QC is both labor and capital saving. Finally, it is a significant result that in the above regression, the rate
of growth of real output (RO) not only depends on capital and labor but also on OIs (the I R Y variable), on
TIs and other innovations (the constant) and on market conditions (the deflator variable).
46
Thus, the inclusion of the significant d u m m y for one sector does not influence the other coefficients. This
shows that these estimated coefficients are not biased by the presence of the d u m m y variable.
47
These data are not 'objective' in the sense that individual industries m a y not add to the total since a patent
m a y be recorded in more than one industry category. The source is Table 863 of the Statistical Abstract of
the U S A Bureau of the Census (1997, p. 552).
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primary metals, fabricated metals, non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, transport, a

professional and scientific equipment). The results are shown below (T-statistics are under the
coefficients):
TFP = 0.021 - 0.68 TRY+ 0.793 PAT R2 = 0 81
(0.06) (-3.91)
(1.87)

The variable PAT (patents) is only significant at the 9.5% level, whereas the IRY variable rema

strongly significant as before48. The poor result of the patents variable representing a proxy f
technical innovations (TIs) is not only due to the small sample, and probably collmearity, but
to more substantial reasons: industries like the chemical ones, with a traditionally high rate
technical innovations in new products, have only a relatively low TFP growth, because of their
poor organizational innovations in terms of JIT/QC. In the last sub-section below, capital

deepening, as represented by the capital to labor ratio (which can partially represent TIs), w
examined, thus the relation between OIs and TIs will be more substantially scrutinized.

A comparison between the three periods in terms of average quantities49 across the 28 sectors wi
further clarify the present assertions. Table 7.10 and Figure 7.7 summarize the findings. They

reveal some interesting results. The sharp increase in TFP during 1987-1996 is accompanied with
a sharp increase in JTT/QC (which in turn are represented by a decrease in the inventories to
shipments ratio). At the same time competition also increased during 1987-1996 as shown by a

significantly smaller increase in producers' prices, although there are other factors involved
increase.
Table 7.10 Comparison between the 3 periods TFP and other variables (in%)

Variable
TFP
IRY
Production deflator
Real output
Labor
Capital

1964-1976

1977-1986

1987-1996

0.62
0.21
4.21
4.21
0.65
3.99

0.54
-0.12
4.70
1.90
-1.15
2.07

0.94
-1.21
3.00
2.56
-0.16
1.23

Source: Author's calculations from the primary N B E R , 2000 Data Base. Figures are average % changes.

The correlation coefficient of TFP and IRY is -0.86, of T F P and P A T is 0.70, and of IRY and P A T is even
smaller -0.55.
49
Weighted averages (to take into account the weights of sectors) did not significantly alter the results.
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In addition, capital during 1987-96 did not increase as much as in the previous two periods
suggests that TFP was mainly the outcome of JIT/QC or other similar OIs and competition.

Furthermore, labor employment decreased in the same period, which indirectly indicates tha

JIT/QC was the central issue at stake during the period 1987-1996. The latter point is also

confirmed by Brox and Fader (1997), who empirically found that JTT firms are more labor and

materials saving than non-JTT firms50. In addition, as the use of the Internet became notice
only from about 1997-8, hence the impact of the Internet on output and TFP growth can only

assessed from that year onwards, the above conclusions are further reinforced, as the teste
regressions are based on the period ending in 1996.

Source: Author's calculations arefromthe primary N B E R , 2000 Data Base. Figures are average % changes.
Figure 7.7
U S A T F P versus other variables

Confirmation of these important findings can be made by examining the summary in Table 7.11

where the following variables are compared for three periods and for 85 sectors: labor pro

('lab pro'=Y/L), capital productivity ('cap pro'=Y/K), capital to labor ratio ('cap/lab'=K/
TFA as a value added formula (TFP va'), and inventories to shipments ratio (IRY).
Table 7.11 Average rates of growth (in %) for 85 sectors
IRY lab pro cap pro cap/lab TFP va
1959-76
-0.15
2.44
-0.41
2.85
0.25
1977-86
-0.58
2.74
-0.52
3.26
0.13
1987-96
-1.35
3.06
1.79
1.27
2.02
Source: Calculations based on the primary N B E R , 2000 Data Base.
Thus, when capital productivity, that is OIs, rose substantially due to the implementation
JJT/QC (hence TRY decreased significantly), only then did TFP move up substantially with a
50
51

In this respect cf. also Sayer and Walker (1992), and previous footnotes in this sub-section.
See equations (7.3) and (7.4) above.
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parallel decrease in the capital to labor ratio, that is, the TIs52. In addition, if we use

above that links TFP to either capital productivity and the capital to labor ratio, or to l

productivity and the capital to labor ratio, the IRY variable is strongly correlated with c

productivity (OIs) (it increased to a positive 1.79% p.a during 1987-9653) but not as stron
capital to labor ratio (TIs).
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T F P U S A average N B E R a n d U N I D O for 28 ISIC sectors
Figure 7.8

Another confirmation of these important findings can be made by looking into the evolution

TFP across the three periods and across the 28 sectors. Figure 7.8 shows the relevant data

main increases during the most recent period 1987-1996 (in relation to the previous two su

periods) took place in the SIC categories of 371, 372, 381, 382, 383, 362, 355, 369, and 3

Appendix 6.A3 for the corresponding names of sectors), thus confirming the leading role mo

these sectors have been playing in the recent American economic revival. In particular, th

sectors 371, 372, 381, 382, and 383 experienced most of the applications and implementatio

lean production processes such as JTT and QC (as indicated in section 7.2). Furthermore, t

economic revival, which took place in the last period from 1987 to 1996 despite a prolonge

recession (especially in Japan), has coincided with a revival in all sectors (apart from s
exceptions). In addition, this revival was accompanied by the 'super' leading role the two

of 382 (mainly computers) and 383 (mainly semiconductors) played during this latter period

52 These

results can be better understood by examining the relationship (7.3) above, which links the three
variables of labor productivity, capital productivity and capital to labor ratio together.
53
TFP has also grown substantially (see Table 7.10) during 1987-96 because capital productivity increased
and the capital to labor ratio decreased.
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7.3.2.3 A pooled 28-sector analysis for TFP and JIT/QC (N=420)
Another way to bring valid quantitative evidence to the present assertions is to pool all

together, and truncate the data to the period 1982 to 1996 during which the American industr

have been gradually imitating the Japanese ones in terms of JIT/QC. Another reason for the c
of the year 1982 is that we have detailed census data on 3-digit establishments from 1982
(every 4 years). Thus, the number of data is very large (420 observations)54.

This TFP series will now be regressed against organizational and economic variables of the 2

pooled sectors. Most of these variables are related to the number of establishments for eac

thus taking into account the effect of small, or big, firms, changes in employment, industri
concentration, and so on (see also Sanidas (2002) for the importance of the number of
establishments in economic growth). One of these variables is the inventories to shipments
above (TRY), which represents the lean production system (LPS). The variable SDLE is the

standard deviation of the ratio of employment to the number of establishments during the per

1982 to 1996 for each sector and captures the significance of the variation in the mean size

firms. The variable TMEX is the ratio of imports to exports in 1992 (this year is approximat

middle of the period 1982 to 1996)55 and captures the competitive strength of each sector. T

variable SDMEST is the average Tatio of the standard deviation to the mean of establishments
from 1982 to 1996. The variable MEANLE is the mean of the ratio of employment to the number

of establishments during the period 1982 to 1996 and captures the significance of the mean s
firms. The variable MATSHI is the annual change in the ratio of materials to shipments and
captures the degree of vertical integration of each sector. Finally, the variable DUM is a

take into account some outliers in the TFP series56. The results of this regression are sho
TFP = 0 012 - 0.14 * ]RY+0.0022*SDLE+0.0014*1MEX-0.0018*SDMEST (6.3) (-9.0) (6.4) (2.5) (-5.3)
-0 0002*MEANLE -0.19*MATSHI +0.083*DUM
(-5.6)
(-4-3)

(16.8)

R2 = 0.51 SE = 0.022 SDofTFP=0.031 DW=1.84
54

See Appendix 7.A5.
Another year instead of 1992 does not alter the results.
56
Out of 420 observations, about a dozen outiiers were detected. The inclusion of D U M expresses the usual
procedure in econometrics to lessen the effect of extreme values.
55
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The diagnostic tests of serial correlation, functional form, normality, and heteroscedasticity (not

shown here) demonstrate that the model is adequate. The figures in brackets below the coefficie

are the T-ratios and show that all variables are significantly different from zero. The coeffi

have the right signs. In particular the TRY variable is definitely significant, and has the neg
sign as expected. If the variables MATSHI and DUM are dropped from the regression the
remaining variables remain significant and their coefficients are unaffected. The aim here is

analyze the significance and relevance of all variables in the regression but to re-enforce th

obtained in the previous sub-section regarding the paramount role that the LPS has played in th
revival of the .American economy in the last 20 years or so. The proxy variable IRY that is
inherently linked with the LPS and the JTT/QC is once more undoubtedly significant.

7.3.2.4 A pooled 28-sector analysis of JIT/QC and various variables (N=1008)

This time the whole sample for the 28-pooled sectors will be used, thus forming a very large se
1008 observations (28 times 36 years, from 1961 to 1996)57. The aim of this sub-section is to

explore the possibility of integrating the proxy variable IRY in the set of other important ec

variables such as labor productivity, capital productivity, etc5S. Table 7.12 (shown for conven
at the end of this section) contains the results of simple OLS regressions, for the 1008 data,

relating each one of the endogenous variables YL, ML, KL, PY, and IRY to each other, and to the

exogenous variables UN, PKPL, INT59 (all of them expressed as first differences in natural logs,

that is as growth rates except for the rate of interest which is given as a percentage number).
7.13 summarizes the definitions of all these variables. YL, ML, KL together constitute the
classical determinants of economic growth. The PY represents the output price component, and
IRY represents the mode of organizational production (the JTT/QC mode). Each one of these five
endogenous variables is influenced by all of the others, but not in a simultaneous way (in the

two sub-sections all these variables will be simultaneously determined). They are also influenc
57

See Appendix 7.A6.
Thus T F P is excluded. This exclusion is due to the fact that T F P is a function of labor productivity and the
capital to labor ratio, as shown above in 7.3.2.1.
59
The variables U N , INT are exogenous in the sense that they are c o m m o n (the same) to all sectors. The
variable P K P L showing the relative price of capital to labor, is a proxy for other exogenous variables such as
prices of raw materials which are determined in international markets and so on.
58
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by: UN standing for business fluctuations or cycles; PKPL standing for the relative scarcity
capital and labor; and TNT standing for the monetary policy of the American government, and

opportunity cost of holding inventories. In addition, each one of the endogenous variables m

also represent other issues, for example the KL ratio may embody the impact of TIs and so on
Table 7.13 Definitions of variables60

YL

Nominal production per employee (=the classical labor productivity)

ML

Nominal materials per employee (=labor productivity for materials)

KL

Nominal capital per employee (=the classical capital labor ratio)

PY

Deflator of the shipments series

IRY

The ratio of inventories to shipments (=proxy for the JIT/QC system)

UN

Unemployment (=total number of unemployed in the economy)

PKPL

Ratio of capital to labor prices (=investment deflator over the ratio of payments to labor
divided by the total number of employed people)

INT

Rate of interest

The variable of immediate interest is the I R Y one. Its coefficient is significant for all regressions

and has the right sign, at least where YL and PY are the dependent variables. Note that the

regression is perhaps the most important to observe as it links labor productivity with the
proxy IRY. Also the lagged one-year TRY1 and two year TRY2 seem to be significant in some

regressions. The elasticities shown are again close to -0.13 (or 0.13 according to the depe

variable) as expected. The importance of the variable TRY can also be examined in the conte

the significance of the other dependent variables. In this way, the overall significance of

regression reinforces the significance of each dependent variable, and hence of the TRY va

particular. More precisely, for the YL regression (that is, when YL is the dependent variab

dependent variables have significant coefficients (and with the right or expected sign). Fo

example, the higher the growth in ML, KL, KL1, PY, and UN, the higher the growth in YL (thu
the higher the unemployment, the higher the ratio YL becomes as the growth in L slows down

to the increase in unemployment). For the IRY regression, the higher the growth rate in YL,

and TRY2, the lower the growth rate in TRY; the lower the growth rate in KL, ML, PY, UN, TN

the lower rate of growth in TRY. Similar relationships can be found for the other regressi
60

All these variables except the rate of interest (which is already given as a percentage)
first differences in natural logs.
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these relationships can be further explored and have their own merit in these results. However,
detailed analysis of all these models of the American sectoral economy is outside the scope of
thesis.

7.3.3 Two stage least squares regression analysis (2SLS)

Still using the 1008-pooled data, this time the aim is to explore the possibility of the integ
TRY into a system of simultaneous equations containing the variables used in the previous sub-

section (sub-section 7.3.4 below will explore the simultaneity character of equations in a more

rigorous way). These five variables are now simultaneously determined and also influenced by th
three exogenous variables UN, PKPL, and TNT. Since adequate proxies for the exogenous
variables are not available, the variables UN, UNI, TNT, TRY1, TRY2, PKPL, PKPL1, PKPL2,
KL1, YL1, and ML1 (UNI means UN lagged one year, etc) are used instead. Despite this
inadequacy the method of two-stage LS can still provide us with some estimates to compare with

the simple OLS ones. Table 7.12 shows the results of these two-stage least squares regressions.

Again, the variable of immediate interest is TRY. Its coefficient for YL is significant only at

16% significance level, very significant for PY, and has the right sign at least for YL and PY.

that the magnitude of the coefficient of TRY in the YL regression is almost the same as that fo
simple regression (-0.122) .

Also, note that the coefficient of TRY for YL, in both the simple and two-stage LS regressions

(around -0.13), is lower than that for the 28 data models of the period 1987-96 examined above.
This is an expected result as the YL regression covers the whole period of 1958 to 1996. In
addition, it is worth emphasizing that the elasticity of TRY (since we have growth rates, the
coefficients are also elasticities) in the YL simple and two-stage LS regressions is virtually
same as that obtained for the TFP regression of the 420 data model62.

61

The 2SLS regression results are overall the least significant results of all regressions in this chapter. Thi
is expected, because 2SLS heavily depends on the chosen proxies for exogenous variables IheVfcC moaei
that follows will better address the simultaneity of equations issue and provide more robust results.
52
This similarity is due to the close relation between T F P and Y L , as shown in 7.3.2.1 above.
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7.3.4 Vector Error Correction Model ( V E C M )

In this sub-section, the main variables YL, ML, KL, PY, TRY, UN, PKPL, and TNT (as defined

earlier) will be analyzed in the context of a general vector error correction model (VECM)

underlies a vector autoregressive (VAR) model and the restrictions imposed upon it via a s
procedure (see below). The main reasons for using such models for analyzing the impact of
JTT/QC system on the American industrial economy can be summarized as follows.
• A VECM can be interpreted as a set of simultaneous equations with endogenous and
exogenous variables (see for instance section 5.6 in Maddala and In-Moo Kim, 1998).

• Though the determination of the vectors V (see Appendix 7.A7 for a brief derivation of t

vectors) of coefficients of error correction models (ECMs) (via the Johansen method for wh
see Maddala and In-Moo Kim, 1998 ) is a-theoretical and a-priori void of economic

interpretation, it is possible to identify the nature of each V as a correspondence betwee
endogenous variables and these Vs (see below).

• A VEC model can provide a Granger type of causality through the error correction terms (
for instance section 5.9.2 in Maddala and In-Moo Kim, 1998).

• It is quite safe to use the VECM and especially Johansen's method if the number of avail
data is very large.

• Johansen's procedure (see the Appendix 7.A7 for a reference to alternatives) is a reliab

estimation procedure for determining the coefficients in a system of equations such as the
presented here. This procedure is also related to using the full information maximum
likelihood (FTML) modus operandi (Banerjee et al, 1993).
• Johansen's coefficients of the Vs can be used as the restrictions to estimate the ECMs
(Maddala and In-Moo Kim, 1998; Enders, 1995).

• A VEC model can be considered as a system in the sense of an open complex evolving syste

(see Chapter five). In particular, it has a feedback mechanism expressed in terms of the EC
(see below regarding the results of this mechanism).
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In the present analysis 1008 observations of the pooled 28 manufacturing sectors of the Amer
industrial economy are used again. The model of simultaneous equations consists of the five
endogenous variables: YL, ML, KL, PY, and IRY as well as the three exogenous variables UN,
PKPL, and TNT, as previously defined. The unrestricted VAR model indicated as the optimum

order a lag of 5 if the AIC is used and a lag of 1 if the SBC is used63. Note that such a dis

usually exists and hence one has to experiment with all lags between 1 and 5 in order to det

the final model. Thus, for each lag between 1 and 5, the 5 corresponding Vs were estimated (

on Johansen's method). See Table 7.14 (at the end of this section) for some of these results

reason for having 5 Vs and no less for each VAR model, is that Johansen's tests strongly sug

that there are 5 Vs. This is not surprising, since all the variables used (both endogenous a
exogenous) are already log differenced once and hence, as the ADF (augmented Dickey-Fuller)

test confirmed, they all are integrated of order 0 (that is, 1(0)), which means that they ar
64

stationary .

The next aim is to determine the most representative set of five Vs65 and accordingly to esti

the ECMs (error correction models), which will ultimately provide more evidence to this thes

order to determine the most representative set of 5 Vs, three sets of criteria will be used.

already have a relatively good idea as to what each one of the Vs looks like from the previo

econometric analysis shown in the previous sub-sections. Second, a priori economic reasoning
identify the expected sign of each long-term coefficient of a given V. Finally, the signs,
significance and magnitude of the relevant ECMs will confirm the first two criteria.

Out of all the 5 sets of Vs the Vs of VAR (1) and VAR (2) were chosen as they satisfied, to

extent, all three criteria. For instance, virtually all coefficients have the right sign; th

approximately the right magnitude and to some degree they are similar to the regression resu
63

The Microfit program is used for all the V E C M analysis, see Pesaran and Pesaran, (1997). The printouts
of the tests are not provided here for space reasons unless otherwise indicated.
64
This stationarity is desirable for two reasons:first,because the intention is to examine growth rates, thus
being consistent with previous models (with stationary data, O L S estimates are not biased). Second, because
the raw pooled 1008 data is also stationary (an examination of the raw data yields similar results for the
V E C model).
See also Appendix 7.A7.
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shown in previous sections. It would be possible to test and slightly change some of the
coefficients according to the log-likelihood ratio, however this is not the purpose of this

A more detailed examination of the sets of coefficients of the selected Vs is outside the sc

this study since the main purpose is to show the integrated impact of the JTT/QC variable on
economy via the ECMs.

The results regarding the ECMs are now shown in Table 7.15 (at the end of this section)66. Th
sets of ECMs were estimated: the first is based on the VAR (1) model, the second on the VAR
and the third on the VAR (5) but using the restrictions (coefficients) of the VAR (1) model

as VAR(5)* in Table 7.15). The VAR (1), as expected, still has some serial correlation probl

whereas the VAR (5) does not. All three models have apparently a significant heteroscedastic

but this is as expected because the 1008 data are pooled data from 28 sectors and hence they

some pattern in terms of variance across these sectors. In addition, a few extreme values (o

certainly adversely affected this test. To verify the validity of these explanations the cov
matrix was re-estimated using the White and Newey-West methods (see Pesaran and Pesaran,

1997, also Greene, 1993). The new T-ratios obtained according to the new covariance matrices

were smaller, as expected, but were still high enough and close to those shown in Table 7.15

Though the normality test (Bera-Jarque) rejects the assumption that the residuals are normal

distributed, the very large sample used in these estimations and the plots of the histograms

residuals (which approximately show a normal distribution) suggest that the normality assump
should not be a problem. Again, outliers have a negative impact on most of these diagnostic

The R2 is quite high in all regressions, which is encouraging given the nature and stationar

data. The T-ratios of the ECM coefficients are generally high suggesting the significant imp
the dependent variables underlying the ECMs. In particular, the coefficient of the ECM

corresponding to the variable TRY68 (inventories to shipments ratio) has a considerable impac

66

See also Appendix 7.A7.
The elimination of outliers is a major problem in econometric analysis, so it was preferred not to remove
them.
68
A similar reasoning process would lead to similar conclusions for the other coefficients (speed of
adjustment).
67
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determining the other endogenous variables (YL, ML, KL, and PY) in a causal way. The negative

coefficient of TRY in the ECM, combined with the original negative coefficient of TRY in the V
regarding the dependent variable YL, shows that shocks produced by IRY have a positive impact

on the mean value of YL69. This error correction seems to be cumulative, showing the complexit

of the situation, and, in particular, the structural shift in the behavior of firms regarding

organization (and inventories) as Figures 7.4, 7.5a, 7.5b, and 7.5c have shown. Regarding thes

Figures it was indicated that the inventories to shipments ratio has started to continually d

since the early 1980s. Thus, it is possible that this positive impact of TRY on the long run t

growth rates of productivities signifies that over a long period of time (even longer than the

years of the period 1980s to 1996) the impact of the LPS becomes more permanent70. In any case

all this further validates the conclusions of the significant impact of JTT/QC on economic gr

Furthermore, when TRY becomes the dependent variable, the coefficients of the ECMs of all five

endogenous variables are also significant, thus re-enforcing the two-way causal and simultane

interactions of these variables with TRY. Some more remarks will justify the conclusions so fa

First, the choice of the relevant underlying dependent variables of the ECMs71 is strongly
confirmed by the right sign and significance of the appropriate ECM in each regression. For
example, for the IRY dependent variable the ECM1 (-1) corresponding to the IRY variable has a
positive sign (hence negative when combined with the negative sign of the ECM equation

containing TRY), is very significant (a T-statistic ranging from 16.5 to 32.6), and its magnit

(e.g. 0.43 for the VAR (1) model; see the bottom left segment of Table 7.15) shows that its im
'corrects' the long-term path of TRY without too much of a delay. Second, the coefficients of

ECM regression are relatively stable for the three VAR models used, have the right sign and ag

with the previous econometric analysis carried out in the sub-sections above. Third, in the VA

(5)* model the exogenous variables play a significant role (for instance the variable PKPL has

strong impact on KL). This active role of the exogenous variables makes the relationships betw
69

If the coefficient of IRY of the ECM were positive then the impact of JIT/QC would have onl
temporary (in this case the error correction term draws the impact of the shock back to the trend).
70
This makes sense for JIT/QC because this system is not only about a reduction in the ratio of inventories
to shipments, but also about increases in quality of products, and about drastic changes in the POFOs.
71
As explained above and in Appendix 7.A7, the computations of the Vs does not automatically determine
the underlying dependent variables (that is, which V corresponds to which dependent variable).
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the endogenous variables more valid and significant. Fourth, although the results shown

analyzed so far are based on the version of "restricted intercepts and no trends in the

versions such as the "unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR" produce

similar results72. Fifth, further examination of the ECM regressions, involving plots of

fitted values, plots of residuals, Wald tests of restrictions imposed on parameters, aut

and spectral functions of residuals, unit root tests for residuals, CUSUM tests etc, al
validity of the present analysis.

Sixth, the estimated elasticity between the IRY and productivities is not influenced by

common time trends, since the variables are all stationary. Also, this elasticity takes
all endogenous variables (as well as exogenous) such as the capital-labor ratio (hence

TIs) and so on in a simultaneous manner. Furthermore, this elasticity is estimated eith

the coefficients of the vectors V directly (a rather longer term evaluation) or through
rather shorter term evaluation).

Seventh, via the VEC model, the separate impact of OIs and the TIs on sectoral growth ha
Y
become possible. According to equation (7.4) T F P is a function of either labor productivity (—)

and the capital to labor ratio (—) (all expressed as growth rates), or, a function of ca
Li

Y K
productivity (—)
K

and the capital to labor ratio (—)
L.

again. Also w e know from a previous

Y K
discussion that (—) and (—) can represent OIs and TIs respectively. Hence, in the present V E C

K

L

is

model, the relationships between the variable K L , which is ( — ) , and the other variables shows the

impact of TIs, whereas the impact of OIs (in this case JTT/QC) on the remaining variable
captured by the proxy TRY (the inventories to shipments ratio).

As expected because the data are stationary.
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Eighth, the VEC model used in this sub-section is, overall, a model of estimating the impact

productivities of the American industrial sectors through time, and its usefulness can go bey

the estimation of the influence of the JIT/QC system via its proxy of the inventories to ship
ratio. The results of this model seen through the prism of a sectoral growth model of

productivities, are significant and rather robust in their own right. If, for example, we con

relationship between capital deepening as represented by the capital to labor ratio and the l

productivity as represented by the output to labor ratio, then from Tables 7.14 and 7.15 we c
that the corresponding coefficients and their signs are the desirable ones. Thus, the higher

deepening is the higher labor productivity is, ceteris paribus, and so on. Also, the ECM vari

corresponding to the same dependent variables (e.g. ECM(-l) (YL) of the dependent YL), all ha

the right sign (negative if the sign of the dependent variable is positive and vice-versa). T

that any 'error' of the variance of the dependent variable is brought back to zero (rapidly f

and ML, slowly for KL and PY, average pace for IRY). In addition, often the exogenous variabl
are significant, thus providing more robustness to the regressions. Overall, the system of

simultaneous equations of the five dependent variables YL, ML, KL, PY, and TRY seem to provid

a good explanatory tool for the functioning of the economy from the manufacturing sub-sectors

point of view. This means that organizational structures such as the JIT/QC, as represented b
TRY, are an integrated part of this economy.

Table 7.12

Results of the simple O L S and 2 S L S regressions

SIMPLE OLS REGRESSIONS

Dependent
Intercept

YL
0.011

6.3

YL
ML
KL
PY
IRY
UN
PKPL

INT
IRY1
IRY2
PKPL1
PKPL2

UN1
KL1
YL1

R 2 bar

SE

IRY

KL

PY

•0.0015

0.0083

-0.029

0.004

0.0057

0.002

-0.006

0.66

1.5

0.41

0.41

4.4

2.8

1.86

0.429

-0.988

2.6

0.62

1.2

0.8
1.3

-0.424
-0.124

YL

ML

0.61

2.2

9.1

1.053

0.187

0.61

-1.304

0.884

43.5

2.8

11.3

14.6

4.5

PY

KL

0.62

-0.14

0.173

0.613

0.782

43.5

2.7

3.9

8.4

5.7

2.9

-0.029

0.042

-0.054

-0.033

0.309

0.17

-0.217

0.109

2.8

2.7

1.2

6.7

2.7

2.9

0.53

0.187

0.089

-0.045

0.372

0.078

0.165

-0.091

11.3

3.9

1.2

7

0.71

1.2

0.23
-0.251

0.03

0.52
0.48
0.946

4
0.64

-0.135

0.107

0.141

0.126

-0.122

-0.059

14.6

8.4

6.7

7

1.4

0.49

0.84

4.1

0.145

-0.043

0.08

0.016

-0.027

0.142

0.017

0.049

-0.0006

0.016

3.3

4.3

15.2

1.9

3.2

0.04

0.97

5

1.3

2.2

0.045

0.354

0.39

-0.309

0.493

0.042

-0.139

11.1
0.0009 0.0017

0.51

2.8

0.55

1.5

3.3

1.7

0.003

-0.0007

0.002

2.8

0.71

2.1

-0.221

0.078

-0.129

8.8

2.3

2.4

0.00009

-0.0002

0.002

-9E-05

0.0005

0.47

0.96

2.4

5.1

3.6

0.25

0.98

-0.02

0.02

0.086

0.015

-0.102

2

4.1

0.85

3.3

-0.008

1.5
0.004

0.024

0.001

-0.078

-0.88

0.38

1.3

0.06

2.8

0.051

-0.018

-0.066

-0.006

-0.079

2

0.54

1.2

0.12

1

1.8

-0.137 0.0004

0.075

-0.122

0.01

1.1

1.5

-0.013

•0.006

0.009

0.26

0.29

2.9

-0.0063

0.019

-0.042

-0.023

1.26

3

4

2.6

0.81
-0.028

0.067

-0.057

0.196

-0.066

4.5

2.9

6.3

2.4

0.6

0.258

-0.147

0.00003

-0.035 -0.0094
0.14
0.87

4.7

1.5

-0.0025

0.041

0.006

-0.098

0.078

-0.1

1.3

0.1

2.2

1

0.88

0.86

0.36

0.68

0.34

0.017

S D Dep/t
0.051
2.02
DW-stat
Diagnostic tests
0.45
Ser. Cor/n
0.4
Functional
Normality
0.000
Heteros/ty
0.000
Notes:

IRY

ML

-1.76

0

ML1

TWO-STAGE LS REGRESSIONS

0.022

0.037

0.031

0.054

0.06

0.046

0.056

0.067

2

1.93

1.6

1.98

0.93

0.005

0.000

0.401

0.1

0.132

0.011

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.001

0.000

0.000

0.000

-0.183

0.43

0.15

0.23

0.13

0.026

0.063

0.052

0.065

0.55
0.019

1. The figures under the coefficients are"f-statistics
2. The figures of the diagnostic tests are the p-values
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Table 7.14

T h e vectors V of selected V J 4 R models

VAR(1)

Parti
Dependent IRY
YL
-1
1.85
ML
-0.22
KL
-0.75
PY
-1.86
IRY

Initial Vs
YL
ML
-1
-1

KL
-1

PY
-1

0.45
0.21
0.32
-0.27

2.81
1.77
-1.83
0.28

0.49
-0.77
-3.19
0.09

UN

0.0206 -0.037 -0.02 -0.162 -0.109 0.021 0.039 0.011
-0.051
3.23
-3.36 -0.47 -1.70
-0.2239 0.0392 0.14105 0.11254 -0.0508
-0.008 -0.097 0.131 1.361
-0.037 -0.008 0.102 -0.074 0.427
-0.29
3.25
-1.98 0.72
-0.4156 -0.1455 0.546
-0.9102 0.42677
0.0002 0.0023 -0.004 0.0039 0.005
0.0002 -0.002 0.002 0.001
0.72
1.17
-3.00
5.90
-6E-05
0.00049 -0.0014 0.00028 0.00121
0.015 -0.006 -0.055 0.1556 -0.055 0.015 0.007 0.031
0.049
5.24
7.58
-1.78 -4.26
-0.0165 0.0103 0.00099 0.0313
0.04878
In Part II above , the underlined coefficients are from the VAR(5) model under the restrictions
of the endogenous variables' coefficients of the V A R(1) model.
Initial V s
Part II Regression coefficients

T-stat
PKPL
T-stat

INT
T-stat
Intercept
T-stat

-0.203
-4.95
-0.068
-0.38
0.0091
6.50
-0.103
-8.05
Note:

V A R (2)
Parti
Dependent IRY

YL
ML
KL
PY
IRY
UN
T-stat
PKPL
T-stat

INT
T-stat
Intercept
T-stat

-1
0.74
0.31

0.1
-0.85

0.2

YL
-1

ML
-1

KL
-1

PY
-1

0.45
0.45
0.36
-0.11

0.99
-0.14
-0.06
0.054

-0.13
-0.59
0.33
-0.22

-1.55
-2.44
5.58
-0.49

-0.042
-3.72
-0.193
-3.67
0.0016
4.85
-0.007
-2.45

0.16
6.84
-0.371
-3.41
0.0005
0.74
0.0628
10.30

0.049
0.37
-1.781
-2.87
0.0079
1.98
-0.066
-1.88

0.0008
0.05
-0.088
-1.15

0.0189
1.77
0.1508
3.03
0.0008 -3E-04
-0.82
1.63
-0.007 0.0135
4.82
-1.71

V A R (3)

0.95
-0.37
0.04

0.565
-1.588
1.000
1.034
-0.158

-0.313
0.154
-0.241
1.000
0.028

IRY

YL

ML

KL

PY

-1.176
0.871
0.365
0.118
1.000

1.000
0.450
0.450
0.360
-0.110

1.010
1.000
0.141
0.061
-0.055

-1.695
-0.220
1.000
0.559
-0.373

0.179
0.278
0.437
1.000
0.088

0.0009

0.0189 0.0424 0.2712 -0.009

-0.1029 0.1508 0.1949 -0.629
0.0009

0.319

-3E-04 -0.002 0.0009 -0.001

-0.0085 0.0135 0.0073 0.1064 0.012
Regression coefficients

PY

YL

ML

KL

PY

-1
-1.568
-1.167
6.92
-0.913

-0.013
0.045
0.104
-0.135
1.000

1.000
0.497
0.437
0.272
-0.261

0.901
1.000
0.004
0.084
0.048

-1.898
0.400
1.000
0.636
-0.245

0.145
0.227
0.169
1.000
0.132

0.026 0.085
-0.094 0.118 -0.383 0.014
-0.156 -0.513 -2.015 -0.108 0.159 0.141
0.000 -0.001
0.0016 0.001 0.0092 0.000
-0.017 0.0355 -0.155 -0.005 0.010 0.015
(3) model was discarded for the final ECM estimations.

0.224
-0.973
0.002
0.067

0.055
0.291
-0.001
0.022

KL

YL
ML
KL
PY
IRY

-1
3.46
7.92
-10.24
-76.11

-1
-1
0.497 1.11
0.437 -0.004
0.272 -0.093
-0.261 -0.053

-1
0.211
-0.527
0.335
-0.129

UN

1.04
-8.21
-0.018
-0.403
Note:

0.026
0.159
0.0001
0.0098
The VAR

Intercept

1.000 1.053
0.450 1.000
0.210 0.389
0.320 -0.042
-0.270 -0.211

IRY

Initial Vs
YL
ML

INT

-0.538
0.995
-0.118
-0.403
1.000

Part II

Parti
Dependent IRY

PKPL

Part II Regression coefficients
IRY
YL
ML
KL
PY
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Table 7.15

E C M s of the 3 V A R models
VAR(1)

VAR (5)*

VAR (2)

dYL

dYL

Dependent dYL

VAR(1)
dML

VAR (5)*
dML

Sign of
var/e in
the ECM

VAR (2)
dML

Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio V A R ( 1 )
-0.136
ECM1(-1)(IRY)
13.6 -0.14
6
-0.2
4.5 -0.15
12.5 -0.13
4.8 -0.26
4.9
~
ECM2(-1)(YL)

0.896

13

ECM3(-1)(ML)

-0.145

3.5 -0.42

ECM4(-1)(KL)

-0.04

3.1

0.004

ECM5(-1)(PY)

0.131

16.8

0.15

12

Bar-R2

1.05

6.4

0.64

9.1

0.42

5.2

4.7 -0.31

3.9

-0.65

0.2 -0.54

13.2

-0.13

10.7

0.14

0.085

0.52

2.7

0.26

13.1

-0.92

8.9

-1.1

11.7

+

8.6

-0.12

4

-0.6

12.5

+

15.5

0.18

12.2 0.085
0.42

0.39

0.49

0.41

0.4

0.51

SE

0.048

0.044

0.048

0.057

0.052

0.055

SDofdep/t

0.062

0.062

0.062

0.073
2.02

0.073
2.06

2.05

2.02

2.04

0.073
2.07

Ser. Corr. Test 0.012
0.000
Funct. Form

0.107

0.001

0.001

0.128

0.000

0.09

Normality

0.000

0.000

0.001
0.000

0.037
0.000

0.313
0.000

0.019
0.000

Heterosc/ty

0.000

0.002

0.000

0.000

0.057

0.000

VAR (5)*

VAR (2)

dKL

dKL

VAR(1)
dPY

VAR (5)*
dPY

VAR (2)
dPY

DW-stat

VAR(1)
Dependent dKL

3.1

9.1

Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio
0.067
4.3 0.055
2.2 0.04
0.9
7.8 0.039
1.9 -0.13
3.6 0.044
ECM1(-1)(IRY)
-0.42
-0.41
5.8 -0.19
1.1 -0.49
6.9
7.1 -0.43
3.1 -0.73
ECM2(-1)(YL)
12.8
5.5 -0.47
5.1 -0.21
2.7
0.76
7.8 0.59
9.2 -0.23
ECM3(-1)(ML)
21.2
0.6
ECM4(-1)(KL)

-0.21

ECM5(-1)(PY)

0.015

Bar-R2

18.5 -0.21
2.3

0.038

9.9 -0.41

12.2

0.044

3.6 -0.049

7.5

0.15

0.47

0.57

0.54

SE

0.042

0.038

SDofdep/t

0.058

0.058

0.039
0.058

1.91

2.05

Ser. Corr. Test 0.001

0.000

2.03
0.049

Funct. Form

0.000

0.018

0.000

0.000

DW-stat

Normality
Heterosc/ty

0.002
0.000
0.074

VAR(1)
Dependent dIRY

0.011

0.123

VAR (5)*
dIRY

VAR (2)
dIRY

3.3 -0.004
19.3

0.16

0.1

-0.3

7.2

12

0.13

16

0.31
0.049

0.41
0.046

0.34
0.048

0.059
2

0.059
2.04

0.059
2

0.985

0.003

0.469

0.975
0.000

0.519
0.000

1
0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

+
+

Significant lagged variables of V A R (5)*

(at less than 5%, unless otherwise indicated)
dlNT1 (dYL,dML,dKL,dPY,dlRY)
Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio dYL2 (dKL)
(dKL)
dlNT2
(dYL.dKL.dlRY)
dYL3
22.2
16.5
1-31
32.6 0.54
0.43
ECM1(-1)(IRY)
d
Y
L
4
(dYL,dML,dPY)
dlNT3
(dYL,dML,dPY,dlRY)
10.1
2.3 -0.92
0.31
3.4 0.51
ECM2(-1)(YL)
d
M
L
1
(dKL)
dlNT4
(dML(9.7),dKL,dPY(10.3),dlRY)
3
.
2
4.2 -0.32
-0.38
6.9 -0.5
ECM3(-1)(ML)
d U N 1 (dYL.dML.dPY)
2.7 d M L 2 (dKL)
7.2 -0.15
9.6 -0.24
-0.17
ECM4{-1XKL)
dUN2
(dYL.dML.dPY)
4.6 d M L 3 (dKL)
0.2 -0.048
1.6 0.004
-0.16
ECM5(-1)(PY)
2

Bar -R

SE
SDofdep/t
DW-stat

0.55
0.064
0.095

0.61
0.06
0.095

0.58
0.062
0.095

dKL1
dKL2
dKL3
dKL4

2

1.99

2.05

dPY1

(dYL,dML,dPY(6.9),dlRY(5.2))

0.001
0.104

dPY2

(dPY)

d P K P L 3 (dYL.dML.dPY)

dPY3

(dPY(9.8))

d P K P L 4 (dYL(9.7),dKL)

Ser. Corr. Test 0.697

0.297

Funct. Form

0.308

0.03

Normality

0.000

0.000

0.000

Heterosc/ty

0.107

0.004

0.006

(dYL)
(dYLdKL)
(dKL)
(dKL)

dUN3
dUN4
dPKPLI
dPKPL2

(dYL.dML.dPY)
(dYL,dML,dPY,dlRY)
(dYL(8.8),dKL,dlRY)
(dYL,dML.dKL,dPY(8.1))

d P Y 4 (dYL.dML)
dlRY1 (dPY(6),dlRY)
Note: the corresponding
dlRY2 (dPY(io.7),dlRY)
dependent variables are
dlRY4 (dPY)

in brackets.
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7.4

CONCLUSIONS

In previous Chapters (two to five) the theoretical foundations for the importance of OIs in
economic, and, in particular, industrial growth was laid. More especially one of the major

theoretical preoccupations was to define, describe, and evaluate the main axis of OIs, namely t

JIT/QC cum Fordism axis, which constitutes the intrafirm organization of labor and capital. The
value of JIT/QC in the process of economic growth could also be appreciated from the

development of the concepts of the five processes of firm operations (POFOs), and, in particular
from the process of movements (POM). In Chapter six, a qualitative and quantitative analyses of
industrial sectoral growth in Japan and the USA provided some evidence, consistent with this
thesis, that the sectors which experienced higher growth rates were those that introduced

significant OIs, especially in relation to the main axis of OIs. In this chapter a more detaile
thorough, quantitative analysis of American manufacturing sectoral growth has provided more

evidence as to the confirmation of the hypothesis that the OI of the LPS, or its equivalent the

JIT/QC system, has played a significant role in the revival and continuous growth of the Americ
manufacturing sectors.

However, it is necessary to stress that the contribution of the findings of this chapter cannot
properly evaluated unless this contribution is seen through the light of previous chapters. In
study the extensive reference to many researchers' work on the substantial role of the LP or

JIT/QC system on industrial growth, including their relevant empirical evidence, have shown tha
OIs (or disembodied technology) such as JIT/QC are a necessary component of industrial growth.

This extensive reference supports the quantitative analysis presented in this chapter and viceAs an extra example of this mutual backup between the evidence of previous chapters and the
evidence provided in this chapter, consider the article by Brox and Fader (1997) entitled
"Assessing the impact of JIT using economic theory". These two authors say:
"...Our statistical findings support the claims made by JIT proponents that the Japanese JIT
manufacturing philosophy is being successfully implemented in North America. More importantly,

we find statistical support for the assertions from JIT users that the technology not only enha
cost efficiency, but that the way that productivity is enhanced is through added worker and
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flexibility and quality improvements... " ; and "...the difference between the elasticities of
productivity, with respect to output changes, shows that JIT firms as being more labor-and
materials-saving than the non-JIT firms... " (p. 382)

The results presented in this chapter, based on an econometric study of American manufacturing
sectoral growth, and not just on a sample of firms, provide a more comprehensive and robust

support for the conclusions reached by the above two authors (and many others cited in previou
chapters and sections).

The implementation of the JIT/QC system in the USA (as an extension of that in Japan) took pla

during the last 20 years, and especially from the mid 1980s to the end of the 1990s. Informati

relating to this provided the necessary background for the subsequent quantitative analysis. T
latter was carried out in a robust and comprehensive manner starting from simple models and
ending with the usage of much more complicated ones. In brief the results obtained are the
following:
i) There is a strong relationship between the proxy for JIT/QC (the ratio of inventories to

shipments) and productivity (the lower the ratio, the higher the productivity): this link beco

stronger in the most recent periods examined (1982-96, and especially 1987-1996). The elastici

of productivity in relation to the LPS was found to be between -0.14 and -0.65 depending on th
variable that the proxy is linked with, the model, and the examined period. These figures are

higher or much higher than estimates provided by Lieberman and Demeester (1999), that is, -0.1

This difference is due to three reasons: first, productivity increases are a consequence not o
OIs (the JIT/QC system in this case) but also of other types of innovations such as TIs and

strategic innovations73. The model that shows more clearly the net impact of JIT/QC is the VECM

which provides an elasticity of-0.14 between labor productivity (YL) and the inventories ratio

(IRY), since in this model at least the TIs have been considered separately through the capita
labor ratio (KL). Given that the VEC model was applied to the whole period 1958 to 1996, a

higher elasticity is expected for the most recent period of 1987-1996. Second, the sectoral mo

3

However, in footnotes number 40 and 41 the estimated regressions suggest that the IRY elasti
very high even in the presence of the measurement of other innovations (captured by the constant in that
case). More quantitative work is needed to separate more precisely the impact of the various types of
innovations on economic growth.
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take into account other effects such as the externalities effect (eg. demonstration effects) a
the elasticities are higher than those provided by Lieberman and Demeester (1999) which are

based on a sample of firms. Third, the higher elasticity estimates are more related to the mos
recent period of 1987-1996 for which the JIT/QC implementation has been more spread out and

more rigorous. In addition, these elasticity estimates are the direct effect of the JLT/QC impa
indirectly (through the multiplier mechanism on all sectors including services) the impact of
adoption of JIT/QC on the economy should be much larger.
ii) The relationship between the impact of the LPS and the economy is simultaneous and
directed in both ways, that is, the JIT/QC influences the economy and vice-versa.
iii) The leading sectors in the USA during the last 15-20 years, mainly machinery (including

computers), electronics, and plastics experienced the largest reduction in the ratio of invento
shipments; these sectors were the most efficacious in implementing the LPS (evidence for this
statement was provided in Chapter six regarding some of the leading sectors).
iv) Other factors have been taken into account in the econometric exploration, such as the
number of establishments, number of patents, rate of interest, price levels, and so on (within

limits of data availability); the inclusion of these factors enhanced the validity of the resul
v) The impact of TIs, such as patents and LT, was also briefly examined and this impact was

found to be less significant or even doubtful. The impact of TIs was also taken more explicitl

account in the econometric analysis by considering the role of the proxy for TIs, namely the K
ratio.

These conclusions were based on using, in the empirical analysis, the proxy of the ratio of
inventories to shipments for JIT/QC. The use of such a proxy (several others could be used

instead, or concurrently, such as the number of defects if relevant data were available) was f

justified by the extensive analysis carried out in previous chapters. There is strong evidence

other production system, such as the Neo-Fordist system including variations based on flexible

automation, can achieve such substantial reductions in the ratio of inventories to shipments a
LPS can. The empirical analysis carried out in this chapter is strongly supported by the

'theoretical' analysis of Chapters three, four, five, and the general discussion of Chapter six
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Figure 7.9 at the end of this chapter shows the links between the 'theoretical' chapters and the
'quantitative' ones.

These results have far-reaching implications for the theory of industrial growth and policy. Fir
models of economic growth, whether endogenous or not, should include a new variable, namely
the organizational relation between the traditional inputs of capital and labor. Second, growth
policies should encourage the development of quality control, outsourcing of supplies, the lean
production process in general, and SMEs (for the link between SMEs and economic growth in this

respect see Sanidas, 2002). Third, the American experience shows that it is possible to transpla
with success Japanese type organizational innovations in other countries. Adjacent to this last

point it is worth noting that it is rather important to consider the specific country in which s

holistic systems (JIT/QC) are transferred, and thus isolated firms attempting to implement these

systems in countries not yet ready to adopt them will most likely fail. In other words it is cou

like Japan and the USA, and some other developed nations (perhaps to a lesser extent), which are
the friendliest environments for the adoption of the LP or JIT/QC process74.

Overall, the main message of this chapter is that the quantitative evidence provided confirms th
theoretical propositions made in previous chapters.

74

This last remark is confirmed by Stern's article (1993, p. 342), thoughflieperiod
™ » « ^ ^
was the starting period of adoption for many Americanfirmsthemselves: «.. .It is perhaps » » ^ S d W l o w
effect of 'just-in-time' inventory policies, which have driven U S ^ntory-sales raUos to ^ t o n c d i ^ o w
levels, is not in evidence in the year-to-year inventory-sales ratios of the foreign affiliates of U S parent firm
during the 1982-87 span..."
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8. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATIONS
8.1 INTRODUCTION

The last six Chapters have provided evidence of the importance and the role of OIs in shaping

industrial (and consequently economic) growth1. In particular, the evidence was directed towar

the following points. First, in order to complement the existing theories of economic growth,
must be explicitly included in the production process. Second, OIs are distinct from TIs and
be separately analyzed when exploring their impact on economic growth. Third, OIs can be

grouped into three main interdependent axes with emphasis on the main axis, namely the JIT/QC

cum Fordism axis (which is extensively covered in this thesis). Thus, the meaning of OIs used

the present volume is primarily related to what takes place inside the firm and encompasses n

only its organizational form (e.g. M-form) but also its organizational system as described by
five processes of firm operations (POFOs).

Fourth, the main axis JIT/QC cum Fordism can be further explored by introducing the five
fundamental processes of firm operations (POFOs) and especially the process of movements

(POM) and its related kinetic costs (KCs); thus the process of growth is ultimately a functio
the five POFOs and, in particular, the POM. Thus, the 'waste' described by Williamson (1994)

its link with transaction costs is not sufficient to explain why firms differ in terms of gro

performance. Fifth, industrial growth is basically a micro phenomenon; hence emphasis is give

firms and sectors, and especially to leading firms and sectors. Sixth, basic quantitative evi

a sectoral basis is provided for two countries, the USA and Japan, by examining the links bet

OIs and productivity (e.g. TFP). Finally, econometric evidence on a sectoral basis is provide

the USA, by exploring the impact of the JIT/QC system on sectoral productivity growth (TFP or
labor productivity).

1

Economic growth of the macro economy depends on the growth of the major sectors of manufacturing
industries, services and primary industries and their interlinkages. This thesis has been mostly concerned
with industrial or manufacturing growth, although the results can be easily extended to other major sectors,
such as services.

313
To bring adequate evidence for all these points, Chapter two established the major OIs by
reviewing the organizational features of American and Japanese firms from the last decades of

19th century till the end of the 20th century. Chapter three established the need to separate OI

TIs and incorporate the OIs into the production function of firms. Chapter four provided evide

for the positive role OIs played in promoting industrial growth in various periods of the mode

economic history of the USA and Japan. Chapter five presented an extension of the theory of th
firm in order to capture more precisely the importance of the micro foundations of the growth

firms, thus complementing the previous two chapters; thus, the five POFOs were introduced. Als
in this chapter, the growth on a firm basis was related to the growth on a sectoral basis, in
establish an atomic/systemic model of industrial growth. Chapter six provided some basic

quantitative evidence for the link between OIs and sectoral industrial growth. Finally, in Cha

seven, rigorous econometric evidence for the positive impact of the JIT/QC system on the reviv

of the American industrial sectors during the last 20 years was provided. In brief, the qualit

evidence was provided in Chapters two, three, four, and five, whereas the quantitative evidenc
was provided in Chapters six and seven.

The comparative study between the two economic giants, the USA and Japan, has facilitated the

present process of research as theories and empirics are better understood and analyzed if thi
process has the tool of comparisons. In addition, this comparative study was carried out on a
historical basis, thus allowing a comparison between various periods, exposing appropriate
theories, and testing relevant hypotheses.

8.2 SYNTHESIS OF THE MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
Industrial and hence economic growth cannot only be explained by the quantity or quality of

capital and labor, or by human capital and TIs. The role of OIs in explaining industrial growt

least as significant as all these factors. In addition, although OIs are interrelated with all
inputs of production in an endogenous and simultaneous way, this study has almost exclusively

concentrated on how the major OIs influence the process of growth and all the other inputs. Th
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influence was demonstrated in various ways: through review of the relevant literature, contr

between OIs and TIs, theoretical inclusion of the variable OIs into a general form of a prod
function, use of pertinent concepts and theories for the inclusion of OIs (e.g. transaction

competences and capabilities, and so on), resort to the historical evolution of OIs, an exte

the theory of the firm with the introduction of the five processes of firm operations and he
and benefits, resort to the concepts of leading firms and leading sectors of the economy, a
quantitative analysis of manufacturing sub-sectors in Japan and the USA, and an econometric

analysis of the link between the lean production system and the manufacturing sub-sectors in

USA, plus a few other approaches such as an account of industry cases. All this evidence abo

impact of OIs on industrial growth and other inputs of production is primarily evidence abou
substantial increases in productivity, and hence growth.

With respect to the major OIs analyzed in this study, emphasis was purposely put on only som

aspects of OIs believing that these aspects are the moving forces of all OIs. This belief em

from a detailed analysis of all major OIs in relation to industrial growth. These emphasized

are the internal organizational features of firms radiating from the main axis of scientific
management cum Fordism versus JIT/QC or LPS, and more precisely from the POM. The other

two axes, that of vertical integration and that of networks depend on the main axis to a gre
extent; for example, the recent tendency for disintegration of firms in many industrialized
countries (cf. Krajewski and Ritzman, 1999, p. 99; or Grant, 1998, p. 196 or 326) is due to

adoption of the LPS, which is the core trait of the main axis. It is this axis that has gene
American supremacy in the 20th century and later the serious challenge by Japanese leading

sectors. The empirical evidence presented in Chapter seven showed that the American industri

sub-sectors revived and counter-challenged the Japanese ones in the last 20 years because th
adopted the LPS (ceteris paribus2). This main axis can be extended beyond the boundaries of

20th century; thus, in the 19th century, scientific management was not totally absent but it ha

different face based on the effort to rationalize the production processes via various metho

the 18th century before the First Industrial Revolution in Britain, craftsmen like blacksmit

2

See next section for an elaboration of this ceteris paribus clause.
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individual requirements according to the pull system observed in the modern JIT/QC process (on

this point see also Linge, 1991); furthermore, the 21st century might fully 'imitate' the 18th c
with a wider adoption of the LPS and the advent of Internet-oriented marketing procedures.

To further explore the main axis and its links with other OIs, a system of the fundamental

operations of firms (the five POFOs) was presented in a detailed manner in Chapter five. There

was argued that we need to take into account not only transaction costs, production costs, and

competencies in a general and generic way, but also in a more analytical and 'atomic' way so t

more light is shed on the nature, functions and usefulness of OIs and other innovations such a

strategic ones. Thus, it was suggested that besides transaction costs we also have kinetic cos
are exclusively linked to the OIs3; we also have wisdom and factor costs, which are related to

but not exclusively, and so on. Such a fundamental exploration of all firm operations, and hen
costs and benefits, show why the main axis is paramount in exploring the impact of OIs on
industrial and hence economic growth.

There is a very close link between industrial and hence economic growth and the various facets

that the main axis can take. From the analysis presented in this study it becomes apparent tha

only when this axis takes the appropriate form that accelerating industrial growth ensues. Thu

was following the appearance of new TIs and large firms at the end of the 19th century that the
main axis had to take the form of scientific management cum Fordism in the USA so that
industrial growth could be sustained for many more decades. This form of OIs generated

economies of scale and scope given the extensive demand by a growing population with constantl
rising real income, given the abundance of resources in that country and given the favorable

institutional background. Later, during the 1960s and 1970s, after the challenge of the Japane
leading sectors, which introduced in praxis the JIT/QC system and hence substantially lowered
costs, the main axis had to adjust again in the USA, by becoming more flexible, more customer

3

OIs and the POM (from which the KCs are derived) are intrinsically related, whereas the POFO
combinations generate the three axes of OIs. A n OI such as JIT/QC is a combination of all the POFOs but
mainly of the P O M . M u c h emphasis in this thesis is given to the exploration and definition of all kinds of
OIs as distinct from TIs and other types of innovations. In addition, all OIs are heavily influenced by the

POM.
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oriented, more quality oriented, or, in other words by adopting the JTT/QC philosophy. Thus,
industrial growth could be again sustained at relatively high levels despite the already very
income per capita achieved by the USA.

Thus, one of the main conclusions of this study is that the appropriate form of the main axis
scientific management cum Fordism versus JIT/QC or LPS is a necessary condition of sustained
industrial growth, but of course not sufficient as many other factors are part of the complex
process of this growth such as TIs, quality of labor and so on. This conclusion is similar to
reached by Harbison (1956) who emphasized in a rather neglected paper amongst other points:
"...Large expenditures for equipment and machinery are likely to be quite unproductive unless

there is a corresponding investment in organization..." In the present study, the importance
JIT/QC process is emphasized because this process is an overall organizational phenomenon as
demonstrated in previous chapters4. The contiguous scientific management and its many

consequences has been shown to be significantly important for both the USA and Japan, although

in different periods and in different ways. Striving for continuous rationalization and impr

has been present one way or another in the USA since the 1910s, whereas for Japan mainly since
the end of WWII and mainly via quality control. The different facets of scientific management
have been explained in various parts of this volume.

The other two axes of vertical integration and networking are as important to analyze as the m

axis as this was shown in Chapter four5. However, from the empirical viewpoint, mostly the mai

axis was scrutinized in Chapters six and seven, where it was found that the manufacturing firm

and sectors that led their national economies of the USA and Japan were those that appropriate
adopted the characteristics of this axis. Thus, although the main axis was more emphasized
throughout this study, the elements of the other two OIs axes were sufficiently explored in
bring qualitative evidence about their positive impact on industrial growth (the three axes

intrinsically interrelated). For example, the disappearance of the domestic system and its gr

4

See also, Sakakibara et al, 1997, who empirically tested JIT, on a firm basis, as an overal
phenomenon, and confirmed it.
However, these two axes ultimately depend on the main axis.
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replacement by the factory system created a substantial increase in economic growth. The reas

for this boost can be summarized in the savings and reduction of transaction costs as well as

appearance of new TIs that in turn shaped the emerging factory system, although, according to

analysis of the five processes of firm operations (POFOs) in this study, it becomes clear tha
types of costs and benefits ought to be examined in order to understand the passage from one
production system to another. Also, the integration of mass consumption and distribution and

parallel increase in vertical big business generated a new era of secular growth for the USA,
reconfirming Chandler's thesis. However, the comparison of the American firm organizational
system with that of Japan produced some more significant conclusions.

Thus, one of the positive side effects of this study was the testing of Chandler's thesis reg
the birth and expansion of managerial capitalism in the USA and its contribution to economic
growth on a more general basis. One of the major conclusions presented in this study is that
USA, for which both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis provide extra support for
Chandler's thesis, at least up to the end of the 1970s6. However, the American experience of

1980s and the 1990s cannot be explained only in typical Chandlerian arguments; as was shown i

Chapters six and seven, the contribution of the main axis of this analysis based on the impor

of intrafirm OIs such as the JIT/QC or lean production system was considerable during the las

decades of the 20th century7. In addition, the strong Japanese industrial growth from the very

period of the 1870s to the 1930s, and especially after WWH, cannot be explained strictly with

Chandlerian variables which are mainly based on the exploitation of economies of scale and sc
created by big business. Effectively, there is something extra in Japan, expressed in two

interrelated ways. First, we have what Fruin (1992) called economies of scope of joint produc

and cooperation by small focal firms, which gives a different dimension to the explanation of
economic growth by small and medium firms; these enterprises are interlinked in a mesh that

6

However, even up to the 1970s, this study (also see Kogut, 1996, as previously mentioned) h
the rationalization process, which started or accelerated with scientific management cum Fordism, has been
a substantial factor in creating and sustaining strong American manufacturing firms and sectors from the
early decades of the 20th century.
7
It is easy andfrequentto ignore the contribution of OIs even if authors such as Nelson and Wright (1992)
are well aware of the role of OIs or at least of the role of some of the OIs in determining the industrial
performance of the U S A and other countries.
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generates healthy competition and neutralizes the big profits of big monopolist or oligopol

corporations, such as those found in the USA; the Japanese model could and has created more

value added than the American one in particular periods of time. Second, we have a reductio

kinetic costs (KCs) generated by the adoption of the JTT/QC system, as extensively analyzed
various parts of this study.

These last points bring forward an important aspect of the assertions seen throughout the w

study: there is no superior model of firm organization and industrial and hence economic gr

what is good in one country and in one period is not necessarily good in another country or

another period. Thus, this conclusion espouses the premises of contingency theories. For in

the integration of mass production and mass distribution, which took place in the USA at th

beginning of the 20th century, took place in Japan only after WWH and to a much lesser exten
This was also due to the rise in the standard of living in Japan during the period 1950 to
which was similar to that of the USA at the beginning of the 20th century; but it was mainly

the different historical or context contingent evolution of firms during the last 120 years

Therefore, there is no process of determinism that pushes entrepreneurs towards a certain t

organization and management (for a good example of the rather contrary forces of contingenc

and determinism cf. Elazar, 1999). The same thing can be said about the adoption of the mult

divisional form of big companies, which started propagating in Japan only recently after so
other changes took place.

Another way of expressing the contingency approach to industrial development is to examine
conditions under which growth took place in the two countries. Thus, according to Wilken's

(1979) terms, the Americans had more resources, more time, and more opportunities for growth

but they did not take full advantage of all these extra factors, contrary to the Japanese w
much more adverse conditions exhibited a higher rate of economic growth in various periods

their history. In other words the opportunity cost in the American secular growth was highe
that of Japan, though one has to consider the dual nature of the Japanese economy in order

conclude this with safety. Thus, Japan has a group of modern dynamic sectors (e.g automobil
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electronics) and also a group of m u c h less efficient sectors (e.g. food products, banks) that are
undergoing s o m e substantial changes at the moment. A recent book by Porter et al (2000)
emphasizes this point well:

"... While studying some of Japan's most formidable industries, however, we discovered a Japa

that no one was talking about. Alongside the highly competitive industries were other indu
that were highly uncompetitive. It was as if there were two Japans. As time passed, the
uncompetitive Japan remained obscure and often hidden, and it never showed signs of
improvement... " (p. ix)

On the other hand the American economy has been involved in the rationalization of the quality
control process (as part of the holistic JIT/QC process) in a thorough w a y during the last 15-20
years; hence a higher growth than before has been the relative experience. In Chapter seven it was
shown in a rigorous econometric w a y that the manufacturing jAmerican firms successfully imitated
the Japanese lean production system in the last 15-20 years and accordingly grew faster than
before, especially in terms of productivity gains. The proxy variable for the L P S used in various
cross section or pooled time series data, namely the inventories to sales ratio, has been found to
significantly have an impact on growth (and vice-versa). If data were available on other proxies,
such as the percentage of defects or the percentage of various types of employment, an equivalent
empirical analysis would have been carried out as well. Nonetheless, the proxy of the inventories
to sales ratio is fully supported by the pertinent qualitative analysis as presented in several parts of
this thesis.

So far the conclusions presented are mainly related to the importance of OIs (on a micro level,
is firms and industries) in having a positive impact on industrial and hence economic growth.
However, there is a link that w a s established in various parts of this study regarding the w a y OIs
generate growth starting from the firm level and ending at the macro level. This link is the concept
of leading firms and sectors that initiate OIs that influence other firms and sectors, andfinallythe
whole economy is affected and changes accordingly. This link is also related to the features of
systems, such as organization emergency and entropy. Finally, this link is also related to sectoral
systems, innovations systems, and the evolutionary learning capabilities offirms.In this respect, it
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is worth consulting again Figures 5.10 and 5.11 in Chapter five, which summarize the propose
atomic/systemic model of industrial growth and the whole thesis to some extent.

For instance, as it was analyzed in Chapter six, the second industrial revolution in the USA

connected with a strong growth in some managerial and fully integrated industries such as th

chemical, oil, transport, and machinery ones that heavily invested in OIs and adopted the OI

scientific management cum Fordism, or, more generally, the process of rationalization. In Ja

the textile industry, also OIs oriented, played a preponderant role for a long time until th
transport, and machinery industries took over and accelerated the process of growth. More

recently, the jAmerican economy accelerated its growth because its leading industries - mech
and electric machinery (mainly computers, semiconductors, and telecommunications equipment)

have also been heavily investing in OIs, and especially in the JTT/QC system. On the contrar

Japan is still deeply in its ten-year recession because there are no leading sectors. .All t

extensively explored in the last two chapters, where it was also analyzed that firms such as
Computers or Toyota played an exceptional and hence a leading role in the growth of their
respective industries.

8.3 LIMITATIONS, OMMISSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEAR

This study has several limitations. First, the empirical analysis was limited by the availab

data in the two countries. Thus, regarding the proxy used to empirically test the successful

implementation of the LPS in the USA, namely the inventories to sales ratio, it is not the o
if relevant data were available on a sub-sectoral basis other proxies could have been used,
the percentage of defects, or changes in employment status, and so on.

Second, the ceteris paribus clause has been used in this study in several instances. For exa

OIs and industrial growth have not been linked with exports or imports except in some limite

cases. This link cannot be neglected in the context of a more comprehensive investigation; f

instance, though some of the literature research has revealed that Japanese growth was not e
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led (e.g. Boltho, 1996), thus confirming that other issues have been more prevalent in analyz

the Japanese economic miracle, further exploration is needed to examine the impact of the rol

some leading industrial sub-sectors have played in promoting exports and hence growth. In thi

respect, the analysis by Campa and Goldberg (1997) has revealed that, as expected, transporta

equipment, instruments, and electrical machinery have been the main leaders in exports for Ja
thus confirming that there is a strong link between JTT/QC in these key sectors, exports and
industrial and hence economic growth. Furthermore, this link could also be reinforced by

considering other important empirical results, such as those by Sakakibara and Porter (2001),
which show a positive association between domestic rivalry and international trade.

Another example of the ceteris paribus clause is the omission of additional evidence to suppo
tendency for disintegration and for the growth of smaller business in the USA recently; for

instance, Stewart (1993, p.70) shows a graph that compares growth of US GDP versus total sale
of the FORTUNE 500 largest American companies since 1982; this comparison clearly

demonstrates the 'shrinking importance of bigness' as the author says. The downsizing tendenc
of big business could bring more evidence to the arguments presented in this thesis8. More

specifically, the main axis of JIT/QC has an impact on economic growth (as demonstrated in th

thesis in many ways) and indirectly it has an impact on the vertical integration axis because

encourages outsourcing (hence the evidence just mentioned a few lines above about the 'shrink

importance of bigness'). Yet another example of the ceteris paribus clause is the relationshi
between OIs and long economic cycles or waves; Freeman and Soete (1997, p. 65, Table 3.5),

though overwhelmingly preoccupied by TIs, presented some links between Kondratieff cycles and

'organization of firms and forms of co-operation and competition'; these links could be furth

analyzed to support the assertions of this thesis. A final example of the ceteris paribus cl

relationship between business cycles and OIs; thus, the very recent economic recession in the

(in 2001) might be a new beginning for other OIs to emerge in the near future, or it might be
reinforcement of existing OIs, such as the JIT/QC system within the context of Internet.

8

For a very recent book on the H T / Q C system and its relationship with strategies, downsizing of business
and so on, see Brown (2000).
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Third, the most recent years, namely the period from 1996/97 to 2000 were omitted from the

empirical analysis, because the impact of the Internet on the new economy probably started h
a significant impact on various industries during that period (thus generating a structural
This omission, though desirable from the point of view of making the empirical results more

must be eventually explored in future research, since the Internet TI will very probably in

new OIs, so far not easily discernable, that might push productivity gains much higher. Sowi

(2001, p. 54) expresses a similar assertion: "...In recent years, however, use of JTT progra

exploded, and the increased use of the Internet has only pushed the process faster and farth

Fourth, certainly there is a relation between OIs and TIs, but this link has not been the ma

of this work although it was extensively analyzed in many instances, e.g. in Chapters three,
six, and seven. In particular, how is it possible to empirically separate in a more precise

effects of TIs and OIs on TFP or labor productivity?9 Although this whole thesis is an attem

answer this question, together with others, the future research agenda should include a thor

exploration of the evolution, dependence and links of these two types of technology, and the
separate or concomitant impact on industrial and economic growth. As an example of such
research the two types of Schumpeterian patterns of innovation (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995;

Malerba, 2002) could be further examined in the light of TIs and OIs (a preliminary relevant

discussion took place in this thesis in previous chapters). In addition, the links between T

OIs can be further explored by scrutinizing individual economies such as the Japanese one. A

already analyzed, Japanese firms have mostly imitated foreign technology in terms of TIs; th

Herbig (1995, p. 15) summarizes his work on 'innovation, Japanese style' in this brief state

"...Adapting, not creating has always been the strong point of the Japanese..." And yet, Jap

economic growth has mostly been very high. The Japanese case can be contrasted with the Russ
case in which TIs have always excelled. And yet, economic growth has mostly been very low.
More research of comparative national systems of innovations and sectors (SI in the sense

suggested by Edquist, 1997; and SSIP in the sense of Malerba, 2002) is needed to further sup

9

From the empirical point of view some methods were suggested and used in Chapters five and seven
measure the specific impacts of TIs and OIs, but more research is needed in this respect.
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the arguments of the present thesis, namely that OIs are the neglected force that drives eco
growth.

Fifth, the other two sectors of an economy, namely the primary and services sectors were ove

omitted in this study (but often included implicitly and sometimes explicitly). Their consis
inclusion into the present analysis would certainly enrich the findings and conclusions and

the arguments into a higher level of credibility and significance. For example, from a perus

the already vast relevant literature (e.g. see Duclos et al, 1995, or Matsumoto, 2002), it se

the JTT/QC system is also applicable to the services sector. In addition, despite the fact t

recently more than 70% of national income in many developed countries comes from the service
sector, it remains true that services and hence the whole economy depend heavily on the

development of manufacturing industries (e.g. relevant services branching off from the growt

computers). In addition, future research needs to answer, in a methodical way, questions of t

type asked in a more comprehensive study such as that by Edquist et al (2001, p. 42): "...ar
organizational process innovations more important for productivity and employment than
technological ones in service production?..."

Sixth, the empirical evidence was limited to only some aspects of OIs, some periods of time,

an emphasis was given to the American economy. This was primarily due to availability of dat

space and time limitations. The quantitative analysis presented in this study should be rega
a basis for future more extensive explorations.

Seventh, in this study, the macroeconomy is treated as a derivation of the following sequenc
five POFOs, leading firm, then firms, then leading sector, then sectors, then whole economy.

However, it would be possible to start directly with the macroeconomy and examine the impact
OIs within a macroeconomic model, but without denying the micro-foundations of economic

growth. For example, starting with the conclusion that".. .productivity growth and its deter

are the key to the understanding of the process of economic growth, capital accumulation and

savings... (Chaudhri and Wilson, 2000, p. 66), productivity growth can be explored by introdu
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into Tobin's q (Tobin, 1969) the dimension of OIs. Thus, including an OI such as JTT/QC ca

enhance the marginal value of a firm, thus altering the value of Tobin's q, which, in turn
impact on investment and productivity (Ibid, p. 61)10. Furthermore, if we use a macro model,

as the one explored by Harvie and Kearney (1995), OIs can be incorporated directly into th
aggregate supply function of output. In this case, the whole macro model will be affected

presence of OIs, with significant consequences on employment, wealth and other variables11.

Eighth, it is an omission that formal models of economic growth, such as the exogenous and
endogenous ones, are not included in this thesis, as they could more formally demonstrate
propositions made in this study.

Ninth, direct quantitative evidence of the importance and relevance of the five POFOs has

been provided here. However, this is a vast area for future research. For instance, Womack

Jones's (1996) book is a rich source of detailed study cases that describe how firms decid

adopt the JTT/QC system and how they successfully or not adopted this system. Such study c

provide valuable information that can be explored to evaluate the importance of the five P

Also, the theoretical links between the POFOs, or OIs in general and generic concepts such

resourced-based view of the firm or its core competences have not been sufficiently explor

this study. For example, corporate strategy, governance and leadership can be explained by
embeddedness in the framework of OIs, as suggested in Sanidas (2002b).

Tenth, OIs have been explored within the context of the two countries examined, namely the
and Japan. However, there are other OIs in other countries that have played a substantial
their economic development. For example, the importance of China's township and village

enterprises (TVEs) can be compared to the Japanese focal firms. Thus, TVEs are small, flex

market driven, dedicated to human resources, to innovation and quality firms that employ a

10

The author of this thesis would like to thank Ed Wilson, (Chaudhri and Wilson, 2000), fo
idea.
11
The author of this thesis would like to thank Charles Harvie, (Harvie and Kearney, 1995), for suggesting
this idea.
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substantial part of the Chinese labor force and contribute significantly to the process of ec

development in China (Harvie, 2000). Moreover, ".. .the key issue is not whether the TVEs wil
able to maintain their industrial momentum in the light of deepening reforms, but rather the
organizational and ownership form that will enable them to do so..." (Ibid, p. 98)12

Eleventh, some important elements of the LPS such as the tendency for more systematic

outsourcing have not been sufficiently analyzed. A more detailed exploration of the links bet
suppliers and the internal structure of firms due to the implementation of JTT/QC would have

further supported the conclusions of this study. For example, the links between the main axis
JTT/QC and the other two axes of OIs, namely vertical integration and networking, would have
become more apparent. In order to carry out such a detailed exploration, Fujimoto's (1999)
method and analysis would have been used. As this author says: "...as the case of company B

suggests, the process of developing a black box design system requires step-by-step collabora

and tenacious capability building by both the assembler and the supplier...." (Ibid, p. 167)13

Twelfth, although this study's object has been the exploration of major OIs such as JTT/QC, m
OIs have the same impact on economic growth. Minor organizational improvements (for example

reengineering of a department's tasks) take place frequently in firms especially within the c
of JIT/QC, thus the POM is continually altered and generally improved. Also, when an OI is
introduced, a priori we do not know whether this OI is minor or major. A good example is the

'total productivity management' movement in Japan as Fruin and Nakamura (1997) explored it. I
this 'movement' (that represents a top-down production management) a minor or major

organizational change? The answer is not clear at present. More research is needed to explore

minor OIs within the context of major OIs, or without the embeddedness of major OIs. Perhaps,

this research needs to be linked with more general families of social change as the ones sugg

12

Harvie (2002) suggests that several OIs are required to take place in TVEs in order for the
their important role in the Chinese economic development (e.g. enhancing business alliances, management
control, etc).
13
Individual company studies such as the one produced by Fujimoto (1999) are needed to bring more
evidence on the issues discussed in this thesis, especially in relation to the functioning and measurement of
the POFOs, and in relation to the complexity of an open evolving system of innovations and growth such as
that presented in Chapter five.
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by Ven de Ven and Poole (1995), according to whom there are four such ideal families: life c
evolution, dialectic, and teleology.

Thirteenth, although a substantial econometric analysis was carried out in Chapter seven in
to provide evidence of the impact of JIT/QC on industrial growth, other methods and more
quantification are possible. For example, the seemingly unrelated regressions (SURE) models
could be used to evaluate the exact interdependence of manufacturing sectors.

Fourteenth, in this study emphasis was given to the private sector of the economy. However,

relationship between OIs and the policies of states and governments can also be analyzed in

same way, since the non-private sector is an organizational system as well, and is specifica
related to the institutional character of such system. Thus, Acharya and Chaudhri (2001, p.

their study of policy strategies in Indian agriculture, say, "...An institutional mechanism

be put in place which enables producers or farmers corporate type management to come up for

production, marketing and development of waste lands..." In addition there is interplay betw

the private and the non-private sectors of the economy. In this respect, Chaudhri and Wilson

(2001), in their study of the Indian agricultural growth, employment and poverty, concluded:

"...State level factors like institutions, governance, implementation of laws on the statute
that favor the underdogs (for example minimum wage laws implementation in Kerala) and the

attitude to a development strategy that pays as much attention to growth as to equity needs
research..." (Ibid, p. 642).

Fifteenth, although empirical evidence in this study showed that it is possible to transpla
such as JTT/QC, from the country of origin to another country, more theoretical analysis of

transplant as provided by other researchers like Kenney and Florida (1993), Womack and Jones

(1996), Liker et al (1999) is needed. The validation of the empirical evidence would be enha
if these latter references were explored in more detail.
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8.4 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMMENDATIONS
Once the importance of the appropriate OIs to be implemented in a new firm, or industry, or
country in order to achieve higher growth rates in productivity and hence industrial growth is

recognized, there are many implications in terms of industrial policy or strategy, or scholarly

research. Thus, it is interesting to note that now in the USA, scholars have started talking ab

'end of inventories'; for instance, Oliver (1999) suggested a new acronym to replace JTT, namel
JAZ, or just-about-zero. Also, the recent American imitation of the LPS has now produced the
increasing awareness that smaller and more focused factories are more efficient (Elmore et al,

1995), thus recognizing the value of the focal Japanese factories, which were extensively analy
in previous chapters (though these authors do not seem to be aware of Fruin's work). The

recognition of OIs as an engine of economic growth, not only for firms but also for sectors and

whole economies, is well linked with a multidisciplinary approach to the complicated process of
economic growth. Thus, as this thesis has demonstrated, we need economics (which attempts to
explain economic growth), as well as management (which attempts to explain organization of
firms), and in particular operations management (to elucidate the operations part of a firm),
accounting (to properly record costs), sociology and biology (to enhance the understanding of

systems), physics (to clarify the concept of entropy), operations research for relevant techniq
mainly applicable to the POM, and so on14.

The importance of OIs (as defined and explored in this thesis) in respect with economic growth
needs to be put into a larger perspective, like the one presented in Chapter five, in order to
properly appreciate it. The core of OIs, the five POFOs, and in particular the POM, properly

function in the context of sectoral and innovation systems, of system emergence and evolutionar
learning capability, and so on. Thus, economic growth is far from being only the quantities of

capital, labor, and TIs, or knowledge, learning, and education, as many books in economics woul

14

There are other sub-categories of disciplines that can be part of two main ^ ^ a n ^ * ™ ^ °
involved in this study. For example the theory of entrepreneurship (part of both economics and
management), not directly treated here, but is present in many areas of analysis. Thus, the evidence provided
here about the significant impact of OIs in promoting economic growth can be used as an indirect evidence
for the role of entrepreneurs as well. More specifically, the measurement of OIs can be an mcuiecx
measurement of entrepreneurship.
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have suggested. Economic growth is a complex process involving various layers of systemic

energy, including OIs, the internal system of firms represented by the fundamental POFOs withi

the context of sectoral and innovations systems, as well as evolutionary learning capability,
on. This complexity has a significant impact on policy issues. Within the framework of the SI
approach, "...innovation policy-making itself should be explicitly viewed as a process of

learning..." (Edquist, et al, 2000, p. 537). Such learning becomes even more critical in the c
new TIs that involve mechanisms of transition: "...Here, the relevant capabilities (which are

usually not only technical but also organizational) may lie quite outside the existing structu
firms' competences. What we might call transition problems are thus likely to occur, possibly

motivating public policies..." (Ibid, p. 540)15 Also, public policy is needed to generate appro

institutional frameworks, especially in relation to corporate governance so that strategic de

making processes for the allocation of corporate resources and returns are encouraged (Ibid, p

549). This public policy can be directed towards encouraging all types of organizations to int
with each other in order to adopt specific innovations (TIs, OIs, and others).

In addition, the importance of OIs has another dimension. It is implied in this analysis that

technology (and its impact on growth) is not just TIs, or TIs and OIs. It is implied that it

to consider the OIs as independently affecting industrial growth, and in many cases TIs becomi

the handmaiden of OIs. This increased role assigned to OIs should be considered as an importan

tool of public (government) and private (firms) policy regarding the adoption of new technolog

Should the latter be just the latest state of the art in equipment and machinery? Or, should i

latest state of the art in new ways of organizing the production process and its relation with
firms? Or, should it be a combination of the two? According to the analysis presented in this
TIs without the appropriate OIs are doomed to fail, whereas the other way around is not
necessarily true. In addition, a growth policy should encourage firms to elaborate on their

organizational capabilities, in terms of the elements of the five POFOs, and their impact on m

OIs such as JTT/QC. Thus, TIs are not necessarily the universal solution to all problems of gr

15

Edquist, et al, (2000) propose several concrete cases where public policy is needed. Howev
analysis is predominantly Tls-oriented, though they explicitly recognize the implications of OIs. Here, only
some of the latter are mentioned.
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The government, in particular, should be involved in assisting in the smooth functioning of

sectoral and innovation systems as defined in Chapter five. Furthermore, an eventual adoption o

the five POFOs could have repercussions on the prevailing accounting rules: costs should measur
changes in each of the five POFOs so that firms can have a direct knowledge of their
organizational operations16.

Finally, the evidence provided in the last two chapters has shown that it is possible to implem

OIs in a different country from the one in which they originated. The transplantation of OIs mi

take a long time to be effective, but it is possible. The implication of this conclusion is tha
governments, managers, entrepreneurs, and scholars ought not to waste time in debating whether
this transplantation is feasible or not. Because there is strong evidence that it is. However,
shown in this study, it takes many years for individual firms to adopt a major system such as
JTT/QC and many more years before sectors and the whole economy adopt it. In addition, the

tendency for globalization makes it easier to imitate TIs than OIs. As Nelson and Wright (1992,
1962) argue: "...the advanced nations of the world have come to share a common technology..."
Consequently, it becomes imperative that policy by firms and government should encourage the

generation and introduction of OIs (minor or major) which are more difficult to imitate and off
more possibilities for growth, including the development of new TIs.

8.5 EPILOGUE

In most of this thesis the analysis and synthesis17 of appropriate topics have aimed at achievi

two main targets: first, to increase awareness that a systematic exploration of OIs is necessar
economic thinking in order to dig deeper into the complex process of economic growth. This

exploration has methodically identified, defined, and categorized OIs so that this process beco

clearer. The distinction between OIs, TIs, and other types of innovations is shown to be necess

in economic research in order to explore the well-recognized benefits of technology in promotin

16

This suggestion hints at the multidisciplinary approach of this study. Accounting should be
to what the internal structure of a firm is, which should be the common ground for management and
economics as well.
17
More emphasis has been given to synthesis in several parts due to the nature of the topic.
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and sustaining economic growth. The new concepts introduced, analyzed, and synthesized in th

theoretical parts of this study, namely the three axes of OIs, the five fundamental firm op
(POFOs), in particular the process of movements (POM), and the atomic/systemic model of

economic growth have assisted in reaching the target of recognizing the role of OIs in gener

economic growth. Thus, the traditional production function and its extensions, according to

output depends only on physical capital, labor, human capital, knowledge, and TIs is not su
to explain overall economic growth. We must also include the internal organization of firms

five POFOs, and in particular the POM) and their links with other organizations and agents (

three axes of OIs, sectoral and innovation systems, and overall evolutionary learning capab
as demonstrated in this study. In particular, the relationship between OIs, the POM and the

traditional production function can be seen in the following overall conclusion. No product
possible unless the POM is operational18. The other POFOs (POS, POW, POP, and POC) do not

produce anything unless the POM is present. However, the POM on itself is static as it needs

other POFOs to become dynamic, changing, and evolutionary. The POM is at the core of the mai
axis, which in turn is at the core of the three axes, which in turn constitute all OIs (see
Figures 5.10 and 5.11).

The second target to reach was to bring some quantitative evidence that OIs generated indust

growth in the two countries explored in this thesis. Sectoral analysis, used in various ways

demonstrated that OIs play a substantial part in this growth. In particular, the major OI of

JTT/QC system has been a significant force in sustaining industrial growth in the USA during
last 20 years or so19, as the thorough econometric study conducted here has demonstrated.

18

If, for example, we put in place five machines, ten tools, and six people- into a building- the output
produced will be zero unless these machines, tools, and people move around the building, or generally they
produce kinetic energy in order to carry out specific tasks according to their organized work. Ultimately
output depends on how all these machines, tools and people are organized and continually reorganized (in
terms of layout, timing, hierarchy, etc) according to initiatives, strategies, accumulated knowledge,
contracts, rules etc (all these elements are expressed in thefivePOFOs), and on the links between this
factory and the outside world.
19
The transfer of the LPS from Japan to the U S A took many years to be successfully implemented, as was
shown in this study. This transfer demonstrates that OIs can be imitated but it is a difficult task to achieve
especially on a sectoral or macroeconomic basis. O n the contrary, TIs are easier and faster to imitate,
especially under the umbrella of increasing globalization.
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APPENDIX 6.A2
Tests for unit roots and cointegration
for the sector "Non-ferrous metals"
A] Unit root tests for variable USA
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
31 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
Sample period from 1968 to 1998
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC
DF
ADF(l)
ADF(2)
ADF(3)
ADF(4)

-2.0274
-1.S705
-1.1805
-84227
-.71227

-108..4781
-108 .4724
-108 .1228
-107 .6555
-107 .4071

-110
-111
-112
-112
-113

.4781
.4724
.1228
.6555
.4071

-111
-113
-114
-116
-117

.9121
.6234
.9908
.2404
.7090

-110..9456
-112,.1735
-113..0577
-113 .8241
-114..8094

95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -2.9591
LL = Maximized log-likelihood AIC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian criterionHQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable USA
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
31 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
Sample period from 1968 to 1998
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC
DF
ADF(l)
ADF(2)
ADF(3)
ADF(4)

-3 .0186
-2 .8184
-2 .3285
-1 .9179
-1 .7177

-106..1405
-105 .8907
-105..8900
-105 .8690
-105 .8637

-109..1405
-109 .8907
-110 .8900
-111 .8690
-112..8637

-111..2915
-112 .7587
-114 .4750
-116 .1710
-117 .8826

-109..8417
-110 .8256
-112 .0586
-113 .2713
-114 .4997

95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.5615
LL = Maximized log-likelihood
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian CriterionHQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion

B] Unit root tests for variable JAP
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. Sample period
from 1966 to 1998
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC
DF -1.7628 -100.1977 -102.1977 -103.6942 -102.7012
ADF(l)
-1.7876
-100.0085
-103.0085
-105.2533
ADF(2)
-1.9259
-96.0344
-100.0344
-103.0274

-103.7638
-101.0415

95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -2.9528
LL = Maximized log-likelihood AIC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian CriterionHQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable JAP
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
33 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. Sample period
from 1966 to 1998
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC
DF
ADF(l)
ADF(2)

-2 .9427
-3 .4806
-2 .4837

-96 .9774
-95 .3083
-93 .6186

-99 .9774
-99 .3083
-98 .6186

-102 .2221
-102 .3013
-102 .3599

-100.7327
-100.3154
-99.8775
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95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.5514
LL = Maximized log-likelihood
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian CriterionHQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion

C] Unit root tests for variable JADUS
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
Sample period from 1967 to 1998
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC
DF
ADF(l)
ADF(2)
ADF(3)

-2 .4976
-2 .2933
-2 .1649
-1 .9885

-105
-104
-104
-103

.6847
.6291
.5057
.7160

-107.,6847
-107.,6291
-108..5057
-108 .7160

-109--1504
-109 .8277
-111 .4372
-112 .3803

-108 .170S
-108,.3579
-109 .4774
-109 .9306

95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -2.9558
LL = Maximized log-likelihood
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian CriterionHQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable JADUS
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.
Sample period from 1967 to 1998
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC
DF
ADF(l)
ADF(2)
ADF(3)

-3,.0638
-2 .3074
-2 .1433
-1 .4563

-103
-103
-103
-103

.2447
.1999
.08S2
.0516

-106
-107
-108
-109

.2447
.1999
.0852
.0516

-108..4433
-110 .1314
-111 .7495
-113 .4488

-106..9735
-108 .1716
-109 .2998
-110 .5091

95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.5562
LL = Maximized log-likelihood
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian CriterionHQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion

D] Unit root tests for variable DJADUS
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. Sample period
from 1967 to 1998
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC
-7 1986 -107.2957 -109.2957 -110.7615 -109.7816
SF(1)
-49865
-106.9819
-109.9819
-112.1805
ADF(2)
-4.7891
-105.9027
-109.9027
-112.8342

DF

-110.710
-110.8744

95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -2- 9558
LL = Maximized log-likelihood
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian CriterionHQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
Unit root tests for variable DJADUS
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
32 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. Sample period
from 1967 to 1998
Test Statistic LL AIC SBC HQC
DF -7-4789 -105.9851 -108.9851 -111-1837 -^°9-7129
ADFd)
-5.2220
-105.5991
-109.5991
-112.5305
SF(2)
-5-0663
-104.3061
-109.3061
-112.9705

""J.5708
-110.5208

95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.5562
= Maximized log-likelihood AIC = Akaike Information Criterion
LL
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SBC = Schwarz Bayesian CriterionHQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion

E]Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and no trends in the
VAR
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic
Matrix
35 observations from 1964 to 1998. Order of VAR = 1.
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector:
USA
JAP
List of eigenvalues in descending order:
.26229 .070828
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical Value 90% Critical value
12.9800
r = 0
r<= 1

r = 1
r = 2

10.6473
2.5712

14.8800
8.0700

6.5000

Use the above table to determine r (the number of cointegrating vectors).
Cointegration. with unrestricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR
Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix
35 observations from 1964 to 1998. Order of VAR = 1.
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector:
USA
JAP
List of eigenvalues in descending order:
.26229 .070828
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical Value 90W Critical Value
15.7500
r = 0
r<= 1

r>= 1
r = 2

13.2185
2.5712

17.8600
8.0700

6.5000

Use the above table to determine r (the number of cointegrating vectors).
Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR
Choice of the Number of Cointegrating Relations Using Model Selection Criteria
35 observations from 1964 to 1998. Order of VAR = 1.
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector:
USA
JAP
List of eigenvalues in descending order:
.26229
Rank
r = 0
r = 1
r = 2

.070828
Maximized LL
-225.5383
-220.2146
-218.9291

AIC
-227.5383
-225.2146
-224.9291

AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion

SBC
-229.0936
-229.1030
-229.5951

HQC
-228.0752
-226.5569
-226.5398

Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
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APPENDIX 6.A3
List of manufacturing sectors on a 3-digit basis with their code n u m b e r s
311 Food
313

Beverages

314

Tobacco

321

Textiles

322

Apparel

323

Leather

324

Footwear

331

W o o d products

332

Furniture

341

Paper products

342

Printing and publishing

351

Industrial chemicals

352

Other chemicals

353

Petroleum refineries

354

Miscellaneous petroleum and coal

355

Rubber

356

Plastics

361

Pottery and china

362

Glass products

369

Other non-metallic minerals

371

Iron and steel

372

Non-Ferrous metals

381

Fabricated metals

382

Machinery (not electric)

383

Electric and electronic machinery

384

Transport equipment

385

Scientific equipment

390

Other
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APPENDIX 7.A1:
SIC YEAR
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

EMP

Initial NBER Table of manufacturing sectoral data for the USA, 1958 to 1997

PAY PRODE PRODH

PRODW

VSHIP VIATCOST INVEST ENERGY INVENT

200.9
197.2
194.2
189.3
185.6
180.9
182.7
179.8
173.4
170.6
168.5
166.8
163.6
160.9
157.5
149.4
159.2
160.1
156.7
146.2
147.3
146.5
142.9
135.3
134.9
126.4
124.9
122.2
119.0
113.9
117.8
117.5
118.4
120.8
122.4
124.4
119.5
125.8
130.0

1067.8
1101.0
1138.6
1143.2
1161.1
1146.4
1226.1
1210.1
1207.1
1258.7
1317.4
1380.4
1451.6
1503.3
1532.1
1534.7
1768.9
1918.4
2085.2
2110.6
2244.1
2419.6
2553.0
2585.7
2549.3
2401.2
2327.8
2252.9
2211.0
2162.4
2226.5
2225.7
2256.4
2374.6
2452.8
2541.6
2597.1
2898.1
2990.7

150.8
149.7
147.8
143.4
141.7
138.4
138.6
136.9
132.0
130.9
129.2
128.6
126.3
124.7
123.4
116.1
124.8
126.1
124.1
116.5
119.5
117.5
114.9
108.4
108.9
102.4
102.0
98.7
96.0
93.9
97.8
98.4
100.1
103.3
105.5
107.3
102.2
107.9
110.7

309.1
312.5
312.7
302.8
298.0
289.2
310.0
285.8
278.1
274.3
271.6
267.6
266.5
260.6
254.4
240.1
260.7
257.1
257.0
237.2
243.3
241.3
238.8
225.1
220.2
213.8
211.2
201.4
200.4
197.6
205.4
209.0
210.9
220.4
228.5
232.0
228.0
243.1
250.8

767.7
796.9
826.2
827.4
844.6
846.3
901.9
882.4
879.7
920.8
992.1
1016.0
1076.3
1120.9
1148.4
1147.0
1341.4
1468.0
1608.6
1625.9
1747.6
1887.4
1984.4
2014.5
1995.9
1838.0
1765.5
1708.1
1661.5
1634.7
1703.8
1706.2
1742.9
1833.6
1956.6
2003.7
2082.7
2322.4
2332.8

11950.7
11788.4
11806.2
11916.8
12468.3
12412.6
12950.8
13882.5
15011.8
15553.7
16260.9
17940.2
18408.1
18802.4
23003.4
27311.5
28834.6
31341.8
32392.6
31208.2
38198.7
43191.3
42962.0
44570.0
44853.6
42774.6
44277.7
42553.5
42384.5
45536.6
47333.2
46542.0
51069.2
49326.2
50434.4
53240.3
50443.7
51314.4
51088.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

2088.1
2027.4
2030.0
2070.1
2156.8
2153.2
2319.1
2349.8
2531.4

1657.2
1560.2
1561.0
1601.9
1659.7
1592.3
1722.6
1749.1
1918.8

17.2
14.1
20.1
17.4
19.4
21.4
29.7
51.2
33.2

11.3
11.1
10.8
10.6
10.3
12.4
13.6
14.7
16.0

115.3
107.1
103.8
94.8
99.4
96.9
101.8
110.0
119.7

48.7
49.6
48.5
46.6
47.0
48.6
50.9
49.0
48.4

237.9
248.8
255.6
258.1
269.0
289.9
314.9
308.2
316.9

36.6
38.3
38.4
36.5
36.6
36.4
38.0
36.6
35.6

74.3
76.8
77.0
73.2
73.5
76.1
81.6
75.4
74.7

162.7
169.9
174.7
172.1
180.8
195.9
213.6
205.8
208.9

10230.1
9939.1
9890.8
10047.3
10508.8
10507.3
10835.9
11852.1
13015.1
13329.5
13845.7
15510.2
15711.1
15785.4
20120.1
24073.3
25090.7
27225.6
27977.0
27239.1
33963.5
38073.1
37762.5
39235.8
39048.6
37507.7
38738.3
36637.2
36680.2
40302.9
41700.6
41122.4
44462.7
43311.9
43586.4
45735.8
42045.7
42456.7
42762.6

65.9
67.4
77.2
75.4
90.8
80.2
94.8
101.4
104.2
109.4
109.4
135.6
154.4
162.4
167.7
182.2
216.0
248.4
210.6
236.7
230.9
234.8
299.7
330.3
290.0
278.0
273.4
249.9
258.9
246.1
272.0
365.8
393.7
423.0
343.2
289.8
328.6
440.9
590.0

47.9
49.4
50.9
52.4
53.9
58.8
61.5
64.2
67.0
69.8
72.7
75.7
78.7
81.8
75.5
79.8
111.6
143.6
152.9
171.5
193.7
225.0
261.1
280.2
321.7
346.0
347.2
326.0
293.4
253.1
276.5
253.7
270.9
257.1
251.5
263.9
264.7
263.4
280.8

408.1
370.1
381.6
395.3
411.1
407.8
415.9
435.6
451.2
478.0
512.3
524.2
460.9
494.4
555.9
681.7
662.3
741.8
676.8
700.1
892.5
964.6
996.5
908.8
891.6
940.8
932.3
856.0
830.9
832.2
931.1
929.0
995.2
949.2
1054.3
1182.7
1104.0
1178.6
1125.9
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Appendix 7.A1: cont.
VADD

CAP

EQUIP PLANT PISHIP PIMAT PIINV

PIEN

DTFP5

1748.6 3575.5 1690.8 1884.7
1833.2 3717.8 1750.7 1967.1
1910.7 3883.3 1827.4 2055.9
1889.2 4023.8 1892.9 2130.9
1986.1 4211.6 1961.8 2249.8
1909.0 4422.2 2062.7 2359.5
2128.1 4554.8 2122.6 2432.2
2057.2 4812.1 2246.4 2565.7
2022.5 4960.5 2341.3 2619.2
2222.9 5168.8 2425.9 2742.9
2445.8 5267.5 2471.8 2795.7
2451.6 5516.4 2568.7 2947.7
2668.7 5759.5 2670.5 3089.0
3046.0 5943.4 2761.8 3181.6
2968.1 6165.4 2870.2 3295.2
3954.7 6344.7 2975.2 3369.5
3680.6 6619.3 3146.3 3473.0
4190.6 6798.6 3275.8 3522.8
4350.7 6981.9 3384.8 3597.1
4010.1 7147.4 3506.0 3641.4
4411.1 7224.3 3546.7 3677.6
5156.1 7225.5 3550.9 3674.6
5260.4 7266.5 3586.8 3679.7
5292.3 7315.7 3611.2 3704.5
5824.6 7337.9 3641.7 3696.2
5327.1 7248.5 3587.7 3660.8
5527.9 7190.7 3562.3 3628.4
5859.4 7175.9 3543.3 3632.6
5692.8 7125.1 3523.0 3602.1
5266.9 7012.7 3459.9 3552.8
5700.1 6956.4 3438.4 3518.0
5457.0 6910.1 3420.5 3489.6
6666.5 6955.9 3457.8 3498.1
5957.6 7012.0 3513.2 3498.8
6928.0 7081.6 3566.7 3514.9
7634.2 7061.7 3588.6 3473.1
8350.0 6991.0 3558.1 3432.9
8909.4 6945.9 3539.6 3406.3
8278.4 6992.1 3582.4 3409.7
0.0 7158.2 3697.6 3460.6

0.40
0.37
0.36
0.36
0.37
0.34
0.34
0.38
0.41
0.39
0.39
0.44
0.45
0.45
0.51
0.65
0.64
0.74
0.67
0.68
0.83
0.94
0.93
0.93
0.96
0.93
0.96
0.91
0.92
1.00
1.02
1.09
1.20
1.15
1.09
1.13
1.07
1.05
1.10
1.12

0.34
0.32
0.33
0.32
0.33
0.32
0.31
0.35
0.38
0.36
0.38
0.42
0.42
0.42
0.49
0.64
0.59
0.65
0.61
0.61
0.81
0.97
0.93
0.91
0.95
0.90
0.92
0.87
0.89
1.00
1.01
1.05
1.16
1.12
1.06
1.10
1.00
0.96
0.98
1.03

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.26
0.26
0.26
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.30
0.32
0.34
0.36
0.37
0.39
0.43
0.50
0.53
0.57
0.62
0.68
0.75
0.83
0.87
0.89
0.90
0.92
0.96
1.00
1.04
1.08
1.12
1.15
1.17
1.19
1.22
1.26
1.28
0.00

0.21
0.21
0.22
0.21
0.22
0.22
0.21
0.21
0.21
0.21
0.20
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.25
0.26
0.34
0.45
0.52
0.60
0.67
0.76
0.90
1.00
1.09
1.13
1.15
1.13
1.05
1.00
0.99
1.03
1.07
1.09
1.09
1.12
1.09
1.07
1.17
0.00

0.00
0.03
0.05
-0.02
0.00
0.03
0.01
-0.02
0.00
0.03
0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.10
0.01
0.01
-0.04
-0.05
0.05
-0.02
0.05
0.06
-0.02
-0.01
0.02
-0.02
-0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.00
-0.04
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.05
0.00

500.7
522.1
538.8
558.2
585.6
606.2
626.1
668.3
720.0

0.37
0.35
0.34
0.35
0.34
0.32
0.32
0.37
0.41

0.37
0.35
0.34
0.34
0.35
0.33
0.32
0.35
0.38

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.26
0.26
0.26
0.27
0.28

0.24
0.24
0.25
0.24
0.25
0.25
0.24
0.24
0.24

0.00
0.05
0.01
-0.02
0.04
0.04
0.01
-0.08
-0.07

442.8
462.2
462.6
459.4
493.6
562.7
596.7
606.5
623.4

939.2
976.4
1005.4
1042.4
1082.9
1121.5
1159.5
1246.5
1378.0

438.5
454.3
466.6
484.2
497.3
515.3
533.4
578.2
658.0

.continues for 459 manufacturing sectors
(Source: N B E R , 2000)

TFP5
0.84
0.87
0.92
0.90
0.90
0.93
0.94
0.93
0.93
0.95
0.98
0.96
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.97
0.93
0.88
0.93
0.91
0.96
1.02
0.99
0.98
1.00
0.98
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
1.00
0.96
0.98
0.98
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.94
0.00
0.86
0.91
0.91
0.89
0.92
0.96
0.97
0.89
0.83

DTFP4

TFP4

TFP*

0.00
0.03
0.05
-0.02
0.00
0.03
0.01
-0.02
0.00
0.03
0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.10
0.01
0.01
-0.04
-0.05
0.05
-0.02
0.05
0.06
-0.02
-0.01
0.02
-0.02
-0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.00
-0.04
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.05
-0.005
0.00

0.84
0.87
0.92
0.90
0.90
0.93
0.94
0.93
0.93
0.95
0.98
0.95
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.97
0.93
0.88
0.93
0.91
0.96
1.02
0.99
0.98
1.00
0.98
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
1.00
0.96
0.98
0.98
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.94

0.05
-0.02
0.00
0.03
0.01
-0.02
0.00
0.03
0.03
-0.03
-0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
-0.04
-0.05
0.05
-0.02
0.05
0.06
-0.02
-0.01
0.02
-0.02
-0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.00
-0.04
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.04

0.05
0.01
-0.02
0.04
0.04
0.01
-0.08
-0.07

0.91
0.91
0.89
0.92
0.96
0.97
0.89
0.83

0.0

0.86
0.05
0.01
-0.02
0.04
0.04
0.01
-0.09
-0.07

Appendix 7.A1: cont... Notes on the Table
## The titles of each column have the following meaning:
Standard Industrial classification (4-digit manufacturing)
Year
ranges from 58 to 97
year
Total employemet in 1000s
emp
Total payroll in $1,000,000
pay
Production workers in 1000s
prode
Production worker hours in 1,000,000
prodh
Production worker wages in $1,000,000
prodw
Total value of shipments in $1,000,000
vship
matcost Total cost of materials in $1,000,000
Total value added in $1,000,000
vadd
Total capital expenditure in $1,000,000
invest
End-of-year inventories in $1,000,000
invent
energy Cost of electric and fuels in $1,000,000
Total real capital stock in $1,000,000
cap
Real capital: equipment in $1,000,000
equip
Real capital: structures in $1,000,000
plant
Deflator for vship 1987=1.000
piship
Deflator for matcost 1987=1.000
pimat
Deflator for invest 1987=1.000
piinv
Deflator for energy 1987=1.000
pien
5-factor T F P annual growth rate
dtfp5
5-factorTFP index 1987=1.000
tfp5
4-factor T F P annual growth rate
drfp4
4-factorTFP index 1987=1.000
tfp4

SIC

## The TFP* column (last on the Table) shows the T F P series as estimated by the writer, based on
the formula as explained in chapter seven. It includes the inputs capital, labor, and material but it
excludes energy, whereas the T F P calculated by N B E R as shown in this Table includes the input
energy. The reason for excluding energy from all calculations of T F P in this thesis is that
it is desirable to have consistency throughout the quantitative work since s o m e data used in other
places do not include energy (e.g in U N I D O data). Note that TFP* as estimated by the writer
(thus excluding energy) and T F P as estimated by N B E R are virtually the s a m e since the energy
component is usually very small in the production process.
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A P P E N D I X 7.A2
Transformation of the 459-sector data to 85-sector and 28-sector data
For all non-index variables of the original 459-sector N B E R database, the transformation to the
two more aggregate tables was m a d e by simple addition of the relevant sectors.

For the index variables of the original 459-sector NBER database (that is, those concerning t
four deflator series), the transformation to the two more aggregate tables was m a d e by weightedaveraging the relevant sectors, using as weights the value in dollars of the related series (e.g. for
the deflator index of the shipment series, the value in dollars of the shipment series of the relevant
sectors was used as relative weights).

As an example of the aggregation procedure, the SIC industry No 201, "Meat products" (one of
the 85 sectors used in the analysis) is aggregated by considering the following three sub-sectors (in
the original 459- sector base):
2011:

"Meat packing plants"

2013:

"Sausages and other prepared meals"

2015:

"Poultry slaughtering and processing"

Note that in most cases, the 85 sectors were determined by simply aggregating the 4-digit data into
the 3-digit data according to the 1987 SIC list of industries, as the above example shows.
However, at times, the writer decided about the nature of the 85-sector industry according to the
principle of homogeneity of products; for instance, the SIC sectors 384 ("Medical instruments and
supplies") and 385 ("Ophthalmic goods") were aggregated into a n e w sector (for the list of the 85
sectors see A P P E N D I X 7.A4).

The source of the 1987 SIC Industry (459 sectors) list used by NBER and by the writer is avai
in the N B E R Internet site (see references).
The passage from the 85-sector base to the 28-sector base was m a d e by considering the following
points:
i)

T h e 28-sector base w a s determined by simply accepting the U N I D O data base

classification, which uses 28 sectors ( A P P E N D D C 6. A 3 shows the names and codes of these 28
sectors).
ii)

The correspondence between the 85 aggregated N B E R sectors and the U N I D O 28
sectors was not sometimes straightforward, but nonetheless satisfactory for the
purpose of the present analysis.

All the above tables and calculations (corresponding to hundreds of pages of printing space) are
available on request.
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A P P E N D I X 7.A3 1Basic data for the 28 ISIC sectors in the U S A
(expressed as % )
ISIC

For the period 64-76
x1
tfp
tfp

sector unido nber R Y
311

0.171

313

0.871

314
321

0.111
0.954

322

0.41

For the period 77-86
x2
x3
tfp tfp x1
deflati empl unido nber R Y

For the period 87-96
x2
x3
deflate i
;mpl

tfp

-0.23 2.331 6.404 -6.42 0.8071
0.47 -0.58 3.719 0.0316 0.1019
0.68 -0.91 4.421 1.0078 0.1791
0.43 -0.26 3.905 -0.095 0.5013
0.08 -1.26 6.62 2.4151 -0.661

1.877 1.52 1.17 1.16
353 0.009 -0.81 -3.712 10.68
354 -0.309 0.07 0.561 6.157
355
0.69 0.28 0.101 2.67
356 2.969 1.61 0.463 0.564 6.254

352

0.924
0.713
0.436

x2

0.51 0.003 4.657 0.662
0.5 0.635 4.029 1.266

x3

jeflato empl
1.0628
-1.791
-3.762
-1.055
-1.529
-2.542

0.465 1.7496 2.259 -6.73
4.84 1.9008
0.198 -1.24
-0.11 -2.246 2.845 1.0521
-0.14 -0.542 3.536 0.4847
-1.14 -1.065 4.08 1.0064
0.362 -1.172 3.84 -0.712
-0.88 -0.488 3.906 0.9414
-0.27 -0.422 1.821 -1.034
0.799 0.9436 2.185 -0.434

-1.85 1.3731
0.7419 -0.572
-1.734 0.6012
-0.516 0.2933
-2.096 2.1021 1.469 -2.164 0.603 1.3251
1.802 1.75 -0.72 3.148 4.0231 -0.027 1.349 -0.555 3.956 3.4208
2.69 -0.44 2.176 2.522 -3.11 -0.299 1.37 -1.717 5.791 3.3612
0.518 -0.35 0.36 4.835 -2.199 0.9397 1.89 -1.937 2.918 -0.107
1.49 0.52 -0.92 4.07 -0.962 1.3084 1.551 -0.823 2.766 0.8151
0.217 -0.04 -0.84 3.876 -6.291 2.1524 1.897 -1.095 2.542 -0.657
-0.14 0.28 -0.54 4.126 -1.134 1.0959 0.382 -2.574 3.991 0.7448

0.98 0.737 1.609
-0.24
-1.11 4.454
1.8090.906
-1.12-0.44 1.81 3.957 6.616
1.81 -1.13 -0.92 -0.02 9.578
-1 2.178
0.504 2.308 1.04

362
369

x1
IRY

0.31 -0.344 4.753 -0.6 1.283 0.91 -1.37 2.56 -0.712 0.3454 0.058 0.0096 2.626
1.97 -2.305 3.47 0.0111.228 0.98 -2.28 4.888 -1.689 1.2977 1.706 0.1199 2.394
-3 -2.29 8.672 -3.288 1.639 0.853 -4.822 5.077
0.68 -1.826 3.837 -1.32 -1.13
0.84 -1.217 2.723 0.209 0.895 1.39 -0.97 4.23 -2.984 1.0694 1.28 -0.489 2.313
0.14 0.458 2.519 -0.420.658 0.96 0.142 4.818 -2.153 0.5092 0.941 -0.409 2.259
1.65 -0.66 4.799 -0.77 -0.86 -2.28 3.051 4.586 -5.539 -0.503 1.608 -2.428 7.134

323 0.281
324 -0.566 -0.28 1.132 5.485 -2.66 -1.13
331 0.106 0.57 -1.048 6.169 0.443 0.914
332 0.423 0.51 1.192 3.68 1.6371.269
341 0.439 0.64 0.124 4.731 0.43 0.946
0.5 0.567 4.032 1.367 0.57
342 0.939
351 1.344 1.29 0.126 3.164 0.742 1.313

361

tfp

unido nber

0.52 0.359 4.413 -0.24
371 -0.144 -0.24 2.031 6.21 -0.06
372 -0.17 -0.26 1.527 5.464 1.184
381 0.389 0.13 0.641 4.182 1.5010.146 -0.17 -1.04
382
0.86 5.09 0.304 3.849 2.294 0.681 4.22 -0.69
383 1.469 2.11 0.465 1.975 1.1640.698 1.78 0.269
1.1 1.95 5.556 0.084 0.766 -0.26 1.739
384 0.313
385 0.863 1.16 1.874 3.913 1.576 -1.56 0.51 -1.13
390 0.951 1.24 1.181 2.947 0.48 0.29 -0.18 -0.31

4.669
3.348
4.803
4.497
7.47
4.921

-0.28 0.8392 0.65 -1.888 2.052 0.475
-3.8 -2.106 0.6882
-0.402 4.3662 2.381
-3.189 0.1545
-4.753
4.047
5.5879
1.5129
0.7243 0.2389 -0.09 -1.461 3.284 -1.818
1.85 7.021 -1.822
2.9777 0.3396 0.149
3.352 2.1202
-0.561
-2.179 0.7571 1.099

NOTES:
1) The unido tfp is based on unido data except the capital stock series which is borrowed
from the nber source.
2) The employment ("empl") series is based on the nber source, whereas the output
deflator ("deflator") series is based on the unido source (estimated as the ratio of
nominal output to real output).
3) The "IRY" series is the ratio of inventories to shipments (derived from the NBER base).
4) All series are expressed as annual growth rates.
5) For the names of the ISIC sectors see Appendix 6.A3.

APPENDIX 7.A4: The 85-sector data base, USA, from 1987 to 1996
annual average growth rate, in %
TFP
SIC Names
1

201 Meat products

0.360

2

202 Dairy products

-0.507

3
4

203 Preserved fruits and vegetables
204 Grain mill products

-0.109
-0.289

5
6

205 Bakery products
206 Sugar and confectionery products

-1.219
0.819

7

207 Fats and oils

8
9
10
11

208
209
21
221-224

Beverages
Miscellaneous food and kindred products
Tobacco products
Broadwoven fabric mills, cotton, m a n m a d e fiber and silk, wool, narrow fabric mills

0.195
1 -706
1070
0.853
1.310

12
13

225 Knitting mills
226 Textile finishing, except wool

1

14
15

227 Carpets and rugs
228 Yarn and thread mills

1

16
17
18

229 Miscellaneous textile goods
231+232 Men's and boys' suits and coats, and furnishings
233+234 Women's and misses' outerwear, W o m e n ' s and children's undergarments

19

235-237 Hats, caps, and millinery, girls' and children's outerwear, fur goods

20
21
22

238 Miscellaneous apparel and accessories
239 Miscellaneous fabricated textile products
241-243 Logging, sawmills and planning mills, milwork, plywood, and structural members

- 876
0.834
- 398

1012

°- 321
0.397
1.581
1 -524
1

- 689

°- 7 2 1
0.079

23

244+245+249 W o o d containers, wood buildings and mobile homes, miscellaneous wood products

0.503

24
25

251+252 Household furniture, office furniture
253+254+259 Public building and related furniture, positions and fixtures, miscellaneous furniture

-0.105
-0.200

26

261-263+265 Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills, paperboard containers and boxes

27
28
29
30
31

267 Miscellaneous converted paper products
271-275 Newpapers, Periodicals, Books, Miscellaneous publishing, Commercial printing
276-279 Manifold business forms, Greeting cards, Blankbooks and bookbinding, Printing tra
281 Industrial inorganic chemicals
282 Plastics materials and synthetics

32
33

283 Drugs
284+285 Soaps, cleaners, and toilet goods, Paints and allied products

34

286+287 Industrial organic chemicals, Agricultural chemicals

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

289 Miscellaneous chemical products
291 Petroleum refining
295+299 Asphalt paving and roofing materials, Miscellaneous pertroleum and coal products
301-2+305-6 Tires and inner tubes, Rubber and plastics footwear, Hose etc, Fabricated rubber
308 Miscellaneous plastics products, n.e.c
313+314 Footwear cut stock, Footwear except rubber
311 +315-7+319 Leather tanning and finishing, Leather gloves, Luggage, Handbags etc, Leather got
321 +322+323 Flat glass, Glass and glassware, Products of purchased glass

43

324+325 Cement, Structural clay products

44
45

326 Pottery and related products
327+328 Concreate, gypsum, and plaster products, Cut stone and stone products

46
47
48

329 Miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral products
331 +332 Blast furnace and basic steel products. Iron and steel foundries
333+334+335 Primary and Secondary nonferrous metals, Nonferrous rolling and drawing

49
50

336+339 Nonferrous foundries, Miscellaneous primary metal products
341+342+343 Metal cans and shipping containers, Cutlery, handtools, and hardware, Plumbing el

51
52

344 Fabricated structural metal products
345+346 Screw machine products, bolts, etc, Metal forgings and stampings

-0.236
-0.043
-1 192
-0.759
uo,

°-

°

464

0.445
0.184
•0.045
•0.274
0.799
1.469
1.349
0.465
1.608
1.890
1.939
1.370
1.532
1.158
1.897
0.180
1.195
0.800
0 695
1 -094

346

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

347+348 Metal services, n.e.c, Ordnance and accessories, n.e.c.
349 Miscellaneous fabricated metal products
351 Engines and turbines
352 Farm and garden machinery
353 Construction and related machinery
354 Metalworking machinery
355 Special industry machinery

-0.104
0.606
0.192
1.400
0.859
0.720

357 Computer and office equipment

1.778
0.424
9.624

358 Refrigeration and service machinery

0.878

356 General industrial machinery

359 Industrial machinery, n.e.c.
361+362 Electric distribution equipment, Electrical indutrial apparatus

1.666
1.024

363 Household appliances
364 Electric lighting and wiring equipment
365+366 Household audio and video equipment, Communicaitons equipment

1.112
0.369
2.422
9.912

367 Electronic components and accessories
369 Miscellaneous electrical equipment and supplies
371 Motor vehicles and equipment
372 Aircraft and parts
373 Ship and boat building and repairing
374 Railroad equipment
375 Motorcycles, bicycles, and parts
376 Guided missiles, space vehicles, parts
379 Miscellaneous transportaion equipment
381+382 Search and navigation equipment, Measuring and controlling devices
384+385 Medical instruments and supplies, Ophthalmic goods
386 Photographic equipment and supplies
387 Watches, clocks, watchcases, and parts
391 Jewelry, silverware, and plated ware
393
394
395
396+399

Musical instruments
Toys and sporting goods
Pens, pencils, office, and art supplies
Costume jewelry and notions, Miscellaneous manufactures

Source: T h e calculations of T F P and IRY (ratio of inventories to shipments) is based
on the initial N B E R data base.

0.683
0.385
-1.133
-0.308
1.624
1.914
-2.734
0.752
-0.120
0.439
0.225
-1.253
0.699
-0.136
1.564
1.783
0.922

A P P E N D I X 7.A5:
Extract from the 420 data base used in sub-section 7.3.2.3 of
SIC
Year
tfp
IRY
sdle
imex sdmest meanle
82
311
0.0282 0.02598
3.98
0.64
2.75
71.66
83
311
0.0113 0.01056
3.98
0.64
2.75
71.66
84
311
0.0105 -0.0338
3.98
0.64
2.75
71.66
85
311
0.0059 -0.0314
3.98
0.64
2.75
71.66
86
311
-0.004 -0.0246
3.98
0.64
2.75
71.66
87
311
0.0201 0.00395
3.98
0.64
2.75
71.66
88
311
0.026 -0.0045
3.98
0.64
2.75
71.66
89
311
-0.03 -0.0098
3.98
0.64
2.75
71.66
90
311
-0.009 0.01063
3.98
0.64
71.66
2.75
91
311
-0.005 0.0055
3.98
0.64
2.75
71.66
92
311
0.0129 -0.0014
3.98
0.64
2.75
71.66
93
311
0.0065 -0.0105
3.98
0.64
2.75
71.66
94
311
-0.006 -0.0053
3.98
0.64
71.66
2.75
95
311
0.0149 0.02355
0.64
3.98
2.75
71.66
96
-0.024 -0.0118
311
71.66
0.64
3.98
2.75
82
312
0.0269 0.07677
2.97
9.64
65.72
5.40
83
-0.07
65.72
9.64
312
-0.003
2.97
5.40
84
65.72
9.64
312
0.002
-0.005
2.97
5.40
65.72
9.64
85
0.0106
0.01387
2.97
5.40
312
65.72
9.64
2.97
86
0.03 -0.0253
5.40
312
65.72
9.64
2.97
87
0.0349 -0.0848
5.40
312
65.72
9.64
2.97
5.40
0.0274 0.02018
88
312
65.72
9.64
2.97
5.40
89
-0.001 0.00453
312
65.72
2.97
9.64
-0.0134
5.40
0.0059
90
312
65.72
9.64
2.97
5.40
0.01 -0.0126
91
312
65.72
9.64
2.97
5.40
0.0292 0.02496
92
312
65.72
9.64
2.97
5.40
-3E-04 0.00303
93
312
65.72
9.64
2.97
5.40
0.043 -0.0265
94
312
65.72
9.64
2.97
5.40
0.04619
0.0049
95
312
65.72
9.64
2.97
5.40
0.017 0.04382
96
312
20.03 327.38
0.06
-0.06 0.14233 25.44
82
314
20.03 327.38
0.06
25.44
0.15001
-0.065
83
314
327.38
20.03
0.06
-0.043 -0.1156 25.44
84
314
0.06 20.03 327.38
-0.025 -0.1566 25.44
85
314
0.06 20.03 327.38
25.44
-0.06 -0.0803
86
314
20.03 327.38
0.06
-0.148 25.44
-0.012
87
314
0.06 20.03 327.38
-0.154 25.44
0.0249
88
314
20.03 327.38
0.06
-0.038 25.44
-0.04
89
314
20.03 327.38
0.06
0.0192 -0.0783 25.44
90
314
20.03 327.38
0.06
25.44
-0.034 -0.0089
91
314
20.03 327.38
0.06
-0.011 -0.0377 25.44
92
314
0.06 20.03 327.38
-0.136 0.17464 25.44
93
314
20.03 327.38
0.06
0.1888 -0.1406 25.44
94
314
etc...
NOTES:

Chapter 7
matshi D u m
-0.0251
-0.012
-0.0047
-0.031
-0.0266
-0.003
0.0059
0.0058
-0.0097
-0.0125
-0.0165
-0.0097
-0.0119
-0.0057
0.032
-0.0333
-0.031
0.0088
-0.0056
-0.0241
-0.0316
-0.0052
-0.0107
0.0072
-0.0189
-0.0239
-0.0074
-0.0133
0.0188
-0.016
-0.0779
-0.0938
-0.049
-0.068
-0.074
-0.0613
-0.1078
-0.0521
-0.0823
-0.0403
-0.0346
0.1593
-0.0093

etc...

1) T h e data on establishments were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the U S A ,
Bureau of the Census, various issues. T h e remaining data as per previous Appendices.
2) S e e section 7.3.2.3 of chapter 7 for definitions of variables.
3) T h e whole data base is available on request.

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
2

A P P E N D I X 7.A6:
Basic data for the U S A used
ISIC sector
Year
1961
311
1962
311
1963
311
1964
311
1965
311
1966
311
1967
311
1968
311
1969
311
1970
311
1971
311
1972
311
1973
311
1974
311
1975
311
1976
311
1977
311
1978
311
1979
311
1980
311
1981
311
1982
311
1983
311
1984
311
1985
311
1986
311
1987
311
1988
311
1989
311
1990
311
1991
311
1992
311
1993
311
1994
311
1995
311
1996
311
1961
312
1962
312
1963
312
1964
312
etc...

in sub-sections 7.3.2.4, 7.3.3, and 7.3.4, of chapter 7
IRY
PY
ML
KL
YL
UN
0.0269 0.0148 0.0461 0.045 0.0438 0.2019
0.0042 0.0059 0.0464 0.0662 0.0478 -0.187
0.0457 -7E-04 0.0163 0.0714 0.0196 0.0398
-0.021 -0.006 0.0384 0.0471 0.0419 -0.072
-0.069 0.0384 0.0463 0.0457 0.0415 -0.118
-0.003 0.068 0.0836 0.0459 0.0749 -0.158
0.0246 -0.028 0.0346 0.033 0.0426 0.0342
0.0387 0.0151 0.0383 0.0443 0.046 -0.055
-0.028 0.0522 0.0547 0.0188 0.0521 0.0053
-0.013 0.0414 0.0604 0.0606 0.0707 0.3683
0.0129 0.0172 0.0704 0.0573 0.0735 0.2034
0.14 0.0275 0.1122 -0.027
-0.064 0.0601
0.0317 0.2757 0.2102 0.0246 0.1796 -0.112
0.0535 0.135 0.1942 0.0355 0.1824 0.1665
-0.069 0.019 0.0531 0.0451 0.0701 0.4304
0.0486 -0.042 0.0355 0.0177 0.0449 -0.068
-0.019 0.0604 0.0631 0.028 0.0632 -0.058
-0.028 0.0781 0.0978 0.0068 0.094 -0.12
0.0192 0.0919 0.0832 0.013 0.0846 -0.011
0.0179 0.0563 0.0786 0.0243 0.0845 0.2187
0.08
-0.08 0.0291 0.0711 0.0322 0.0768
0.2552
0.0336
0.026 -0.013 0.0085 0.0258
0.0106 0.0242 0.0429 0.0352 0.0549 0.0036
-0.034 0.0344 0.0465 0.0107 0.0511 -0.227
-0.031 -0.038 -0.023 0.0252 0.0083 -0.027
-0.025 0.0146 -0.007 0.0112 0.0193 -0.009
0.0039 0.0198 0.028 -0.031 0.0309 -0.104
-0.004 0.0503 0.0588 0.0051 0.0529 -0.103
-0.01 0.0498 0.0445 0.0142 0.0387 -0.026
0.0106 0.0325 0.0329 0.0099 0.0426 0.0516
0.0055 -0.008 -0.014 0.0185 -0.001 0.2036
-0.001 0.0029 0.0084 -7E-04 0.025 0.1077
-0.01 0.0191 0.0215 0.0137 0.0313 -0.048
-0.005 0.0154 0.0056 0.0175 0.0175 -0.112
0.0235 0.0057 0.0231 0.0109 0.0288 -0.077
-0.012 0.054 0.0626 0.0282 0.0306 -0.023
0.1049 -4E-04 0.0526 -0.003 0.0399 0.2019
-0.036 0.0011 0.058 0.001 0.0575 -0.187
-0.036 0.0154 0.0563 -0.044 0.0809 0.0398
-0.037 0.0074 0.048 -0.019 0.0566 -0.072

PKPL
-0.029
-0.026
-0.009
-0.025
-5E-04
-0.008
-0.006
-0.01
0.001
-0.014
-0.008
-0.027
-0.029
0.022
0.054
-0.013
0.0103
0.008
0.0308
0.0222
0.015
-0.014
-0.027
-0.017
-0.022
0.021
0.0129
0.0126
0.0023
0.0023
-1E-03
-0.024
0.002
-0.003
0.0038
-0.009
-0.036
-0.037
-0.005
-0.024

etc..

NOTES:
. 0.
1) All data are growth rates(log first differences); interest ratesare in /o.
2) Table 7 13, in chapter 7 contains the definitions of all variables.
3 Variables IRY, PY, ML, KL, YL, and P K P L are derived from the N B E R data base.
The source for the variables U N and INT is Slavin, 1999.
4) The whole data base is available on request.

INT

4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.54
5.63
5.61

6.3
7.96
7.91
5.72
5.25
8.03
10.81
7.86
6.84
6.83
9.06
12.67
15.27
18.87
14.86
10.79
12.04
9.93
8.83
8.21
9.32
10.87
10.01
8.46
6.25

6
7.15
8.83
8.27

4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
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APPENDIX 7.A7 Stationary long-term coefficients and vectors V
Consider the system of equations (the variables are expressed as vectors, or matrices):
Xf — J\JC . ~r Of

=> Ax, = -(I - A)xt_l + e,

(I)

=> Axt = nxt_x + st

Now, suppose that matrix ;r has a full rank. Then, the solution to (I) is:
7tnXlt+7TnX2t+... +

7ruXnt=0

7T2lXu +7t22X2t+... + 7l2nXM = 0

(II)

This solution is the "long-term" solution. This means that the vector xt must be stationa

Now, (IT) can be transformed into an error correction form. As an illustration, one sing
will only be considered:

which after normalization becomes:
Ax,, =

s( x

X \t-x + SnX2t-X + - + SlnXn,-l) + £\t (2)

in which s is the speed of adjustment and the terms inside the brackets constitute the so-called
E C M . Equation (2) is derived from a V A R (1) model (only one lag is considered).
The coefficients of this E C M constitute a vector V:

V = (-l,sl2,s13,...,sj

(3)

This vector V or a matrix of such vectors if w e consider m a n y equations from (E) needs to be
determined. There are several methods to determine such vectors V (Maddala and In-Moo Kim,
1998, from p. 165 onwards):
•

Johansen's method, based on the partial canonical analysis (significant eigenvalues)

•

Box-Tiao method, based on the levels canonical correlation analysis.

•

A n n and Reisnel method, based on an algorithm of iterated least squares.

Note that the Johansen's and A h n and Reisnel's methods yield the same final results (Maddala and
In-Moo Kim, 1998, p. 168). In addition, .Ahn and Reisnel applied their method on both stationary
and non-stationary series in 1988 and in 1990 (Ibid).
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Once these vectors V are estimated, the coefficient 's' of the E C M can also be estimated via an
OLS.

Finally, note that if the matrix n has not a full rank, then the vectors Vs are obviously the
known cointegrating vectors.

In relation to Chapter seven results, equation (3) above is the vector V for each one of the

endogenous variables in Table 7.14. For example, for the VAR (2) model, the V representing YL
is: (-1, 0.45, 0.45, 0.36, -0.11, 0.0189, 0.1508, -0.0003, 0.0135). Although the FIML method
used to estimate this V vector (according to Johansen's procedure) does not specify which V
corresponds to which endogenous variable, some criteria are used (see sub-section 7.3.4) to

determine this correspondence. One of these criteria is the set of corresponding coefficient
estimation of OLS regressions (see Table 7.12). Thus, the OLS regression for YL provides the
coefficients shown in the following Table:
Coefficients

YL

ML

KL

PY

IRY

UN

PKPL

INT

Constant

Of the O L S

-1

0.62

0.042

0.187

-0.135

0.016

-0.221

0.00009

0.011

-1

0.45

0.45

0.36

-0.11

0.0189

0.1508

-0.0003

0.0135

regression
O f the vector

V

Once these vectors V are determined, as briefly just described, they are inserted in equations (2)

above (hence the dependent variable in (2) is dYL in this example) in order to estimate throu

OLS the coefficient V (the speed of adjustment) for the ECM representing YL (this 's' has the

value 0.64 in Table 7.15, third column, top left segment); the speed of adjustment of the oth
ECMs, and the coefficients of lagged variables dYLl=YL(-l)-YL(-2) (-2 means two lags), dMLl,
dKLl, dPYl, dIRYl, dUNl, dPKPLl, and dINTl. All these results for dYL in VAR (2), in other

VAR models and for the other dependent variables are shown in Table 7.15 of Chapter seven. Th
computer outputs using Microfit 4.0 (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997) are available on request.
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